Is moral philosophy more foundational than political philosophy? In other words, is "how to live?" more fundamental than "how to live together?" We were trained to say yes, but there was never any reason to believe it. Must rigorous reflection on how to live aim to derive necessary truths from timeless axioms, ignoring ephemeral contingencies of time and place? In the 1800s, philosophy left the contingencies to emerging departments of social science. Where did that leave philosophy? Did cutting ties (...) to empirical reality checks leave philosophers with deeper questions? Better answers? Here too, our practices suggest that we assume the answer is yes, but the truth appears to be no. To recover a measure of relevance to questions that truly need answers, theorizing about how to live together might take its cue from philosophy's current renewing of ties with political economy. We can ask which principles have a history of demonstrably being organizing principles of actual thriving communities at their best. (shrink)

There is considerable debate about the demands citizenship places upon us in our everyday lives. Living Together as Equals distinguishes two different ways of thinking about citizenship both of which shed some light on the demands that it makes upon us.

" In this volume, the paradoxes, impossibilities, and singular chances that haunt the necessity of "living together" are evoked in Derrida's essay "Avowing--The Impossible: 'Returns,' Repentance, and Reconciliation," around which the ...

Environmental ethics uniquely challenges us to re-examine the foundations of ethical thought. Ethical frameworks that focus on individual ethical agents and ethical patients, ignoring their status as parts of interrelated communities, lead to strongly counterintuitive results in important cases. Ideas only hinted at in Aldo Leopold’s idea of “land ethic” can be developed fruitfully by extending a pragmatist ethical framework drawn from the work of William James. Such a framework is not without difficulties, but does offer a potentially valuable way (...) of framing our ethical obligations toward the encompassing environment within which we live. (shrink)

Environmental ethics uniquely challenges us to re-examine the foundations of ethical thought. Ethical frameworks that focus on individual ethical agents and ethical patients, ignoring their status as parts of interrelated communities, lead to strongly counterintuitive results in important cases. Ideas only hinted at in Aldo Leopold’s idea of “land ethic” can be developed fruitfully by extending a pragmatist ethical framework drawn from the work of William James. Such a framework is not without difficulties, but does offer a potentially valuable way (...) of framing our ethical obligations toward the encompassing environment within which we live. (shrink)

Philosophising, as Spinoza conceives it, is the project of learning to live joyfully. This in turn is a matter of learning to live together, and the most obvious test of philosophical insight is our capacity to sustain a harmonious way of life. Susan James defends this interpretation and explores Spinoza's influence on contemporary debates.

In _The Preparation of the Novel_, a collection of lectures delivered at a defining moment in Roland Barthes's career (and completed just weeks before his death), the critic spoke of his struggle to discover a different way of writing and a new approach to life. _The Neutral_ preceded this work, containing Barthes's challenge to the classic oppositions of Western thought and his effort to establish new pathways of meaning. _How to Live Together_ predates both of these achievements, a series of (...) lectures exploring solitude and the degree of contact necessary for individuals to exist and create at their own pace. A distinct project that sets the tone for his subsequent lectures, _How to Live Together_ is a key introduction to Barthes's pedagogical methods and critical worldview. In this work, Barthes focuses on the concept of "idiorrhythmy," a productive form of living together in which one recognizes and respects the individual rhythms of the other. He explores this phenomenon through five texts that represent different living spaces and their associated ways of life: Émile Zola's _Pot-Bouille_, set in a Parisian apartment building; Thomas Mann's _The Magic Mountain_, which takes place in a sanatorium; André Gide's _La Séquestrée de Poitiers_, based on the true story of a woman confined to her bedroom; Daniel Defoe's _Robinson Crusoe_, about a castaway on a remote island; and Pallidius's _Lausiac History_, detailing the ascetic lives of the desert fathers. As with his previous lecture books, _How to Live Together_ exemplifies Barthes's singular approach to teaching, in which he invites his audience to investigate with him--or for him--and wholly incorporates his listeners into his discoveries. Rich with playful observations and suggestive prose, _How to Live Together_ orients English-speaking readers to the full power of Barthes's intellectual adventures. (shrink)

