‘Feminist logic’ may sound like an impossible, incoherent, or irrelevant project, but it is none of these. We begin by delineating three categories into which projects in feminist logic might fall: philosophical logic, philosophy of logic, and pedagogy. We then defuse two distinct objections to the very idea of feminist logic: the irrelevance argument and the independence argument. Having done so, we turn to a particular kind of project in feminist philosophy of logic: Valerie Plumwood's feminist argument for a relevance (...) logic. Plumwood's work serves as our primary case study as we turn to the project of considering three different ways we might understand her argument and revisionist arguments like it: as a priori theorizing, as ameliorative conceptual engineering, or as instances of anti-exceptionalist approaches to logic. After arguing that the anti-exceptionalist approach seems to provide the most promising means of understanding the kind of project undertaken in a feminist challenge to classical logic, we briefly address the consequences that this might have for logic instruction. Here, we argue for the perhaps unexpected conclusion that feminist programs ought to offer more, not less, instruction in logic for those who take interest. (shrink)

Virtue signaling—using public moral discourse to enhance one’s moral reputation—is a familiar concept. But, what about profile pictures framed by “Vaccines work!”? Or memes posted to anti-vaccine groups echoing the group’s view that “Only sheep believe Big Pharma!”? These actions don’t express moral views—both claims are empirical (if imprecise). Nevertheless, they serve a similar purpose: to influence the judgments of their audience. But, where rainbow profiles guide their audience to view the agent as morally good, these acts guide their audience (...) to view the agent as epistemically good. They are instances of epistemic virtue signaling. The first goal of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic virtue signaling. I argue that epistemic virtue signaling occurs through both behavioral and propositional signals, and serves purposes similar to those of moral virtue signaling across a wide variety of discourses. The second is to show that there is much work for this concept to do. In particular, this concept illuminates a double bind faced by those who suffer from and seek to overcome testimonial injustice. I close by demonstrating how this double bind arises in the dissolution of medical autonomy, focusing on the care gap faced by pregnant women of color in the United States today, as compared with their white counterparts. (shrink)

The idea that our epistemic practices can be wrongful has been the core observation driving the growing literature on epistemic injustice, doxastic wronging, and moral encroachment. But, one element of our epistemic practice has been starkly absent from this discussion of epistemic morality: attention. The goal of this article is to show that attention is a worthwhile focus for epistemology, especially for the field of epistemic morality. After presenting a new dilemma for proponents of doxastic wronging, I show how focusing (...) on attention not only allows us to defuse that dilemma, but also helps to substantiate accounts of what goes wrong in cases of doxastic wronging. (shrink)

How does being a woman affect one’s epistemic life? What about being Black? Or queer? Standpoint theorists argue that such social positions can give rise to otherwise unavailable epistemic privilege. “Epistemic privilege” is a murky concept, however. Critics of standpoint theory argue that the view is offered without a clear explanation of how standpoints confer their benefits, what those benefits are, or why social positions are particularly apt to produce them. For this reason, many regard standpoint theory as being out (...) of step with epistemology more broadly. But this need not be so. This article articulates a minimal version of standpoint epistemology that avoids these criticisms and supports the normative goals of its feminist forerunners. This account serves as the foundation for developing a formal model in which to explore standpoint epistemology using neighborhood semantics for modal logic. (shrink)

Root, branch, and blossom, attention is intertwined with epistemology. It is essential to our capacity to learn and decisive of the evidence we obtain, it influences the intellectual connections we forge and those we remember, and it is the cognitive tool whereby we enact decisions about inquiry. Moreover, because it is both an epistemic practice and a site of agency, attention is a natural locus for questions about epistemic morality. This article surveys the emerging epistemology of attention, reviewing the existing (...) literature and sketching avenues for future investigation. It also argues for a reorientation of epistemology itself. This argument is the focus of Section 1. Section 2 briefly reviews philosophical accounts of attention, Section 3 focuses on issues in traditional, individualistic epistemology, and Section 4 turns to social epistemology. (shrink)

Since it was presented in 1963, Chisholm’s paradox has attracted constant attention in the deontic logic literature, but without the emergence of any definitive solution. We claim this is due to its having no single solution. The paradox actually presents many challenges to the formalization of deontic statements, including (1) context sensitivity of unconditional oughts, (2) formalizing conditional oughts, and (3) distinguishing generic from nongeneric oughts. Using the practical interpretation of ‘ought’ as a guideline, we propose a linguistically motivated logical (...) solution to each of these problems, and explain the relation of the solution to the problem of contrary-to-duty obligations. (shrink)

