The body relation of the sexes, Naked Reality, is an ever present fact -- in us, of us, is us as fleshed race factors, Human Race Creators. An old philosopher asks us to get out of our bodies to think; to him..

While new regulations obligate or recommend people to wear medical masks at public places to prevent further spread of the Covid-19 virus, there are still open questions as to what face coverage does to social emotional communication. Previous research on the effects of wearing veils or face-covering niqabs showed that covering of the mouth led to the attribution of negative emotions and to the perception of less intense positive emotions. The current study compares a sample from the Netherlands with a (...) sample from the United Arab Emirates on their perception of emotions from faces covered by a niqab, censoring black bars, or uncovered faces. The results show that covering the mouth area leads to greater anxiety in participants in both countries. Furthermore, although participants did not report greater decoding difficulties for faces that were covered as compared to fully visible, results show that face coverage did influence emotion perception. Specifically, happiness and anger were perceived as being less intense. Further, face coverage by a niqab, as compared to black bars, yielded lower emotional intensity ratings. We conclude that face coverage in particular can modulate the perception of emotions, but that affective contextual cues may play a role as well. (shrink)

Each decade since 1979, the Healthy People initiative establishes the national prevention agenda and provides the foundation for disease prevention and health promotion policies and programs. Law and policy have been included in Healthy People objectives from the start, but not integrated into the overall initiative as well as possible to potentially leverage change to meet Healthy People targets and goals. This article provides background on the Healthy People initiative and its use among various stakeholder groups, describes the work of (...) a project aiming to better integrate law and policy into this initiative, and discusses the development of Healthy People 2030 — the next iteration of health goals for the nation. Lessons from the preliminary stages of developing Healthy People by the HHS Secretary's Advisory Committee on National Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Objectives for 2030 and a Federal Interagency Workgroup will be included. Efforts by the Committee focused on the role of law and policy as determinants of health and valuable resources around health equity are also shared. Finally, the article discusses ways that law and policy can potentially be tools to help meet Healthy People targets and to attain national health goals. (shrink)

We bear witness to a sweeping social movement for change—fostered and driven by a powerful group of Black nurses and nursing students determined to call out and dismantle anti‐Black racism and discrimination within the profession of nursing. The Black Nurses Task Force, launched by the Registered Nurses' Association of Ontario (RNAO) in July 2020, is building momentum for long‐standing change in the profession by critically examining the racist and discriminatory history of nursing, listening to and learning from the lived experiences (...) of the Black nursing community, and shaping concrete, actionable steps to confront anti‐Black racism and discrimination in academic settings, workplaces, and nursing organizations. The Black Nurses Task Force and the RNAO are standing up and speaking out in acknowledgment of the magnitude of anti‐Black racism and discrimination that exist in our profession, health system, justice system, and economic system. This social movement is demonstrating, in actions, how individuals and a collective act as change agents to drive meaningful and widespread change for our present and future Black nurses. We also acknowledge the Black nurses who have gone before us. (shrink)

This book provides practical and research-based chapters that offer greater clarity about the particular kinds of teacher reflection that matter and avoids talking about teacher reflection generically, which implies that all kinds of reflection are of equal value.

This study examines the cross‐cultural generality of Hering's (1878/1964) color‐opponent theory of color appearance. English‐speaking and Somali‐speaking observers performed variants of two paradigms classically used to study color‐opponency. First, both groups identified similar red, green, blue, and yellow unique hues. Second, 25 English‐speaking and 34 Somali‐speaking observers decomposed the colors present in 135 Munsell color samples into their component Hering elemental sensations—red,green,blue, yellow, white, and black—or else responded “no term.” Both groups responded no term for many samples, notably purples. Somali (...) terms for yellow were often used to name colors all around the color circle, including colors that are bluish according to Hering's theory. Four Somali Grue speakers named both green and blue elicitation samples by their term for green. However, that term did not name the union of all samples called blue or green by English speakers. A similar pattern was found among three Somali Achromatic speakers, who called the blue elicitation sample black or white. Thus, color decomposition by these Somali‐speaking observers suggests a lexically influenced re‐dimensionalization of color appearance space, rather than a simple reduction of the one proposed by Hering. Even some Somali Green‐Blue speakers, whose data were otherwise similar to English, showed similar trends in yellow and blue usage. World Color Survey data mirror these results. These within‐ and cross‐cultural violations of Hering's theory do not challenge the long‐standing view that universal sensory processes mediate color appearance. However, they do demonstrate an important contribution of language in the human understanding of color. (shrink)

