Against the background of a new interest in empires past and present and an inflation of the concept in modern political language and beyond, the article first looks at the use of the concept as an analytical marker in historical and current interpretations of empires. With a focus on Western European cases, the concrete semantics of empire as a key concept in modern European history is analyzed, combining a reconstruction of some diachronic trends with synchronic differentiations.

In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not (...) only questions the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it is confined to intra-agent space. We address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out that while a second-person social understanding may not be the only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in the expression, certainly in the development of social understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical implications of our approach. (shrink)

Global energy studies have produced a flurry of empirical analyses. However, the amount of theoretical reflection on the topic remains comparatively low. This article takes two specific limitations of the literature as its starting point: First, the often-unclear relationship between states and markets in global energy governance, and, second, the concept of energy as a material and external structure. With the aim of providing more nuanced perspectives on these issues, the article turns to the work of Niklas Luhmann and Bruno (...) Latour. Luhmann’s ideas of functional differentiation and structural coupling provide a new look at the interaction of states and markets. Latour’s symmetric anthropology allows us to rethink energy as a hybrid that is in the midst of instead of outside society. While these thinkers provide interesting ways forward for global energy studies, they also appear to be utterly incompatible. Instead of accepting this incompatibility, however, the article uses the tension between Luhmann and Latour’s work as a productive resource for further reflection on global energy governance. It develops a ‘Luhtourian’ approach, arguing that hybrid, issue-specific governance systems can emerge whenever a resistant hybrid instigates the emergence of symbolically generalized governance objects. (shrink)

Antibiotic resistance is a serious public health problem on a global scale. In both developed and developing countries, the unpleasant consequences of the phenomenon are being felt. This paper discusses wild-card patent extensions as a means to incentivize research and development of new antibiotics. The thesis defended in the paper is that the implementation of such patent extensions is an appropriate legislative response to the problem of antibiotic resistance. The general idea of wild-card patent extensions is presented in the first (...) part of the paper. A number of objections to the idea are thereafter discussed and rejected. (shrink)

For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...) resulting emotion account of blame. (shrink)

In der vorliegenden Arbeit soll das komplexe Zusammenwirken von unbewusst Psychischem, biologischem Körper in der Pubertät und gesellschaftlichen Verschiebungen hin zu multiplen Genderidentitäten untersucht und differenziert werden. Ausgangspunkt ist eine Gruppe von Jugendlichen, die sich in der Spezialsprechstunde für Geschlechtsdysphorie des Universitätsklinikums Hamburg-Eppendorf vorstellen und als »Transgender« identifizieren; meist ist der Anlass der Vorstellung der Wunsch nach einer medizinischen Transition (Hormonbehandlung etc.). Der Autor versteht die frühe Adoleszenz als einen sozio-psychischen Umschlagsplatz, der per se einer psychischen und körperlichen, zumal hochgradig (...) konflikthaften Transition nahekommt. Plädiert wird für eine offene und oszillierende Haltung gegenüber den Jugendlichen – und dafür, sich Zeit zu nehmen, auch im Hinblick auf medizinische Schritte, die Teil unserer kulturellen und gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit geworden sind. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 3 Heft: 1 Seiten: 26-50.

This article is concerned with Mark Timmons and Terence Horgan's influential twin - earth argument against the semantic views of that school of thought in metaethics that has come to be known as “Cornell realism”. The semantic views of Cornell realism have been developed in greatest detail by Richard Boyd, and it is Boyd's view that is targeted by Timmons and Horgan. In the first part of the article, the twin - earth argument is introduced and two versions of it (...) are disentangled. Thereafter, a defensive strategy is developed against the most powerful version of the argument. The conclusion of the article is that Timmons and Horgan's argument does not succeed in showing that the semantic views associated with Cornell realism are false. (shrink)

Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind of control. The main thesis is that privacy should be analyzed in terms of source control, a notion that is adopted from discussions about moral responsibility.

In the last two decades, blame has become a core topic in ethics, philosophical moral psychology and, more recently, epistemology. This chapter aims at clarifying the complex state of the debate and at making a suggestion for how we should proceed from here. The core idea is that accounts of blame are often motivated by very different background goals. One standard goal is to provide a unifying account of our everyday blame practices. The chapter argues that there is reason to (...) think that this goal is not achievable. Another goal is to provide the tools for solving or clarifying important social or philosophical problems. The chapter suggests that this is what theories of blame should focus on. (shrink)

The theory of event coding by Hommel et al. proposes that feature binding is a central component of action planning. To evaluate the binding hypothesis, we consider findings from studies of action-perception interference and bimanual movements. We argue that although binding of action features may be a valuable concept, interference from partial feature overlap does not provide a parsimonious account for the observed phenomena.

