Inferentialism claims that expressions are meaningful by virtue of rules governing their use. In particular, logical expressions are autonomous if given meaning by their introduction-rules, rules specifying the grounds for assertion of propositions containing them. If the elimination-rules do no more, and no less, than is justified by the introduction-rules, the rules satisfy what Prawitz, following Lorenzen, called an inversion principle. This connection between rules leads to a general form of elimination-rule, and when the rules have this form, they may (...) be said to exhibit “general-elimination” harmony. Ge-harmony ensures that the meaning of a logical expression is clearly visible in its I-rule, and that the I- and E-rules are coherent, in encapsulating the same meaning. However, it does not ensure that the resulting logical system is normalizable, nor that it satisfies the conservative extension property, nor that it is consistent. Thus harmony should not be identified with any of these notions. (shrink)
In the proof-theoretic semantics approach to meaning, harmony , requiring a balance between introduction-rules (I-rules) and elimination rules (E-rules) within a meaning conferring natural-deduction proof-system, is a central notion. In this paper, we consider two notions of harmony that were proposed in the literature: 1. GE-harmony , requiring a certain form of the E-rules, given the form of the I-rules. 2. Local intrinsic harmony : imposes the existence of certain transformations of derivations, known as reduction and (...) expansion . We propose a construction of the E-rules (in GE-form) from given I-rules, and prove that the constructed rules satisfy also local intrinsic harmony. The construction is based on a classification of I-rules, and constitute an implementation to Gentzen’s (and Pawitz’) remark, that E-rules can be “read off” I-rules. (shrink)
Although the history of adopting the Western Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) concept in China spans less than 20 years, the core principles of CSR are not new and can be legitimately interpreted within traditional Chinese culture. We find that the Western CSR concepts do not adapt well to the Chinese market, because they have rarely defined the primary reason for CSR well, and the etic approach to CSR concepts does not take the Chinese reality and culture into consideration. This article (...) resolves these problems and contributes a new definition of CSR, called here – the Harmony Approach to CSR. Simply, the Chinese harmony approach to CSR means 'respecting nature and loving people'. It is the first time CSR has been defined in relation to Confucian interpersonal harmony and Taoist harmony between man and nature. Conceptually, this definition will broaden our understanding and will fit the characteristics of the Chinese market better. The idea of incorporating cultural contexts into CSR concepts could also contribute to future CSR studies. In business practice, it will help corporations to adopt CSR on their own initiative. The proposed virtues of traditional Chinese wisdom, in particular, will guide corporations to a new way of improving their CSR performance. (shrink)
The notion of harmony has played a pivotal role in a number of debates in the philosophy of logic. Yet there is little agreement as to how the requirement of harmony should be spelled out in detail or even what purpose it is to serve. Most, if not all, conceptions of harmony can already be found in Michael Dummett's seminal discussion of the matter in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Hence, if we wish to gain a better (...) understanding of the notion of harmony, we do well to start here. Unfortunately, however, Dummett's discussion is not always easy to follow. The following is an attempt to disentangle the main strands of Dummett's treatment of harmony. The different variants of harmony as well as their interrelations are clarified and their individual shortcomings qua interpretations of harmony are demonstrated. Though no attempt is made to give a detailed alternative account of harmony here, it is hoped that our discussion will lay the ground for an adequate rigorous treatment of this central notion. (shrink)
We present our calculus of higher-level rules, extended with propositional quantification within rules. This makes it possible to present general schemas for introduction and elimination rules for arbitrary propositional operators and to define what it means that introductions and eliminations are in harmony with each other. This definition does not presuppose any logical system, but is formulated in terms of rules themselves. We therefore speak of a foundational account of proof-theoretic harmony. With every set of introduction rules a (...) canonical elimination rule, and with every set of elimination rules a canonical introduction rule is associated in such a way that the canonical rule is in harmony with the set of rules it is associated with. An example given by Hazen and Pelletier is used to demonstrate that there are significant connectives, which are characterized by their elimination rules, and whose introduction rule is the canonical introduction rule associated with these elimination rules. Due to the availabiliy of higher-level rules and propositional quantification, the means of expression of the framework developed are sufficient to ensure that the construction of canonical elimination or introduction rules is always possible and does not lead out of this framework. (shrink)
