This paper argues against the call to democratize artificial intelligence (AI). Several authors demand to reap purported benefits that rest in direct and broad participation: In the governance of AI, more people should be more involved in more decisions about AI—from development and design to deployment. This paper opposes this call. The paper presents five objections against broadening and deepening public participation in the governance of AI. The paper begins by reviewing the literature and carving out a set of claims (...) that are associated with the call to “democratize AI”. It then argues that such a democratization of AI (1) rests on weak grounds, because it does not answer to a demand of legitimization, (2) is redundant in that it overlaps with existing governance structures, (3) is resource intensive, which leads to injustices, (4) is morally myopic and thereby creates popular oversights and moral problems of its own, and finally, (5) is neither theoretically nor practically the right kind of response to the injustices that animate the call. The paper concludes by suggesting that AI should be democratized not by broadening and deepening participation but by increasing the democratic quality of the administrative and executive elements of collective decision making. In a slogan: The question is not so much whether AI should be democratized but how. (shrink)

The advent of intelligent artificial systems has sparked a dispute about the question of who is responsible when such a system causes a harmful outcome. This paper champions the idea that this dispute should be approached as a conceptual engineering problem. Towards this claim, the paper first argues that the dispute about the responsibility gap problem is in part a conceptual dispute about the content of responsibility and related concepts. The paper then argues that the way forward is to evaluate (...) the conceptual choices we have, in the light of a systematic understanding of why the concept is important in the first place—in short, the way forward is to engage in conceptual engineering. The paper then illustrates what approaching the responsibility gap problem as a conceptual engineering problem looks like. It outlines argumentative pathways out of the responsibility gap problem and relates these to existing contributions to the dispute. (shrink)

The purpose of the present mixed method study was to investigate personal benefits, perceptions, and the effect of a 15-week sport psychological skills training program adapted for musicians. The program was individually tailored for six music performance students with the objective of facilitating the participants' instrumental practice and performance. The participants learnt techniques such as goal setting, attentional focus, arousal regulation, imagery, and acceptance training / self-talk. Zimmerman's ( 1989 ) cyclical model of self-regulated learning was applied as a theoretical (...) frame for the intervention. The present study's mixed-method approach (i.e., quan+ QUAL) included effect size, semi-structured interviews, a research log, and practice diaries of the participants (Creswell, 2009 ). Thematic analysis revealed that participants had little or no experience concerning planning and goal setting in regard to instrumental practice. Concentration, volition, and physical pain were additional issues that the participants struggled with at the time of pre-intervention. The study found that psychological skills training (with special emphasis on planning and goal setting) facilitated cyclical self-regulated learning patterns in the participants. In essence, the intervention was found to facilitate the participants' concentration, self-observation, self-efficacy, and coping in the face of failure. The appliance of practice journals facilitated the participants‘ self-observation, self-evaluation, and awareness of instrumental practice. Finally, the psychological skills intervention reduced participants' worry and anxiety in performance situations. An 8-month follow up interview revealed that the participants were still actively applying psychological skills. (shrink)

he paper examines the thesis that participants in shared intentional activities have first-person plural ‘practical knowledge’ of what they are jointly doing, in the sense of ‘practical knowledge’ articulated by G.E.M Anscombe. Who is supposed to be the subject of such knowledge? The group, or members of the group, or both? It is argued that progress with this issue requires conceiving of collective activities (of the kind affording ‘plural practical knowledge’)as instances, not of supra-personal agency, but of interpersonal agency; specifically: (...) as involving communication. There is a sense, it is suggested, in which the basic form of plural practical knowledge is relational: ‘I am doing x with you.’. (shrink)

In “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Truth Predicate”, Reinhardt [21] famously proposed an instrumentalist interpretation of the truth theory Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {KF}$ ) in analogy to Hilbert’s program. Reinhardt suggested to view $\mathrm {KF}$ as a tool for generating “the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ ”, that is, as a tool for deriving sentences of the form $\mathrm{Tr}\ulcorner {\varphi }\urcorner $. The constitutive question of Reinhardt’s program was whether it was possible “to justify the (...) use of nonsignificant sentences entirely within the framework of significant sentences”. This question was answered negatively by Halbach & Horsten [10] but we argue that under a more careful interpretation the question may receive a positive answer. To this end, we propose to shift attention from $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true sentences to $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true inferences, that is, we shall identify the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ with the set of pairs $\langle {\Gamma, \Delta }\rangle $, such that $\mathrm {KF}$ proves that if all members of $\Gamma $ are true, at least one member of $\Delta $ is true. In way of addressing Reinhardt’s question we show that the provably true inferences of suitable $\mathrm {KF}$ -like theories coincide with the provable sequents of matching versions of the theory Partial Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {PKF}$ ). (shrink)

