For the past several years patients have been expected to play a key role in their recovery. Self management and disease management have reached a hype status. Considering these recent trends what does this mean for the division of responsibilities between doctors and patients? What kind of role should healthcare providers play? With findings based on a qualitative research project of an innovative practice for people with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) we reflect on these questions. In-depth interviews conducted with (...) people with COPD, physiotherapists and a pulmonologist show that shifting responsibilities require a supportive attitude from healthcare providers and a dialogical communication between patients and professionals. Our findings show more is needed in order to motivate people with COPD to take responsibility and become co-owners in a process of recovery. The case example illustrates that people with COPD need support from fellow patients to learn to accept their disabilities. Awareness that COPD is more than just a lack of air, that mind and body interact, is a first step to investigate other potential problems and to enhance one’s quality of life. (shrink)

Sleep has a profound effect on our mood, but insight in the mechanisms underlying this association is still lacking. We tested whether emotion regulation is a mediator in the relationship between fragmented sleep and mood disturbance. The effect of fragmented sleep on the emotion regulation strategies, including cognitive reappraisal, distraction, acceptance and suppression ability, was assessed. We further tested whether the use of these strategies, as well as rumination and self-criticism, mediated the association between fragmented sleep and negative and positive (...) affect. Participants (N = 69) wore an actiwatch and filled in a sleep diary for 12 consecutive nights. They had one control night and one sleep fragmentation night. Emotion regulation ability was assessed with an experimental task. Usage of emotion regulation strategies and negative and positive affect were assessed four times during the day with a survey after the control and sleep fragmentation night. Cognitive reappraisal, distraction, acceptance and suppression ability did not differ between the sleep fragmentation and control condition. However, participants reported higher usage of rumination and distraction after the sleep fragmentation night and rumination significantly mediated the negative association between fragmented sleep and negative affect. (shrink)

The traditional organizational boundaries between healthcare, social work, police and other non-profit organizations are fading and being replaced by new relational patterns among a variety of disciplines. Professionals work from their own history, role, values and relationships. It is often unclear who is responsible for what because this new network structure requires rules and procedures to be re-interpreted and re-negotiated. A new moral climate needs to be developed, particularly in the early stages of integrated services. Who should do what, with (...) whom and why? Departing from a relational and hermeneutic perspective, this article shows that professionals in integrated service networks embark upon a moral learning process when starting to work together for the client’s benefit. In this context, instrumental ways of thinking about responsibilities are actually counterproductive. Instead, professionals need to find out who they are in relation to other professionals, what core values they share and what responsibilities derive from these aspects. This article demonstrates moral learning by examining the case of an integrated social service network. The network’s development and implementation were supported by responsive evaluation, enriched by insights of care ethics and hermeneutic ethics. (shrink)

Geven, Ben‐Shakhar, Kindt and Verschuere point out that research on deception detection usually employs instructed cheating. They experimentally demonstrate that participants show slower reaction times for concealed information than for other information, regardless of whether they are explicitly instructed to cheat or whether they can freely choose to cheat or not. Finding this ‘cognitive signature of lying’ with self‐initiated cheating too is argued by the authors to strengthen the external validity of deception detection research. [75].

The main aim of this dissertation is to model the different ways in which we use language when we engage with fiction. This main aim subdivides itself into a number of puzzles. We all know that dragons do not exist. Yet, when I read the Harry Potter novels, I do accept the existence of dragons. How do we keep such fictional truths separate from ‘ordinary’ non-fictional truths? What is the difference between Tolkien writing down all sorts of falsities, and a (...) liar who also says all sorts of untrue things? How can it be true that Frodo was born in the Shire while it is also true that he was invented by Tolkien? Given that a fiction such as Pride and Prejudice is not about the actual world, how can I learn things about 19th century etiquette in England by reading this novel? -/- I develop a coherent semantic analysis of these different puzzles: the ‘workspace account’. This theory is an extension of Stalnaker’s famous pragmatic ‘common ground’ framework. In this framework, assertions are modelled as proposals to update the ‘common ground’ (the set of shared assumptions) between conversational interlocutors. (shrink)

Central to the ethical concerns raised by the prospect of increasingly autonomous military robots are issues of responsibility. In this paper we examine different conceptions of autonomy within the discourse on these robots to bring into focus what is at stake when it comes to the autonomous nature of military robots. We argue that due to the metaphorical use of the concept of autonomy, the autonomy of robots is often treated as a black box in discussions about autonomous military robots. (...) When the black box is opened up and we see how autonomy is understood and ‘made’ by those involved in the design and development of robots, the responsibility questions change significantly. (shrink)