Many prominent writers on the philosophy of logic, including Michael Dummett, Dag Prawitz, Neil Tennant, have held that the introduction and elimination rules of a logical connective must be ‘in harmony ’ if the connective is to possess a sense. This Harmony Thesis has been used to justify the choice of logic: in particular, supposed violations of it by the classical rules for negation have been the basis for arguments for switching from classical to intuitionistic logic. The Thesis (...) has also had an influence on the philosophy of language: some prominent writers in that area, notably Dummett and Robert Brandom, have taken it to be a special case of a more general requirement that the grounds for asserting a statement must cohere with its consequences. This essay considers various ways of making the Harmony Thesis precise and scrutinizes the most influential arguments for it. The verdict is negative: all the extant arguments for the Thesis are weak, and no version of it is remotely plausible. (shrink)
The paper exposes the relevance of permuting conversions (in natural-deduction systems) to the role of such systems in the theory of meaning known as proof-theoretic semantics, by relating permuting conversion to harmony, hitherto related to normalisation only. This is achieved by showing the connection of permuting conversion to the general notion of canonicity, once applied to arbitrary derivations from open assumption. In the course of exposing the relationship of permuting conversions to harmony, a general definition of the former (...) is proposed, generalising the specific cases of disjunction and existential quantifiers considered in the literature. (shrink)
One of the more exotic and mysterious features of Leibniz’s later philosophical writings is the harmony between the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of grace. In this paper I show that this harmony is not a single doctrine, but rather a compilation of two doctrines, namely (1) that the order of nature makes possible the rewards and punishments of rational souls, and (2) that the rewards and punishments of rational souls are administered naturally. I argue that the (...)harmony is best considered as Leibniz’s distinctive collation, development, and rebranding of these doctrines, which were not themselves unique to Leibniz, nor uncommon in the seventeenth century. There follows a detailed examination of various concrete examples of the harmony in operation, from which I show that it is essentially the culmination of Leibniz’s lifelong thinking about divine justice. (shrink)
Much of what we know and love about music is based on implicitly acquired mental representations of musical pitches and the relationships between them. While previous studies have shown that these mental representations of music can be acquired rapidly and can influence preference, it is still unclear which aspects of music influence learning and preference formation. This article reports two experiments that use an artificial musical system to examine two questions: (1) which aspects of music matter most for learning, and (...) (2) which aspects of music matter most for preference formation. Two aspects of music are tested: melody and harmony. In Experiment 1 we tested the learning and liking of a new musical system that is manipulated melodically so that only some of the possible conditional probabilities between successive notes are presented. In Experiment 2 we administered the same tests for learning and liking, but we used a musical system that is manipulated harmonically to eliminate the property of harmonic whole-integer ratios between pitches. Results show that disrupting melody (Experiment 1) disabled the learning of music without disrupting preference formation, whereas disrupting harmony (Experiment 2) does not affect learning and memory but disrupts preference formation. Results point to a possible dissociation between learning and preference in musical knowledge. (shrink)
The requirement of proof-theoretic harmony has played a pivotal role in a number of debates in the philosophy of logic. Different authors have attempted to precisify the notion in different ways. Among these, three proposals have been prominent in the literature: harmony–as–conservative extension, harmony–as–leveling procedure, and Tennant’s harmony–as–deductive equilibrium. In this paper I propose to clarify the logical relationships between these accounts. In particular, I demonstrate that what I call the equivalence conjecture —that these three notions (...) essentially come to the same thing—is erroneous. (shrink)