Der Band beschäftigt sich mit den komplizierten Mensch-Tier-Verhältnissen und geht der Frage nach, welche Rolle Tieren im anthropologischen Denken zukommt. In den Reflexionen, die auch kunsttheoretische Diskurse berücksichtigen, werden Konstruktionen analysiert und in pädagogischen Kontexten verortet.

Name der Zeitschrift: Paragrana Jahrgang: 23 Heft: 2 Seiten: 167-175.

European Journal of Political Theory, Ahead of Print.

On what I will call the No Subject view, there is a sense in which one may be aware of a thought, conceived as an event in one's stream of consciousness, without being aware of oneself thinking something. Philosophical work on the delusion of thought insertion is one of the areas in which the No Subject view has been highly influential: the view has framed what, in the philosophy of mind, has become the standard interpretation of the delusion. Here I (...) want to present a challenge to the No Subject view, developing from reflection on the ontology of thinking. I will also consider how, if the standard interpretation fails, we are to understand thought insertion. In particular, I will suggest that we should question the widespread assumption that understanding the delusion has to be a matter of making sense of it. (shrink)

Philosophical arguments often assume that the folk tends towards moral objectivism. Although recent psychological studies have indicated that lay persons’ attitudes to morality are best characterized in terms of non-objectivism-leaning pluralism, it has been maintained that the folk may be committed to moral objectivism _implicitly_. Since the studies conducted so far almost exclusively assessed subjects’ metaethical attitudes via explicit cognitions, the strength of this rebuttal remains unclear. The current study attempts to test the folk’s implicit metaethical commitments. We present results (...) of a newly developed Implicit Association Test (IAT) for metaethical attitudes which indicate that the folk generally tend towards moral non-objectivism on the implicit level as well. We discuss implications of this finding for the philosophical debate. (shrink)

This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the effect that the human mind is not a machine. Kurt Gödel thought that the intensional paradoxes stand in the way of proving that the mind is not a machine. According to Gödel, a successful proof that the mind is not a machine would require a solution to the intensional paradoxes. We provide what might seem to be a partial vindication of Gödel and show that (...) if a particular solution to the intensional paradoxes is adopted, one can indeed give an argument to the effect that the mind is not a machine. (shrink)

This chapter argues for a structural injustice approach to the governance of AI. Structural injustice has an analytical and an evaluative component. The analytical component consists of structural explanations that are well-known in the social sciences. The evaluative component is a theory of justice. Structural injustice is a powerful conceptual tool that allows researchers and practitioners to identify, articulate, and perhaps even anticipate, AI biases. The chapter begins with an example of racial bias in AI that arises from structural injustice. (...) The chapter then presents the concept of structural injustice as introduced by the philosopher Iris Marion Young. The chapter moreover argues that structural injustice is well suited as an approach to the governance of AI and compares this approach to alternative approaches that start from analyses of harms and benefits or from value statements. The chapter suggests that structural injustice provides methodological and normative foundations for the values and concerns of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. The chapter closes with an outlook onto the idea of “structure” and on responsibility. The idea of a structure is central to justice. An open theoretical research question is to what extent AI is itself part of the structure of society. Finally, the practice of responsibility is central to structural injustice. Even if they cannot be held responsible for the existence of structural injustice, every individual and every organization has some responsibility to address structural injustice going forward. (shrink)

