This Agenda 2050 piece is a call to action for management scholars to follow the lead of business associations, foundations, and businesses in studying and understanding the transformative change needed to bring about a more equitable and flourishing world for all living beings—including humans and other‐than‐humans. These entities advocate for a significant paradigm shift in how business is practiced as a way of responding to ‘polycrisis’—the interrelated set of civilization‐threatening crises that includes climate change, social inequality, and biodiversity loss. Yet (...) management scholars lag behind business discourse with issues of sustainability and ecological flourishing, adapting to the type of leadership needed for the future, and understanding the need for system change. We provide four keystone pathways to help scholars shape future discourse in business scholarship, practice, and curricula: 1) structural changes to management education, 2) piloting social impact, 3) development of regenerative business models, and 4) moral, legal, and financial cases for action. (shrink)

Not only does this book reflect the clarity and acuity of thought that characterize Wolterstorff's work, it also reflects the humane sensibilities of someone who has thought and felt deeply about these matters for a long time.

What is possible and why? What is the difference between the merely possible and the actual? In Kants Modal Metaphysics Nicholas Stang examines Kants lifelong engagement with these questions and their role in his philosophical development. This is the first book to trace Kants theory of possibility all theway from the so-called pre-Critical writings of the 1750s and 1760s to the Critical system of philosophy inaugurated by the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. Stang argues that the key to (...) understanding both the change and the continuity between Kants pre-Critical and Critical theory of possibility is his transformation of the ontological question about possibility-what is it for a being to be possible?-into a question in transcendental philosophy-what is it to represent an object as possible? (shrink)

"A complete and unified account of Plato's epistemology... scholarly, historically sensitive, and philosophically sophisticated. Above all it is sensible.... White's strength is that he places Plato's preoccupation in careful historical perspective, without belittling the intrinsic difficulties of the problems he tackled.... White's project is to find a continuous argument running through Plato's various attacks on epistemological problems. No summary can do justice to his remarkable success." --Ronald B. De Sousa, University of Toronto, in Phoenix.

A step by step, passage by passage analysis of the complete Republic. White shows how the argument of the book is articulated, the important interconnections among its elements, and the coherent and carefully developed train of though which motivates its complex philosophical reasoning. In his extensive introduction, White describes Plato's aims, introduces the argument, and discusses the major philosophical and ethical theories embodied in the Republic. He then summarizes each of its ten books and provides substantial explanatory and interpretive notes.

An important theme in recent experimental philosophy is that certain judgements (e.g. our judgements involving intentional action and causation) exhibit a kind of normative penetration whereby, in spite of a not-obviously-normative subject matter, they turn out to be sensitive to, and co-vary with, our normative attitudes in interesting and surprising ways. We present the results of several new experimental studies that suggest that our judgements about feasibility also appear to exhibit this kind of normative penetration in at least some cases; (...) that the best explanation of it involves attributing to subjects a certain kind of extensional error that results from conflating the question at hand with another question that is more salient given their normative attitudes; and that these conclusions have significant, though not straightforward, implications for our understanding of both normative penetration and feasibility, respectively. (shrink)

This Element is a concise, high-level introduction to the philosophy of physical symmetry. It begins with the notion of `physical representation' (the kind of empirical representation of nature that we effect in doing physics), and then lays out the historically and conceptually central case of physical symmetry that frequently falls under the rubric of 'the Relativity Principle', or 'Galileo's Ship. This material is then used as a point of departure to explore the key hermeneutic challenge concerning physical symmetry in the (...) last century, namely understanding the physical significance of the notion of 'local' gauge symmetry. The approach taken stresses both the continuity with historically important themes such as the Relativity Principle, as well as novel insights earned by working with contemporary media such as the covariant phase space and derived critical locus formalisms. (shrink)

The rapid development of artificial womb technologies means that we must consider if and when it is permissible to kill the human subject of ectogestation—recently termed a ‘gestateling’ by Elizabeth Chloe Romanis—prior to ‘birth’. We describe the act of deliberately killing the gestateling as gestaticide, and argue that there are good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide, which we consider to be morally impermissible. First, we argue that gestaticide is harder to justify than abortion, primarily because (...) the gestateling is completely independent of its biological parents. Second, we argue that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide. To demonstrate this, we explain that gestatelings are born in a straightforward sense, which entails that killing them is infanticide. However, to strengthen our overall claim, we also show that if gestatelings are not considered to have been born, killing them is still equivalent to killing neonates with congenital anomalies and disabilities, which again is infanticide. We conclude by considering how our discussion of gestaticide has implications for the permissibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from gestatelings. (shrink)

Can a person privileged in some respect understand what it is like to be disprivileged in that respect? Some say yes; some say no. I argue that both positions are correct, because ‘understand what it is like to be disprivileged’ is ambiguous. Sometimes, it means grasp of the character of particular experiences of disprivileged people. Privileged people can achieve this. Sometimes, it means grasp of the general character shared by experiences of disprivileged people. Privileged people cannot achieve this. However, there (...) is a general kind of understanding that they can achieve: understanding of why individual experiences have their character, in relation to privilege and disprivilege. This understanding is a skill, not knowledge. It is difficult and discomforting for the privileged to acquire and is easily conflated with knowledge of general experiential character. Distinguishing and characterizing these kinds of understanding clarifies whether, and how, the privileged might understand what it is like to be disprivileged. (shrink)

Expanding on his 1976 study of the bearing of Christian faith on the practice of scholarship, Wolterstorff has added a substantial new section on the role of faith in the decisions scholars make about their choice of subject matter.