Family firm leaders acting as stewards of a close-knit enterprise may attempt to build a positive atmosphere of trust, clarity, and cohesiveness in the firm’s operation. Yet, conditions unique to family firms may lead some family members to develop a heightened sense of entitlement and weaker bonds to the organization. This creates conditions for a Fredo effect, where a family member’s incompetence, opportunistic behaviors, and/or ethically dubious actions can impede the firm’s success, potentially resulting in a scandal that could lead (...) to the firm’s demise and negative economic impact on employees, customers, and other stakeholders. Surveying 147 family-firm members, we examine the role that linkages among perceptions of family harmony norms, distributive fairness, role ambiguity, and relationship conflict play in the emergence of a family member who acts as an impediment to the firm, which can be manifested in damaging unethical behaviors. As hypothesized, family harmony norms and fairness perceptions are negatively related to family impediment, while role ambiguity is positively related to family impediment. However, relationship conflict mediates these connections, underscoring the potential damage this type of conflict can create in a family firm, even if leaders of the firm attempt to establish conditions that reflect a stewardship approach to firm governance. We discuss how these findings impact the development of an ethical climate in the family firm and the implications for family business survival or scandal. (shrink)
Andrew Chignell recently proposed an original reconstruction of Kant's ‘Only Possible Argument’ for the existence of God. Chignell claims that what motivates the ‘Grounding Premise’ of Kant's proof, ‘real possibility must be grounded in actuality’, is the requirement that the predicates of a really possible thing must be ‘really harmonious’, i.e. compatible in an extra-logical or metaphysical sense. I take issue with Chignell's reconstruction. First, the pre-Critical Kant does not present ‘real harmony’ as a general condition of real possibility. (...) Second, the real harmony requirement is not what motivates the ‘Grounding Premise’ of the proof. Instead, this premise is sufficiently motivated by what Chignell labels the ‘content’ requirement. Finally, Kant's downgrading of the proof in his Critical period is not based on a concern regarding the real harmony of the predicates of God, but on his Critical restrictions on cognition in general and modal cognition in particular. (shrink)
The paper studies the extension of harmony and stability, major themes in proof-theoretic semantics, from single-conclusion natural-deduction systems to multiple -conclusions natural-deduction, independently of classical logic. An extension of the method of obtaining harmoniously-induced general elimination rules from given introduction rules is suggested, taking into account sub-structurality. Finally, the reductions and expansions of the multiple -conclusions natural-deduction representation of classical logic are formulated.
In my Steinberger 2009 I argued that Neil Tennant’s Harmony requirement is untenable because of its failure to account for the standard quantifier rules.1 Instead of justifying the customary rules for the existential and universal quantifiers, Tennant’s account appears to sanction only wholly unrestricted – and so patently disharmonious – quantifier rules. In his characteristically thoughtful response Tennant 2010, Tennant offers a sequent calculus version of his Harmony requirement that rules out such pathological would-be quantifiers. While I agree (...) with Tennant that recasting his Harmony requirement in the sequent format as he proposes blocks the said disharmonious quantifier rules, I submit that Tennant’s revamped Harmony requirement nevertheless misses the mark. I present two objections to substantiate my claim. First, I show that the crucial additional assumption underlying Tennant’s sequent calculus-based account – what I call the admissibility assumption – is excessively strong: so strong, in fact, that it renders otiose the core of Tennant’s original account. Second, I argue that the admissibility assumption, as a global requirement on deductive systems, is ill-suited for the purposes of codifying the intuitive notion of harmony. Fortunately, though, as I will demonstrate, we can dispense with the admissibility assumption altogether. (shrink)
Causation was an important topic of philosophical reflection during the Seventeenth Century. This reflection centred around certain particular problems about causation, one of which was the problem of causation between mind and body. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony is Leibniz's response to the problem of causation between mind and body. In this chapter I shall (a) explain the problem of mind-body causation; (b) explain Leibniz's pre-established harmony; and (c) assess his case for it.