This chapter explores the ideological dimension of dehumanization in the context of National Socialism, focusing on the connection between concepts of humanity and dehumanizing images. NS regarded itself as a political revolution, realizing a new concept of humanity. Nazi ideologues undergirded the self-understanding of NS by developing racist anthropologies. I examine two major strands of Nazi ideology, focusing on their diverging strategies of dehumanization, and arguing that they were dependent on different anthropological frameworks. Richard Walther Darré held a naturalistic concept (...) of humanity and advanced biologistic forms of dehumanization. Alfred Rosenberg developed a dualistic anthropology that combined metaphysical and natural features. He dehumanized certain groups of people by reducing them to being human in a natural sense only. Moreover, I aim to show that the key motifs of these racist worldviews were prevalent in the scientific and philosophical debates on anthropology in early-twentieth-century Germany. I thus explore the general orientation of both the naturalistic and the anti-naturalistic strand in anthropological thought, unfold the animalizing tendencies of these views, and emphasize their conformity with the key motifs of Nazi ideology. The case of NS should thus exemplify the dehumanizing potential of anthropological theories. (shrink)

Future weapons will make life-or-death decisions without a human in the loop. When such weapons inflict unwarranted harm, no one appears to be responsible. There seems to be a responsibility gap. I first reconstruct the argument for such responsibility gaps to then argue that this argument is not sound. The argument assumes that commanders have no control over whether autonomous weapons inflict harm. I argue against this assumption. Although this investigation concerns a specific case of autonomous weapons systems, I take (...) steps towards vindicating the more general idea that superiors can be morally responsible in virtue of being in command. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to clarify the meaning and the use of the concept of relativism in the context of National Socialism (NS). This chapter analyzes three aspects of the connection between relativism and NS: The first part examines the critical reproach that NS is a form of relativism. I analyze and criticize the common core of this widespread argument, which is developed in varying contexts, was held in different times, and is still shared by several authors. The (...) second part investigates the ideological debate among Nazi philosophers themselves concerning whether NS is indeed a form of relativism. I focus on the epistemological consequences of Nazi anthropology and analyze both its relativistic tendencies and the strategies used to reject relativism. In contrast to the received view, I argue that Nazi philosophers attempted to overcome both absolutism and relativism. The third part investigates the academic debate on relativism during NS, using the example of the prize question on relativism that was announced by the Prussian Academy of Science in 1936. By examining the academic approaches to the problem of relativism, I also address the question of how broader philosophical debates were related to the core of Nazi ideology. Academic philosophers took the self-understanding of Nazi philosophers seriously. They saw the shared aim of overcoming relativism as an opportunity to collaborate with NS. The brief conclusion summarizes the findings of the chapter. I conclude that, in the context of NS, critics, ideologists, and academics understand and use the concept of relativism in the same way. (shrink)

Much of the debate on the ethics of self-driving cars has revolved around trolley scenarios. This paper instead takes up the political or institutional question of who should decide how a self-driving car drives. Specifically, this paper is on the question of whether and why passengers should be able to control how their car drives. The paper reviews existing arguments—those for passenger ethics settings and for mandatory ethics settings respectively—and argues that they fail. Although the arguments are not successful, they (...) serve as the basis to formulate desiderata that any approach to regulating the driving behavior of self-driving cars ought to fulfill. The paper then proposes one way of designing passenger ethics settings that meets these desiderata. (shrink)

While the general topic of agency has been collaboratively explored in philosophy and psychology, mental action seems to resist such an interdisciplinary research agenda. Since it is difficult to empirically access mental agency beyond externally measurable behavior, the topic is mainly treated philosophically. However, this has not prevented philosophers from substantiating their arguments with psychological findings, but predominantly with those which allegedly limit the scope and conscious controllability of mental action in favor of automated subpersonal processes. By contrast, the call (...) for a methodological extension through introspective access is particularly noticeable among proponents of a wider significance of mental action. Taking this up, it is shown how an empirical-introspective methodology can obtain a differentiated structure of mental activities occurring in directed thought. The empirical results gained under replicable conditions with 32 participants lead to insights about mental activity regarding (1) immanent causation, (2) content-free intention, (3) active receptivity and (4) its selective openness to mental content, and (5) different levels of observational awareness. These arguments speak for assigning an agentive status to the activities studied and hence for a more significant role of mental action in cognitive processes. (shrink)

Statements purporting to convey practical knowledge in Anscombe's sense are subject to two distinctive kinds of error: errors in performance and errors of practical judgement. I argue that reflection on these kinds of errors sheds light both on the nature of practical knowledge and on the status of Anscombe's account of it. Briefly: practical knowledge is knowledge we ordinarily find intelligible in the light of the agent's non-defective exercise of practical judgement. And Anscombe's account is not primarily designed to make (...) practical knowledge intelligible to philosophers but to make explicit how such knowledge is seen as intelligible — and claims to such knowledge are seen to be justifiable — by those who are engaged in the practice of sharing it. I go on to consider how this interpretation bears on the disagreement between Anscombe's view and what she calls a 'contemplative' conception of knowledge. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