This book comprises essays centered on Aristotle’s objectivist conception of eudaimonia, especially the roles played in it by activities of theoretical and practical intellect and the quality of our relationships with one another. Common objections to grounding this conception in the “proper function” of a human being are answered by appeal to the role played by Aristotle’s teleologically driven essentialism. His struggle to reconcile living in accordance with distinctively human virtues with the ideal of living a “divine” contemplative (...) life is explored, along with puzzles about how to reconcile his conception of eudaimonia as the ultimate end of human action with the parallel requirements that virtuous agents choose to engage in virtuous action “for itself” and that friends love their friends “for themselves.” Readings of Aristotle’s “eudaimonism” as a form of rational egoism are challenged by appeal to an original account of the ideal friend as an “other self,” one that stresses appreciation of the friend’s character “for itself” (apart from any relationships in which it happens to stand to the agent’s own needs and/or tastes) but acknowledges the role played by pleasure in “character friendship.” The friend’s good is not, as on “colonizing ego” readings, part of the agent’s own. Rather, the ideal friend recognizes the value her friend’s activity has for him and she take pleasure in his activity as such. This explains why even the maximally self-sufficient (and so most godlike) agent, who needs nothing from a friend, will nevertheless want to have at least one. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, the most characteristic activity of friendship is “living together” [to suzên]. This paper seeks to understand living together in the light of his famous, foundational claim that humans are social by nature. Based on an interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics 9.9, I explain our need for friends in terms of a more fundamental human need to appreciate one's life as a whole. I then argue that friendship is built into the very structure of human (...) life itself such that human living is living together. (shrink)

Viver de forma autônoma, em paz e em harmonia ainda é um estorvo para os seres humanos. O documento Learning to live together in peace and harmony, publicação conjunta da UNESCO-APNIEVE, retrata essa dificuldade e expressa os desafios políticos, econômicos, sociais, étnicos e culturais que os habitantes da região Ásia-Pacífico enfrentam para aprender a viver de maneira autônoma, pacífica e harmoniosa. O documento defende que o caminho para esse processo é mudar o modelo vigente, voltado para criar uma força (...) de trabalho qualificada, para uma concepção de Educação voltada para a formação humana, para o desenvolvimento da pessoa por inteiro. A Educação é aqui concebida a partir da totalidade das dimensões humanas e deve facultar ao educando a compreensão de sua realidade interior e da realidade dos seus arredores, aguçando a sua capacidade para se autodeterminar, ser autônomo e expressar as suas potencialidades. A Educação integral deve ofertar ao aprendiz caminhos por meio dos quais ele possa pouco a pouco entrar em contato com as inúmeras facetas das suas dimensões, de modo que o processo formativo direcione o indivíduo para uma forma de viver equilibrada com ele mesmo, com os outros seres vivos e com a natureza. A Educação como processo de formação humana deve permitir o desenvolvimento de um modo de ser e de viver direcionado para a humanização do homem. A proposta advoga a ideia que os indivíduos e a sociedade devem dar prioridade ao desenvolvimento pessoal e social a partir de quatro valores fundamentais: paz, direitos humanos, democracia e desenvolvimento sustentável. O objetivo deste artigo é refletir sobre o documento Learning to live together in peace and harmony como o ponto de partida para o processo formativo-educacional do ser humano. Palavras-chave: Formação humana. Educação. Educação integral. Autonomia. Unesco-Apnieve. (shrink)

Today’s societies face the minorities that want recognition and respect for cultural differences. Kymlicka names it the challenge of multiculturalism. It is considered that identity and recognition problems have recently come to the fore because of a transformation in the perception of subject, truth, reason caused by postmodernism. Kymlicka claims that even if it is more difficult to live together today, it is not because of the so-called post-truth age. In his opinion, we have never reached absolute common grounds (...) before, either. So, it is not true that we cannot get common grounds by we do not believe metaphysical truths anymore. He already believes that a sense of justice does not count on the metaphysical truths, but it can be based on social identities and a sense of belonging. So, he thinks that an overlapping consensus is possible. However, I will defend a different perspective about pluralism and living together. I think that modus vivendi is an undeniable universal fact. For this reason, an overlapping consensus as a model of living together can only be possible domestically at the expense of a global modus vivendi. (shrink)

