Events—the experiences we think we are having and recall having had—are constructed; they are not what actually occurs. What occurs is ongoing dynamic, multidimensional, sensory flow, which is somehow transformed via psychological processes into structured, describable, memorable units of experience. But what is the nature of the redescription processes that fluently render dynamic sensory streams as event representations? How do such processes cope with the ubiquitous novelty and variability that characterize sensory experience? How are event‐rendering skills acquired and how do (...) event representations change with development? This review considers emerging answers to these questions, beginning with evidence that an implicit tendency to monitor predictability structure via statistical learning is key to event rendering. That is, one way that the experience of bounded events (e.g., actions within behavior, words within speech) arises is with the detection of “troughs” in sensory predictability. Interestingly, such troughs in predictability are often predictable; these regions of predictable‐unpredictability provide articulation points to demarcate one event from another in representations derived from the actual streaming information. In our information‐optimization account, a fluent event‐processor predicts such troughs and selectively attends to them—while suppressing attention to other regions—as sensory streams unfold. In this way, usage of attentional resources is optimized for efficient sampling of the most relevant, information‐rich portions of the unfolding flow of sensation. Such findings point to the development of event‐processing fluency—whether in action, language, or other domains—depending crucially on rapid and continual cognitive reorganization. As knowledge of predictability grows, attention is adaptively redeployed. Accordingly, event experiences undergo continuous alteration. (shrink)

Fitouchi et al.'s moral disciplining approach highlights the significant role social evaluations of self-control appear to play in human moral judgment. At the same time, attributing the wide range of puritanical concerns to a singular focus on self-control seems unwarranted. A more pluralistic approach would enrich understanding of moral judgment in all its cultural and historical diversity.

Osiurak and Reynaud highlight the critical role of technical-reasoning skills in the emergence of human cumulative technological culture, in contrast to previous accounts foregrounding social-reasoning skills as key to CTC. We question their analysis of the available evidence, yet for other reasons applaud the emphasis on causal understanding as central to the adaptive and collaborative dynamics of CTC.

Highlights the roles of intention and intentionality in social cognition.

Grossberg and VanDieren have started a program to develop a stability theory for tame classes. We name some variants of tameness and prove the following. Let K be an AEC with Löwenheim-Skolem number ≤κ. Assume that K satisfies the amalgamation property and is κ-weakly tame and Galois-stable in κ. Then K is Galois-stable in κ⁺ⁿ for all n<ω. With one further hypothesis we get a very strong conclusion in the countable case. Let K be an AEC satisfying the amalgamation property (...) and with Löwenheim-Skolem number ℵ₀ that is ω-local and ℵ₀-tame. If K is ℵ₀-Galois-stable then K is Galois-stable in all cardinalities. (shrink)

Political liberals assume an accessibility requirement, which means that, for ensuring civic respect and non-manipulation, public officials should offer accessible reasons during political advocacy. Recently, critics have offered two arguments to show that the accessibility requirement is unnecessary. The first is the pluralism argument: Given the pluralism in evaluative standards, when officials offer non-accessible reasons, they are not disrespectful because they may merely try to reveal their strongest reason. The second is the honesty argument: As long as officials honestly confess (...) their beliefs after offering non-accessible reasons, disrespect and non-manipulation do not occur. This paper defends the accessibility requirement and asserts that these two arguments overlook a unique feature of the political domain. While all citizens collectively own political power as a corporate body, an official does not privately own her political power. Instead, she is a trustee who has a duty to act on behalf of the corporate body, that is, she has to make decisions on grounds that are accessible to others. This duty explains why, despite pluralism, the accessibility requirement is necessary. Moreover, given that political decisions are profoundly influential to each person, requiring people to be honest is ineffective in discouraging disrespectful and manipulative acts. (shrink)