In this paper, I argue that the different understandings of “harmony”, which are rooted in ancient Greek and Chinese thought, can be recapitulated in the name of “dialectic harmony” and “ambiguous harmony” regarding the representation of the beautiful. The different understandings of the concept of harmony lead to at least two kinds of aesthetic value as well as ideality – harmony in conciliation and harmony in diversity. Through an explication of the original meaning and (...) relation between the concept of harmony and beauty, we can learn more about the cosmo-metaphysical origins in Western and Eastern aesthetics, with which we may gain insights for future aesthetics discourse. (shrink)
The paper begins with a conceptual discussion of Michael Dummett's proof-theoretic justification of deduction or proof-theoretic semantics, which is based on what we might call Gentzen's thesis: 'the introductions constitute, so to speak, the "definitions" of the symbols concerned, and the eliminations are in the end only consequences thereof, which could be expressed thus: In the elimination of a symbol, the formula in question, whose outer symbol it concerns, may only "be used as that which it means on the basis (...) of the introduction of this symbol".' The intuitive philosophical content of Dummett's notions of harmony and stability is that harmony obtains if the grounds for asserting a proposition match the consequences of accepting it, and stability obtains if the converse also holds. Rules of inference define the meanings of a logical constant they govern if and only if they are stable. Gentzen observed that 'it should be possible to establish on the basis of certain requirements that the elimination rules are functions of the corresponding introduction rules.' One of the objectives of this paper is to specify such a function: I will specify a process by which it is possible to determine the elimination rules of logical constants from their introduction rules, and conversely, to determine the introduction rules from the elimination rules. I'll give the general forms of rules of inference and generalised reduction procedures for the normalisation of deduction. I'll give a formally precise characterisations of harmony and stability and show that deductions in logics that contain only constants governed by stable rules always normalise. (shrink)
Simmias' famous epiphenomenalist analogy of the soul-body relation to the harmony and strings of a lyre leads to Socrates' initial refutation and subsequent prolonged defense of soul's immortality in the Phaedo. It also yields in late antiquity significant treatments of the harmony relation by Plotinus and Porphyry that present a larger context for viewing the nature of harmony in the soul and the psycho-somatic compound. But perhaps the most detailed treatment of the musical analogy, and certainly the (...) most radical, is to be found in Gregory of Nyssa's De Hominis Opificio. Gregory's remarkable development of the musical instrument analogy provides a multi-layered analysis of interrelated causality on the mechanistic, physiological, psycho-somatic and intellectual/spiritual planes. Gregory not only sees mind/soul and body as radically equal and yet multilayered in their mutual development; he also refuses to restrict mind to the brain alone, for all physiological systems, in his view, are holistically and individually expressive of mind's activity. Gregory's theory is more innovative than Augustine's view of the mind/soul-body relation and, in my view, the most important account between Plotinus and Aquinas. (shrink)
Spinoza is in a potentially untenable position. On the one hand, he argues that those who claim to see harmony in the universe are badly mistaken; they are falsely imagining rather than properly reasoning. On the other hand, harmony is positively discussed in his ethical writings and even serves as the basis for his vision of society. How can both be maintained? In this chapter l argue that this prima facie conflict between the two treatments of harmony (...) is resolvable, but that in resolving it, a new set of questions for Spinoza is raised. In doing so, I explore how harmony was used in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, which will help us better situate Spinoza. In doing so, we can recognize new possibilities and new connections between Spinoza and philosophers who are not often discussed in connection with him. (shrink)