In _The Preparation of the Novel_, a collection of lectures delivered at a defining moment in Roland Barthes's career, the critic spoke of his struggle to discover a different way of writing and a new approach to life. _The Neutral_ preceded this work, containing Barthes's challenge to the classic oppositions of Western thought and his effort to establish new pathways of meaning. _How to Live Together_ predates both of these achievements, a series of lectures exploring solitude and the degree of (...) contact necessary for individuals to exist and create at their own pace. A distinct project that sets the tone for his subsequent lectures, _How to Live Together_ is a key introduction to Barthes's pedagogical methods and critical worldview. In this work, Barthes focuses on the concept of "idiorrhythmy," a productive form of living together in which one recognizes and respects the individual rhythms of the other. He explores this phenomenon through five texts that represent different living spaces and their associated ways of life: Émile Zola's _Pot-Bouille_, set in a Parisian apartment building; Thomas Mann's _The Magic Mountain_, which takes place in a sanatorium; André Gide's _La Séquestrée de Poitiers_, based on the true story of a woman confined to her bedroom; Daniel Defoe's _Robinson Crusoe_, about a castaway on a remote island; and Pallidius's _Lausiac History_, detailing the ascetic lives of the desert fathers. As with his previous lecture books, _How to Live Together_ exemplifies Barthes's singular approach to teaching, in which he invites his audience to investigate with him -- or for him -- and wholly incorporates his listeners into his discoveries. Rich with playful observations and suggestive prose, _How to Live Together_ orients English-speaking readers to the full power of Barthes's intellectual adventures. (shrink)

For an educational zeitgeist so rooted, and understandably so, in measurable, scalable, and replicable results, it is difficult to entertain the idea of an unquantifiable goalpost. Although terms l...

Spinoza on Learning to Live Together is a collection of nine of Susan James’ previously published papers alongside four more essays published for the first time.

Future Politics confronts the most important question of our time: how will digital technology change society?

This essay focuses on political implications of Derrida’s messianicité as a form of Marrano messianism: a universal vision of community “out of joints” which, despite its disjointedness and inner separation, nonetheless addresses itself as “we”. By referring to the generalized “Marrano experience” – the fate of those Sephardic Jews who were forced to convert to Christianity and, in consequence, became neither Jewish nor Christian – Derrida takes the Marrano as his paradigmatic political figure of a “rogue” who escapes every identity (...) politics. In Derrida’s project of “living together”, the Marrano stands for the non-participatory remnant of otherness which is not just the other of this or that particular tradition, but becomes a bearer of a new universalism, based not on the abstract notion of human nature but on the non-identity, a distance-from-identity or what Yirmijahu Yovel calls the “non-integral identity.”. (shrink)

In On the Difficulty of Living Together, Manuel Cruz launches a nuanced study of memory and forgetting, defining their forms and uses, political meanings, and social and historical implications. Memory is not an intrinsically positive phenomenon, he argues, but an impressionable and malleable one, used to advance a variety of agendas. Cruz focuses on five memory models: that which is inherently valuable, that which legitimizes the present, that which supports retributive justice, that which is essential to mourning, and (...) that which elicits renunciation or revelation. His methodical approach makes sense of memory's positive and negative effects, its contradictions, and its tensions. Cruz shows us that remembering is not necessarily an end in itself, nor is it a supreme value, immune to external influence. The exercise of memory guarantees nothing, though many insist it is a progressive act preventing the repetition of past mistakes. Tying the making of memory to the movements of history, Cruz prioritizes memory's political dimensions over its philosophical aspects and helps us remember its myriad uses. (shrink)