Pretend play is generally considered to be a developmental landmark in Theory of Mind acquisition. The aim of the present paper is to offer a new account of the role of pretend play in Theory of Mind development. To this end I combine Hutto and Gallagher’s account of social cognition development with Matravers’ recent argument that the cognitive processes involved in engagement with narratives are neutral regarding fictionality. The key contribution of my account is an analysis of pretend play as (...) interaction with fictions. I argue that my account offers a better explanation of existing empirical data on the development of children’s pretend play and Theory of Mind than the competing theories from Leslie, Perner and Harris. (shrink)

The prospect of increasingly autonomous military robots has raised concerns about the obfuscation of human responsibility. This papers argues that whether or not and to what extent human actors are and will be considered to be responsible for the behavior of robotic systems is and will be the outcome of ongoing negotiations between the various human actors involved. These negotiations are about what technologies should do and mean, but they are also about how responsibility should be interpreted and how it (...) can be best assigned or ascribed. The notion of responsibility practices, as the paper shows, provides a conceptual tool to examine these negotiations as well as the interplay between technological development and the ascription of responsibility. To illustrate the dynamics of responsibility practices the paper explores how the introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles has led to (re)negotiations about responsibility practices, focusing particularly on negotiations within the US Armed Forces. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies offer new ways of conducting decision-making tasks that influence the daily lives of citizens, such as coordinating traffic, energy distributions, and crowd flows. They can sort, rank, and prioritize the distribution of fines or public funds and resources. Many of the changes that AI technologies promise to bring to such tasks pertain to decisions that are collectively binding. When these technologies become part of critical infrastructures, such as energy networks, citizens are affected by these decisions whether (...) they like it or not, and they usually do not have much say in them. The democratic challenge for those working on AI technologies with collectively binding effects is both to _develop_ and _deploy_ technologies in such a way that the democratic legitimacy of the relevant decisions is safeguarded. In this paper, we develop a conceptual framework to help policymakers, project managers, innovators, and technologists to assess and develop approaches to democratize AI. This framework embraces a broad sociotechnical perspective that highlights the interactions between technology and the complexities and contingencies of the context in which these technologies are embedded. We start from the problem-based and practice-oriented approach to democracy theory as developed by political theorist Mark Warren. We build on this approach to describe practices that can enhance or challenge democracy in political systems and extend it to integrate a sociotechnical perspective and make the role of technology explicit. We then examine how AI technologies can play a role in these practices to improve or inhibit the democratic nature of political systems. We focus in particular on AI-supported political systems in the energy domain. (shrink)

Semanticists and philosophers of fiction that formulate analyses of reports on the content of media—or ‘contensive statements’—of the form ‘In/According to _s_, \(\phi \) ’, usually treat the ‘In _s_’-operator (_In_) and the ‘According to _s_’-operator (_Acc_) on a par. I argue that _In_ and _Acc_ require separate semantic analyses based on three clusters of linguistic observations: (1) preferences for _In_ or _Acc_ in contensive statements about fictional or non-fictional media, (2) preferences for _In_ or _Acc_ in contensive statements about (...) implicit or explicit content and (3) tense preferences in contensive statements with _In_ and _Acc_. To account for these three observations I propose to adopt Lewis’s possible world analysis for contensive statements with _In_ and to analyse contensive statements with _Acc_ as indirect speech reports. (shrink)

Traditional definitions of common ground in terms of iterative de re attitudes do not apply to conversations where at least one conversational participant is not acquainted with the other(s). I propose and compare two potential refinements of traditional definitions based on Abelard’s distinction between generality in sensu composito and in sensu diviso.

Biodiverse ecosystems play a key role in maintaining life on earth. In response to rapid declines in biodiversity throughout the world, the UN Biodiversity Summit 2020 brought together world leaders to discuss potential solutions. We draw on cognitive linguistics, critical discourse analysis and ecolinguistics in analysing the summit contributions. All speakers blended vocabulary from the fields of BUSINESS and NATURE; in doing so, they were able to advocate solving biodiversity loss by implementing approaches commonly found in business. In addition, three (...) main ‘moves’ were employed in these speeches: the state of nature was lamented, the interdependent relationship between humans and nature was mentioned and a call to action was given. It is argued that relying on the BUSINESS–NATURE blend for solutions to environmental problems serves to maintain the status quo and may obscure pathways to transformational change. Linguistic strategies for more effective environmental communication are suggested. (shrink)

In human-chatbot interaction, users casually and regularly offend and abuse the chatbot they are interacting with. The current paper explores the relationship between chatbot humanlikeness on the one hand and sexual advances and verbal aggression by the user on the other hand. 283 conversations between the Cleverbot chatbot and its users were harvested and analysed. Our results showed higher counts of user verbal aggression and sexual comments towards Cleverbot when Cleverbot appeared more humanlike in its behaviour. Caution is warranted with (...) the interpretation of the results however as no experimental manipulation was conducted and causality can thus not be inferred. Nonetheless, the findings are relevant for both the research on the abuse of conversational agents, and the development of efficient approaches to discourage or prevent verbal aggression by chatbot users. (shrink)

