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In recent decades in North American social and moral philosophy, alongside the development and discussion of widely influential theories of justice, taken as Rawls takes it as the ‘first virtue of social institutions,’ there has been a counter-movement gathering strength, one coming from some interesting sources. For some of the most outspoken of the diverse group who have in a variety of ways been challenging the assumed supremacy of justice among the moral and social virtues are members of those sections (...) of society whom one might have expected to be especially aware of the supreme importance of justice, namely blacks and women. Those who have only recently won recognition of their equal rights, who have only recently seen the correction or partial correction of long-standing racist and sexist injustices to their race and sex, are among the philosophers now suggesting that justice is only one virtue among many, and one that may need the presence of the others in order to deliver its own undenied value. Among these philosophers of the philosophical counterculture, as it were - but an increasingly large counterculture - I include Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Stocker, Lawrence Blum, Michael Slote, Laurence Thomas, Claudia Card, Alison Jaggar, Susan Wolf and a whole group of men and women, myself included, who have been influenced by the writings of Harvard educational psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose book In a Different Voice caused a considerable stir both in the popular press and, more slowly, in the philosophical journals. (shrink)

In recent decades in North American social and moral philosophy, alongside the development and discussion of widely influential theories of justice, taken as Rawls takes it as the ‘first virtue of social institutions,’ there has been a counter-movement gathering strength, one coming from some interesting sources. For some of the most outspoken of the diverse group who have in a variety of ways been challenging the assumed supremacy of justice among the moral and social virtues are members of those sections (...) of society whom one might have expected to be especially aware of the supreme importance of justice, namely blacks and women. Those who have only recently won recognition of their equal rights, who have only recently seen the correction or partial correction of long-standing racist and sexist injustices to their race and sex, are among the philosophers now suggesting that justice is only one virtue among many, and one that may need the presence of the others in order to deliver its own undenied value. Among these philosophers of the philosophical counterculture, as it were - but an increasingly large counterculture - I include Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Stocker, Lawrence Blum, Michael Slote, Laurence Thomas, Claudia Card, Alison Jaggar, Susan Wolf and a whole group of men and women, myself included, who have been influenced by the writings of Harvard educational psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose book In a Different Voice caused a considerable stir both in the popular press and, more slowly, in the philosophical journals. (shrink)

In recent decades in North American social and moral philosophy, alongside the development and discussion of widely influential theories of justice, taken as Rawls takes it as the ‘first virtue of social institutions,’ there has been a counter-movement gathering strength, one coming from some interesting sources. For some of the most outspoken of the diverse group who have in a variety of ways been challenging the assumed supremacy of justice among the moral and social virtues are members of those sections (...) of society whom one might have expected to be especially aware of the supreme importance of justice, namely blacks and women. Those who have only recently won recognition of their equal rights, who have only recently seen the correction or partial correction of long-standing racist and sexist injustices to their race and sex, are among the philosophers now suggesting that justice is only one virtue among many, and one that may need the presence of the others in order to deliver its own undenied value. Among these philosophers of the philosophical counterculture, as it were - but an increasingly large counterculture - I include Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Stocker, Lawrence Blum, Michael Slote, Laurence Thomas, Claudia Card, Alison Jaggar, Susan Wolf and a whole group of men and women, myself included, who have been influenced by the writings of Harvard educational psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose book In a Different Voice caused a considerable stir both in the popular press and, more slowly, in the philosophical journals. (shrink)

Hume’s version, in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, section 9,, of the viewpoint from which moral assessments are made, and from which traits are recognized as virtues or vices, is that it is one which activates a “universal principle of the human frame,” the “principle of humanity.” It displays “the force of many sympathies,” and depends upon our possession of “some propensity to the good of mankind”. Does this represent a revision, on Hume’s part, of his Treatise claim (...) that sympathy with a person’s “narrow circle” is what enables us to judge that person’s moral goodness? A humanity-wide circle is scarcely “narrow,” even if it is not wide enough for those who see our treatment of animals as relevant to our moral merit or demerit. (shrink)

Both a morality, like Kant's, which relies on wrongdoers' guilt feelings and expectation of punishment, as enforcement for its requirements, and one which, like Hume's, relies on the feelings of shame and expectation of their fellows' contempt which will be felt by those showing lack of the moral virtues, seem to merit the charge that morality is an intrinsically cruel institution. The prospects for a gentle non-punitive morality are explored, and Hume's views found more promising, for this purpose, than Kant's.

Berkeley says that "the making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active." What did Berkeley take as the paradigm of that making which denominates mind active? He speaks in the same passage of exciting "ideas in my mind at pleasure," of varying and shifting the scene "as oft as I see fit. It is no more than willing and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy." This quite clearly takes human idea-making to be fantasizing. (...) But if this is the only sort of making we are capable of, it is a poor model for that divine making which Berkeley wishes to obtain by "reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections." Ideas of the fancy are not strong, lively, vivid, nor real for other minds. Has Berkeley any other, better, human model for the divine making? In his Commonplace Book, Berkeley notes tersely, "We move our legs ourselves." This suggests that our voluntary actions could be taken by Berkeley as ideas made by us. This would at least give him a human model for that divine responsibility for something real, something strong, vivid, lively, something which other minds have no choice but to see, when in broad daylight they open their eyes from the appropriate vantage point. (shrink)

We discuss the variety of sorts of sympathy Hume recognizes, the extent to which he thinks our sympathy with others’ feelings depends on inferences from the other’s expression, and from her perceived situation, and consider also whether he later changed his views about the nature and role of sympathy, in particular its role in morals.

