Results for 'Lewis Carroll, Gilbert Ryle, Reasoning, Regress, Knowing How, Dispositions'

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  1.  45
    XIII—Knowing How to Reason Logically.Corine Besson - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (3):327-353.
    In this paper, I examine Gilbert Ryle’s claim that ordinary competence with logical principles or rules is a kind of knowing how, where such knowledge is understood as a skill, a multi-track disposition. Ryle argues that his account of ordinary logical competence helps avoid Lewis Carroll’s famous regress argument (Carroll 1895), which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning might be impossible. Indeed, Carroll’s regress is the central motivation for Ryle’s account. I argue that this account is inadequate on (...)
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  2.  40
    Norms, reasons and reasoning: a guide through Lewis Carroll’s regress argument.Corine Besson - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
    This paper concerns connection between knowing or accepting a logical principle such as Modus Ponens and actions of reasoning involving it. Discussions of this connection typically mention the so-called ‘Lewis Carroll Regress’ and there is near consensus that the regress shows something important about it. Also, although the regress explicitly concerns logic, many philosophers think that it establishes a more general truth, about the structurally similar connection between epistemic or practical principles and actions involving them. This paper’s first (...)
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  3.  18
    Gilbert Ryle’s Wisdom.Colin Hamer - 1969 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 18:133-139.
    THE mind is the locus of various dispositions, of developed sources and motives of action, which are not mere reflex habits but trained abilities and bents, tendencies, liabilities or inhibitions. Human knowing is more an intending of facts or states of affairs than a relation to them. Knowledge is not a predicamental relation. Consciousness is related to its object not as North Pole to South Pole, nor as container to contained, but as matter to form, and to the (...)
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  4.  4
    Gilbert Ryle’s Wisdom.Colin Hamer - 1969 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 18:133-139.
    THE mind is the locus of various dispositions, of developed sources and motives of action, which are not mere reflex habits but trained abilities and bents, tendencies, liabilities or inhibitions. Human knowing is more an intending of facts or states of affairs than a relation to them. Knowledge is not a predicamental relation. Consciousness is related to its object not as North Pole to South Pole, nor as container to contained, but as matter to form, and to the (...)
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  5.  23
    Forms of Carroll’s Paradox in Post-Classical Arabic Logic.Dustin D. Klinger - forthcoming - History and Philosophy of Logic:1-16.
    Arabic logicians in the thirteenth century discussed a set of arguments raised by the theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) that in some respects closely resembles Carroll’s paradox. Roughly, the paradox states that we can never reach a conclusion from a set of premises without incurring an infinite regress. The present article presents and discusses Rāzī’s formulation of the problem with syllogistic deduction, his own solutions to the problem, and the contributions of Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d. 1248) and Najm al-Dīn (...)
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  6. Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intellectualism.Stina Bäckström & Martin Gustafsson - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5).
    In this paper, we aim to show that a study of Gilbert Ryle’s work has much to contribute to the current debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism with respect to skill and know-how. According to Ryle, knowing how and skill are distinctive from and do not reduce to knowing that. What is often overlooked is that for Ryle this point is connected to the idea that the distinction between skill and mere habit is a category distinction, or a (...)
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  7.  25
    A Buddhist Take on Gilbert Ryle’s Theory of Mind.Chien-Te Lin - 2014 - Asian Philosophy 24 (2):178-196.
    Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949/2002. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press) is generally considered a landmark in the quest to refute Cartesian dualism. The work contains many inspirational ideas and mainly posits behavioral disposition as the referent of mind in order to refute mind–body dualism. In this article, I show that the Buddhist theory of ‘non-self’ is also at odds with the belief that a substantial soul exists distinct from the physical body and further point out similarities (...)
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  8. Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
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  9.  21
    Knowing how and knowing that: A distinction reconsidered.Paul Snowdon - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):1–29.
    The purpose of this paper is to raise some questions about the idea, which was first made prominent by Gilbert Ryle, and has remained associated with him ever since, that there are at least two types of knowledge (or to put it in a slightly different way, two types of states ascribed by knowledge ascriptions) identified, on the one hand, as the knowledge (or state) which is expressed in the ‘knowing that’ construction (sometimes called, for fairly obvious reasons, (...)
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  10. Informal Logic’s Infinite Regress: Inference Through a Looking-Glass.Gilbert Edward Plumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. pp. 365-377.
    I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified by the Groarkes that “all theories of informal argument must face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to each of the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument content, usually premise material.