Clayton and Stevens argue that political liberals should engage with the religiously unreasonable by offering religious responses and showing that their religious views are mistaken, instead of refusing to engage with them. Yet they recognize that political liberals will face a dilemma due to such religious responses: either their responses will alienate certain reasonable citizens, or their engagements will appear disingenuous. Thus, there should be a division of justificatory labour. The duty of engagement should be delegated to religious citizens. In (...) this comment, I will argue that the division of justificatory labour is indefensible. This dilemma can be avoided if politicians and political philosophers correctly use conjecture, a form of discourse that involves non-public reason. As a conditional response, conjecture avoids alienating any reasonable citizens. Also, if conjecture is given in a sincere and open-minded manner, then the problem of disingenuousness can be overcome. My comment concludes that while the engagement of politicians and political philosophers does not necessarily jeopardize overlapping consensus, they should be permitted, or perhaps even required, to engage with the religiously unreasonable due to the natural duty of justice. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga’s externalist religious epistemology, which incorporates a proper function account of warrant, forms the basis for his standard and extended Aquinas/Calvin models. Respectively, these models show how it could be that Theistic Belief and Christian Belief could be warranted for believers in a properly basic manner. Christianity and Islam share fundamental theses that underlie the plausibility of Plantinga’s models: the Dependency Thesis, the Design Thesis, and the Immediacy Thesis. Accordingly, an Islamic worldview can endorse the truth of the standard (...) A/C model but recommend a uniquely Islamic extension. Thus, there are multiple viable extensions of the standard A/C model. That there are Multiple Viable Extensions of the standard A/C model grounds the Multiple Viable Extensions Objection (MVE): given the truth of the standard A/C model, it is more likely than not that a given extension of it is probably incorrect, thus those who accept some extension of the standard A/C model have a reason to think that model they affirm is incorrect. After considering the plausibility of second-order knowledge states and responding to objections, I conclude that because a uniquely Islamic extension of the standard A/C model advocates a limited second-order awareness condition on knowledge, it is plausible to think that an Islamic model of warrant (and its corresponding Islamic extension) suggests ways in which a satisfactory response to the MVE objection might be formulated. (shrink)

Most countries promote mass immunisation programmes. The varying policy details raise a raft of philosophical issues. I have two broad aims in this paper. First, I hope to begin to remedy a rather curious philosophical neglect of immunisation. With this in mind, I take a broad approach to the topic hoping to introduce rather than settle a range of philosophical issues. My second aim has two aspects: I argue that the states should have pro-immunisation policies, and I advance a view (...) of the subsequent and more specific question as to which sorts of pro-immunisation policies they should prefer. I use the immunisation policies of the United States and New Zealand to frame my discussion of these substantive questions. Immunisation is effectively compulsory in the United States. New Zealand, by contrast, requires evidence not of immunisation but of immunisation status upon school enrolment: New Zealand's policy effectively makes immunisation choice compulsory. I argue that, as between the pro-immunisation policies of the United States and New Zealand, the latter should be preferred. Though the threshold question as to whether states should have pro-immunisation policies should be answered affirmatively, the move to compulsory immunisation cannot be justified. (shrink)

Political liberals usually assume the coercion account, which argues that state actions should be publicly justified because they coerce citizens. Recently some critics object this account for it overlooks that some policies are non-coercive but still require public justification. My article argues that, instead of understanding coercion as particular laws or policies, it should be understood as the exercise of collective political power that shapes the basic structure. This revised coercion account explains why those ostensibly non-coercive policies are in fact (...) coercive. Moreover, I argue that the alternative accounts suggested by critics fail, unless they assume the revised coercion account. (shrink)

We introduce the notion T does not omit obstructions. If a stable theory does not admit obstructions then it does not have the finite cover property . For any theory T, form a new theory $T_{\rm Aut}$ by adding a new unary function symbol and axioms asserting it is an automorphism. The main result of the paper asserts the following: If T is a stable theory, T does not admit obstructions if and only if $T_{\rm Aut}$ has a model companion. (...) The proof involves some interesting new consequences of the nfcp. (shrink)

To have the burden of proof is to be rationally required to argue for or provide evidence for your position. To have a heavier burden than an opponent is to be rationally required to provide better evidence or better arguments than they are required to provide. Many commentators suggest that differential or uneven distribution of the burden of proof is ubiquitous. In reasoned discourse, the idea goes, it is almost always the case that one party must prove the claim at (...) issue to prevent the opposing view winning by default. The following passage is typical of the sort of thing one finds in critical thinking textbooks. (shrink)