The object of Angleâ€™s rich, fascinating and wide-ranging book is the admirable one of building a bridge between Confucian ethics and modern ethical thought. He does this through the use of two major tools. The first is the overall framework: Confucian ethics is understood as a type of virtue ethics. The second is the deployment of â€œbridge conceptsâ€ â€œwhich allow us to put two traditions into dialogueâ€ for â€œthey are open enough to permit of greater specificationâ€ (Stalnaker 2006: 17) in (...) relation to each of the traditions brought into dialogue (52). These two tools are linked, for Angle thinks of virtue ethics itself as a bridge concept, â€œwhich is meant to be a general framework for discussion rather than a particular, fully specified understandingâ€ (52). This is an interesting approach to the problem of the definition of virtue ethics, but I shall not focus on this issue. Nor shall I challenge the virtue ethical framework of Angleâ€”I am not qualified enough for thatâ€”though I believe that some reject such a framework in favor of role ethics. I myself believe that virtue ethics in its fuller development should embrace role ethics through the notion of what I have called â€œdifferentiatedâ€ virtue. But this issue is not the focus of Angleâ€™s book. Rather I shall concentrate on aspects of two concepts which Angle appears to deploy as bridge concepts: balance in relation to the Confucian idea of harmony, and attention in relation to the Confucian idea of reverence. We begin with balance and harmony. (shrink)
The aims of this research were twofold: first, to compare the levels of organisational harmony between family and non-family firms and, second, to study the influence of organisational harmony on family firms’ performance (profitability, longevity and group cohesion). Starting from a definition of organisational harmony as a value and considering the importance of the management of organisational values, we use the main topics indicated by the general literature (organisational climate, trust and participation) to analyse organisational harmony, (...) as well as three other topics for performance (profitability, survival and group cohesion). Results indicate that family firms have higher levels of these three qualities than non-family firms, and that the levels of trust, participation and organisational climate have a positive and significant influence on the performance of family firms. These results can be understood as a consequence of the influence of family social capital on organisational social capital and so on the performance of family businesses. From the perspective of institutionalism, the higher levels of harmony existing in family businesses are a reflection of the pressures that the owning family as an institution exercises on the organisational social capital in its companies. (shrink)
This study investigates the idea of harmony as a protological and eschatological principle in three outstanding Patristic philosophers, well steeped in the Platonic tradition: Origen, Gregory Nyssen, and Evagrius. All of them attached an extraordinary importance to harmony, homonoia, and unity in the arkhē and, even more, in the telos. This ideal is opposed to the disagreement/dispersion of rational creatures’ acts of volition after their fall and before the eventual apokatastasis. These Christian Platonists are among the strongest supporters (...) of the final universal restoration. Their reflection on the unity-multiplicity dialectic, which parallels that between harmony and disorder/discord/dissonance, is informed by the Platonic tradition. In Gregory, the idea of harmony assumes musical connotations, especially in relation to the telos. In this connection, I examine the relationship between their notion of harmony in the arkhē and telos and Plotinus’ concept of harmony. Plotinus was well known to Gregory, the author of a Christianized version of Plato’s Phaedo in which apokatastasis is prominent. Origen, whose readings included many Middle-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean texts, in Alexandria attended the classes of the “proto-Neoplatonist” Ammonius, who was also Plotinus’ teacher. A wide-ranging methodical investigation of the relation between Origen’s and Plotinus’ philosophical thoughts is still a notable desideratum. Finally, I concentrate on the concept of harmony in astronomy as a metaphor for intellectual harmony and apokatastasis in Patristic Platonism, especially in Evagrius’ Kephalaia Gnōstika. The noun apokatastasis was used in an astronomical sense, and employed in Stoicism for the conclusion of a cosmic cycle. Evagrius, who loved astronomical metaphors, focussed a kephalaion on a wordplay—which escaped Guillaumont and all other scholars—concerning the astronomical meaning of apokatastasis, thus embedding his theory of the eventual restoration in an allegorical framework that rests on a notion of astronomical harmony. A strong case is made in this connection that Evagrius was elaborating on Plato’s pivotal link between cosmological and intellectual harmony, and was aware that the Stoic theory of cosmological apokatastasis drew on Plato. (shrink)
There are some indications within the Symposium that Socrates will learn and describe the real truth about Love from his wise mentor Diotima. This leaves unclear why Plato decided to include the other speeches developed within the dialogue’s elaborate structure. Can we take anything seriously from these other speeches? This paper examines the doctor Eryximachus’ speech with the general hypothesis that we can actually learn from his medical metaphors about love as a healthy harmony.