Ethical decision-making frameworks assist in identifying the issues at stake in a particular setting and thinking through, in a methodical manner, the ethical issues that require consideration as well as the values that need to be considered and promoted. Decisions made about the use, sharing, and re-use of big data are complex and laden with values. This paper sets out an Ethics Framework for Big Data in Health and Research developed by a working group convened by the Science, Health and (...) Policy-relevant Ethics in Singapore Initiative. It presents the aim and rationale for this framework supported by the underlying ethical concerns that relate to all health and research contexts. It also describes a set of substantive and procedural values that can be weighed up in addressing these concerns, and a step-by-step process for identifying, considering, and resolving the ethical issues arising from big data uses in health and research. This Framework is subsequently applied in the papers published in this Special Issue. These papers each address one of six domains where big data is currently employed: openness in big data and data repositories, precision medicine and big data, real-world data to generate evidence about healthcare interventions, AI-assisted decision-making in healthcare, public-private partnerships in healthcare and research, and cross-sectoral big data. (shrink)

Adolescence is a crucial time for social development, especially for helping and compassionate behaviors; yet brain networks involved in adolescent prosociality and compassion currently remain underexplored. Here, we sought to evaluate a recently proposed domain-general developmental network model of prosocial cognition by relating adolescent functional and structural brain networks with prosocial and compassionate disposition. We acquired resting state fMRI and diffusion MRI from 95 adolescents along with self-report questionnaires assessing prosociality and compassion. We then applied the Network-Based Statistic to inductively (...) investigate whether there is a significant subnetwork related to prosociality and compassion while controlling for age and sex. Based on the Do-GooD model, we expected that this subnetwork would involve connectivity to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex from three domain-general networks, the default mode network, the salience network, and the control network, as well as from the DMN to the mirror neuron systems. NBS revealed a significant functional subnetwork related to prosociality and compassion connecting 31 regions, showing DMN and DLPFC connectivity to the VMPFC; DMN connectivity to mirror neuron systems; and connectivity between the DMN and cerebellum. These findings largely support and extend the Do-GooD model of prosocial cognition in adolescents by further illuminating network-based relationships that have the potential to advance our understanding of brain mechanisms of prosociality. (shrink)

Levels of organization and their use in science have received increased philosophical attention of late, including challenges to the well-foundedness or widespread usefulness of levels concepts. One kind of response to these challenges has been to advocate a more precise and specific levels concept that is coherent and useful. Another kind of response has been to argue that the levels concept should be taken as a heuristic, to embrace its ambiguity and the possibility of exceptions as acceptable consequences of its (...) usefulness. In this chapter, I suggest that each of these strategies faces its own attendant downsides, and that pursuit of both strategies (by different thinkers) compounds the difficulties. That both kinds of approaches are advocated is, I think, illustrative of the problems plaguing the concept of levels of organization. I end by suggesting that the invocation of levels may mislead scientific and philosophical investigations more than it informs them, so our use of the levels concept should be updated accordingly. (shrink)

Drawing on a landscape analysis of existing data-sharing initiatives, in-depth interviews with expert stakeholders, and public deliberations with community advisory panels across the U.S., we describe features of the evolving medical information commons. We identify participant-centricity and trustworthiness as the most important features of an MIC and discuss the implications for those seeking to create a sustainable, useful, and widely available collection of linked resources for research and other purposes.

Presents a plethora of approaches to developing human potential in areas not conventionally addressed. Organized in two parts, this international collection of essays provides viable educational alternatives to those currently holding sway in an era of high-stakes accountability.

