SummaryThe early writings of Barry Barnes, as the co‐founder of the Edinburgh School of sociology of scientific knowledge, are explored to bring out and to evaluate his main presuppositions and arguments. Barnes is highly critical of anthropologists' conception of scientific knowledge, rationality, truth, and their asymmetrical explanatory approach towards different belief‐systems. Likewise he rejects the prevalent View of science among sociologists of knowledge, and also their approach to explanation of knowledge or belief‐adoption. His proposal is based on a (...) Kuhnian model of science, and offers his own socio‐causal explanatory scheme applicable to all beliefs and knowledge‐claims. I have challenged the basis of his model of science and have tried to show that his use of Kuhn's concepts of normal practice and paradigm is problematic, and that his idea of social causation of beliefs is highly problematic.“new paradigms may gain support not because of any demonstrable superiority over the old but simply because scientists welcome the opportunity of a new try at explanation” Barry Barnes “all belief‐systems, scientific or preliterate, ‘true’ or ‘erroneous’, are most profitably compared and understood within a single framework” Barry Barnes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:484 BOOK REVIEWS faith. Yet faith-knowledge alone is insufficient to account for Jesus' extraordinary gifts as a teacher: for this we must appeal to a special charism along the lines of an infused knowledge. According to Torrell this knowledge is best understood by reference to Aquinas's mature teaching on prophecy: God equipped the prophets with an infused light (but not infused ideas) enabling them to communicate divine truths to (...) others. Likewise, God conferred on Jesus an infused light akin to that of the prophets, but with this qualitative difference: in him the lumen is a permanent feature of his cognitive life (a habitus), while it is given to the prophets only intermittently (per modum actus). The foregoing i;ummary will have served its purpose if it has conveyed to the reader some sense of the very rich historical, philosophical, and theological reflections that comprise this volume. The editorial team of the Revue thomiste is to be commended for the high caliber of this and the other special publications it has produced in recent years: the 1992 commemorative volume on the theological achievement of M.-M. Labourdette; th~ 1993 centenary index ("tables generales 1893-1992"); the Gilson issue of 1994; and most recently an issue devoted to Thomas Aquinas and the onto-theo-logy debate (1995). This reviewer eagerly waits for more. Fordham University Bronx, New York GREGORY M. REICHBERG The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan. By J. MICHAEL STEBBINS. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995. Pp. xxii + 399. $65.00 (cloth). Aquinas insists that the creator's primary intent is the "order of the universe," and Bernard Lonergan's dissertation on "operating grace" in Aquinas's writings managed to move beyond the stalemated discussion of "sufficient" and "efficacious" grace precisely because he displayed how any discourse about grace had to be connected with larger theorems of the creator's operation in creation. What speaking of the divine action called "grace" requires is a set of metaphysical skills adequate to speaking of the "order of the universe" as created. A tall order, whose scope the published edition of his dissertation-Grace and Freedom-so understated that its implications have been missed by many philosophers and theologians fascinated with such questions. Stebbins's careful reconstruction of that text reminds us of its daunting scope. And part of the reason it can do so is that he illustrates both the method and conclusions of Grace and Freedom through a later text which Lonergan had composed (in Latin) for a course on grace offered from 1947 to 1960: De ente supernaturali (which will appear in volume 16 [Early Latin Theology] of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, published by BOOK REVIEWS 485 University of Toronto Press). The significance of this collateral source is that it can profit from and respond to Henri de Lubac's epochal Surnaturel (1946). For those not familiar with Grace and Freedom, as well as some who thought they were, a list of Stebbins's chapters manages to convey the scope of Lonergan's achievement: 1. The Role of Understanding in Theological Speculation; 2. The Principal Instance of Supernatural Being: The Created Communication of the Divine Nature; 3. Thirteenth-Century Breakthrough (The "Theorem" of the Supernatural); 4. Supernatural Transformation of Human Activity; 5. Obediential Potency and the Natural Desire to See God; 6. Molinist and Bannezian Systems; 7. Theoretical Perspective on Divine Concourse; 8. Contingence, Sin and Divine Efficacy. As always, Lonergan must actively reflect on method while executing a theological inquiry, so Stebbins rightly begins with his insistence that such inquiry must be more than "just a networks of concepts; it is primarily an act of understanding" (xix)-Chapter 1. Then, following the expository order of De ente supematurali, he shows how Lonergan roots the supernatural in the theorems developed to speak of the natural: of creation itself. ("Theorem," as we shall see, is a favorite word of Lonergan's, intimating what it takes to move beyond our imaginations to a set of propositions able to articulate the metaphysical issues at stake.) Following the analogy of nature, we can see how the "two operations by which creatures... (shrink)

Previous discussions of the origins of writing in the Ancient Near East have not incorporated the neuroscience of literacy, which suggests that when southern Mesopotamians wrote marks on clay in the late-fourth millennium, they inadvertently reorganized their neural activity, a factor in manipulating the writing system to reflect language, yielding literacy through a combination of neurofunctional change and increased script fidelity to language. Such a development appears to take place only with a sufficient demand for writing and (...) reading, such as that posed by a state-level bureaucracy; the use of a material with suitable characteristics; and the production of marks that are conventionalized, handwritten, simple, and non-numerical. From the perspective of Material Engagement Theory, writing and reading represent the interactivity of bodies, materiality, and brains: movements of hands, arms, and eyes; clay and the implements used to mark it and form characters; and vision, motor planning, object recognition, and language. Literacy is a cognitive change that emerges from and depends upon the nexus of interactivity of the components. (shrink)

Contemporary thought has been profoundly shaped by the early-twentieth-century turn toward synchronic models of explanation, which analyze phenomena as they appear at a single moment, rather than diachronically as they develop through time. But the relationship between time and system remains unexplained by the standard account of this shift. Through a new history of systematic thinking across the humanities and sciences, The Writing of Spirit argues that nineteenth-century historicism wasn't simply replaced by a more modern synchronic perspective. The (...) structuralist revolution consisted rather in a turn toward time's absolutely minimal conditions, and thus also toward a new theory of diachrony. Pourciau arrives at this surprising and powerful conclusion through an analysis of language-scientific theories over the course of two centuries, associated with thinkers from Jacob Grimm and Richard Wagner to the Russian Futurists, in domains as disparate as historical linguistics, phonology, acoustics, opera theory, philosophy, poetics, and psychology. The result is a novel contribution to a pressing contemporary question--namely, what role history should play in the interpretation of the present. (shrink)

Notations are cognitive systems involving distinctive psychological functions, behaviors, and material forms. Seen through this lens, two main types – semasiography and visible language – are fundamentally differentiated by their material prehistories, emphasis on iconography, and the centrality of language's combinatorial faculty. These fundamental differences suggest that key qualities (iconicity, expressiveness, concision) are difficult to conjoin in a single system.