In this chapter we address what we call “The-Everybody-Did-It” (TEDI) Syndrome, a symptom for collective negligence. Our main thesis is that the character of scientific communities can be evaluated morally and be found wanting in terms of moral responsibility. Even an epistemically successful scientific community can be morally responsible for consequences that were unforeseen by it and its members and that follow from policy advice given by its individual members. We motivate our account by a critical discussion of a recent (...) proposal by Heather Douglas. We offer three, related criticisms of Douglas’s account. First, she assumes that scientific fields are communicative communities. Second, in a system where the scientific community autonomously sets standards, there is a danger of self-affirming reasoning. Third, she ignores that the character of a scientific community is subject to moral evaluation. We argue that these omissions in Douglas’s theory leave it with no adequate response to TEDI Syndrome. Moreover, we deny that science ought to be characterized by unanimity of belief among its competent practitioners, this leads easily to the vices of close-mindedness and expert-overconfidence. If a scientific community wishes to avoid these vices it should create conditions for an active pluralism when it and its members aspire to the position of rational policy decision-making. (shrink)

A fictional text is commonly viewed as constituting an invitation to play a certain game of make-believe, with the individual sentences written by the author providing the propositions we are to imagine and/or accept as true within the fiction. However, we can’t always take the text at face value. What narratologists call ‘unreliable narrators’ may present a confused or misleading picture of the fictional world. Meanwhile there has been a debate in philosophy about so-called ‘imaginative resistance’ in which we are (...) inclined to resist imagining (or even accepting as true in the fiction) what’s explicitly stated in the text. But if we can’t take the text’s word for it, how do we determine what’s true in a fiction? We propose an account of fiction interpretation in a dynamic setting (a version of DRT with a mechanism for opening, updating, and closing temporary ‘workspaces’) and combine this framework with belief revision logic. With these tools in hand we turn to modelling imaginative resistance and unreliable narrators. (shrink)

This dissertation starts with a concise overview of what philosophers of science have written about unification and its role in scientific explanation during the last 50 years to provide the reader with some background knowledge. In order to bring unification back into the picture, I have followed two strategies, resulting respectively in Parts I and II of this dissertation. In Part I the idea of unification is used to refine and enrich the dominant causalmechanist and causal-interventionist accounts of scientific explanation. (...) In this part of the dissertation I bracket the classical ideas about unification: deduction and derivation. I do grant, for the sake of argument, that explanations are causal and argue that unification is important from within this causalist perspective. In Part II I continue my strategy of digging into scientific practice to find cases of ontological unification. But here I distance myself from the dominant literature that all explanations must be causal. I will investigate whether explanatory unification is possible in non-causal explanations. Part III contains some further reflections and conclusions. I will formulate my primary results, and I will elaborate on their implications for thinking about unification and explanation. The different forms of ontological unification were quite diverse. This relates to the method I have used. Throughout this dissertation the types of unification that were discussed emerged from digging into scientific practice. This philosophy-of-science-practice approach steered me towards a pluralistic view on unification and on explanation. In this dissertation I do not try to develop a new model of explanation and compare it to existing models. The aim is to show that there are important types of explanatory practice which cannot be properly analyzed if we neglect unification as a desideratum for explanations. (shrink)

This book explores the intersection of evaluation studies and care ethics in contemporary Western societies. In all societies and institutions, large and small, we find forces that can strengthen or destroy their fabric. One new regulation, law, or policy can impact the lives of many who find themselves in precarious positions. Think, for example, about health care reform and migrant policies in various Western countries and their effects on the everyday lives of millions of people. Policies, programs, and those who (...) execute them can threaten the daily routines of our lives, and we can respond by withdrawing or freezing, doing nothing and thinking it will pass. Or we can respond with resistance, anger, and sometimes much worse, like the shootings in several American cities. (shrink)

In the current literature on scientific explanation unification became unfashionable in favour of causal approaches. We want to bring unification back into the picture. In this paper we demonstrate that resemblance questions do occur in scientific practice and that they cannot be properly answered without unification. Our examples show that resemblance questions about particular facts demand what we call causal network unification, while resemblance questions about regularities require what we call mechanism unification. We clarify how these types of unification relate (...) to Philip Kitcher’s account, but also to causal and mechanistic accounts of explanation. (shrink)