Philosophers have always seen at least part of their job to be social criticism, where by that I mean not necessarily negative assessment of existing social practices, but rather the attempt to understand them, to see existing local ones against a background of other possibilities. Included among these surveyed practices are, or should be, practices of justification and criticism, our own included. Socrates set the standard when, in the Apology and Crito he turned his method on his own activity, both (...) defending it and also showing understanding and acceptance of the judgment of those who condemned it. Most of us, after Socrates, have tried to emulate his self-conscious attention to philosophical method, but usually only to intellectual methods of reasoning, rarely following him in consciousness of the social role we play, and its relation to the whole network of roles in which it is embedded. Yet if our own activity is to justify itself, that justification surely depends upon the relation between what we are doing and the work done by others, including those who support us in the crude economic sense. It is not easy to survey the whole scheme of social roles and to consider alternative ways of dividing the social labor, but philosophers have often claimed to have synoptic vision. No greater hubris is involved in trying synoptically to survey a society's array of social roles, and its alternatives, than in purporting to produce moral principles valid in all conditions, or truths for all possible worlds. (shrink)

David Hume has been invoked by those who want to found morality on human nature as well as by their critics. He is credited with showing us the fallacy of moving from premises about what is the case to conclusions about what ought to be the case; and yet, just a few pages after the famous is-ought remarks in A Treatise of Human Nature, he embarks on his equally famous derivation of the obligations of justice from facts about the cooperative (...) schemes accepted in human communities. Is he ambivalent on the relationship between facts about human nature and human evaluations? Does he contradict himself – and, if so, which part of his whole position is most valuable? Between the famous is-ought passage and the famous account of convention and the obligations arising from established cooperative schemes once they are morally endorsed, Hume discusses the various meanings of the term “natural.” “Shou'd it be ask'd, Whether we ought to search for these principles [upon which all our notions of morals are founded] in nature or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I wou'd reply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal.” The natural can be opposed to the miraculous, the unusual, or the artificial. It is the last contrast that Hume wants, for his contrast between the “artificial” culturally variant, convention-dependent obligations of justice and the more invariant “natural virtues,” and what he says about that contrast in this preparation for his account of the “artificial” virtues, makes it clear why he can later refer to justice as “natural” and to the general content of the rules of justice – that is, of basic human conventions of cooperation – as “Laws of Nature”. (shrink)

Hume’s version, in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, section 9,, of the viewpoint from which moral assessments are made, and from which traits are recognized as virtues or vices, is that it is one which activates a “universal principle of the human frame,” the “principle of humanity.” It displays “the force of many sympathies,” and depends upon our possession of “some propensity to the good of mankind”. Does this represent a revision, on Hume’s part, of his Treatise claim (...) that sympathy with a person’s “narrow circle” is what enables us to judge that person’s moral goodness? A humanity-wide circle is scarcely “narrow,” even if it is not wide enough for those who see our treatment of animals as relevant to our moral merit or demerit. (shrink)

Adam Smith’s famous account of Hume’s death, in his letter to Strahan, included a reference to what Hume had been reading shortly before his death, Lucian’s “Dialogues of the Dead.” But when one reads those, one becomes puzzled by Smith’s report that Hume had been trying out excuses to delay death, for no such scene occurs in those Lucian dialogues. Fortunately Smith’s was not the only letter written about exactly what Lucian dialogue Hume was reading.

We want to know about philosophers’ lives in part to see how they applied their philosophy to their own lives. Plato’s account of Socrates’ life, trial, and death sets a great example here, perhaps never equalled, just as few philosophers equal Socrates in integrity and courage.

At the end of part 3 of Book 1 of his Treatise,1 Hume had given a touchstone by which to judge any account of the human mind, namely that, where other animals appear to display the same cognitive operation that we do, our account applies as well to them as to us.2 He tests his own account of causal inference this way and finds that it comes through with flying colors, since the effects of experience of constant conjunctions on animal (...) minds is just as he has claimed it to be on ours. Some of their actions, such as nest building and sitting on their eggs till they hatch, are "extraordinary instances of sagacity", but on other matters, they, like us, learn from experience, so that the older one. (shrink)

Childhood and youth: loss of faith and a passion for literature -- "At a distance from relations": writing his treatise in France -- Hume after the treatise -- Hume as librarian and historian -- Hume's life as a man in the public eye -- Hume's final years in Edinburgh -- Death and character.

We want to know about philosophers’ lives in part to see how they applied their philosophy to their own lives. Plato’s account of Socrates’ life, trial, and death sets a great example here, perhaps never equalled, just as few philosophers equal Socrates in integrity and courage.