This edition of the French philosopher Auguste Comte's (1798-1857) early essays shows Comte at the heart of the political and intellectual debates of Restoration France. The young Comte forged the central features of his philosophical system in response to the central challenge of the 1820s - how to find a new foundation for political legitimacy and thus to 'close' the revolutionary era. Stuart Jones's introduction to this new edition shows how Comte grappled with problems that confronted liberals and counter-revolutionaries (...) alike, and identifies the novelty of his solution. The essays presented in this edition reveal the systematizing character of Comte's intellect, which lay at the root of his enormous appeal to nineteenth-century readers. In addition to the substantial introduction, this volume contains a chronology, biographical information on key figures, and a bibliographical note making this an accessible volume highly suitable for undergraduate use. (shrink)

This article accomplishes two goals. First, the paper clarifies Edmund Husserl’s investigation of the historical inception of the number system from his early works, Philosophy of Arithmetic and, “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)”. The article explores Husserl’s analysis of five historical developmental stages, which culminated in our ancestor’s ability to employ and enumerate with number signs. Second, the article reveals how Husserl’s conclusions about the history of the number system from his early works opens up a fusion (...) point with his investigations from his mature texts, The Crisis of the European Sciences and “The Origin of Geometry”. On the one hand, the essay shows that Husserl’s methodology was similar, as he sought in both his early and late writings to uncover the essence of the history of the formal sciences and was not executing mere intellectual history. On the other hand, the article discloses that Husserl’s insights from both time periods are strikingly analogous. Already in his early texts, Husserl saw that the sciences emerged from pre-theoretical experiences of the world and that the sciences are the result of a historical process, which involves the psychic activities of past individuals and the maintaining of discoveries over time by intersubjective communities. I conclude by showing how, in light of the analysis of this paper, we can rethink the evolution of Husserl’s philosophy. (shrink)

This book is an expanded catalogue of an exhibit of mid‐fifteenth‐ through seventeenth‐century drawings, woodcuts, engravings, and etchings emphasizing hands as objects of study, as teaching tools, and as reflections of the human being. In addition, it contains an extended introduction by the curator of the exhibit, Claire Richter Sherman, and four essays by other contributors on pertinent topics: the hand as an instrument of the intellect, manual reckoning, music, and chiromancy . These essays, which precede the catalogue itself, are (...) only loosely connected to the exhibit, but each deals with its subject clearly and crisply.In his composition on the hand as a means of expression, Martin Kemp traces the legacy of ancient thought as reflected in the various anatomical drawings from Leonardo through the detailed Bidloo prints. Kemp concludes that the hand remains “a prime mechanism for personal expression—for the manifestation of individual character and identity.” In the following essay Sachiko Kusukawa provides a succinct sketch of finger numeration, noting that a system alluded to by ancient authors was fully described by the Venerable Bede in the eighth century. Bede also wrote of a method of using the hand as a mnemonic aid in determining the proper date for Easter and other movable feasts. Finger counting remained popular throughout the Middle Ages but gradually fell into disuse in the West by the sixteenth century and was merely quaint by the eighteenth. Kusukawa does not, unfortunately, suggest a reason for the decline, but the spread of computation with Arabic numerals was surely a major factor.Next, Susan Forscher Weiss discusses the use of the hand in teaching music theory and scales. Although there are some indications of this practice in antiquity, variations on a system developed in the eleventh century by Guido of Arezzo were used to teach music through the sixteenth century. Finally, Brain P. Copenhaver discusses the history of the pseudoscience chiromancy . Already in existence in antiquity, palmistry, and other forms of divination, flourished despite the prohibitions of the church. Copenhaver concludes with a witty discussion of the hard times on which palmistry has fallen recently in California.As for the catalogue, it consists of eighty‐three monochrome illustrations, each with an extensive commentary about the artist, the subject, and the reason the item was included in the exhibit. These descriptions are frequently fascinating short essays in themselves, enticing the reader to investigate further. The organization is thematic rather than chronological, with six divisions : “Reading the Writing on Hands,” “Handiwork of the Creator,” “Messengers of the World,” “Knowledge on Hand,” “Whole World in the Hand,” and “Guiding Hands.” The faults are minor. Although the themes of the divisions themselves are clearly described in Sherman's introduction, several of the illustrations seem to have only a general association with the stated theme. A few are filled with details too small to be legible in the necessary reduction of plates to fit the book. Most of the illustrations, however, are excellent examples of the main subject of the exhibit and are fascinating studies in their own right.Generally, this volume is a valuable work for anyone interested in the history of the hand in science and the arts. The four prefatory essays are particularly instructive, and the prints are reproduced clearly, with elaborate descriptions of their historical context and their meaning. Accordingly, this book is much more than merely a catalogue; it is an important work in its own right. Throughout, the substantial references to other works indicate directions for further study. One only regrets that the exhibit itself was shown in only two venues. (shrink)

From his earliest writings as a student in the Evangelical Stift in Tübingen to the last years of his life as a professor in Berlin, art played a major role in Hegel’s various philosophical formulations. It is important to note, however, that although Hegel remained convinced of the general importance of art for his own philosophical endeavors, the particular details of his interpretation of its significance changed quite markedly over the years as he developed his own unique philosophical position and (...) as his firsthand experience of works of art increased. In this paper I will concentrate on some of Hegel’s earliest efforts toward developing his own philosophical system, and will show how this development is reflected in a fundamental transformation of his interpretation of the significance of art. More specifically, I will establish in what follows that one major consequence of Hegel’s evolving systematic philosophy is an “impoverishment” of the artistic in the sense that art comes to lose a certain fertility which it had had in his earlier views. This impoverishment is in effect the price exacted if art is to assume a place within Hegel’s system, precisely because the role and significance of art now come to be defined by and expressed in terms of its place in that system. Although this paper will be concerned with only the first stages in a process of development which continues all the way up to his Berlin lectures on beautiful art, it will nonetheless become apparent that Hegel’s early understanding of art has to have been radically altered for such a development even to begin. (shrink)

This handsome volume contains Fichte’s preparatory, supplementary, and popular writings about the first version of the Wissenschaftslehre, together with a very judicious selection from his philosophical correspondence in the decade 1790-99. Anyone who puts it on the shelf beside the Heath-Lachs translation of the 1794 lecture script and the two 1797 “Introductions” can now be confident of possessing in excellent and accurate English all of Fichte’s theoretical discussions of the philosophical view that made him both famous and immensely influential in (...) the development of German idealism. His later thought remains still the private preserve of a few German-reading specialists; and we need good modern translations of his practical philosophy: Foundation of Natural Right and System of Ethical Theory. But his Theory of Scientific Knowledge we do now have. (shrink)

Gentzen writes in the published version of his doctoral thesis Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen that he was able to prove the normalization theorem only for intuitionistic natural deduction, but not for classical. To cover the latter, he developed classical sequent calculus and proved a corresponding theorem, the famous cut elimination result. Its proof was organized so that a cut elimination result for an intuitionistic sequent calculus came out as a special case, namely the one in which the sequents have (...) at most one formula in the right, succedent part. Thus, there was no need for a direct proof of normalization for intuitionistic natural deduction. The only traces of such a proof in the published thesis are some convertibilities, such as when an implication introduction is followed by an implication elimination [1934–35, II.5.13]. It remained to Dag Prawitz in 1965 to work out a proof of normalization. Another, less known proof was given also in 1965 by Andres Raggio.We found in February 2005 an early handwritten version of Gentzen's thesis, with exactly the above title, but with rather different contents: Most remarkably, it contains a detailed proof of normalization for what became the standard system of natural deduction. The manuscript is located in the Paul Bernays collection at the ETH-Zurichwith the signum Hs. 974: 271. Bernays must have gotten it well before the time of his being expelled from Göttingen on the basis of the racial laws in April 1933. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study in Peirce's early metaphysics embedded in his writings between 1859 and 1867, which have received scant attention. Its purpose is to unravel his concept of reality and some relevant epistemological notions. Peirce's early metaphysical speculations can be divided into two parts. One is a system which covers thought between 1859 and 1862. The other manifests in lectures and writings between 1863 and 1867. The present study, consisting of five chapters, includes both of them. (...) ;Murray G. Murphey is one of the very few scholars who have attempted to take Peirce's early theories of knowledge and reality seriously. Thus the first chapter delineates his general interpretation of Peirce's first system, as a base for further discussions in the next two chapters. The second chapter clarifies Peirce's notion of metaphysics and then criticizes Murphey's understanding of Peirce's view of metaphysics. Similarly, the task of the third chapter is twofold: on the one hand, focusing on the epistemological and metaphysical issues, it provides an exposition of Peirce's system in detail and shows that some of his philosophical doctrines can be traced back to that system; on the other hand, it critically examines Murphey's interpretations of Peirce's texts and demonstrates that they involve misunderstandings or are one-sided. The fourth chapter scrutinizes Peirce's early writings on logic, which is regarded as a branch of semiotic and the foundation of metaphysics. It first elucidates Peirce's unpsychological view of logic as well as his notion of symbol and then discloses his theory of individual and diachronic view of knowledge therein embedded. Furthermore, Peirce's thesis that the function of a proposition is to reduce the impression to unity is investigated. Finally, it sums up the epistemological and metaphysical significance of Peirce's logical theory above expounded and, especially, specifies the fundamental tenets of Peirce's concept of reality implicitly involved in his early semeiotical approach to logic. The last chapter is simply a brief conclusion, roughly adumbrating Peirce's later doctrine of reality and how, in many aspects, it is foreshadowed by his early thought. (shrink)