Research on privacy practices in digital environments has oftentimes discovered a paradoxical relationship between users’ discursive appraisal of privacy and their actual practices: the “privacy paradox.” The emergence of this paradox prompts us to conduct ethnography of a health and fitness platform in order to flesh out the structural mechanisms generating this paradox. We provide an ethnographic analysis of surveillance capitalism in action that relates front-end practices empirically to the data economy’s back-end operations to show how this material-semiotic setup elicits (...) users’ desire to become self-determined subjects in a way that makes them amenable as objects of behavioral engineering. We combine different ethnographic methods and materials to specify how different types of values are produced and translated on the investigated platform. The latter offers users the values of self-mastery and social visibility. However, the data generated in this process serve to translate these values into the value of economic amenability and thereupon ultimately into economic profit. What gets lost in translation, though, is the front-end promise of self-mastery. It is these structural mechanisms that generate the privacy paradox in the first place. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEinhergehend mit den Fortschritten in der Reanimationsmedizin beschäftigen sich seit den 80er Jahren viele Studien mit der prognostischen Güte von reanimations- und patientenbezogenen Akutmarkern. Generell sollen Prognosemarker die Vorhersagbarkeit des Heilungspotenzials erlauben, sie besitzen dadurch eine Steuerfunktion für das weitere Therapiekonzept. Die Wertigkeit dieser Prädiktoren verändert sich jedoch, wenn sie als Determinanten bei Non-Treatment-Entscheidungen herangezogen werden. Dies aus zwei Gründen: 1. Nach Sichtung der Literatur und eingedenk eigener Studienresultate fehlt bislang ein 100%- sicherer Prognose-Algorithmus für Patienten im posthypoxischen Koma. 2. (...) Der komatöse Patient kann an der Beurteilung der Prognoseaussagen selbst nicht teilnehmen. Es stellt sich somit die Frage: Dürfen Prognosemarker unser moralisches Handeln an der Grenze des Lebens leiten? Die Autoren bejahen diese Frage und sehen eine adäquat moralische Handlungsoption in der Durchführung einer diskurs-pragmatischen Patientenkonferenz. Den Prognosemarkern kommt hier eine Stellvertreterfunktion im Sinne eines „stillen Patientenargumentes“ zu, wodurch die potenzielle Dialogfähigkeit des Patienten als moralisches Anspruchsobjekt gewahrt wird. Im Rahmen einer diskursiven Erörterung wird dann der Einfluss der Prognosedaten an der Entscheidung gewichtet. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEinhergehend mit den Fortschritten in der Reanimationsmedizin beschäftigen sich seit den 80er Jahren viele Studien mit der prognostischen Güte von reanimations- und patientenbezogenen Akutmarkern. Generell sollen Prognosemarker die Vorhersagbarkeit des Heilungspotenzials erlauben, sie besitzen dadurch eine Steuerfunktion für das weitere Therapiekonzept. Die Wertigkeit dieser Prädiktoren verändert sich jedoch, wenn sie als Determinanten bei Non-Treatment-Entscheidungen herangezogen werden. Dies aus zwei Gründen: 1. Nach Sichtung der Literatur und eingedenk eigener Studienresultate fehlt bislang ein 100%- sicherer Prognose-Algorithmus für Patienten im posthypoxischen Koma. 2. (...) Der komatöse Patient kann an der Beurteilung der Prognoseaussagen selbst nicht teilnehmen. Es stellt sich somit die Frage: Dürfen Prognosemarker unser moralisches Handeln an der Grenze des Lebens leiten? Die Autoren bejahen diese Frage und sehen eine adäquat moralische Handlungsoption in der Durchführung einer diskurs-pragmatischen Patientenkonferenz. Den Prognosemarkern kommt hier eine Stellvertreterfunktion im Sinne eines „stillen Patientenargumentes“ zu, wodurch die potenzielle Dialogfähigkeit des Patienten als moralisches Anspruchsobjekt gewahrt wird. Im Rahmen einer diskursiven Erörterung wird dann der Einfluss der Prognosedaten an der Entscheidung gewichtet. (shrink)