Aristotle’s account of friendship has largely withstood the test of time. Yet there are overlooked elements of his account that, when challenged by apparent threats of current and emerging communication technologies, reveal his account to be remarkably prescient. I evaluate the danger that technological advances in communication pose to the future of friendship by examining and defending Aristotle’s claim that perfect or character-friends must live together. I concede that technologically-mediated communication can aid existing character-friendships, but I argue that character-friendships (...) cannot be created and sustained entirely through technological meditation. I examine text-based technologies, such as Facebook and email, and engage a non-text based technology that poses the greatest threat to my thesis—Skype. I then address philosophical literature on friendship and technology that has emerged in the last decade in Ethics and Information Technology to elucidate and defend my account by contrast. I engage Cocking and Matthews (2000), who argue that friendship cannot be created and sustained entirely through text-based contact, Briggle (2008), who argues that friendship can be created and sustained entirely through text-based contact, and Munn (2012), who argues that friendship cannot be created and entirely sustained through text-based contact but can be created and sustained entirely in immersive virtual worlds. My account discusses a certain kind of friendship, character-friendship, and a certain kind of technology, Skype, that these accounts do not. Examination of these essays helps to demonstrate that character friendship cannot be sustained entirely by technologically-aided communication and that character-friends must live together. (shrink)

Drawing primarily from the cultural traditions and beliefs of the Muscogee peoples, I will provide an account of how harmony can play a foundational role in providing a structure to morality. In the process of providing this account, I will begin (§2) by defining two key Muscogee concepts: ‘energy’ (§2.1) and ‘harmony’ (§2.2). I will also explain how the relationship between these two concepts can provide a structure for morality. Then I will explain the conditions that make promoting harmony a (...) normative principle (§3) by explaining why promoting harmony is relevant to humans (§3.1) as well as a providing a prudential reason to promote harmony (§3.2). Finally, I will explain how harmony can be achieved (§4) by explaining two examples that highlight the importance of non-moral knowledge in promoting harmony. I will then conclude with some remarks about how the Muscogee concept of harmony relates to some contemporary metaethical concerns (§5). (shrink)

본 논문의 목적은 『니코마코스 윤리학』 제9권 제9장에 대한 해석을 바탕으로 인간의 삶 그 자체의 본질적 구조가 ‘더불어 사는 것’임을 논증하는 것이다. 이를 위하여 필자는 친구 및 즐거움에 대한 아리스토텔레스의 설명에 주목한다. 아리스토텔레스는 우리 자신이 존재하고 있음을 지각하는 것이 즐겁다는 것을 특별히 강조한다. 아리스토텔레스에 의하면, 자기 지각이 즐거운 것은 자기 지각을 통해서 삶이 좋은 것으로서 드러나고 우리 자신이 좋음을 가지고 있는 존재자로서 드러난다는 사실 때문이다. 따라서 우리 자신이 살아 있다는 것을 지각하는 것은 우리 자신의 삶을 좋고 가치 있는 것으로서 즐기거나 음미하는 (...) 하나의 방식임을 의미한다. 우리 자신이 살아 있다는 지각은 우리의 삶의 목표를 성찰하는 지적 행위와는 다르다. 왜냐하면 지각에는 무시되거나 사소한 것으로 여겨져서는 안 되는 정서적 차원이 있기 때문이다. 아리스토텔레스에 의하면, 정서적으로 우리의 삶을 좋고 가치 있는 것으로 체험하는 데 결정적으로 기여하는 것이 바로 친구이다. 공동 지각을 통해서 친구들은 서로의 삶에서 좋음을 조명할 수 있다. 그렇게 함으로써 전체로서의 삶이 좋다는 것을 드러내주는 즐김의 가능성이 지속된다. 달리 말해서 친구들은 살아 있다는 것을 느끼기 위하여 서로를 필요로 한다. 공동 지각이란 친구들이 서로의 삶이나 서로의 존재를 좋고, 의미 있고, 바람직한 것으로 느끼는 방식을 가리킨다. 공동 지각은 서로의 삶에 대해서 잘 알고 있을 것을 요구한다. 이 잘 알고 있음은 삶의 특성, 삶의 역사, 삶의 궤적을 아는 데서, 그리고 그 삶이 어떻게 체험되었는지에 대한 공감적 이해에서 성립한다. 따라서 공동 지각은 더불어 사는 것을 전제한다. 만약 우리가 인간으로서 친구와 더불어 살아야 하고 더불어 사는 것이 우리의 삶을 충만하게 하는 활동이라면, 인간의 삶은 더불어 사는 것일 수밖에 없다. 필자는 이것이 바로 인간은 본성상 사회적이라는 아리스토텔레스의 유명한 명제가 의미하는 것이라고 생각한다. (shrink)