Idealization is a necessity. Stripping away levels of complexity makes questions tractable, focuses our attention, and lets us develop comprehensible, testable models. Applying such models, however, requires care and attention to how the idealizations incorporated into their development affect their predictions. In epistemology, we tend to focus on idealizations concerning individual agents' capacities, such as memory, mathematical ability, and so on, when addressing this concern. By contrast, this dissertation focuses on social idealizations, particularly those pertaining to salient social categories like (...) race, sex, and gender. In Chapter II, Privilege and Superiority, we begin with standpoint epistemology, one of the earliest efforts to grapple with the ways that social structures affect our epistemic lives. I argue that, if we interpret standpoint epistemologists' claims as hypotheses about the ways that our social positions affect access to evidence, we can fruitfully employ recent developments in evidence logic to study the consequences. I lay the groundwork for this project, developing a model based on neighborhood semantics for modal logic. Adapting this framework to standpoint epistemology helps to clarify the meaning of terms like "epistemic privilege" and "superior knowledge" and to elucidate the differences between various accounts of standpoint epistemology. I also address a longstanding criticism of these views: Longino's (1990) bias paradox, which suggests that there is no objective position from which to judge the goodness of a particular standpoint. Chapter III, Evidence in a Non-Ideal World, turns to the broader social context, looking at how ideology affects the availability of evidence. Throughout the chapter, I take the formation, justification, and maintenance of racist, sexist, and otherwise oppressive beliefs as a central case. I argue that these beliefs are, at least sometimes, formed as a result of evidential distortion, a structural feature of our epistemic contexts that skews readily available evidence in favor of dominant ideologies. Because they are formed this way, such beliefs will appear justified on prominent accounts of justification, both internalist and externalist. As a result, epistemic norms that fail to account for such non-ideal conditions will deliver verdicts that are not only counter-intuitive, but also morally unpalatable. This, I argue, reveals a kind of structural epistemic injustice, especially where oppressive ideology is involved and suggests the need for epistemic norms that are sensitive to agents' social contexts. Much of the discussion in Chapters II and III depends on social categories like race and gender, arguing that they have a distinctive influence on our epistemic lives. In Chapter IV, I Know You Are, But What Am I?, my co-author and I focus on social categories themselves, distinguishing between self-identity, social identity, and social role. We self-identify as gay or straight, men or women, couch-potatoes or gym rats. Sometimes, these identities affect our social roles---the way we are perceived and treated by others---and sometimes they do not. This relationship between our internal identities and our preferred public perceptions begs for explanation. On our account, this relationship is captured by what we refer to as 'social identity'---roughly, internal identities made available to others. We argue that this account of social identity plays an illuminating role in structural explanation of discrimination and individual behavior, dissolves puzzles surrounding the phenomenon of 'passing', and explains certain moral and political obligations toward individuals. (shrink)

What is the reality behind the famous phrase, in Demosthenes 2. 6? It is commonly spoken of as a secret treaty, pact, agreement, bargain, or understanding, or as a secret clause or article, between Athens and Philip II of Macedon, at some time between 359 and 357, whereby the Athenians promised to hand over their ally, Pydna, to Philip, in return for his promise to hand over Amphipolis to them.

What’s important about ‘coming out’? Why do we wear business suits or Star Trek pins? Part of the answer, we think, has to do with what we call agential identity. Social metaphysics has given us tools for understanding what it is to be socially positioned as a member of a particular group and what it means to self-identify with a group. But there is little exploration of the general relationship between self-identity and social position. We take up this exploration, developing (...) an account of agential identity—the self-identities we make available to others. Agential identities are the bridge between what we take ourselves to be and what others take us to be. Understanding agential identity not only fills an important gap in the literature, but also helps us explain politically important phenomena concerning discrimination, malicious identities, passing, and code-switching. These phenomena, we argue, cannot be understood solely in terms of self-identity or social position. (shrink)

The tragedy of heterosexuality is this: modern straightness dooms once-hopeful, loving couples to share dull, frustrating, and lonely lives together. After all, men are from Mars, women are from Venus, and what’s a heterosexual to do about it? Against this dismal state of affairs, Jane Ward’s The Tragedy of Heterosexuality offers a scholarly, empathetic intervention from the perspective of queer culture. Ward’s book reveals that the titular tragedy is rooted in the misogynistic ideology permeating straight culture, according to which women (...) are at once objects of desire and derision. In a culture animated by this antimony, women and men are very different creatures and, by the same token, they are bound to struggle... (shrink)