For understanding early Chinese "theories of language" and views about the relation of speech to a nonalphabetic script, a thorough analysis of early Chinese metalinguistic terminology is necessary. This article analyzes the function of ming & (name) in early Chinese texts as a first step in that direction. It argues against the regular treatment of this term in early Chinese texts as the equivalent of "word." It examines ming in light of early Chinese ideas about (...) sense perception, the mythology about the origin or music and writing, and changes occurring in the writing system in the third century B.C.E. This lays the groundwork for a more informed response to Derrida's speculation about Chinese logocentrism. It is explained that, in early Chinese texts, certain concepts associated with logocentrism (e.g., reality/appearance, presence/absence) function in a way that is neither the same as, nor exactly the reverse of, the Western philosophical episteme. Thus, attempts to reconstruct attitudes toward "language" in early China should note the importance of sound in interpreting ming. Moreover, interpretations of apparent denigrations of writing in early Chinese texts should, before diagnosing logocentrism, consider the context of the reliability of the visual. (shrink)

Semanticists will often casually remark that Noam Chomsky rejects semantics. Chomsky has frequently noted how poorly understood some aspects of semantics are, and has shown little inclination to grant the status of reasonably well‐developed science to many parts of semantics. One specific reason Chomsky has often voiced skepticism about semantics is that he saw the wrong kinds of appeals to semantics in the wrong places. The arguments for the autonomy of syntax in Chomsky's early writing have been described (...) as part of an extended argument for the “existence of syntax”. Semantics for Chomsky must be part of I‐language: the part that provides useful information from the Language Faculty to the Conceptual‐Intentional system. There are many traditions in semantics, and many current research programs in sematics are embedded in firmly anti‐Chomskyan views of language in general. Chomsky's skepticism about truth‐conditional semantics has been, and remains strong. (shrink)

Buddhism traces its origin to the teachings of the historical figure of Gautama, the Buddha. Buddhist system addresses perennial human concerns and articulates profound insights into human nature and thus provides a practical context against the back ground of which it is possible to unravel the meaning of lives. Different branches of this school developed various scriptural traditions. Among them early Buddhist thought branched out into diversity of orders, schools of thought and teaching lineages. Wisdom and compassion are the (...) distinctive marks of Buddhism and this strife-tormented world is in dire need of these qualities. Buddhism not only talks about these qualities, it also illustrates the way how to acquire the same. Post-modernism which is a movement in different fields, culture, philosophy, literature, and arts etc. claims to decentralize the importance of reason. There are many post modern thinkers like, Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze, Guattari, Levinas who worked in their own way and they discerned a shift in the art and culture of their societies from a distinctively modern phase to a postmodernist phase. Considering these observations this paper is motivated by two questions. On the one hand, one is constantly intrigued by the vast treasures of early Buddhist heritage; on the other hand, one is perplexed by the post modern deconstructive method which has some point of similarities with early Buddhistthought. In between these two lines of thinking this paper tries to argue that the better our understanding and appreciation of this ancient legacy of Buddhist treasures becomes, the more able we will be to grasp the lines of post-modern thinking. There are certain concepts of Buddhism namely, language, writing, desire, suffering, death which are all important issues to the post-modern thinkers. The present paper is an effort to high light some of these concepts against the back ground of early Buddhist traditions. (shrink)

It can hardly be denied that since Schelling’s early comment on Plato’s Timaeus was published. Schellingiana, Vol. 4, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994, 177 pp.) the research on Schelling’s philosophical beginnings has been thoroughly renewed. This text documented for the first time Schelling’s in-depth acquaintance with Plato while he studied in Tübingen and exhibited at the same time his characteristically Kantian reading and understanding of Plato’s theory of creation. Two years later, in 1996, Michael Franz refined Schelling’s view on Plato during (...) his years in Tübingen, by commenting on hitherto unpublished new material from the Berliner Nachlass. With Tanja Gloyna’s Kosmos und System, another major study is added to the attempt at unravelling the significance of Platonic philosophy to Schelling’s early writings. (shrink)

Theories of writing and mind have proposed that the uses of literacy give rise to a distinct repertoire of cognitive skills, attitudes, and concepts. This paper reconsiders the earliest lexical lists of the Ancient Near East as one type of evidence on writing and mind. Past and present conceptions of the lists are briefly reviewed. Early views cast the lists as reflecting a Sumerian mentality or a uniquely literate mode of thought, while recent accounts suggest they may (...) simply be routine scribal exercises. A view from the philosophy of science, on which lists are considered a sub-type of ordering system, suggests a way of aligning a scribal practice account with aspects of earlier views by articulating the nature of list entries and the intentions of the list makers. On this account, the Ancient Near Eastern lists can be seen both as uniquely literate and as uniquely informative on the role of writing in mind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:"The Veil of Maya": Schopenhauer's System and Early Indian ThoughtStephan Atzert"The Veil of Maya": Schopenhauer's System and Early Indian Thought. By Douglas Berger. Binghamton: Global Academic Publishing, 2004. Pp. 319.Arthur Schopenhauer's (1788-1860) philosophy combines a number of inquiries into epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and psychology. Schopenhauer read widely in several languages and incorporated many influences, including his reading of Anquetil Dupperon's Latin translation of selected Upanishads. (...) From a contemporary perspective it is fair to say that Schopenhauer does not offer a systematic philosophy, internally consistent in all its parts, but rather a philosophical approach that is descriptive and sensitive to a wide range of issues. Despite definite exceptions, the strength of Schopenhauer's writing lies in his attempt to be descriptive about the human experience, in combination with a willingness to incorporate its possibilities, and therefore his writings provided, and still do provide, points of departure for a wide variety of investigations.Schopenhauer became especially popular with artists, due to the fact that he proposed a metaphysical theory of art that offered artists possibilities for self-flattering. Aside from the role he played for Nietzsche, this is perhaps the only area in which Schopenhauer's impact is well understood. By contrast, Schopenhauer's decisive role in the development of Freud's psychoanalytic theory has only begun to be appreciated in the past few years. And although there exists a significant tradition of relating Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism to Schopenhauer's philosophy-the approaches of Paul Deussen, Helmuth von Glasenapp, and Wilhelm Halbfass marking conceptual shifts in this tradition-truly comprehensive perspectives are emerging only now. The fascinating exploration of Schopenhauer's exposure to relevant indological texts, commentaries, and scholars is still far from complete, as only a comparatively small selection of Schopenhauer's manuscript remains has been published, by Arthur Hübscher in 1966. As recently as 1998 Urs App was able to conclude, from his study of Schopenhauer's unpublished annotations to the Asiatick Researches, that it has been a misconception-although one carefully nourished by Schopenhauer himself-to assume that Indian concepts only confirmed what Schopenhauer had conceptualized intuitively of his own accord. Douglas Berger's timely study, "The Veil of Maya": Schopenhauer's System and Early Indian Thought, shows that this case can be made by way of a careful analysis of the development of Schopenhauer's philosophy without recourse to unpublished manuscript remains. In this respect Berger states:After reading Schopenhauer for some years, I became convinced that some crucial aspects of his system, specifically how he made argumentative transitions from epistemology to metaphysics to ethics, transitions about which much dispute still rages in the secondary literature, could not be well assessed without taking into consideration how Scho-penhauer understood the Upanishadic and Vedantic notion of maya.(p. xii) [End Page 675]On the basis of the published manuscript remains Berger traces how the early system developed. Here Berger shows very convincingly that the formation of Schopenhauer's system was strongly influenced by his appropriation of one particular element of Hinduism-or better, of Brahmanic world views-namely the idea of maya. Maya in the Upanishads is "most often identified to be the magical power of God employed to create the world and then to hide behind the matter out of which it was made" (p. 62). As Berger has traced in the manuscript remains,Schopenhauer develops an understanding of maya over time which makes it at once an epistemological category of falsification and an existential fetter that causes human beings to comport themselves... in an ethically pernicious way. More specifically Scho-penhauer believes maya to be a way the world appears to us as something it is not.... Epistemologically, maya entails an erroneous perception of things and a fallacious assessment of their nature; axiologically, it is the inauthentic valuation of world and other; metaphysically, it is the mere phenomenal appearance of a noumenal reality; and ethically, it leads to an unjustifiable alienation of other from self.(p. 63)In Schopenhauer's own words from a manuscript dating to 1814:In so far as he is alive... a human being... is doomed not merely to... (shrink)