In Public Reason Confucianism, Kim Sungmoon presents a perfectionist theory that is based on a partially comprehensive Confucian doctrine but is non-sectarian, since the doctrine is widely shared in East Asian societies. Despite its attractiveness, I argue that this project, unfortunately, fails because it is still vulnerable to the sectarian critique. The blurred distinction between partially and fully comprehensive doctrines will create a loophole problem. Sectarian laws and policies may gain legitimacy that they do not deserve. I further defend political (...) Confucianism, which is regarded by Kim as an inadequately intelligible form of Confucianism. Kim assumes a too narrow understanding of intelligibility. Although political Confucianism may not be politically intelligible, it is civically intelligible, i.e. it is culturally intelligibly different from other political theories in terms of its implications in citizens’ actions in civil society. In light of civic intelligibility, the distinctiveness of political Confucianism should not be underestimated. (shrink)

In “Sex selection and regulated hatred”1 John Harris launches a vehement critique of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s recent report Sex Selection: options for regulation, raising several issues that merit discussion.He begins by complaining about the recommendation that because of the theoretical risk associated with the use of flow cytometry as a method of sperm sorting, its use should be restricted for the moment to cases in which a clear medical benefit is to be gained from its use. Harris (...) objects that in this recommendation “an absurdly high standard of caution is employed”, since a theoretical risk is associated with almost all medical procedures. This objection is misplaced: as paragraph 142 of the report indicates, the phrase “theoretical risk” is to be understood here in the light of the earlier discussion of the risks arising from the fact that flow cytometry exposes sperm to laser energy, a procedure which is known to be liable to damage DNA. Since the application of flow cytometry to humans is a new procedure, the risk of human genetic defects caused this way is still only “theoretical”; nonetheless it is serious enough to warrant caution—hence the recommendation that at present flow cytometry should be available only when its use brings clear medical benefits. The HFEA has recently been criticised by some for not being cautious enough when permitting the use of intracytoplasmic sperm injection even though in that case there are clear medical benefits from its use. It is extraordinary that Harris should now criticise the HFEA for not throwing caution to the winds concerning flow cytometry.Harris’ next point concerns the justification for this suggestion that preimplantation sex selection should be available only where it is undertaken for medical reasons. The obvious way to justify this would appear …. (shrink)

This article examines why firms engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Specifically, it investigates the relationship between a firm's motivation to engage in CSR and the depth of its commitment. I propose that the enduring debate over CSR and financial performance is misaligned, and that scholars should instead focus on the underlying components of CSR engagement. This research sheds light on the motivational antecedents of a firm's engagement in CSR and their effect on CSR commitment. Despite calls for scientific investigation (...) of this linkage, it has received scant attention in the literature. Pursuing this area of research requires the construction of measures of CSR motivation and CSR commitment, as prior work generally lacks objective analysis. I present measures and a research methodology that test hypotheses about how CSR motivation relates to different levels of CSR commitment. The results of this research both validate and challenge current theory. This refined understanding of CSR engagement may enhance firm transparency and accountability to stakeholders. It may reduce the uncertainty in both internal and external assessments of firm CSR and the potential for social and financial impact. (shrink)

An interview exploring the complexity of contemporary French philosophical atheism, in the light of Difficult Atheism: Post-Theological Thinking in Badiou, Nancy and Meillassoux (Edinburgh UP, 2011).

Most countries promote mass immunisation programmes. The varying policy details raise a raft of philosophical issues. I have two broad aims in this paper. First, I hope to begin to remedy a rather curious philosophical neglect of immunisation. With this in mind, I take a broad approach to the topic hoping to introduce rather than settle a range of philosophical issues. My second aim has two aspects: I argue that the states should have pro‐immunisation policies, and I advance a view (...) on the subsequent and more specific question as to which sorts of pro‐immunisation policies they should prefer. I use the immunisation policies of the United States and New Zealand to frame my discussion of these substantive questions. Immunisation is effectively compulsory in the United States. New Zealand, by contrast, requires evidence not of immunisation but of immunisation status upon school enrolment: New Zealand's policy effectively makes immunisation choice compulsory. I argue that, as between the pro‐immunisation policies of the United States and New Zealand, the latter should be preferred. Though the threshold question as to whether states should have pro‐immunisation policies should be answered affirmatively, the move to compulsory immunisation cannot be justified. (shrink)