A partir de l'idée de “ folie ” chez S. Paul , Fr. Le Gal explore le thème de “ la folie sainte de Dieu ” qui n'est autre que la révélation de son amour fou pour l'homme. Examinant tout d'abord la polysémie du terme, sa réflexion porte en première partie sur Jésus-Christ comme “ homme de la dérision et Dieu à la folie ”, examinant au passage la parabole comme lieu de l' “ ironie christique ”. Dans la (...) seconde partie, c'est Paul qui révèle le contenu à la fois christologique, théologique et spirituel de la folie dans la tension entre la scandale de la croix et le risque pour l'apôtre et le croyant de n'être pas reçus. C'est pourtant là que se manifestera la “ folie sainte ”.Beginning with the idea of 'folly " in St. Paul , Fr Le Gal explores the theme of "the holy folly of God " that is nothing other than the revelation of his mad love for man. Examining first of all the polysemy of the term, his reflection in the first part is on Jesus Christ as "man of derision and God of folly ", examining in passing the parable as the area of "christic irony ". In the second part, it is Paul who reveals, at the same time, the christological, theological, and spiritual content of folly in the tension between the scandal of the cross and the risk for the apostle and the believer not to be accepted. It is there, nevertheless, that the "holy folly " manifests itself. (shrink)

Robert Hurley | : Éphésiens 2 décrit l’offre de salut aux nations comme ayant été rendue possible « par le sang de Christ » et « par la croix du Christ ». La recherche actuelle tient pour acquis que le salut des nations dépend d’une troisième condition, à savoir leur incorporation dans la cité d’Israël. Une étude des lecteurs implicites et de l’auteur implicite de la lettre mène à une conclusion différente. Ce que Dieu accomplit dans le Christ a (...) été ordonné avant la fondation du monde et a préséance sur toute revendication juive au privilège découlant des « alliances de la promesse ». Dans le Christ, Dieu abolit la Loi et fonde une nouvelle communauté de justice et de vérité. Les saints d’Éphèse y rejoignent les saints d’ailleurs dans le monde pour s’opposer à l’esprit à l’oeuvre dans l’Empire romain et aux fils de la désobéissance qui sont ses fidèles soutiens et alliés. | : Ephesians 2 describes the offer of salvation to the nations as having been made possible “by the blood of Christ” and “through the cross of Christ”. In current research, a third condition for the salvation of the nations is believed to be present. Researchers have taken for granted that pagans must first be incorporated into the commonwealth of Israel before they can be saved. A study of the implied readers and implied author of the letter points to other conclusions. What God is doing in Christ was ordained before the foundations of the world and thus supersedes any Jewish claims of privilege flowing from the historical “covenants of promise”. In Christ, God abolishes the Law and founds a new commonwealth of justice and truth, in which the saints at Ephesus join the saints everywhere in their opposition to the spirit at work in the Roman Empire and its supporters. (shrink)

Résumé Témoignage d’une collaboration au sein des musées et réflexion sur l’exposition à partir de « extraits » présentée au musée Sainte-Croix de Poitiers en 1989, d’après les saisons de nicolas poussin au musée des Beaux-Arts de Nancy en 2003 et 2004, et la peinture de claude rutault expose celle de Jean Gorin au musée des Beaux-Arts de Nantes en 2008.

À la mémoire de Michel Haar (1937-2003) Et de Dominique Janicaud (1937-2002) Alors que pendant des siècles, on s’est interrogé sur le mystère de la croix, de la résurrection et du jugement dernier, force est de reconnaître que ces questions, de nos jours, n’occupent plus guère les esprits. On en viendrait presque à se demander comment des chrétiens ont bien pu par le passé s’entretuer. Le Sacré-Cœur, La Sainte-Chapelle, Notre-Dame de Paris sont désormais des monuments historiques – « (...) les cave... (shrink)

Niccolò et Domenico Sandro, imprimeurs à Venise de 1505 à 1542, utilisèrent deux marques portant, l’une le monogramme trilittérale de Jésus, l’autre une figure représentant deux triangles appointés et sommée d’une croix. La première s’inspire des tablettes de saint Bernardin de Sienne, reprises par les Jésuates, pour lesquels les Sandro travaillèrent. La seconde, plus énigmatique, est susceptible de recevoir plusieurs interprétations : variation sur le chrisme, union des deux natures en Jésus, rencontre du cœur humain et de celui de (...) Jésus. (shrink)

Présentation d'un sceau de pain eucharistique trouvé en 1987, dans une couche de la 2e moitié du Ve s. ou des premières décennies du VIe s. ap. J.-C. Le sceau est circulaire (diam. 7,6 cm) et porte en son centre une croix de Malte, inscrite dans un cercle comportant une couronne de vingt-deux cavités. L'étude iconologique du sceau conduit à penser que cet objet, malgré son aspect modeste et de peu de prix, constitue en fait un important témoignage sur (...) les préférences et les choix de l'église d'Argos en ce qui concerne les pains offerts par les fidèles pour la célébration de la Sainte Liturgie. Les cavités de la couronne périphérique représentent probablement une forme annonciatrice des «parcelles» telles que nous les connaissons par la période byzantine postérieure et la pratique liturgique orthodoxe actuelle. Parallèlement, on procède à un examen des données concernant la topographie monumentale chrétienne, tant de la ville que de ses alentours immédiats, et l'on avance avec prudence l'hypothèse de l'existence d'une église paléochrétienne encore inconnue dans la zone de l'agora. (shrink)