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  11.  16
    Knowing How, Knowing That, Knowing Technology.Per Norström - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (4):553-565.
    A wide variety of skills, abilities and knowledge are used in technological activities such as engineering design. Together, they enable problem solving and artefact creation. Gilbert Ryle’s division of knowledge into knowing how and knowing that is often referred to when discussing this technological knowledge. Ryle’s view has been questioned and criticised by those who claim that there is only one type, for instance, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson who claim that knowing how is really a (...)
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  12.  50
    Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address.Gilbert Ryle - 1946 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46:1 - 16.
  13. Logical Expressivism and Carroll's Regress.Corine Besson - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:35-62.
    In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll's Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold (...)
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  14.  97
    Presumptions, Assumptions, and Presuppositions of Ordinary Arguments.Gilbert Plumer - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):469-484.
    Although in some contexts the notions of an ordinary argument’s presumption, assumption, and presupposition appear to merge into the one concept of an implicit premise, there are important differences between these three notions. It is argued that assumption and presupposition, but not presumption, are basic logical notions. A presupposition of an argument is best understood as pertaining to a propositional element (a premise or the conclusion) e of the argument, such that the presupposition is a necessary condition for the truth (...)
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  15. Knowledge-how, Linguistic Intellectualism, and Ryle's Return.David Löwenstein - 2011 - In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. De Gruyter. pp. 269-304.
    How should we understand knowledge-how – knowledge how to do something? And how is it related to knowledge-that – knowledge that something is the case? In this paper, I will discuss a very important and influential aspect of this question, namely the claim – dubbed ‘Intellectualism’ by Gilbert Ryle – that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that. Recently, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have tried to establish Intellectualism with the aid of linguistic considerations. This project – Linguistic Intellectualism – (...)
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  16. Gilbert Ryle and the Ethical Impetus for Know-How.Matt Dougherty - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (1):01-21.
    This paper aims to shed light on an underexplored aspect of Gilbert Ryle’s interest in the notion of “knowing-how”. It is argued that in addition to his motive of discounting a certain theory of mind, his interest in the notion also stemmed (and perhaps stemmed more deeply) from two ethical interests: one concerning his own life as a philosopher and whether the philosopher has any meaningful task, and one concerning the ancient issue of whether virtue is a kind (...)
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  17. The non-existence of “inference claims”.Gilbert Edward Plumer - 2019 - In Bart Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell & Jean H. M. Wagemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). [Amsterdam, July 3-6, 2018.]. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Sic Sat. pp. 913-918.
    Some believe that all arguments make an implicit “inference claim” that the conclusion is inferable from the premises (e.g., Bermejo-Luque, Grennan, the Groarkes, Hitchcock, Scriven). I try to show that this is confused. An act of arguing arises because an inference can be attributed to us, not a meta-level “inference claim” that would make the argument self-referential and regressive. I develop six (other) possible explanations of the popularity of the doctrine that similarly identify confusions.
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  18. Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowledge How.Will Small - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5).
    Contemporary discussions of knowledge how typically focus on the question whether or not knowing how to do ϕ consists in propositional knowledge, and divide the field between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists. This way of framing the issue is said to derive from Gilbert Ryle. I argue that this is a misreading of Ryle, whose primary interest in discussing knowledge how was not epistemological but rather action-theoretical, whose argument against intellectualism has for this reason been misunderstood and underestimated, and whose (...)
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  19. Regresse und Routinen. Repliken auf Brandt und Jung.David Löwenstein - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):110-113.
    This paper responds to comments and criticisms by Stefan Brandt and Eva-Maria Jung, directed at the book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
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  20. Gilbert Ryle’s adverbialism.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):318-335.
    Gilbert Ryle famously wrote that practical knowledge (knowing how) is distinct from propositional knowledge (knowing that). This claim continues to have broad philosophical appeal, and yet there are many unsettled questions surrounding Ryle’s basic proposal. In this article, I return to his original work in order to perform some intellectual archeology. I offer an interpretation of Ryle’s concept of action that I call ‘adverbialism’. Actions are constituted by bodily behaviours performed in a certain mode, style or manner. (...)
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  21.  4
    Collected Essays 1929 - 1968: Collected Papers Volume 2.Gilbert Ryle - 2009 - Routledge.
    Gilbert Ryle was one of the most important and yet misunderstood philosophers of the Twentieth Century. Long unavailable, _Collected Essays 1929-1968: Collected Papers Volume 2_ stands as testament to the astonishing breadth of Ryle’s philosophical concerns. This volume showcases Ryle’s deep interest in the notion of thinking and contains many of his major pieces, including his classic essays ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, ‘Philosophical Arguments’, ‘Systematically Misleading Expressions’, and ‘A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking’. He (...)