It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, (...) but that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported. Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn’t possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all. (shrink)

Somatic or inherited mutations in the adenomatous polyposis coli (APC) gene are a frequent cause of colorectal cancer in humans. APC protein has an important tumor suppression function to reduce cellular levels of the signaling protein β‐catenin and, thereby, inhibit β‐catenin and T‐cell‐factor‐mediated gene expression. In addition, APC protein binds to microtubules in vertebrate cells and localizes to actin‐rich adherens junctions in epithelial cells of the fruit fly Drosophila (Fig. 1). Very little is known, however, about the function of these (...) cytoskeletal associations. Recently, Hamada and Bienz have described a potential role for Drosophila E‐APC in cellular adhesion,1 which offers new clues to APC function in embryonic development, and potentially colorectal adenoma formation and tumor progression in humans. BioEssays 24:771–774, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:510 Feminist Studies 44, no. 2. © 2018 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Some women are plain. Not ugly, but plain, like bread without butter. It seems unfair at first. Why can’t we luxuriate in pools of Pre-Raphaelite hair? Why must we walk under dry brown bobs? Beauty is not shallow, although Ophelia drowned in a thin layer of oil paint brushed to look like water. Beauty’s naturally easy, but (...) plain takes cultivation. Sisters, listen. Plain becomes us. It’s a biome, not a state. It’s a wink: hey Tallgrass. It’s asters. Sisters, resist the nervous chorus that insists you’re beautiful in your own way. Say no. Say I am plain. Angela Sorby Limn Claire G. Moses Award for the Most Theoretically Innovative Article Published in the Journal in 2017 Feminist Studies is pleased to announce that Tara Daly is the winner of the 2017 “Claire G. Moses Annual Award for the Most Theoretically Innovative Article.” Daly was selected for her article “Christian Bendayán: Queering the Archive from Iquitos, Peru,” which was published in Volume 43, Number 2 (2017). In her article, Daly focuses on Iquitos artist Christian Bendayán, a visual artist who is of a cohort of Peruvian artists assembling a “counterarchive” that contests the heteronormative frame that has shaped how the Amazon has been imagined and represented. Daly shows how Bendayán effectively queers the archive and provides a compelling counterpoint to the way Iquitos has been historically understood. * * * The award, given to the most theoretically innovative article published in Feminist Studies each year, was created to honor Claire Goldberg Moses on her retirement as editorial director of Feminist Studies, a position she held from 1977 to 2011.... (shrink)

À vouloir résumer dans une formule l'histoire de plus d'une décennie de Memoria, je suis tentée d'affirmer qu'il s'est agi d'une expérience d'invention avec une innovation et une diffusion limitées. L'allusion du titre est, évidemment, à la célèbre distinction entre invention, innovation et diffusion proposée en 1912 par Joseph Schumpete. Sur la base de cette tripartition, l'innovation se trouve précédée de l'invention qui lance l'idée de quelque chose de nouveau et d'utile pour le progrès, t...