The _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_ is the most comprehensive history of philosophy ever published in any language. Since the publication the initial volume in 1863 it has been the aim of this vast scholarly undertaking to elucidate philosophical systems and schools of thought as completely and objectively as possible. Thanks to these merits the _GGPh_ has become the standard work of reference on the history of philosophy for entire generations of scholars, teachers and students of all academic domains. While (...) the first editions had only three volumes, the completely revised new edition published by Schwabe Verlag in Basel, Switzerland, since 1988 is going to comprise of more than 30 volumes. Applying highest scholarly standards, the editors aim at balanced, well-informed presentations of of highest objectivity of individual philosophers, traditions of thought and of philosophical debates. (shrink)

This paper argues that epistemic smothering is not a form of epistemic paternalism. In this sense, it refutes the claim recently made by Valerie Chock and Jonathan Matheson, who defend epistemic smothering as epistemically permissible form of epistemic paternalism. After an outline of what is meant by epistemic paternalism and epistemic smothering, based on the work by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Kristie Dotson on these topics, the paper argues against the identification of epistemic smothering as a form of epistemic paternalism. In (...) the conclusion, it also calls for a reconsideration of how exactly to conceive of epistemic paternalism. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungParallel zu einer noch immer weitestgehenden Tabuisierung von Homosexualität und normabweichendem Geschlecht im Leistungssport haben sich im Bereich des Breitensports in der Vergangenheit zahlreiche queere Sportvereine gegründet, die insbesondere homo-, bisexuelle, Trans*- und Inter-*, Non-Binary- bzw. queere Personen zur Zielgruppe haben. Der vorliegende Beitrag basiert auf einer qualitativ angelegten Interviewstudie, in der Mitglieder eines queeren (LGBTI*) Sportvereins zu ihren Sporterfahrungen und Motiven der Partizipation befragt wurden. Die Befunde zeigen, dass nicht nur auf Heteronormativität basierende Negativerfahrungen im herkömmlichen Verein ausschlaggebend sind, (...) sondern auch die Selbstsegregation innerhalb des queeren Vereins eine eigene Anziehungskraft hat. Dabei erweist sich der Verein für die Befragten als Gemeinschafts- und Wohlfühlraum, Kontaktbörse oder auch als mentaler Schutzraum. Im Beitrag werden die Bedeutungsfacetten des queeren Vereins ausdifferenziert beschrieben und kritische Perspektiven hinsichtlich der Teilnahme am queeren Sport aufgezeigt. (shrink)

The paper proposes a strategy for understanding metaphysical grounding in deflationary terms and, more generally, proposes a form of methodological deflationism with respect to the notions of ground. The idea is to define a deflationary is grounded in-predicate by appeal to the two-place non-causal connective ‘because’ and a deflationary truth predicate. To this end, we discuss the explanatory role of the truth-predicate in non-causal explanations and develop a theory of truth for the language of the ‘because’-connective. We argue that at (...) least from a logical perspective our deflationary notion of ground is up to the task. (shrink)

This chapter outlines a framework for thinking about justice in the global digital economy. The chapter first proposes to understand the digital economy as about infrastructure, then describes some of the problems of justice raised by the global digital economy and sketches potential reforms.

Hierarchical groups shape social, political, and personal life. This paper concerns the question of how individuals within such groups can be responsible. The paper explores how individual responsibility can be partially grounded in difference-making. The paper concentrates on the control condition of responsibility and takes into view three distinct phenomena of responsibility in hierarchical groups. First, a superior can be responsible for outcomes that her subordinates bring about. Second, a subordinate can be responsible although she is unable to prevent the (...) outcome she brings about. Third, a superior can sometimes be responsible to a greater degree than her subordinates. It is argued that difference-making, as an interpretation of the control condition that partially grounds responsibility, accounts for all three of these phenomena within a limited but significant range of circumstances and can hence partially ground individual moral responsibility in hierarchical groups. The paper provides an element of a theory of individual responsibility to complement theories of corporate responsibility. (shrink)