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  22. Carroll’s Regress Times Three.Gilbert Plumer - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):551-571.
    I show that in our theoretical representations of argument, vicious infinite regresses of self-reference may arise with respect to each of the three usual, informal criteria of argument cogency: the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable. They arise needlessly, by confusing a cogency criterion with argument content. The three types of regress all are structurally similar to Lewis Carroll’s famous regress, which involves quantitative extravagance with no explanatory power. Most attention is devoted to the sufficiency criterion, including (...)
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  23.  13
    Abstractions.Gilbert Ryle - 1962 - Dialogue 1 (1):5-16.
    St. Augustine said “When you do not ask me what Time is, I know perfectly well; but when you do ask me, I cannot think what to say.” What, then, was it that he knew perfectly well, and what was it that he did not know? Obviously he knew perfectly well such things as these, that what happened yesterday is more recent than what happened a month ago; that a traveller who walks four miles in an hour, goes twice as (...)
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  24. Gilbert Ryle and the Chinese Skeptic: Do Epistemologists Need to Know How to?István Sn Berkeley - 2002 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
     
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  25. Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
    What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what (...)
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  26. Propositions, Dispositions and Logical Knowledge.Corine Besson - 2010 - In M. Bonelli & A. Longo (eds.), Quid Est Veritas? Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes. Bibliopolis.
    This paper considers the question of what knowing a logical rule consists in. I defend the view that knowing a logical rule is having propositional knowledge. Many philosophers reject this view and argue for the alternative view that knowing a logical rule is, at least at the fundamental level, having a disposition to infer according to it. To motivate this dispositionalist view, its defenders often appeal to Carroll’s regress argument in ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’. I (...)
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  27.  3
    A rational animal.Gilbert Ryle - 1962 - [London]: University of London, The Athlone Press.
    This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...)
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  28.  73
    Ryle on knowing how: Some clarifications and corrections.Stefan Brandt - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):152-167.
    I argue for an account of know‐how as a capacity for practical judgment—a view I derive from Gilbert Ryle. I begin by offering an interpretation of Ryle and by correcting a number of widespread misconceptions about his views in the current debate. I then identify some problems with Ryle's account and finally present my own view which, I argue, retains Ryle's insights while avoiding his mistakes.
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  29.  18
    Is knowing-how simply a case of knowing-that?Tobias Rosefeldt - 2004 - Philosophical Investigations 27 (4):370–379.
    Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have argued that there is no fundamental distinction between what Gilbert Ryle famously called 'knowing how' and 'knowing that', and that the former can be treated as a special kind of the latter. I will endeavour to show that sentences of the form 'a knows how to F' are ambiguous between a reading in which we ascribe knowledge-that to a and another in which we ascribe something to a which is irreducible to (...)
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  30. Intellectualizing know how.Benjamin Elzinga - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-20.
    Following Gilbert Ryle’s arguments, many philosophers took it for granted that someone knows how to do something just in case they have the ability to do it. Within the last couple decades, new intellectualists have challenged this longstanding anti-intellectualist assumption. Their central contention is that mere abilities aren’t on the same rational, epistemic level as know how. My goal is to intellectualize know how without over-intellectualizing it. Intelligent behavior is characteristically flexible or responsive to novelty, and the distinctive feature (...)
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  31.  15
    Know-how and why self-regulation will not go away.Benjamin Elzinga - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.
    In the 1940s, Gilbert Ryle argued that knowing how to do something is not just a matter of being well-regulated but also a matter of self-regulation. Ryle appears to have thought that know-how requires self-regulation in both a backward-looking and forward-looking sense, but both ideas run counter to ordinary intuitions about know-how. The basic idea behind self-regulation, undertaking trials and adjusting to feedback, is captured by the “law of effect.” Daniel Dennett has argued that the “law of effect (...)
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  32.  84
    A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge.Michael Kremer - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):25-46.
    Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an ‘intellectualist’ opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat ‘know’ as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge-how, which is ‘knowledge’ only so-called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as ‘a capacity to get things right’, covering both knowledge-how and knowledge-that. I (...)
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  33.  14
    A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge.Michael Kremer - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an ‘intellectualist’ opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat ‘know’ as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge-how, which is ‘knowledge’ only so-called. I develop the challenge and show that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as ‘a capacity to get things right’, covering both knowledge-how and knowledge-that. I (...)