Human social interaction is varied, complex and always changing. How we perceive each other and ourselves, how individuals interact within groups, and how groups are structured--all these are the domain of social psychology. Many have doubted, however, that a full-fledged social psychology textbook can successfully be written from a Christian perspective. Inevitably, some say, when attempting to integrate theology and social psychology, one discipline must suffer at the expense of the other. Angela Sabates counters that thinking by demonstrating how (...) these two disciplines can indeed be brought together in a fruitful way. She crisply covers key topics in social psychology, utilizing research that is well grounded in the empirical and theoretical literature, while demonstrating how a distinctively Christian approach can offer fresh ideas and understandings. Why doesn t our behavior always match what we say we believe? How and when are we most likely to be persuaded? What is the social psychology of violence? How reliable are eyewitness testimonies? Are racism and prejudice on the decline or are we just better at hiding them? Sabates draws out the implications of a Christian view of human persons on these and other central subjects within the well-established framework of social psychological study. This volume is for those looking for a core text that makes use of a Christian theological perspective to explore what the science of psychology suggests to us about the nature of human social interaction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Medical MishapAngela MooreIn western society we live in an environment where image is valued and sought after. Acquiring Spastic Cerebral Palsy through no fault of one’s own directly challenges and contradicts this. We tend to base our judgments of other people on the way they “look” before we even speak to them or get to know them. For many centuries western society has valued and aspired to having (...) the “perfect” image and body shape. The children’s nursery rhyme “Humpty Dumpty” illustrates that as far back as the 1600’s when something was broken people felt there was a “need” to correct the damage and fix the problem. Maybe “Humpty Dumpty” was an obese person who fell off the wall, maybe he was an intoxicated soldier, maybe it was a name of a large cannon that was sitting on the wall of Colchester (Wright, 2008) which was set up to protect the city. No matter what the situation, the reader is left with a feeling that whenever there was something wrong with Humpty Dumpty, there was a need to correct the error and fix what was broken. Because he was “different” or “not normal” in one way or another he was not valued for his role by members of his local community. The reader is left to form his or her own opinion. Society continues to hold those views to this very day.I am a secondary emergency teacher, have completed a Masters in Special Needs along with having a permanent acquired physical disability, Spastic Cerebral Palsy, affecting my four limbs. This was caused after an initial medical examination was “botched” by an unsupervised intern—the specialist left the theatre during the procedure when I was 14 weeks of age, over forty years ago. Further medical testing was arranged because there was a belief that I may have had hydrocephalus—swelling and excess fluid buildup around my brain causing it to be unnecessarily enlarge for my age. In my family’s case this seems to be an hereditary trait that has passed from my father who has a large head. It’s interesting to note that an obstetrician made a comment to my sister on the size of her toddler’s head. [End Page 213]Since 1970 I have had a range of both positive and negative medical experiences. As a child who wasn’t able to comprehend what and why things were happening I was very frightened and often very upset. As an adult I am able to understand what and why something is going on and I ask questions when needed.“Normal” has always been completing the same things but in a different way to other people while intending to reach the same outcome of “success.” There are many ways to skin a cat and “normal” is a term that has a very broad definition which is dependent upon the individual and the situation at hand. What is “normal” for me will be “different” for someone else. What is “normal” for another person will be “different” for me. It’s the differences between individuals that we come to value later on in life. That I cope in a different manner from others has clearly been aided by being able to make use of information technology—laptop, mobile phones, printers, etc.—along with a feeling that the acquired physical disability that I have is a small part of the overall person that I am. Before I became a person with an acquired disability I was a normal, happy, healthy baby and even now although I will always have a disability I have excellent health and choose not to be defined by having acquired a disability. Unlike some other people I consider myself to be a person who “acquired” a disability instead of being a “disabled” person. Having an acquired physical disability is a small part of the person I am. The manner in which I acquired a severe physical disability is what I have come to value along with the fact that I have done well in many areas of life while having such a severe condition.Unlike people who had disabilities in the 19... (shrink)