Theories of writing and mind have proposed that the uses of literacy give rise to a distinct repertoire of cognitive skills, attitudes, and concepts. This paper reconsiders the earliest lexical lists of the Ancient Near East as one type of evidence on writing and mind. Past and present conceptions of the lists are briefly reviewed. Early views cast the lists as reflecting a Sumerian mentality or a uniquely literate mode of thought, while recent accounts suggest they may (...) simply be routine scribal exercises. A view from the philosophy of science, on which lists are considered a sub-type of ordering system, suggests a way of aligning a scribal practice account with aspects of earlier views by articulating the nature of list entries and the intentions of the list makers. On this account, the Ancient Near Eastern lists can be seen both as uniquely literate and as uniquely informative on the role of writing in mind. (shrink)

For over a century, Hegel’s view of war is seen as controversial that results in mutually exclusive interpretations. To reach a proper evaluation of Hegel’s views, it is necessary to consider both Hegel’s initial states of philosophical doctrine about war and peace, and the development of his understanding of war from early works to mature ones. In the first part of the paper, I characterize Kant’s position on war, since it was the starting point for Hegel. Contrary to popular (...) representations about Kant as an exclusive pacifist, the philosopher of Koenigsberg had a philosophical-historical treatment of war, in which the war appeared as something sublime. However, both legal-ethical peace understanding and veto of war from the point of practical reason were not dominant in Kant’s philosophy, subordinating the sublime treatment of war. Kant’s next contemporaries could not already keep this position, emphasizing either one or the other side of war interpretation. Starting from the early writings (the paper “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law” or manuscripts “System of Ethical Life” and “The German Constitution”), Hegel stresses an ethical aspect of war and its necessity, so that the shield is arranged on the way of systems isolation and individuals atomization, and the unity in its ethical health is saved. Perpetual peace, on the contrary, leads to diseases. The statement about equality of claims and the same truthfulness of warring parties’ rights is the originality of Hegel’s view. It makes absolutely impossible the war evaluation from the point of its justice and injustice. (shrink)

In the philosophical works of Emmanuel Levinasʼs early career, it is in a phenomenology of Eros that he claims to have uncovered the site of what he calls ʻtranscendenceʼ. This is no small claim. According to the argument of the later Totality and Infinity (1961), the history of Western philosophy is to be thought as the history of the ʻphilosophy of the sameʼ. Within this polemical generalization almost the whole of Western philosophy is characterized as a totalizing discourse which (...) aims to reduce everything to the categories of a thematizing consciousness. Conceptual structures are employed (or presupposed) in order to make diverse phenomena commensurable within a system, and according to Levinas this operation always constitutes a reduction of what is ʻotherʼ to the order of the ʻsameʼ. In agreement with a certain transcendentalism which is itself implicated in Levinasʼs critique, these structures of thought are then equated with consciousness itself; the thematizing project is one of mastery in which noemata will of necessity conform to noesis, in which the object is constituted for and by the subject. The experience of transcendence, so rare in this version of philosophyʼs history, is the experience of whatever is and truly remains other than me, recalcitrant to mastery through conceptualization and to the transcendental project of the subject to construe everything as originating from within itself. If, then, it is first of all in the erotic relation that the possibility of the experience of transcendence is said to arise, Eros can in no sense be dismissed as an unimportant or peripheral theme for Levinas, and a full investigation is warranted, especially given the current interest in Levinasʼs work, interest which is not limited to the discipline of philosophy. Furthermore, as the notion of Eros is closely associated, textually and conceptually, with what Levinas calls ʻthe feminineʼ, critical attention has been excited amongst feminist scholars of various persuasions, with claims – both positive and negative – being made for Levinasʼs significance as a resource for feminist philosophy and feminist politics. If assertions of a ʻLevinasianʼ feminism, no matter how qualified, tend to rest on the idea that Levinasʼs phenomenology of Eros, and analyses of ʻthe feminineʼ mark a break in or a new departure from a ʻmasculinistʼ tradition, this article seeks, in part, to argue to the contrary. (shrink)

Kant’s philosophy is often treated as a closed system, without reference to how it was written or how Kant arrived at its familiar form, the critique. In fact, the style of the critique seems so artless that readers think of it as an unfortunate by-product—a style of stylelessness. In _Constituting Critique_, Willi Goetschel shows how this apparent gracelessness was deliberately achieved by Kant through a series of writing experiments. By providing an account of the process that culminated in his (...) three _Critiques_, this book offers a new perspective on Kant’s philosophical thought and practice. _Constituting Critique_ traces the stages in Kant’s development to reveal how he redefined philosophy as a critical task. Following the philosopher through the experiments of his early essays, Goetschel demonstrates how Kant tests, challenges, and transforms the philosophical essay in his pursuit of a new self-reflective literary genre. From these experiments, critique emerges as the philosophical form for the critical project of the Enlightenment. The imperatives of its transcendental style, Goetschel contends, not only constitute and inform the critical moment of Kant’s philosophical praxis, but also have an enduring place in post-Kantian philosophy and literature. By situating the _Critiques_ within the context of Kant’s early essays, this work will redirect the attention of Kant scholars to the origins of their form. It will also encourage contemporary critical theorists to reconsider their own practice through an engagement with its source in Kant. (shrink)

This volume contains essays that examine infinity in early modern philosophy. The essays not only consider the ways that key figures viewed the concept. They also detail how these different beliefs about infinity influenced major philosophical systems throughout the era. These domains include mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, science, and theology. Coverage begins with an introduction that outlines the overall importance of infinity to early modern philosophy. It then moves from a general background of infinity up through Kant. (...) Readers will learn about the place of infinity in the writings of key early modern thinkers. The contributors profile the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Debates over infinity significantly influenced philosophical discussion regarding the human condition and the extent and limits of human knowledge. Questions about the infinity of space, for instance, helped lead to the introduction of a heliocentric solar system as well as the discovery of calculus. This volume offers readers an insightful look into all this and more. It provides a broad perspective that will help advance the present state of knowledge on this important but often overlooked topic. (shrink)

In this paper, I ask whether Francis Bacon constitutes a revealing exception to the modern predilection for ‘system.’ First, I consider evidence for reading Bacon as a philosopher strongly attracted toward the ideal of system. Second, I show how reflecting on Bacon’s philosophical practice can motivate an ‘anti- system‘ reading of his texts. In considering the small number of works in which Bacon explicitly discusses ‘system’ under that name (in particular, the Descriptio globi intellectualis), I clarify what is and is (...) not meant by ‘philosophical system’ as distinct from other ideas of system (e.g. ‘system of the heavens’). Third, I draw from the Temporis Masculus Partum and Novum Organum to argue that Bacon’s doctrine of the ‘idols of the mind’ amounts to a thoroughgoing critique of system in philosophy. Fourth, I show how and why Bacon deploys the aphoristic form in Novum Organum as an alternative to system. I conclude by suggesting some ways in which an ‘anti-system’ reading of Bacon has the power to enhance our appreciation of other early modern authors who write philosophy without pretensions to system. (shrink)