Many philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that (...) the targets have forfeited their claims that others not blame them and that there is positive reason to blame them. The paper shows how this view frames the discussion about skepticism about free will and responsibility. (shrink)

Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive functions of blame. The new challenge (...) is that skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or less inappropriate) to respond with this kind of disappointment to people’s conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. The paper argues that current blame-skeptical views fail to meet this challenge. (shrink)

One objection that has been consistently raised for theorists who are committed to the idea that we have a positive duty to aid the global poor is the overdemandingness objection. This article is a critical discussion of this objection. First, the objection is laid out in some detail. A number of influential attempts to meet the overdemandingness objection are then discussed, and it is argued that they all fail in their intended purpose. The conclusion of the article is not that (...) the overdemandingness objection cannot be met. Rather, the conclusion is that the overdemandingness objection constitutes a serious challenge to anyone who accepts the objection and goes beyond the standard libertarian doctrine and commits herself to the existence of positive duties to aid the global poor. (shrink)

Much of today’s international trade is conducted according to trade agreements that involve substantial and uniform protections of intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights are a socio‐economic tool that create a temporary monopoly for inventor firms and enable such firms to charge prices for their innovations that are many times higher than the marginal cost of production of the innovations. This allows the inventor firms to salvage their research‐costs and secure a profit on their innovations. A large body of contemporary (...) philosophical and interdisciplinary literature suggests that intellectual property rights give rise to a number of ethical problems. This review paper seeks to give an overview of what these problems are. It also offers an outline of proposals as to how these problems might be alleviated, and it briefly explains the two classical defenses of the ethical permissibility of intellectual property rights. The ethical issues surrounding intellectual property rights are most pertinent when it is socially valuable goods that are given intellectual property protection. The discussions in this paper revolve around just one product type in order to bring out the broader ethical issues surrounding intellectual property rights. In line with much contemporary literature on the ethical dimensions of intellectual property rights, the product type in question is life‐saving medicines. (shrink)

Infectious and parasitic diseases cause enormous health problems in the developing world whereas they leave the developed one relatively unscathed. Research and development (R&D) of drugs for diseases that mainly affect people in developing countries is limited. The problem that relatively few drugs are available for diseases that cause an enormous burden of disease in the developing world is called the 'availability problem'. In recent years, the availability problem has received quite a bit of attention. A number of proposals have (...) been fielded as to how this problem might be minimized. Wild-card patent extensions, advance market commitments, cash prizes and the Health Impact Fund are prominent examples of such proposals. These proposals can be thought of as pull-mechanisms for R&D of drugs for neglected diseases. What has been coined a 'priority review voucher' is another pull-mechanism. This paper is a critical discussion of this pull-mechanism. First, the original priority review voucher scheme, as proposed by Ridley et al. (2006), is described. A number of objections to this scheme are thereafter presented. A few amendments to the original scheme are then suggested, and it is argued that with these amendments in place, the priority review voucher scheme constitutes an attractive way of stimulating R&D of drugs for neglected diseases. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will (...) has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach. (shrink)

Im Gegensatz zu dem Weltreisenden und Revolutionär Georg Forster (1754-1794) ist der Autor Forster, der Theoretiker der Wahrnehmung und der Beschreibung weniger bekannt. Der Band vereinigt Studien zu unterschiedlichen Werkgruppen Forsters, die befragt werden nach der Aneignung des 'Wirklichen' durch 'Erfahrung', 'Verstand', 'Idee', 'Bild' und 'Totaleindruck' im Spannungsfeld von Perzeption und Möglichkeitskonstruktion. Konkrete Textanalyse, Bestimmung der Wirkungsabsicht des Autors bzw. der Arbeitsverfahren des 'gesellschaftlichen Schriftstellers' eröffnen ein neues Forster-Bild.