Let’s consider the following paradox (Fodor [1989], Jackson and Petit [1988] [1992], Drestke [1988], Block [1991], Lepore and Loewer [1987], Lewis [1986], Segal and Sober [1991]): i) The intentional content of a thought (or any other intentional state) is causally relevant to its behavioural (and other) effects. ii) Intentional content is nothing but the meaning of internal representations. But, iii) Internal processors are only sensitive to the syntactic structures of internal representations, not their meanings. Therefore it seems that if we (...) want to defend the idea -absolutely plausible from an intuitive point of view- that mental / intentional states are causally responsible for behavioural outputs and we want to do it on the physicalist basis of any scientific methodology, we will have to give up the conviction that such intentional states qua intentional, i. e. as having a particular meaning, are the ones causally responsible for our behaviour. The path that takes us to mental epiphenomenalism is clear: 1) the causal powers of any event are completely determined by its physical properties; 2) although intentional properties supervene on physical properties, they can’t be identified with them; 3) intentional properties, as intentional, are not causally responsible for behaviour, because they don’t take part in the causal powers of the states to which they belong, i. e., intentional properties are epiphenomenal. Let’s consider now a different yet parallel position to the one just described. There is an important debate in cognitive science about whether the class of mechanisms to which we belong and which the computational modelling project of cognitive processes refers to is best represented by classical or connectionist approaches (McClelland, Rumelhart et. al [1986], Smolensky [1987] [1988], Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988], Pinker and Prince [1988], Clark [1989], Ramsey, Stich and Rumelhart [1991], Clark and Karmiloff-Smith [forthcoming]).In classical, serial processing models, information is encoded in terms of rules that have a linguistic character. In connectionist or parallel distributed processing (PDP) models, the causal relationships among the units that constitute the system determine how the information is processes by the network, although these units don’t have a direct semantic interpretation. But, for both, classical and connectionist models, all the computations can be explained without any reference to the content of the processed information, i.e., in both cases the properties that seem to be responsible for the system’s behaviour are ultimately physical properties nor intentional ones. This situation mirrors thus, within cognitive science, the philosophical discussion concerning the causal efficacy of semantic properties. Now, if in this debate we opt for the classical paradigm, there is a way of finding a solution to the computational version of the epiphenomenalism paradox. This solution is based mainly on the notion of supervenience or, more precisely, on the notion of mereological supervenience (Kim [1984] [1988])1 . The idea of intentional properties supervening on physical properties makes sense within the classical context because there exists an easily isolable supervenience base comprising the syntactic items in the socalled language of thought. But, what happens if we opt for the connectionist paradigm?. The situation here doesn’t seem to favour the use of the same supervenience strategy. For it has been argued (Ramsey, Stich and Garon [1991]) that beliefs, desires, and other mental states are nor, in the connectionist paradigm, individuable as weight or activation states of the system. This is because information is encoded by the network in distributed and superpositional representations, i.e., there are no straightforwardly isolable vehicles at the physical level that can be identified as the articulated supervenience base on which the semantic properties supervene2 . If this is true, then the connectionist not only loses the battle against epiphenomenalism but more drastically, seems to offer a standing invitation to eliminativism, since talk of beliefs and desires, etc. now seems to be floating free of any acceptable scientific underpinning, i.e., she has lost the necessary theoretical apparatus for supporting the intuitive idea that propositional attitudes -beliefs, desires and any mental states with semantic content- are physically realized. This second line of argumentation doesn’t take us to a paradox but to a dilemma: either we accept eliminativism, if connectionist hypothesis are correct or we defend the causal efficacy of mental states with semantic content by showing that, after all, connectionist networks are not plausible cognitive models (Davies [1991]). From my point of view, however, both lines of argumentation need to be revised. The aim of this paper is to find an account of the causal efficacy of content that avoids the aforementioned epiphenomenalist objections and that doesn’t require the discovery of inner symbols in the computational modelling of such contentful mental states. In short, the aim is to find a meeting point where a philosophical story about content and cause and the connectionist computational model can be brought together (Cfr. Clark [1989]). (shrink)

Semantic properties are not commonly held to be part of the basic ontological furniture of the world. Consequently, we confront a problem: how to 'naturalize' semantics so as to reveal these properties in their true ontological colors? Dominant naturalistic theories address semantic properties as properties of some other kind. The reductionistic flavor is unmistakable. The following quote from Fodor's Psychosemantics is probably the contemporary locus classicus of this trend. Fodor is commendably unapologetic: "I suppose that sooner or later the physicists (...) will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear upon their list. But aboutness surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. It's hard to see, in the face of this consideration, how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else." Notice the shape of this explanatory project. Intentional properties will count as real in virtue of their identity with, or supervenience on, some set of lower-level physical properties. Fodor thus assumes, in effect, that the program of naturalization demands a higher-to-lower, top-to-bottom, kind of explanatory strategy. This paper addresses precisely that assumption, namely, that the non-semantic properties on which semantic properties depend, belong to what are intuitively lower levels of description than the intentional level itself. It also questions the higher-to-lower explanatory scheme associated with that assumption. My discussion of this topic draws on Robert Brandom's recent work and can be considered an analysis of Brandom's stance and its implications. The discussion should help to explain the general lack of progress in the project of naturalizing content. It should also help show why attempts to eliminate the normative vocabulary employed in specifying the practices that guide the use of a language are unlikely to succeed. I shall start by displaying the general order of explanation that characterizes typical naturalization projects, showing that even when a full reduction to physics is avoided, some important assumptions inherited from the explanatory model of physics remain. These include the demand for an array of causal explanations couched in terms of ultimate properties of the world, and the idea that such non-semantic properties should be constitutive of whatever semantic properties are in question. Extending Brandom's idea that the normativity of content is not reducible to physics, I shall argue that even such residual demands are inappropriate. More positively, I suggest that, despite the deep irreducibility of the normative dimension of content, we need not consider that dimension either primitive or inexplicable. Instead, such normative aspects can be unpacked by invoking a different, lower-to-higher, explanatory scheme in which the explanans includes higher level features such as skilled know-how and social frames of action. (shrink)