This paper is an investigation into the introduction of the term ‘system’ and its conceptual background in the writings of Bartholomew Keckermann. This includes a brief summary of the literature and evidence identifying Keckermann as the first to make significant usage of the term in logic, philosophy, and theology. Then, after a survey of his life, work and milieu, this paper will look closer at three of Keckermann’s own ‘systems’; Systema logicae (1600), Praecognitorum Logicorum (1606), and Systema SS. Theologiae (...) (1602). Finally, I will touch on the influence Keckermann’s innovation had on subsequent ideas of method in modern philosophy, especially how his innovative use of this term gives the logician the directing role as a technical expert in mining the truth of theology, philosophy, and other sciences. This, of course, flies in the face of the medieval view of the Church and its elders controlling that role, characterizing the discovery and refinement of knowledge as being a process of electing and using worthy passive subjects as conduits of divine knowledge. Thus Keckermann’s systems can be considered an important step away from this, towards the early modern epistemology requiring an active thinking subject, best characterized in Descartes’ Meditations. (shrink)

August Cieszkowski was a philosopher, economist, social reformer and political activist. As early as 1838 he formulated a daring critique of Hegel, which culminated in the notion of praxis and marked the beginning of the radicalization of the Hegelian school. Throughout the 1840s he participated in the social movement in France with a variety of highly original economic and social schemes. After 1848 he played a key role in Polish politics and elaborated a future-oriented and messianic vision of history (...) that sought to integrate Hegel and Christianity. The publication of this volume in 1979 formed part of a revival of interest in Cieszkowski, which centred about his influence on Marx as well as his impact on Herzen, Hess and Proudhon. It also focused on Cieszkowski's position within the broad current of nineteenth-century Polish and European messianism as well as on the originality of his peculiarly non-revolutionary system. (shrink)

For three centuries Europe has been holding forth on the advantages and disadvantages of the Chinese system of writing.At first, judgments were positive. The abundant correspondence “à la Chine” of the missionaries inspired a number of commentaries in the early years of the 17th century and even roused the admiration of Leibnitz for a system which he considered, briefly, completely rational. At that time, the Chinese Empire was one of the most important in the world, and the number (...) of techniques coming from the East was not negligible. But while in Europe modern science was being confirmed, China's evolution proceeded very slowly. (shrink)

This set is a carefully balanced selection of writings representing some of the most important currents in the thought of city and regional planning during the period 1870-1940 when urban planning emerged as a serious disciplinary field. The set consists of eight key books from this period, handsomely illustrated and reproduced in their entirety, and a separate volume of fifteen seminal short selections - all by major figures of the time, such as Abercrombie, Geddes, and the Olmsteds. Soria y Mata's (...) writings on the linear city also appear in translation for the first time. In addition to seminal works on city planning, the set covers themes such as neighbourhood, Utopian and visionary planning; planning for parks; housing; transportation systems, and public health. A wide variety of cities feature including Paris, Vienna, Amsterdam, Berlin, London, Manchester, New York and San Francisco, showing a great diversity of cultural styles. Early Urban Planning 1870-1940 is of continued importance today, as it highlights ideals which remain strikingly relevant in development of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. (shrink)

This volume contains essays that examine infinity in early modern philosophy. The essays not only consider the ways that key figures viewed the concept. They also detail how these different beliefs about infinity influenced major philosophical systems throughout the era. These domains include mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, science, and theology. Coverage begins with an introduction that outlines the overall importance of infinity to early modern philosophy. It then moves from a general background of infinity up through Kant. (...) Readers will learn about the place of infinity in the writings of key early modern thinkers. The contributors profile the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Debates over infinity significantly influenced philosophical discussion regarding the human condition and the extent and limits of human knowledge. Questions about the infinity of space, for instance, helped lead to the introduction of a heliocentric solar system as well as the discovery of calculus. This volume offers readers an insightful look into all this and more. It provides a broad perspective that will help advance the present state of knowledge on this important but often overlooked topic. (shrink)

The intellectual foundation of early modern Japan was provided by Confucianism—a system of knowledge set forth in Chinese classical writings. In order to gain access to this knowledge, the Japanese applied reading markers to modify the original Chinese to fit the peculiarities of Japanese grammar and pronunciation. Confucian education started by having the children memorize these Japanese readings of the Chinese classics by endless recitation. This article will examine the significance of this study method in order to demonstrate the (...) following: 1. The recitation of the Chinese classics led to these texts being ‘incorporated’ into the body, where they become the ‘intellectual language’ of thought and speech. 2. This quality of ‘incorporation’ was appreciated because it fostered the unity of thought and behavior, leading to the formation of a strong-willed subject. 3. This idea of ‘incorporation’ stands in stark contrast to the modern conception of knowledge that stresses objectivity and transparency, and ignores the pedagogical significance of the body. (shrink)

In The Burning Bush, Glazov conducts a profoundly original inquiry into Vladimir Solovyov's attitude toward Judaism. Solovyov (1853-1900) was one of the most remarkable figures of the 19th century: He was the most important Russian speculative thinker of that century, publishing major works on theoretical philosophy, the philosophy of religion, and ethics; he also produced sensitive literary criticism and incisive essays on current political, social, and ecclesiastical questions. The eminent theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar designated Solovyov as the greatest artist (...) of conceptual order and organization--after Thomas Aquinas--in the entire history of thought, a thinker who borrows from all systems after purging them of their negations. Solovyov was also the first major Russian thinker to enter into ecumenical dialogue with Jewish scholars and theologians, and Glazov's main concern is (1) to translate as completely as possible all of Solovyov's writings on Judaism and to annotate these texts by identifying persons, places, and citations, especially in the Biblical and rabbinic literature; and (2) to synthesize the information gleaned from these writings with key recollections of Solovyov's attitudes toward Jews and Judaism by his immediate family, friends, and early biographers. Glazov collects, translates, and comments on all the relevant primary texts: writings, letters, pamphlets, protests, political documents, and prayers which relate to Solovyov's work on Jewish matters. (shrink)