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  34.  68
    The Limits of Stanley and Williamson’s Attack on Ryle's View About Know-How.Juan Camilo Espejo-Serna - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):59-88.
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss Stanley and Williamson’s take on Ryle’s argument against know-how being know-that. For this, I provide an initial consideration of the possibility of isolating Ryle’s argument from his overall philosophical outlook and Stanley and Williamson’s purpose in their discussion of Ryle. I then examine in detail Stanley and Williamson’s reconstruction of Ryle’s argument with the specific aim of showing where they have introduced extraneous elements: I examine what they take to bes additional assumptions (...)
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  35. Volume Introduction: Gilbert Ryle on Propositions, Propositional Attitudes, and Theoretical Knowledge.Julia Tanney - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5).
    In the introduction to the special volume, Gilbert Ryle: Intelligence, Practice and Skill, Julia Tanney introduces the contributions of Michael Kremer, Stina Bäckström and Martin Gustafsson, and Will Small, each of which indicates concern about the appropriation of Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that in seminal work in contemporary epistemology. Expressing agreement with the authors that something has gone awry in these borrowings from Ryle, Tanney takes this criticism to a deeper level. She argues that the very (...)
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  36.  26
    Reason and responsibility: readings in some basic problems of philosophy.Joel Feinberg (ed.) - 1965 - Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Pub. Co..
    Joel Feinberg : In Memoriam. Preface. Part I: INTRODUCTION TO THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY. 1. Joel Feinberg: A Logic Lesson. 2. Plato: "Apology." 3. Bertrand Russell: The Value of Philosophy. PART II: REASON AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF. 1. The Existence and Nature of God. 1.1 Anselm of Canterbury: The Ontological Argument, from Proslogion. 1.2 Gaunilo of Marmoutiers: On Behalf of the Fool. 1.3 L. Rowe: The Ontological Argument. 1.4 Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Five Ways, from Summa Theologica. 1.5 Samuel (...)
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  37.  20
    Intellectualizing know how.Benjamin Elzinga - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1741-1760.
    Following Gilbert Ryle’s arguments, many philosophers took it for granted that someone knows how to do something just in case they have the ability to do it. Within the last couple decades, new intellectualists have challenged this longstanding anti-intellectualist assumption. Their central contention is that mere abilities aren’t on the same rational, epistemic level as know how. My goal is to intellectualize know how without over-intellectualizing it. Intelligent behavior is characteristically flexible or responsive to novelty, and the distinctive feature (...)
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  38.  5
    Lewis Carroll’s Dream-child and Victorian Child Psychopathology.Stephanie L. Schatz - 2015 - Journal of the History of Ideas 76 (1):93-114.
    This essay reads Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) alongside influential mid-century Victorian psychology studies—paying special attention to those that Carroll owned—in order to trace the divergence of Carroll’s literary representations of the “dream child” from its prevailing medical association with mental illness. The goals of this study are threefold: to trace the medico-historical links between dream-states and childhood, to investigate the medical reasons behind the pathologization of dream-states, and to understand how Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland contributed to Victorian interpretations of (...)
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  39.  96
    Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1987-2001.
    Many virtue-based approaches to propositional knowledge begin with the ability and achievement intuitions. In this paper, I rely on this pair of intuitions to explore the relationship between knowing how and knowing that. On the view that emerges, propositional knowledge is a kind of success through cognitive know how. Rather than simply equating know how with ability, I reveal deeper connections between both kinds of knowledge by focusing on the role of self-regulation.
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  40. Know How and Skill: The Puzzles of Priority and Equivalence.Yuri Cath - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise. New York: Routledge.
    This chapter explores the relationship between knowing-how and skill, as well other success-in-action notions like dispositions and abilities. I offer a new view of knowledge-how which combines elements of both intellectualism and Ryleanism. According to this view, knowing how to perform an action is both a kind of knowing-that (in accord with intellectualism) and a complex multi-track dispositional state (in accord with Ryle’s view of knowing-how). I argue that this new view—what I call practical attitude (...)
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  41. XV—Intelligent Capacities.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):347–376.
    In The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle argued that a more sophisticated understanding of the dispositional nature of ‘intelligent capacities’ could bolster philosophical resistance to the tempting view that the human mind is possessed of metaphysically ‘occult’ powers and properties. This temptation is powerful in the context of accounting for the special qualities of responsible agency. Incompatibilists indulge the temptation; compatibilists resist it, using a variety of strategies. One recent strategy, reminiscent of Ryle’s, is to exploit a more sophisticated (...)