There is a compelling idea in the air. Both contemporary philosophers of mind and philosophers of language are engaged in developing theories of content that are naturalistic. The stand has been taken: semantic properties are not part of the primitive ontological furniture of the world. If we want to vindicate those properties as real, we will have to show that it is possible to unpack them into some other –primitive– set of properties. It is taken for granted that there is (...) no alternative way of avoiding circularity in explaining the semantic properties of mental or linguistic representations. The following quote from Fodor's Psychosemantics is probably the locus classicus for this trend: "I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear upon their list. But aboutness surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. It's hard to see, in the face of this consideration, how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else." The naturalistic project seems thus to be deeply rooted in the search for a non-circular, explanatory account of intentional categories. Although, in principle, one should not take naturalism in regard to some realm as committing one to any sort of reductive explanation of that realm, in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, naturalism and reductionism como easily upon a meeting point. The reason is that explanatory, non-circular answers are taken to be reductionist. If this is correct, we would have to conclude that naturalism entails reductionism or, even more strongly, that naturalism is constitutively dependent upon the defense of a reductionist thesis. In this case, we would have to admit that there cannot be a non-reductionist naturalistic theory of content. The main aim of this paper is to cast some light on the issue of what naturalism means regarding a theory of content. It is a matter of a some urgency to find out exactly what it takes for a theory of content to be naturalistic. Until we do so, we cannot properly evaluate the existing theories. I will center my discussion of this topic on the question of whether naturalistic theories of content ought to be reductionist theories. The claim I want to defend is that, despite the current trend regarding the relations between naturalism and reductionism, the former is not constitutively dependent upon the latter. I will argue that, in fact, the strong requirements of a reductionist thesis are the very reason the project of naturalization seems to be doomed. However, I will try to show that once we have weakened those requirements, non-reductionist answers are certainly acceptable, in the sense of being informative, non-circular, and above all, explanatory. I propose a safe[r] characterization of naturalism that seems to better fit our theoretical views about content, and to turn the whole project into a more promising enterprise. (shrink)

Peacocke's characterization of what he calls implicit conceptions recognizes the significance of a subset of contentful states in making rational behavior intelligible. What Peacocke has to offer in this paper is an account of why we need implicit conceptions; how we can discover them; what they explain; what they are; and how they can help us to better understand some issues in the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. The rationalist tradition in which Peacocke's project ought to be (...) located is concerned with the nature of understanding. His notion of implicit conceptions is invoked to explain non-straightforwardly inferential but rational patterns of concept-involving behavior. We come to know about implicit conceptions because we treat the thinker's practices as having a certain representational content. They are implicit in what the thinker does. I intend to focus on the question of what implicit conceptions are. I will argue for the following position: that —even at the personal level— certain inferential principles underlie the process that leads to the thinker's reliably differential responses and that subsequently point us in the direction of a notion such as that of an implicit conception. More precisely, I will argue that practical inferential processes are involved in the understanding-based capacities that support our ascription of personal-level implicit conceptions to the thinker. If I am right, then Peacocke's implicit conceptions don't preclude acceptance of personal-level conceptual role theories because that practical inferential articulation, i.e. that conceptual role, is the implicit conception itself. (shrink)