This essay provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of a cluster of Heraclitus’ fragments that revolve around an image of ‘musical’ harmony (B 8, 10, and 51 Diels-Kranz). The aim is to demonstrate that more numerous as well as more specific references to contemporary musical practice can be found in these fragments than is usually thought. In particular, it is argued that in his talk of cosmic harmonia Heraclitus might well know and exploit a musical sense of this word, (...) namely, that of ‘attunement’, which was already developing at his time from the primary meaning of ‘connection’ and ‘agreement’. Furthermore, it is shown that the investigation of musical patterns with which Heraclitus was clearly acquainted offered him a significant analogical ground for his reflection on the order and rationality of kosmos. He was not apparently interested in the numerical definition of musical patterns, and thus there is no need to assume any influence of earlier Pythagorean research on his theory of cosmic harmony: the other way round, this theory was likely food for thought for Philolaus. (shrink)
The Law has always been an instrument to exorcise different kinds of fear, primarily the fear of differences, through the distribution of shares of power. Perhaps, this system, inherently conflictual, is behind the failure of the multicultural policies of many countries, that have divided the society in as many separate communities as are the elements that differentiate each human being. The Law has also recognized to men a total power over Nature, feeding its illusion of control, that in recent decades (...) has shattered in front of several natural disasters. Ecuador, Buthan and South Africa have introduced in their Constitutions ideas belonging to the indigenous cultural tradition (buen vivir, buddhism and ubuntu), which express harmony between men and Nature. The paper analyzes these experiences in order to propose a new model of eco-friendly constitutionalism. (shrink)
This novel approach to epistemological discourse explains the complex but crucial role that systematization plays-not just for the organization of what we know, but also for its validation. _Cognitive Harmony_ argues for a new conception of the process philosophers generally call induction. Relying on the root definition of harmony, a coherent unification of component parts in such a way that the final object can successfully accomplish what it was meant to do, Rescher discusses the role of harmony in (...) cognitive contexts, the history of cognitive harmony, and the various features it has in producing human knowledge. The book ends on the issue of philosophy and the sort of harmony required of philosophical systems. (shrink)
Maximalism is the view that an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action if and only if she is permitted to perform some instance of this type, where φ-ing is an instance of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. Now, the aim of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when combined with maximalism results in a theory that accommodates the idea (...) that a moral theory ought to be morally harmonious—that is, ought to be such that the agents who satisfy the theory, whoever and however numerous they may be, are guaranteed to produce the morally best world that they have the option of producing. I argue that, for something to count as an option for an agent, it must, in the relevant sense, be under her control. And I argue that the relevant sort of control is the sort that we exercise over our reasons-responsive attitudes by being both receptive and reactive to reasons. I call this sort of control rational control, and I call the view that φ-ing is an option for a subject if and only if she has rational control over whether she φs rationalism. When we combine this view with maximalism, we get rationalist maximalism, which I argue is a promising moral theory. (shrink)
When I began working on my dissertation on Kant’s aesthetic theory in 1971, I was able to read virtually all of the extant literature on the Critique of Judgment in English, German, andFrench going back to Hermann Cohen’s Kants Begr¨undung der A¨ sthetik of 1889, while also reading most of what I wanted to read of eighteenth-century British and German aesthetics before Kant—not because I had paid my dues to Evelyn Wood, but just because there was not all that much (...) to read.1 I pity the graduate student who sets out to write a dissertation on the third Critique now: since Donald Crawford, Francis Coleman, Jens Kulenkampff, Eva Schaper, and I published books on Kant’s aesthetics between 1974 and 1979 there has been a continuing flood of articles (this journal receives more submissions on Kant’s aesthetics annually than on any other historical topic) and books, a flood that has only accelerated since 2000. Confining myself only to monographs and anthologies on Kant’s aesthetics or the third Critique as a whole (but not those devoted exclusively to teleology) in English, German, and French on my shelves, and no doubt missing some, at least in German and French, I find twenty-eight monographs and anthologies published in the period between 1980 and 1999 and another twenty-seven just since 2000. (Indeed, two more have arrived on my desk since this article was written.)3 Someone setting out to work on the third Critique now has at least as many books from the last decade alone to read as I had in 1971 from the eight preceding decades. The present review will make only a small dent in this pile: I will discuss just five monographs and one introduction to the third Critique, all published in English in 2006 and 2007. (shrink)
The aim of this text is to investigate if it is possible to attribute to Plato a dualistic conception of human nature, that is, whether the philosopher can be inscribed in the line of thinkers who establish the so-called “Mind-Body Problem”. In various passages of Platonic Dialogues we can see that the body and the soul constitute two different and quite incompatible natures. On the other hand, the relationship between body and soul is constitutive of human being and is unquestionable (...) in the act of perception. Our study develops in three moments. At a first time we explain the reasons why it is justified to claim that there is in Plato’s Dialogues a difference between soul and body; afterwards, we analyze the relationship between soul and body just as an essential attribute of human nature; we bring about the investigation with the analysis of the “Plato’s pineal gland”, specifically, the element that allow us to consider the liaison between soul and body as a “dual relationship”, that is, not as an undifferentiated unit, nor as a juxtaposition of elements unrelated to each other. Our proposal consists in showing that the mathematical structure, proportional, harmonic and musical crosses all reality: the cosmic body and soul, as well as the human body and soul. (shrink)
This paper presents an interpretation of Plato''s moral psychology in two books of the Republic that construes Plato as adopting a strong unity for the moral agent. Within this conception reason influences both emotion and action directly. This view is contrasted with the current prevailing interpretation according to which all three parts of the soul have their own reason, feeling, and desire. The latter construal is shown to be both philosophically weak, and less plausible as a historical reconstruction.