This book addresses the challenges of living together after empire in many post-colonial cities. It is organized in two sections. The first section focuses on efforts by people of multiple faiths to live together within their contexts, including such efforts within a neighborhood in urban Manchester; the array of attempts at creating multi-faith spaces for worship across the globe; and initiatives to commemorate divisive conflict together in Northern Ireland. The second section utilizes particular postcolonial methods to (...) illuminate pressing issues within specific contexts—including women’s leadership in an indigenous denomination in the variegated African landscape, and baptism and discipleship among Dalit communities in India. In the context of growing multiculturalism in the West, this volume offers a postcolonial theological resource, challenging the epistemologies in the Western academy. (shrink)

This book addresses the challenges of living together after empire in many post-colonial cities. It is organized in two sections. The first section focuses on efforts by people of multiple faiths to live together within their contexts, including such efforts within a neighborhood in urban Manchester; the array of attempts at creating multi-faith spaces for worship across the globe; and initiatives to commemorate divisive conflict together in Northern Ireland. The second section utilizes particular postcolonial methods to (...) illuminate pressing issues within specific contexts—including women’s leadership in an indigenous denomination in the variegated African landscape, and baptism and discipleship among Dalit communities in India. In the context of growing multiculturalism in the West, this volume offers a postcolonial theological resource, challenging the epistemologies in the Western academy. (shrink)

For too long, Spinoza's ethics was misread as an ethics of ideals, in which the most virtuous life possible was said to consist of the life of pure reasoning. The "free man," Spinoza's paragon of virtue, was understood to be the individual who is neither helped nor harmed by anything external. The goal, on this view, was to transcend the life of the body, of the material, and of the political, in order to focus solely on becoming like God by (...) increasing one's store of rational ideas.This, of course, is an impoverished understanding of Spinoza's aims. Not only does it cast virtue as something unattainable for actually existing, materially and socially embedded individuals, but it overlooks a vast swath of Spinoza's... (shrink)

In Can We Live Together? Alain Touraine combines a consummate analysis of crucial social tensions in contemporary societies with a strong normative appeal for a new emancipatory 'Subject' capable of overcoming the twin threats of atomisation or authoritarianism. He calls for a move from 'politics to ethics' and then from ethics back to politics to enable the new Subject to make a reality out of the goals of democracy and solidarity. However, he has little to say about the nature (...) of such an ethics. This article argues that this lacuna could usefully be filled by adopting a form of radical humanism found in the work of Erich Fromm. It defies convention in the social sciences by operating from an explicit view of the 'is' and the 'ought' of common human nature, specifying reason, love and productive work as the qualities to be realised if we are to move closer to human solidarity. Although there remain significant philosophical and political differences between the two positions, particularly on the role to be played by 'the nation', their juxtaposition opens new lines of inquiry in the field of cosmopolitan ethics. (shrink)

Living together peacefully in a world of differences asks for a practice of respecting the irreducible difference of the other. Acknowledging this `not-me' of the other subject generates an in-between: a space/time between subjects that cannot be transgressed other than by violence. Following Irigaray, I argue that this `in-between' comes about through the passion of wonder, a being touched in the flesh in the encounter with the other, which opens the subject to him/herself and to the other. To (...) perceive this touch asks for a life-style directed at keeping open and sensitizing the sensibilities of the senses, so that the subject's aesthesis or awareness for the perceptions of the sensible flesh and of its reactions to the other is heightened. Key-element in this aesthetics is the practice of breathing. It enables the subject to remain rooted in him/or herself and open to the other: generating and respecting the in-between between them. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Politics: Living Well and Living Together, Eugene Garver’s third book on key texts of the Aristotelian corpus, charts the relationship between politics and philosophy through careful detailing of Aristotle’s text. In other words, Garver reads the Politics for us. This is an achievement in itself given the gravity of both Garver’s and Aristotle’s thinking. Garver’s reading elaborates the arguments of the Politics in order to establish a claim for what he calls “political philosophy.” His reading offers (...) a methodological defense for a form of thinking that is itself not necessarily either “practical” or “political,” at least as scholars of rhetoric would tend to understand these terms. But Garver gives us .. (shrink)