This is a monumental work. The author's aim is to follow the destiny of the self-explicitation [[sic]] of western thought from the concept of substance to that of structure. Authentic philosophical thinking has always been ontological, and structure, no less than substance is a form or species of being. System too is a species of being which leads from substance to structure. Structure is only an articulation and intensification of substance. The concept of structure is the central notion of contemporary (...) thought; it is at the focus of the natural as well as of the social sciences and it alone can bridge the gap between the "two cultures." It alone can pave the way for a new philosophical humanism which, without abandoning the claim to universality and "objectivity," retains the thinking man as its focus. The author's contention is that the concept of structure is far from being a newcomer on the scene but it has been rather ripening slowly throughout the great systems of the last six centuries. Without being in any way a treatise on the history of philosophy and on the history of science, the present book describes with great competence and persuasiveness the evolution of "structure" from Nicholas of Autrecourt via Cusanus and early modern science to Descartes. Next comes an extraordinarily rich and insightful analysis of the world of Pascal. Finally the conclusion is reached through a discussion of Leibniz and Kant. This is a difficult book, a long and complex one. It might well belong to those writings which reshape our understanding of the past, and through it, contribute to our expectations of the future.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This is a monumental work. The author's aim is to follow the destiny of the self-explicitation [[sic]] of western thought from the concept of substance to that of structure. Authentic philosophical thinking has always been ontological, and structure, no less than substance is a form or species of being. System too is a species of being which leads from substance to structure. Structure is only an articulation and intensification of substance. The concept of structure is the central notion of contemporary (...) thought; it is at the focus of the natural as well as of the social sciences and it alone can bridge the gap between the "two cultures." It alone can pave the way for a new philosophical humanism which, without abandoning the claim to universality and "objectivity," retains the thinking man as its focus. The author's contention is that the concept of structure is far from being a newcomer on the scene but it has been rather ripening slowly throughout the great systems of the last six centuries. Without being in any way a treatise on the history of philosophy and on the history of science, the present book describes with great competence and persuasiveness the evolution of "structure" from Nicholas of Autrecourt via Cusanus and early modern science to Descartes. Next comes an extraordinarily rich and insightful analysis of the world of Pascal. Finally the conclusion is reached through a discussion of Leibniz and Kant. This is a difficult book, a long and complex one. It might well belong to those writings which reshape our understanding of the past, and through it, contribute to our expectations of the future.--M. J. V. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 558-559 [Access article in PDF] Stephen Gaukroger. Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. viii + 258. Cloth, $60.00. Paper, $22.00. Stephen Gaukroger, author of a definitive biography of Descartes, has now written an excellent account of Descartes's natural philosophy as presented in his Principia philosophiae. Gaukroger claims that the roots of modernity lay in the (...) philosophies of Francis Bacon and René Descartes, both of whom regarded natural philosophy, rather than either moral philosophy or metaphysics, as the core of the philosophical enterprise. Whereas Bacon developed his ideas from a background steeped in the writings of the Renaissance humanists who emphasized moral philosophy, Descartes developed his ideas in the context of Scholastic philosophy, particularly the textbooks of the Jesuits that he had encountered at La Flèche and that located the foundations of philosophy in metaphysics.Regarding the unpublished early works, Le monde and L'homme, as suppressed parts of Descartes's mature project and taking seriously Descartes's stated intention of dealing with living things and humans along with the physical world in his natural philosophy, Gaukroger presents a detailed account of this "complete" version of the Principia philosophiae. In a series of six chapters, he explicates Descartes's views on the principles of knowledge, the principles of material objects, the visible universe, the Earth, living things, and man. In addition to Le monde and L'homme, Gaukroger draws on Les Passions de l'âme as an important source for Descartes's views on human nature.Gaukroger situates Descartes's natural philosophy in the context of the Scholastic textbook tradition in a chapter preceding his account of the Principa philosophiae. He delves into the history of medieval universities, the place of natural philosophy in the medieval curriculum, and the changing relationship between metaphysics and natural philosophy, particularly after the Condemnations of 1277. Difficulties in reconciling Aristotelian natural philosophy and Christian theology, which had been formulated in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics, continued into the sixteenth century and provided the immediate background to the Jesuit commentaries and textbooks to which Descartes was exposed as a student. In these works, Jesuit philosophers attempted to derive a coherently unified Christian Aristotelianism from first principles. Gaukroger reminds us that Descartes's Principia philosophiae was a deliberate attempt to replace these Jesuit textbooks with one based on mechanistic principles.Despite the strength of Gaukroger's book as a contextualized study of a major philosophical figure who is frequently treated in an entirely ahistorical way, the book is not without its problems. The main problem is one that plagues many studies of Descartes (and other canonical figures in the history of philosophy), to wit, the presumption that he is somehow unique. For example, Gaukroger writes at length about Descartes's views about the differences between animals and humans with regard to cognition, arguing that Descartes did not consider animals to be automata because they lack rational souls but rather that they actually experience some but not all of the more abstract or reflexive forms of cognition usually ascribed to humans. Gaukroger does not mention the fact that many other early modern philosophers held a view like this. For example, Descartes's contemporary and fellow mechanical philosopher Pierre Gassendi claimed that animals could know universals, as when a dog recognizes that it is a human that is approaching, but differ from humans in not being capable of contemplating the nature of universality per se. Descartes was part of a community of thinkers concerned with similar problems, and his natural philosophy can be illuminated by viewing him in that context as well as against the backdrop of Scholasticism.Gaukroger underplays the significance of theology for Descartes's philosophy. Although he discusses how God's attributes, especially immutability, provide the basis for Descartes's laws of motion, he does not explore the specific aspects of Descartes's theological presuppositions and the way they influenced his entire natural philosophical project. Gaukroger repeats the received view that "One of the principal tasks of a mechanistic natural philosophy... (shrink)

_Kexue_, or science, captured the Chinese imagination in the early twentieth century, promising new knowledge about the world and a dynamic path to prosperity. Chinese Buddhists embraced scientific language and ideas to carve out a place for their religion within a rapidly modernizing society. Examining dozens of previously unstudied writings from the Chinese Buddhist press, this book maps Buddhists' efforts to rethink their traditions through science in the initial decades of the twentieth century. Buddhists believed science offered an exciting, (...) alternative route to knowledge grounded in empirical thought, much like their own. They encouraged young scholars to study subatomic and relativistic physics while still maintaining Buddhism's vital illumination of human nature and its crucial support of an ethical system rooted in radical egalitarianism. Showcasing the rich and progressive steps Chinese religious scholars took in adapting to science's rising authority, this volume offers a key perspective on how a major Eastern power transitioned to modernity in the twentieth century and how its intellectuals anticipated many of the ideas debated by scholars of science and Buddhism today. (shrink)

In his magnum opus, the _Historical and Critical Dictionary_, Pierre Bayle offered a series of brilliant criticisms of the major philosophical and theological systems of the 17 th Century. Although officially skeptical concerning the attempt to provide a definitive account of the truths of metaphysics, there is reason to see Bayle as a reluctant skeptic. In particular, Todd Ryan contends that Bayle harbored deep sympathy for the attempt by Descartes and his most innovative successor, Nicolas Malebranche, to establish a (...) metaphysical system that would provide a foundation for the new mechanistic natural philosophy while helping to secure the fundamental tenets of rational theology. Through a careful analysis of Bayle’s critical engagement with such philosophers as Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and Newton, it is argued that, despite his reputation as a skeptic, Bayle was not without philosophical commitments of his own. Drawing on the full range of Bayle’s writings, from his early philosophical lectures to his final controversial writings, Ryan offers detailed studies of Bayle’s treatment of such pivotal issues as mind-body dualism, causation and God’s relation to the world. (shrink)

In 1964, Jacques Derrida’s long essay “Violence and Metaphysics” opened a dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas that would not be interrupted until Derrida’srecent death. Published only three years after the appearance of Totality and Infinity and at a moment when Derrida’s own early texts were still in the course of elaboration, this text right away recognizes the legitimacy and the import of Levinas’s philosophical project. Derrida pays homage to the Levinasian attempt to interrogate the whole of the western philosophical tradition (...) beginning from its Greek origin — which should not be understood as an empirical place but as a system of categories and fundamental concepts, elaborated for the first time in Greece and structuring the entire philosophical discourse. According to Levinas, these concepts are dominated by “the supremacy of the One and the Same” making the long history of philosophy a history that takes place in the shadow of Parmenides, who would still command — all the more surely from afar — the phenomenology of Husserl and the ontology of Heidegger. The reservations that Derrida expresses in “Violence and Metaphysics” concern more Levinas’s discursive strategy than his intentions. He does not contest the desire to open philosophy to another origin than the Greek origin, no more than the necessity of making resonate in philosophical discourse the call of an alterity capable of contesting the supremacy of the One and the Same. His reservations are situated, rather, at the level of the strategy to follow in order to render this opening finally effective. (shrink)