Skepticism about blameworthiness says that there is good reason to doubt that, in our world, humans are ever blameworthy for their deeds. A significant problem for the discussion of this view is that it is unclear how to understand the kind of blame that should be at issue. This paper makes a new proposal. The basic idea is that the kind of blame skeptics should be skeptical about is constituted by responses that can violate the targets’ claims and by the (...) responders’ thought that the targets have forfeited this claim because of their morally objectionable actions and because of how they were when they performed them. This view identifies an important part of our everyday lives and frames discussions about skepticism about blameworthiness in a new way. (shrink)

This paper deals with an aspect of the commitment-theoretic account of evaluative compounds that Simon Blackburn has recently offered. The main point of the paper is that the special account of disjunction is flawed because it fails to validate certain very simple patterns of inference. This point is brought out by considering two examples. A reply on behalf of Blackburn is considered, but it is shown that this reply is defective because it makes use of an unacceptable inference-rule. In the (...) last section, the relatively technical point about disjunction is placed in a broader context. It is argued that without an acceptable account of disjunction, expressivism entails revisionism about everyday moral discourse. (shrink)

The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at stablishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues (...) that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise in some sense. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work. (shrink)

A standard account of privacy says that it is essentially a kind of control over personal information. Many privacy scholars have argued against this claim by relying on so-called threatened loss cases. In these cases, personal information about an agent is easily available to another person, but not accessed. Critics contend that control accounts have the implausible implication that the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases. Recently, threatened loss cases have become important because Edward Snowden’s (...) revelation of how the NSA and GCHQ collected Internet and mobile phone data presents us with a gigantic, real-life threatened loss case. In this paper, I will defend the control account of privacy against the argument that is based on threatened loss cases. I will do so by developing a new version of the control account that implies that the agents’ privacy is not diminished in threatened loss cases. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the expressivist account of moral supervenience that Simon Blackburn has offered. First, the account is presented, and an objection to it is thereafter discussed. In short, the objection is that the supervenience constraint in moral discourse is mysterious, given that no similar constraint governs speech and thought in other areas of discourse that seem to be prime candidates for an expressivist analysis. The conclusion of the paper is that this objection can be fended off.

In a paper from 2005, Gerhard Overland defends the thesis that one's responsibility to render assistance is not affected by having contributed to the situation by causing harm. Overland applies this thesis to the issue of what duties relatively well-off people have in terms of rendering assistance to the global poor and argues for the sub-conclusion that contribution carries little momentum when assessing our duty to assist people in severe need if we can do so at a little cost. In (...) this paper, I discuss Overland's argument in favor of the sub-conclusion and try to show that it is not sound. (shrink)

Nicole Hassoun has recently defended the view that the relatively affluent members of the world’s population are, prima facie, obligated to ensure that the global institutional system enables all people to meet their basic needs. This paper is a critical discussion of Hassoun’s argument in favor of this view. Hassoun’s argument is first presented. In sections three and four, I try to bring out a number of formal and informal problems with the argument. Section five discusses a number of possible (...) replies to the worries raised in section four. The conclusion of the paper is that Hassoun’s argument should be rejected. There are two independent and individually sufficient reasons for this conclusion: the argument is invalid and contains at least one false premise. (shrink)

The paper contributes to the current discussion on the role of participatory methods in the context of technology assessment (TA) and science and technology (S&T) governance. It is argued that TA has to be understood as a form of democratic policy consulting in the sense of the Habermasian model of a “pragmatist” relation of science and politics. This notion implies that public participation is an indispensable element of TA in the context of policy advice. Against this background, participatory TA (pTA) (...) is defended against recent criticism of procedures of lay participation which states that pTA is lacking impact on S&T decision making, that pTA instead of opening S&T policies to new perspectives is used as a means to support mainstream S&T policy and that in pTA procedure the authentic lay perspective is systematically contorted by dominant expert knowledge. (shrink)

When confronted with the question of why it is appropriate to morally blame a person for some bad action, it may seem plausible to reply that she is morally responsible for it. Some authors, inspired by Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment," argue, however, that thinking this way is backwards. They believe that a person is morally responsible for some bad action because it would be appropriate to blame her for it. The aims of this paper are to present this account, (...) to highlight some of its important but often overlooked features, and to defend it against pressing objections. (shrink)

Digitalization goes hand in hand with a fundamental change in methods that has the potential to change people’s thinking, decisions and actions. Departing from this thesis, a structure is proposed for the analysis of the method change induced by digitalization. The article provides a brief outline of the driving forces, the forms and the effects of this method change.

This paper discusses the idea that the concept of privacy should be understood in terms of control. Three different attempts to spell out this idea will be critically discussed. The conclusion will be that the Source Control View on privacy is the most promising version of the idea that privacy is to be understood in terms of control.