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  42. Précis zu Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):95-99.
    This is a précis of my book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
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  43. Knowing-that, Knowing-how, or Knowing-to?Yong Huang - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:65-94.
    Gilbert Ryle has made the famous distinction between intellectual knowing-that and practical knowing-how. Since knowledge in Confucianism is not merely intellectual but also practical, many scholars have argued that such knowledge is knowing-how or, at least, very similar to it. In this essay, focusing on Wang Yangming’s moral knowledge, I shall argue that it is neither knowing-that nor knowing-how, but a third type of knowing, knowing-to. There is a unique feature of (...)-to that is not shared by either knowing-that or knowing-how: a person with knowing-to will act accordingly, while neither knowing-that nor knowing-how, whether separately or combined, will dispose or incline its possessor to act accordingly. (shrink)
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  44. Knowing How and Knowing To.Karyn L. Lai & Stephen Hetherington - 2015 - In Brian Bruya (ed.), The Philosophical Challenge from China. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 279 - 302.
    Since the 1940s, Western epistemology has discussed Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Ryle argued that intelligent actions – manifestations of knowledge-how – are not constituted as intelligent by the guiding intervention of knowledge-that: knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that; we must understand knowledge-how in independent terms. Yet which independent terms are needed? In this chapter, we consider whether an understanding of intelligent action must include talk of knowledge-to. This is the knowledge to do this or that (...)
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  45.  14
    Knowing‐how: Problems and Considerations.Ellen Fridland - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):703-727.
    In recent years, a debate concerning the nature of knowing-how has emerged between intellectualists who claim that knowledge-how is reducible to knowledge-that and anti-intellectualists who claim that knowledge-how comprises a unique and irreducible knowledge category. The arguments between these two camps have clustered largely around two issues: intellectualists object to Gilbert Ryle's assertion that knowing-how is a kind of ability, and anti-intellectualists take issue with Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's positive, intellectualist account of knowing-how. Like most (...)
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  46.  44
    Practical Knowledge: Knowing How To and Knowing That.David Wiggins - 2012 - Mind 121 (481):97-130.
    Ryle’s account of practical knowing is much controverted. The paper seeks to place present disputations in a larger context and draw attention to the connection between Ryle’s preoccupations and Aristotle’s account of practical reason, practical intelligence, and the way in which human beings enter into the way of being and acting that Aristotle denominates ethos . Considering matters in this framework, the author finds inconclusive the arguments that Stanley and Williamson offer for seeing knowing how to as a (...)
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  47.  14
    Sporting knowledge and the problem of knowing how.Gunnar Breivik - 2014 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 41 (2):143-162.
    In the Concept of Mind from 1949 Gilbert Ryle distinguished between knowing how and knowing that. What was Ryle’s basic idea and how is the discussion going on in philosophy today? How can sport philosophy use the idea of knowing how? My goal in this paper is first to bring Ryle and the post-Rylean discussion to light and then show how phenomenology can give some input to the discussion. The article focuses especially on the two main (...)
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  48. What is Intelligence For? A Peircean Pragmatist Response to the Knowing-How, Knowing-That Debate.Catherine Legg & Joshua Black - 2020 - Erkenntnis (5):1-20.
    Mainstream philosophy has seen a recent flowering in discussions of intellectualism which revisits Gilbert Ryle’s famous distinction between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’, and challenges his argument that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. These debates so far appear not to have engaged with pragmatist philosophy in any substantial way, which is curious as the relation between theory and practice is one of pragmatism’s main themes. Accordingly, this paper examines the contemporary debate in the light (...)
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  49.  19
    Propositional knowledge and know-how.John N. Williams - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):107-125.
    This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does (...)
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  50.  8
    Age-Related Differences in Lexical Access Relate to Speech Recognition in Noise.Rebecca Carroll, Anna Warzybok, Birger Kollmeier & Esther Ruigendijk - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7:170619.
    Vocabulary size has been suggested as a useful measure of “verbal abilities” that correlates with speech recognition scores. Knowing more words is linked to better speech recognition. How vocabulary knowledge translates to general speech recognition mechanisms, how these mechanisms relate to offline speech recognition scores, and how they may be modulated by acoustical distortion or age, is less clear. Age-related differences in linguistic measures may predict age-related differences in speech recognition in noise performance. We hypothesized that speech recognition performance (...)
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