This book is the revised version of a dissertation defended at the University of Chicago. It is also volume 3 of the series “North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy.” Its impressive title refers backward to Laywine’s purpose of showing “why Kant came to the view that sensibility and pure understanding are radically different faculties of knowledge governed by different principles—a view of central importance to the Critique of Pure Reason”. Such a research object is in itself not new. What (...) is new, however, is Laywine’s seeing Kant’s late elaborations on sensibility and understanding as an attempt to provide an answer to the problem of the commercium between body and soul, a problem that was the subject of many discussions within post-cartesian philosophy and received a great deal of attention by Kant too, especially at the beginning of his scientific career, as testified by the presentation of a system of real interaction in his 1755 writing, Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio, whose details are investigated in chapter 2 and in chapter 3. But it is in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, published in 1766, that Laywine sees the “key moment” that gives momentum to her interpretation and are thus made the subject of chapter 1. Laywine dismisses some of the most renowned interpretations of this satirical and at the same time enigmatic writing of Kant’s. She maintains that most interpretations have been failures, and that we can understand the Dreams in a more fruitful way only if we understand the reason for this failure. The reason of the failures, says Laywine, is not having been able to “explain why Kant associates the question of spirits and spirit-seeing with the status and future of metaphysics”, and the more fruitful understanding of the Dreams centers in their connection to Kant’s earlier work in metaphysics, in particular to “his efforts during the mid-1750s to lay the foundation of a credible system of real interaction to supplant the system of pre-established harmony favored by Wolff and Leibniz”. Chapter 4 contains some remarks on the source of Kant’s Dreams, for example, Swedenborg’s Arcana coelestia, while chapter 5 provides a careful analysis of the Dreams, which, according to Laywine, contains not only a critique to Swedenborg, but also a critique to Kant’s Nova dilucidatio in so far as both falsely represent the realm of intelligible substances as though it were subject to the conditions of the sensible world. Chapter 6 is dedicated to Kant’s 1770 dissertation, De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis, which, Laywine remarks, contains the method for correcting the error of Kant’s early metaphysics, namely a method for avoiding false representation of immaterial substances as determined by the conditions of sensibility. Detailed conclusive remarks round out the volume by indicating the direction toward the critical philosophy. (shrink)

Kant’s philosophy is often treated as a closed system, without reference to how it was written or how Kant arrived at its familiar form, the critique. In fact, the style of the critique seems so artless that readers think of it as an unfortunate by-product—a style of stylelessness. In _Constituting Critique_, Willi Goetschel shows how this apparent gracelessness was deliberately achieved by Kant through a series of writing experiments. By providing an account of the process that culminated in his (...) three _Critiques_, this book offers a new perspective on Kant’s philosophical thought and practice. _Constituting Critique_ traces the stages in Kant’s development to reveal how he redefined philosophy as a critical task. Following the philosopher through the experiments of his early essays, Goetschel demonstrates how Kant tests, challenges, and transforms the philosophical essay in his pursuit of a new self-reflective literary genre. From these experiments, critique emerges as the philosophical form for the critical project of the Enlightenment. The imperatives of its transcendental style, Goetschel contends, not only constitute and inform the critical moment of Kant’s philosophical praxis, but also have an enduring place in post-Kantian philosophy and literature. By situating the _Critiques_ within the context of Kant’s early essays, this work will redirect the attention of Kant scholars to the origins of their form. It will also encourage contemporary critical theorists to reconsider their own practice through an engagement with its source in Kant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 447-448 [Access article in PDF] Brigitte Sassen, translator and editor. Kant's Early Critics: The Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. ix + 331. Cloth, $54.95. Brigitte Sassen has translated and edited an extremely useful collection of texts dating from the years 1782 to 1789. Most of the texts were written by Kant's empirically (...) minded critics, but a few are the work of defenders of the Critical philosophy. Although some have been translated before—e.g., the notorious Feder/Garve review of the first Critique that prompted Kant's vitriolic response in the Prolegomena, the original Garve review that served as the basis of the Feder/Garve review, and Jacobi's critique of Kant's transcendental idealism—the entire anthology is the first ever to be devoted exclusively to English translations of some of the first reactions to and defenses of Kant's theoretical philosophy. All of this makes for an exciting event in Kant studies.Sassen identifies three major trends in Kant criticism that began in 1782. The first is the empiricist reaction to Kant's theoretical writings. Sassen considers the year 1789 the endpoint of this trend, since critical attention, she argues, shifted around that time to the rationalist reaction to Kant's writings. The initial wave of rationalist criticism, which constitutes the second trend, lasted until 1793. The third and final trend, she says, is the more forward-looking one that eventually blossomed into the systems of post-Kantian thought.Given such a wealth of material, Sassen has focused on Kant's empiricist critics, choosing the writers and topics most representative of the overall empiricist critique of the 1780s. The selections are divided into five sections. The first consists of the Feder/Garve and Garve reviews (from 1782 and 1783, respectively). Since these were the very first reviews of the Critique of Pure Reason, they helped to formulate many of the classic objections to it. For example, not only does the standard charge of Berkeleyan idealism originate in these reviews, but Feder and Garve also express concerns about Kant's ability to distinguish between reality and illusion if nothing in sensation itself determines the understanding to combine sensations in one way as opposed to another. The second section contains discussions of the Transcendental Aesthetic, including an early version of the "neglected alternative" charge more famously made by Trendelenburg in the nineteenth century. Hermann Andreas Pistorius, one of the most sophisticated of Kant's empiricist critics, argues that Kant has not ruled out the possibility that space and time are both forms of sensibility and properties of things in themselves. The third section (especially Jacobi's famous critique) explores the relationship between appearances and things in themselves, the problem of affection, and other topics touching on the very nature of Kant's idealism. The fourth section deals with various issues involving the table of categories. For example, Kant's critics had doubts about its completeness, and they were also puzzled as to how a priori concepts could be applied to ordinary experience. The fifth and final section looks at the contrast between empiricism and purism, that is, the overall adequacy of empiricist and Kantian approaches to issues in metaphysics and epistemology. Here we find Pistorius once again writing thoughtfully about the Critical philosophy, this time in response to Carl Christian [End Page 447] Erhard Schmid, the author of a dictionary for the "easier use" of Kant's writings that went through several editions in the late 1780s and 1790s.This brief sketch of Sassen's book gives only an inadequate idea of its richness and usefulness. Her introduction, which is thorough and informative, patiently sorts out the various players in the debates of the 1780s, outlines their arguments with Kant and one another, and even describes the nature of periodical publication in late eighteenth-century Germany. The editorial apparatus includes short biographies of the participants in the debates as well as the other authors mentioned throughout the book... (shrink)