In this article, I set out to prove that if, by following this basic intuition, we correctly understand human nature and organize our world according to the principle of cooperation, we can arrive at a world of social harmony. The current disharmony in the world, which can be observed especially in the field of politics and economics, is largely related to the erroneous modern Western philosophical assertions identifying the human being with an individual moved by desires and the will (...) to power, and the phenomenon of life with an endless conflict. These misconceptions have enormous practical implications on the picture of today’s world. I want to show that cooperation is an integral part of human nature, and that the society organized according to the requirements of our nature can become a truly harmonious and happy society. (shrink)
Michael Dummett and Dag Prawitz have argued that a constructivist theory of meaning depends on explicating the meaning of logical constants in terms of the theory of valid inference, imposing a constraint of harmony on acceptable connectives. They argue further that classical logic, in particular, classical negation, breaks these constraints, so that classical negation, if a cogent notion at all, has a meaning going beyond what can be exhibited in its inferential use. I argue that Dummett gives a mistaken (...) elaboration of the notion of harmony, an idea stemming from a remark of Gerhard Gentzen's. The introduction-rules are autonomous if they are taken fully to specify the meaning of the logical constants, and the rules are harmonious if the elimination-rule draws its conclusion from just the grounds stated in the introduction-rule. The key to harmony in classical logic then lies in strengthening the theory of the conditional so that the positive logic contains the full classical theory of the conditional. This is achieved by allowing parametric formulae in the natural deduction proofs, a form of multiple-conclusion logic. (shrink)
This paper takes a close look at the thought that mereological relations on material objects mirror, and are mirrored by, parallel mereological relations on their exact locations. This hypothesis is made more precise by means of a battery of principles from which more substantive consequences are derived. Mereological harmony turns out to entail, for example, that atomistic space is an inhospitable environment for material gunk or that Whiteheadian space is not a hospitable environment for unextended material atoms.
For Kant, any authentic moral demands are wholly distinct from the demands of prudence. This has led critics to complain that Kantian moral demands are incompatible with our human nature as happiness-seekers. Kant’s defenders have pointed out, correctly, that Kant can and does assert that it is permissible, at least in principle, to pursue our own happiness. But this response does not eliminate the worry that a life organized around the pursuit of virtue might turn out to be one from (...) which we cannot expect any of this (permissible) happiness. To address this worry, Kant would need to establish that there is a kind of harmony between virtue and our own happiness that can give us confidence that aiming at morality does not require us to abandon our hope for happiness in this life. This paper aims to show that Kant—building on insights from Rousseau that Kant identifies with Cynicism—does offer an account of such a harmony between virtue and worldly happiness. (shrink)
Say that mereological harmony is the view that there is at least some mirroring between the mereological structure of material objects and the mereological structure of their locations: each, in some way, mirrors the other. As it turns out, there is a confusing array of systems of harmony available to the substantivalist. In this paper, I attempt to bring some order to these systems. I explore some systems found in the literature, as well as some natural systems which (...) haven’t been discussed. Along the way, I explore a number of metaphysical consequences of the different systems of harmony. The paper ends with a roadmap of possible views for the substantivalist. (shrink)