Contractualism is a normative theory which characterizes principles of right in terms of the idea of mutual respect. In this theory, mutual respect is regarded as having deliberative priority over other values. This essay aims to examine how contractualists can provide a satisfactory justification for prioritizing mutual respect. I will argue that the ‘value of mutual respect argument,’ which is a justification commonly adopted by contractualists, is inadequate because an unconditional priority of mutual respect cannot be grounded on the desirability (...) of a relationship of mutual respect. Then I will suggest that a ‘consistency argument’ can provide a better justification of why the idea of mutual respect should have priority. Mutual respect is of special importance, not because it is highly desirable, but rather because it is required by an a priori guiding principle of consistency. Individuals become inconsistent if they ask others to respect them as reason-assessing individuals, while at the same time refusing to respect others in the same way. (shrink)

Here reprinted from the 1902 Macmillan edition.

Psychology is the science of the mind. It aims to find out all about the mind--the whole story--just as the other sciences aim to find out all about the subjects of which they treat--astronomy, of the stars; geology, of the earth; physiology, of the body. And when we wish to trace out the story of the mind, as psychology has done it, we find that there are certain general truths with which we should first acquaint ourselves; truths which the science (...) has been a very long time finding out, but which we can now realize without a great deal of explanation. (shrink)

Where a man foresaw that through its consequences his action would violate a law, is he for that reason to be judged responsible for the violation of the law? The principle that such a man is responsible, and thus that foresight is sufficient for responsibility, has long been accepted in both legal and moral theory. But in recent years anxieties about this principle have been expressed by both philosophers and lawyers. What one commonly finds in older books, both legal and (...) ethical, is the thesis that foresight is proof of intention. Given that intention is sufficient for responsibility, this thesis has as consequence the principle that foresight is sufficient for responsibility, but it is only required by that principle if one wants to keep the view that intention is also necessary for responsibility in all cases where negligence is not involved. Miss Anscombe made the extraordinary suggestion that this thesis that foresight is proof of intention originates with Sidgwick, and she took him severely to task on this account; indeed, she even implied that Sidgwick's introduction of this thesis is the source of the shallowness of ‘modern’ moral philosophy. While it is true that Sidgwick did endorse this thesis, in a somewhat qualified manner, he was only following an established tradition of utilitarian thought to which the thesis belongs . Thus this thesis occurs in John Austin's 1828 lectures on Jurisprudence and the best early discussion of it is to be found in Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation . Bentham, it is true, introduces a distinction between ‘directly intentional consequences’ and ‘obliquely intentional consequences’ which we might describe as a distinction between consequences that are intended and those that are foreseen but not intended. But for Bentham, foresight is proof of intention, and thus for him obliquely intentional consequences are intended: ‘Advisedness with respect to the circumstances, if clear from the mis-supposal of any preventive circumstance, extends the intentionality from the act to its consequences’. (shrink)

The paper begins with a hypothetical story and asks: how should a Rawlsian political liberal state justify its coercion over Nozick, an unreasonable but intelligible citizen (UIC)? I use this thought experiment to illustrate a recent critique of political liberalism. It argues that political liberalism coerces UIC on a sectarian ground. Call it the sectarian critique. My paper addresses the sectarian critique from a political liberal perspective. I suggest a condition of state conjecture, which argues that the state officials should (...) use conjecture to engage with UIC, like Nozick. This brings two benefits to the stability of a political liberal society. First, UIC may be convinced and become reasonable citizens. Secondly, the activity of offering conjectures can strengthen the public confidence of political liberalism as a valuable collective project. Although, eventually, some UIC may remain unpersuaded and be coerced on grounds that are unjustified to them, the force of the sectarian critique will be significantly weakened after the condition of state conjecture is fulfilled. (shrink)