Professor Garver’s “Living Well and Living Together” sheds light on one of the more confusing sections in Aristotle’s Politics, namely the discussion of the best way of life for individuals and city in Politics VII.1-3. At a distance, the conclusion of Aristotle’s remarks seem relatively clear: He endorses the claim that the most choice-worthy life and happiness of a city and an individual are the same. Further, the implications of such a claim for Aristotle’s political philosophy also (...) seem clear: Aristotle’s view of an “internally active” city amounts to a thorough critique of expansionist imperialism. But how these two surface level views—the best way of life for a city and the critique of imperialism—fit together is less than perspicuous. Garver’s paper goes after this text through the lens of two problems. First, Aristotle apparently argues from the nature of the best way of life or happiness for an individual to the best way of life for a city. But as Aristotle himself points out in his critique of the Republic, such an argument seems in danger of falling into a fallacy of composition. In response to such a perceived fallacy, Garver argues that Aristotle incorporates into his argument a third thing—what is the best life for a citizen or what Garver calls “common life” (p. 5, 6, of Garver’s text)—which mediates between the best life for a separate individual and for the city. As Garver puts it at one point “the best life for the citizen will be our means for discovering those [other] two” (p. 5, Garver’s text). The second problem which Garver raises concerns Aristotle’s apparent inference from energeiai to dunameis. Aristotle’s argument in Politics VII.1-3 begins from the claim that a city and individual have the same kind of happiness—namely, a sort of energeia—and extends to a claim about the structure which serves as the basis of that activity. The problem, according to Garver, is that “the virtues of the state cannot be energeiai of that part of its soul, because states don’t have souls” (p. 6, Garver’s text). The comparison between city and individual works—if it does work—only if “the psychological aspects of the virtue central to the Ethics become politically irrelevant” (p. 7, Garver’s text). Thus, Garver suggests that Aristotle’s comparison of city and individual comes at a cost, viz. that “Aristotle can talk about states being virtuous and happy only because of this psychological superficiality” (p. 9, Garver’s text). (shrink)

Manuel Cruz launches a nuanced study of memory and forgetting, defining their forms and uses, political meanings, and social and historical implications. Memory is not an intrinsically positive phenomenon, he argues, but an impressionable and malleable one, used to advance a variety of agendas. Cruz focuses on five memory models: that which is inherently valuable; that which legitimizes the present; that which supports retributive justice; that which is essential to mourning; and that which elicits renunciation or revelation.

Imaging Otherness explores relationships between film and religion, aesthetics and ethics. The volume examines these relationships by viewing how otherness is imaged in film and how otherness alternately might be imagined. Drawing from a variety of films from differing religious perspectives -- including Chan Buddhism, Hinduism, Native American religions, Christianity, and Judaism -- the essays gathered in this volume examine the particular problems of 'living together' when faced with the tensions brought out through the otherness of differing sexualities, (...) ethnicities, genders, religions, cultures, and families. (shrink)

A neighborhood in a US city seems to present a possibly unique exception to empirical generalizations and explanations of urban decline and occasional rehabilitation. Resisting decline, gentrification, and outside interests and actors, the neighborhood generated a subculture created by working class artists. As a valuable occasion for revising urban social theory, this essay draws on the work of Howard S. Becker, Pierre Bourdieu, Henri Lefebvre, Jacques Rancière, and Georg Simmel, among others. It relies on ethnographic method for its empirical findings.