Peacocke's characterization of what he calls implicit conceptions recognizes the significance of a subset of contentful states in making rational behavior intelligible. What Peacocke has to offer in this paper is an account of (i) why we need implicit conceptions; (ii) how we can discover them; (iii) what they explain; (iv) what they are; and (v) how they can help us to better understand some issues in the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. The rationalist tradition in which (...) Peacocke's project ought to be located is concerned with the nature of understanding. His notion of implicit conceptions is invoked to explain non-straightforwardly inferential but rational patterns of concept-involving behavior. We come to know about implicit conceptions because we treat the thinker's practices as having a certain representational content. They are implicit in what the thinker does. I intend to focus on the question of what implicit conceptions are (although in doing so some of the other aspects will also come to the fore). I will argue for the following position: that —even at the personal level— certain inferential principles underlie the process that leads to the thinker's reliably differential responses and that subsequently point us in the direction of a notion such as that of an implicit conception. More precisely, I will argue that practical inferential processes are involved in the understanding-based capacities that support our ascription of personal-level implicit conceptions to the thinker. If I am right, then Peacocke's implicit conceptions don't preclude acceptance of personal-level conceptual-role theories because that practical inferential articulation, i.e. that conceptual role, is the implicit conception itself. (shrink)

En los procesos sociopolíticos de superación de los conflictos armados, la recuperación de la Memoria histórica está ocupando un lugar central debido al papel que está juega para una efectiva reconciliación donde la verdad, la reparación y el perdón forman parte de ese proceso. La experiencia cristiana, como comunidad de memoria tiene mucho que aportar en la medida que articule la reflexión crítica sobre qué memoria, desde dónde, desde quiénes; con el potencial liberador del Dios que se pone del lado (...) de las víctimas y desde ellas no deja que se olvide su dolor sino que busca transformarlo. Además incorporar la perspectiva de género, permite reconocer las diferencias genéricas que influyen en la recuperación de la memoria histórica. Mostrar la relevancia de estas articulaciones, es el propósito de este artículo con la invitación a transformar la pastoral urbana que pretende acompañar a las personas en situación de desplazamiento. In socio-political processes of overcoming armed conflict, the Historical Memory is taking a central point because of the role it plays for effective reconciliation where "truth, reparation and forgiveness" are part of that process. Christian experience, as memory community has much to contribute to articulate the critical reflection about what memory, from where, from whom; with the liberating potential of the God who takes the side of the victims and doesn’t allow to forget them neither their pain and seeks transformation. Besides, incorporate the gender perspective, allow to recognize the gender differences and their influences in the recovery of historical memory. Show the relevance of these articulations is the purpose of this article with an invitation to transform urban pastoral in order to support displaced people. (shrink)

La tesis de este artículo es que tenemosrazones suficientes para considerar losdeícticos un problema para la propuestasemántica de Gottlob Frege. Dividiremosel texto en dos partes: en la primera,expondremos el programa semánt i codel l ógi co al emán por medi o de t rest e s i s e s t r uc t ur ant e s. En l a s e gunda,introduciremos la cuestión de los deícticos,explorando en qué medida representan unproblema para dicho programa. The thesis of this (...) article is that we haveenough reasons to consider indexicals asa problem for Gottlob Frege’s semantic.We will divide the text into two parts: inthe first one, we will expose the semanticprogram of the german logician by meansof three structuring theses. In the secondone, we will introduce the question of theindexicals, exploring how they representa problem for the above mentioned program. (shrink)