This monograph explores the logical systems of early logicians in the Arabic tradition from a theoretical perspective, providing a complete panorama of early Arabic logic and centering it within an expansive historical context. By thoroughly examining the writings of the first Arabic logicians, al-Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroes, the author analyzes their respective theories, discusses their relationship to the syllogistics of Aristotle and his followers, and measures their influence on later logical systems. Beginning with an introduction to (...) the writings of the most prominent Arabic logicians, the author scrutinizes these works to determine their categorical logic, as well as their modal and hypothetical logics. Where most other studies written on this subject focus on the Arabic logicians’ epistemology, metaphysics, and theology, this volume takes a unique approach by focusing on the actual technical aspects and features of their logics. The author then moves on to examine the original texts as closely as possible and employs the symbolism of modern propositional, predicate, and modal logics, rendering the arguments of each logician clearly and precisely while clarifying the theories themselves in order to determine the differences between the Arabic logicians’ systems and those of Aristotle. By providing a detailed examination of theories that are still not very well-known in Western countries, the author is able to assess the improvements that can be found in the Arabic writings, and to situate Arabic logic within the breadth of the history of logic. This unique study will appeal mainly to historians of logic, logicians, and philosophers who seek a better understanding of the Arabic tradition. It also will be of interest to modern logicians who wish to delve into the historical aspects and progression of their discipline. Furthermore, this book will serve as a valuable resource for graduate students who wish to complement their general knowledge of Arabic culture, logic, and sciences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hellenistic and Early Modern PhilosophyChristopher S. CelenzaJon Miller and Brad Inwood, editors. Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xii + 330. Cloth, $60.00.There are at least two ways of writing the history of philosophy: the first and most common among those self-identified as "philosophers" treats philosophers of the past as if they were in live dialogue with the present. (...) Only the text is dissected, studied, and analyzed as the interpreter attempts to reconstruct, examine, and occasionally challenge the arguments under consideration. Practitioners of this first way assume that systematic and seemingly internally coherent styles of thought are most worthy of the name "philosophy." These thinkers believe that the term "philosophy," as Richard Rorty pointed out long ago, has an "honorific" sense: philosophy as such stands above other forms of thought, it is regulative in scope, and it serves as something that examines the conclusions of other, necessarily less rigorous fields. The second way is more explicitly contextualist, seeking to understand what a past thinker may have meant in his own time, what outside factors may have shaped his arguments, and how his thought may be part of broader historical currents that are none the less worthy of being remembered and studied now. Practitioners of this way are more likely to believe that ambiguities or seeming deficiencies of clarity that we find in the work of a past thinker are unlikely to be resolved by hypothetical, propositional reconstruction; rather the ambiguities are apparent to us because we are differently situated, so that the study of history is a more powerful tool in helping us satisfactorily access the work of a past thinker than rationalistic reconstruction. (Full disclosure: I am an advocate of the second way.) This volume presents studies that fall into both of the two camps, as Jerome Schneewind points out in his cogent introduction.The volume has a manifest unity: almost all of the articles are concerned in some way with different Hellenistic schools of thought and the way early modern thinkers used, re-imagined, and interpreted them. The studies are often meticulous and all are stimulating. Anthony Long offers a wonderfully synthetic presentation of ancient Stoicism as a coherent system, after which he examines the way Spinoza, Justus Lipsius, and the eighteenth-century Anglican bishop Joseph Butler measure up; unsurprisingly, they don't measure up that well. Margaret Osler seeks to illuminate the way Gassendi appropriated certain aspects of Epicureanism. Philip Mitsis argues that modern scholarship on Locke has not taken Locke's interest in Cicero's De officiis as a tool for teaching morality seriously. Donald Rutherford studies Leibniz's critique of Stoicism, which "centers," he writes, on their "failure to offer an adequate explanation of the nature of moral progress and of the dependence of human happiness on the hope for such progress" (62-63). Catherine Wilson presents a study of the corpuscular aspect of Epicurean natural philosophy among Leibniz and his contemporaries. Jon Miller eloquently and thoughtfully discusses the way Grotius and Spinoza worked with the natural law theory of the Stoics. Among a number of excellent articles, perhaps the most interesting is Stephen Menn's. Menn makes a compelling case that Descartes's intellectual autobiography in the Discourses may be seen as part of a tradition. In it, the writer presents himself as reaching a moment of dissatisfaction with the intellectual customs with which he has come into contact and as needing to strike off into new directions, unencumbered by the vestiges of those customs. While others, most notably Dan Garber, have shown that, as Menn puts it, "none of Descartes's contemporaries seem to have thought in 1637 that they were witnessing a revolution" (142), Menn's study is striking because it shows the depth of the tradition within which Descartes was working. Next, Gail Fine finds that the Cyrenaics, as presented by Sextus Empiricus, seem to have [End Page 207] endorsed "the view that there are truths, beliefs, and knowledge about the subjective" (214). Steven Nadler seeks to show that there is no mysticism in Spinoza's thought, even though it was not uncommon in Spinoza's own day to... (shrink)

In recent years, historians of science have increasingly turned their attention to the “print culture” of early modern science. These studies have revealed that printing, as both a technology and a social and economic system, structured the forms and meanings of natural knowledge. Yet in early modern Europe, naturalists, including John Aubrey, John Evelyn, and John Ray, whose work is discussed in this paper, often shared and read scientific texts in manuscript either before or in lieu of printing. (...) Scribal exchange, exemplified in the circulation of writings like commonplace books, marginalia, manuscript treatises, and correspondence, was the primary means by which communities of naturalists constructed scientific knowledge. Print and manuscript were necessary partners. Manuscript fostered close collaboration, and could be circulated relatively cheaply; but, unlike print, it could not reliably secure priority or survival for posterity. Naturalists approached scribal and print communication strategically, choosing the medium that best suited their goals at any given moment. As a result, print and scribal modes of disseminating information, constructing natural knowledge, and organizing communities developed in tandem. Practices typically associated with print culture manifested themselves in scribal texts and exchanges, and vice versa. “Print culture” cannot be hived off from “scribal culture.” Rather, in their daily jottings and exchanges, naturalists inhabited, and produced, one common culture of communication. (shrink)

Note?takers in early modern Europe mixed a number of scribal practices. Not only did they write down extracts of texts, they also collected data from observation or from accounting. Practices such as commonplacing were part of sometimes communal, rather informal personal practices that laid the foundations for personal diaries. Other note?taking was prescriptive, fact?establishing technical data entry. Yet both the personal, sentimental and technical forms of note?taking were interrelated. It was during this period that merchants, administrators, scholars and scientists (...) sought methods to transform raw information such as notes into formalized knowledge for practical use. Notes had formed a part of larger writing and archival projects since the dawn of writing and literacy, but during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, figures such as Bacon, Boyle and Pepys not only mixed note?taking practices from both scholarly and mercantile traditions; they also thought about the very act of note?taking and how to transform it into a tool for the management of large?scale government, industry and research. Most of all, in the seventeenth century, scholars, merchants and naturalists began thinking in formal terms about how to use notes as part of larger information systems which they called collections, compilations and even archives. (shrink)

This is the final textual volume in The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953, published in 3 series comprising 37 volumes: _The Early Works, 1882–1898 _; _The Middle Works, 1899–1924 _; _The Later Works, 1925–1953 _. Volume 17 contains Dewey’s writings discovered after publication of the appropriate volume of The Collected Works and spans most of Dewey’s publishing life. There are 83 items in this volume, 24 of which have not been previously published. Among works highlighted in this volume (...) are 10 “Educational Lectures before Brigham Young Academy,” early essays “War’s Social Results” and “The Problem of Secondary Education after the War,” and the previously unpublished “The Russian School System.”. (shrink)

Sébastien Le Clerc (1637–1714) was the most renowned engraver of Louis XIV's France. For the history of scientific publishing, however, Le Clerc represents a telling paradox. Even though he followed a traditional route based on classic artisanal training, he also published extensively on scientific topics such as cosmology and mathematics. While contemporary scholarship usually stresses the importance of artisanal writing as a direct expression of artisanal experience and know-how, Le Clerc's publications, and specifically the work on cosmology in hisSystème (...) du monde(1706–1708), go far beyond this. By reconstructing the debate between Le Clerc and the professor Mallemant de Messange on the authorship of this ‘system of the world’, this article argues that Le Clerc's involvement in publishing ventures shaped his identity both as an artisan and as a scientific author. Whereas the Scientific Revolution supposedly heralded a change from the world of ‘more or less’ to the ‘world of precision’, this article shows how an artisan could be more ‘precise’ than the learned scholar whose claims he disputed, and points to the importance of the literary field as a useful lens for observing the careers of early modern scientific practitioners. (shrink)

Levin follows the development of Freud's ideas up to Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, claiming that "his writings through 1905 can easily be recognized as containing virtually all the fundamental elements of his system." The interpretation has two complementary emphases: "that his early theoretical models were much more closely tied to current medical and psychological literature than has previously been acknowledged, and that, contrary to presently accepted views, Freud, from his first studies of the neuroses, consistently eschewed (...) speculations concerning possible organic explanations for these diseases". (shrink)

This is the final textual volume in The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882⿿1953, published in 3 series comprising 37 volumes: The Early Works, 1882⿿1898 ; The Middle Works, 1899⿿1924 ; The Later Works, 1925⿿1953. Volume 17 contains Dewey⿿s writings discovered after publication of the appropriate volume of The Collected Works and spans most of Dewey⿿s publishing life. There are 83 items in this volume, 24 of which have not been previously published. Among works highlighted in this volume are (...) 10 ⿿Educational Lectures before Brigham Young Academy,⿿ early essays ⿿War⿿s Social Results⿿ and ⿿The Problem of Secondary Education after the War,⿿ and the previously unpublished ⿿The Russian School System.⿿. (shrink)