La date de l'installation des croix dans les colonnes et les murs de l'Eglise Sainte-Sophie est difficile à connaître. D'après leurs formes, il s'agirait d'un phénomène post-iconoclaste, qui se situerait entre le 10e et le 12e siècles. Ces croix étaient très certainement des reliques témoignant d'un phénomène de piété populaire dans l'Eglise centrale de l'Empire byzantin. Un appendice donne une description de ces croix, un plan de l'Eglise Sainte-Sophie ainsi que la reproduction de onze photographies.

Une des caractéristiques de l'architecture de la Grèce du Sud aux IXe-XIIe s. est l'utilisation d'appareils où les blocs ont une place prépondérante. Ces appareils peuvent être classés selon des critères morphologiques. C'est ainsi que sont décrits neuf types comprenant le grand appareil rectangulaire, caractéristique du XIIe s., l'appareil cloisonné à croix, surtout représenté au XIe s., et leurs dérivés (appareil rectangulaire irrégulier, appareil à moellons quadrangulaires, appareil mixte, grand appareil hétérogène, grand appareil rectangulaire cloisonné, appareil cloisonné à mégalithes, (...) appareil à montants et remplissage et appareil à moellons quadrangulaires à croix), ainsi que l'appareil cyclopéen qui est particulier au Magne et date de la fin du Xe- début du XIe s. Cette classification a par ailleurs permis d'émettre de nouvelles hypothèses sur la datation de certains édifices tels que le catholicon d'Ossios Loukas, Saint-Nicolas-aux-Champs, la Dormition de la Vierge de Merbaka ou certaines églises du Magne. (shrink)

There are two quite common views which appear to be embraced by a large number of aestheticians as well as a large number of nonaestheticians. It is quite commonly believed by many of both groups that God is omniscient with respect to the future, that is, that God knows everything that will ever occur. I refer to this belief as the doctrine of divine omniprescience. It is also quite common to many of both groups to believe that literary authorship is (...) creative in the sense that by means of his composing activity an author is an agent who brings about the existence of some thing which did not exist prior to the composing activity of that agent and which would not exist without the composing activity of that agent or some similar agent. I shall call this belief the doctrine of literary creativity. What does not appear to be recognized is that these two doctrines cannot both be consistently endorsed. I argue that the two doctrines jointly entail a contradiction and I will point out some of the logical consequences of trying to avoid that contradiction. (shrink)

In this essay I will try to show that there are what would appear to be some unnoticed consequences of the doctrine of divine foreknowledge. For the purposes of this discussion I will simply assume that future events are possible objects of knowledge and, hence, that foreknowledge is possible. Accordingly, I will not be concerned with discussing such questions as the status of truth-values for future contingent propositions or whether knowledge is justified true belief. Furthermore, I will not be concerned (...) with the issues involved in the claim that the doctrine of divine foreknowledge conflicts with doctrines concerning the properties of created beings, e.g., the doctrine of voluntary human action. (shrink)

With very few exceptions philosophers believe that no account of the doctrine of divine omnipotence is adequate if it entails that God can do what is logically impossible. Descartes is credited with believing otherwise. In his article ‘Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths’ Harry Frankfurt attributes to Descartes the belief that God is ‘a being for whom the logically impossible is possible’. In addition, Frankfurt claims that because of this belief Descartes’ account of God's omnipotence is open to (...) the charge of being incoherent. I will argue that it is wrong to attribute this belief to Descartes and that if his account of divine omnipotence is incoherent, it is incoherent for reasons other than that it entails the possibility of what is logically impossible. (shrink)

With very few exceptions philosophers believe that no account of the doctrine of divine omnipotence is adequate if it entails that God can do what is logically impossible. Descartes is credited with believing otherwise. In his article ‘Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths’ Harry Frankfurt attributes to Descartes the belief that God is ‘a being for whom the logically impossible is possible’. In addition, Frankfurt claims that because of this belief Descartes’ account of God's omnipotence is open to (...) the charge of being incoherent. I will argue that it is wrong to attribute this belief to Descartes and that if his account of divine omnipotence is incoherent, it is incoherent for reasons other than that it entails the possibility of what is logically impossible. (shrink)