The considerable prominence of internet addiction (IA) in adolescence is at least partly explained by the limited knowledge thus far available on this complex phenomenon. In discussing IA, it is necessary to be aware that this is a construct for which there is still no clear definition in the literature. Nonetheless, its important clinical implications, as emerging in recent years, justify the lively interest of researchers in this new form of behavioral addiction. Over the years, studies have associated IA with (...) numerous clinical problems. However, fewer studies have investigated what factors might mediate the relationship between IA and the different problems associated with it. Ours is one such study. The Italian version of the SCL-90 and the IAT were administered to a sample of almost 800 adolescents aged between 16 and 22 years. We found the presence of a significant association between IA and two variables: somatization (β = 7.80; p < 0.001) and obsessive-compulsive symptoms (β = 2.18; p < 0.05). In line with our hypothesis, the results showed that somatization predicted the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptoms and IA (β = −2.75; t = −3.55; p < 0.001), explaining 24.5% of its variance (ΔR2 = 1.2%; F = 12.78; p < 0.01). In addition, simple slopes analyses revealed that, on reaching clinical significance (+1 SD), somatization showed higher moderation effects in the relationship between obsessive-compulsive symptoms and IA (β = 6.13; t = 7.83; p < 0.001). These results appear to be of great interest due to the absence of similar evidence in the literature, and may open the way for further research in the IA field. Although the absence of studies in the literature does not allow us to offer an exhaustive explanation of these results, our study supports current addiction theories which emphasize the important function performed by the enteroceptive system, alongside the more cited reflexive and impulsive systems. (shrink)

This book argues that whiteness is not only a visual orientation; it is a way of hearing. Inspired by the understandings of race and whiteness in the existential writings of Fanon, Beauvoir, Sartre, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Angela Davis, this book introduces students to the notion of the white sonic gaze.

It can be stated that self-regulated learning (SRL) brings broad benefits to the process of students' learning and studying. However, research has yet to be undertaken in relation to one of its components, namely self-regulation of motivation and affectivity. The main objectives of this study are to examine the use of self-motivation strategies that involve classmates and to obtain models on the influence of academic goals and self-efficacy on such self-motivation strategies. To this end, was conducted a study using two (...) different samples of students in the compulsory secondary education or baccalaureate stages in Spain (N = 613 and N = 910). The results obtained indicate that, with regard to gender, differences only exist in the use of the strategy of deception (t = 5.450, p <.001, d =.364). That the two pairs of strategies positively and significantly correlated with one another (r =.239, p <.01 and r =.355, p <.01). That only the strategy of annulation of others correlates with a more adaptive type of motivation. Thus, the group of students that reported the greatest level in its use also did so in relation to task and ego self-enhancing goals, to self-efficacy, and being negatively associated with the goal of work avoidance. Finally, were offered models on relationships between academic goals, self-efficacy and enhancement and annulation strategies (χ² (8) = 5.204, p =.736) and deception and annulation strategies (χ² (4) = 3.228, p =.520). (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse examined the subjective and material conditions of radical social change and developed the "Great Refusal," a radical concept of "the protest against that which is." The editors and contributors to the exciting new volume The Great Refusal provide an analysis of contemporary social movements around the world with particular reference to Marcuse's revolutionary concept. The book also engages-and puts Marcuse in critical dialogue with-major theorists including Slavoj Žižek and Michel Foucault, among others. The chapters in this book analyze (...) different elements and locations of the contemporary wave of struggle, drawing on the work and vision of Marcuse in order to reveal, with a historical perspective, the present moment of resistance. Essays seek to understand recent uprisings-such as the Zapatistas in Mexico, the Arab Spring, and the Occupy movement-in the context of Marcuse's powerful conceptual apparatus. The Great Refusal also charts contemporary social movements against global warming, mass incarceration, police brutality, white supremacy, militarization, technological development, and more, to provide insights that advance our understanding of resistance today. Contributors include: Kevin B. Anderson, Stanley Aronowitz, Joan Braune, Jenny Chan, Angela Y. Davis, Arnold L. Farr, Andrew Feenberg, Michael Forman, Christian Fuchs, Stefan Gandler, Christian Garland, Toorjo Ghose, Imaculada Kangussu, George Katsiaficas, Douglas Kellner, Sarah Lynn Kleeb, Filip Kovacevic, Lauren Langman, Heather Love, Peter Marcuse, Martin J. Beck Matuštík, Russell Rockwell, AK Thompson, Marcelo Vieta, and the editors. (shrink)

This paper is an ethical reflection on the real-life case of "Angela", a highly intelligent but severely anorexic young woman who wishes to refuse all but palliative treatment. It is part of CQHE's "Ethics Committees and Consultants at Work" series, in response to the essay, "Starving for Perfection.".