The paradoxes of (in)tolerance in epistemic networks Does the Capitol invasion of January 2021 teach us that intolerant viewpoints have no place in public debates? This view is defensible on the basis of Karl Popper’s paradox of tolerance, which states that too much tolerance will ultimately entail the demise of that very tolerance. But how are the limits of (in)tolerance to be determined? We argue that Popper’s purely epistemological interpretation of the concept of tolerance is untenable; determining such limits ultimately (...) requires a political-normative interpretation. As an alternative epistemological perspective, we show how network epistemology can give us insight into how information, especially intolerant content, spreads through communities. This analysis can help us assess the consequences of potential interventions in public debates, and thus make informed choices. (shrink)

This collection addresses a post-WWII shift in the hierarchy of scientific explanations, where the highest goal moves from reductionism towards some ...

For the theorists of crisis, the revolutionary state comes into existence through violence, and due to its inability to provide an authoritative katechon (restrainer) against internal and external violence, it perpetuates violence until it self-destructs. Writing during extreme economic depression and growing social and political violence, the crisis theorists––Joseph de Maistre, Juan Donoso Cortés, and Carl Schmitt––each sought to blame the chaos of their time upon the Janus-faced postrevolutionary ideals of liberalism and socialism by urging a return to pre-revolutionary moral (...) and religious values. They are united by three counterrevolutionary principles, all of which are purported to remedy revolutionary violence: traditional constitutional fidelity, the philosophy of the decision, and opposition to bourgeois liberalism. This essay is followed by the first complete English translation and publication of Donoso’s letter of October 24, 1851, which contains Donoso’s only reference to the “discussing class,” a political entity later popularized by Schmitt in his 1922 work Political Theology. (shrink)

Imagery Rehearsal Therapy is effective for trauma-related nightmares and is also a challenge to patients in finding access to their traumatic memories, because these are saved in non-verbal, visual, or audiovisual language. Art therapy is an experiential treatment that addresses images rather than words. This study investigates the possibility of an IRT-AT combination. Systematic literature review and field research was conducted, and the integration of theoretical and practice-based knowledge resulted in a framework for Imagery Rehearsal-based Art Therapy. The added value (...) of AT in IRT appears to be more readily gaining access to traumatic experiences, living through feelings, and breaking through avoidance. Exposure and re-scripting take place more indirectly, experientially and sometimes in a playlike manner using art assignments and materials. In the artwork, imagination, play and fantasy offer creative space to stop the vicious circle of nightmares by changing theme, story line, ending, or any part of the dream into a more positive and acceptable one. IR-AT emerges as a promising method for treatment, and could be especially useful for patients who benefit least from verbal exposure techniques. This description of IR-AT offers a base for further research. (shrink)

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of laws, more specifically mechanistic explanations of laws. We investigate whether providing unificatory information in mechanistic explanations of laws has a surplus value. Unificatory information is information about how the mechanism that explains the law which is our target relates to other mechanisms. We argue that providing unificatory information can lead to explanations with more explanatory power (...) and that it may lead to more strongly supported explanations. (shrink)

In much of the current academic and public discussion, conspiracy theories are portrayed as a negative phenomenon, linked to misinformation, mistrust in experts and institutions, and political propaganda. Rather surprisingly, however, philosophers working on this topic have been reluctant to incorporate a negatively evaluative aspect when either analyzing or engineering the concept conspiracy theory. In this paper, we present empirical data on the nature of the concept conspiracy theory from five studies designed to test the existence, prevalence and exact form (...) of an evaluative dimension to the ordinary concept conspiracy theory. These results reveal that, while there is a descriptive concept of conspiracy theory, the predominant use of conspiracy theory is deeply evaluative, encoding information about epistemic deficiency and often also derogatory and disparaging information. On the basis of these results, we present a new strategy for engineering conspiracy theory to promote theoretical investigations and institutional discussions of this phenomenon. We argue for engineering conspiracy theory to encode an epistemic evaluation, and to introduce a descriptive expression—such as ‘conspiratorial explanation’—to refer to the purely descriptive concept conspiracy theory. (shrink)

The periodic table is one of the best-known systems of classification in science. Because of the information it contains, it raises explanation-seeking questions. Quantum mechanical models of the behaviour of electrons may be seen as providing explanations in response to these questions. In this paper we first address the question ‘Do quantum mechanical models of atoms provide legitimate explanations?’ Because our answer is positive, our next question is ‘Are the explanations provided by quantum mechanical models of atoms mechanistic explanations?’. This (...) question is motivated by the fact that in many scientific disciplines, mechanistic explanations are abundant. Because our answer to the second question is negative, our last question is ‘What kind of explanation do quantum mechanical models of atom provide?’ By addressing these questions, we shed light on the nature of an important type of chemical explanation. (shrink)