Three thoughts strongly influence recent work on sensory imagination, often without explicit articulation. The image thought says that all mental states involving a mental image are imaginative. The attitude thought says that, if there is a distinctive imaginative attitude, it is a single, monolithic attitude. The function thought says that the functions of sensory imagination are identical or akin to functions of other mental states such as judgment or belief. Taken together, these thoughts create a theoretical context within which eliminativism (...) appears attractive. Eliminativism is the idea that we needn’t refer to a distinctive attitude in order to characterize sensory imagination: the attitudes involved in other states provide all the resources we need. Peter Langland-Hassan’s account of sensory imagination provides an example of such eliminativism. Via close examination of this account, I make manifest the three thoughts and their collective tendency to support eliminativism. I argue that all three are dubious, and that we should reject eliminativism; we need a distinctive imaginative attitude if we are to adequately explicate sensory imagination. (shrink)

All Christian theologians agree that God is without beginning and without end. The vast majority have held, in addition, that God is eternal, existing outside of time. Only a small minority have contended that God is everlasting, existing within time. In what follows I shall take up the cudgels for that minority, arguing that God as conceived and presented by the biblical writers is a being whose own life and existence is temporal.

In “Artistic Worth and Personal Taste,” Jerrold Levinson develops a problem for those who think we should strive to be “ideal critics” in our aesthetic lives. He then offers several solutions to this problem. I argue that his solutions miss the mark and that the problem he characterizes may not be genuine after all.

Enlightening Journey brings the life of the American philosopher, Nicholas Rescher, into the new millennium. The latest in a quartet of autobiographical works, this latest installment charts—in a single volume—the many twists and turns of Rescher's life and career. It takes the reader from Rescher's childhood in Weimar and then Nazi Germany through life as a first generation American during the Depression; as a high school student during World War II and a graduate student at Princeton; as a serviceman (...) during the Korean War to work as a Cold War warrior with the RAND Corporation during the Vietnam War. It traces the evolution of Rescher's career as a professional philosopher and his contribution of over seventy books and more than two hundred articles, many written in the construction of his signature system of pragmatic idealism. The very best in biography, Enlightening Journey offers new insight into the intellectual power and restless curiosity of an extraordinary modern scholar seeking to live out a very ordinary American life. (shrink)

Are probabilism and special relativity compatible? Dieks argues that they are. But the possible universe he specifies, designed to exemplify both probabilism and special relativity, either incorporates a universal “now”, or amounts to a many world universe, or fails to have any one definite overall Minkowskian-type space-time structure. Probabilism and special relativity appear to be incompatible after all. What is at issue is not whether “the flow of time” can be reconciled with special relativity, but rather whether explicitly probabilistic versions (...) of quantum theory should be rejected because of incompatibility with special relativity. (shrink)

Opponents of abortion are commonly said to be inconsistent in their beliefs or actions, and to fail in their obligations to prevent the deaths of embryos and fetuses from causes other than induced...

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 5, Page 899-906, September 2022.

In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich, die innere Kohärenz der Cartesischen Lehre von der Wechselwirkung zwischen Leib und Seele nachzuweisen. Ich versichte jedoch darauf, das Prinzip, daß die Ursache ebenso viel Realität enthalten muß wie die Wirkung, selbst und erst recht Descartes' Anwendung derselben auf die Ideen zu verteidigen. Mein Bemühen um die innere Kohärenz der Cartesischen Position erklärt die ausschließliche Blickrichtung auf nur eine Richtung der Wechselwirkung. Unter der Voraussetzung der Cartesischen Prinzipien kann sich durch die Annahme von durch Wollen (...) verursachter physischer Veränderung kein Problem ergeben; denn hier kommt das Augustinische Prinzip Descartes zur Hilfe. Nach Augustins Prinzip ist nämlich das Geistige vollkommener und daher realer als das Physische. Heutige Philosophen mögen Descartes' Auffassung der willentlichen Bewegungen geheimnisvoll finden, doch geschieht das aus Gründen, die außerhalb des Cartesischen Systems liegen. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 1, Page 57-63, January 2022.

In the historiography of Classical Greek ethics over the last two hundred years, and in the employment of Greek ideas by modern philosophers, one story has been standard. Greek ethics, it says, espouses a kind of eudaimonism that Ishall call harmonizing eudaimonism. This story seems to me quite wrong, but it is now so firmly rooted that scarcely anyone ever thinks of questioning it.

I offer a Kantian argument for the idea that the state lacks the authority to punish neglected, impoverished citizens when they commit crimes to cope with that neglect. Given Kant’s own commitments to the value of external freedom and the state’s obligation to ensure it in Doctrine of Right, there is no reason a Kantian state can claim authority to punish an impoverished citizen while also failing in significant ways to protect her external freedom.

Listening to other cultures offers challenges to our fundamental assumptions and world views. In New Zealand public policy on Assisted Reproductive Technology is being worked out in a society committed to the development of bicultural partnership honouring the Treaty of Waitangi, a treaty with the indigenous people.Strong claims to the cultural significance of genetic heritage by Maori have made apparent to non-Maori their own assumptions. These claims also resist reductive understandings of genetics.In this paper I review, as a Pakeha ethicist, (...) initiatives taken in New Zealand, and the impact of bicultural development on public policy on ART. I also discuss some of the issues this raises for western bioethics as it relates to non-western approaches and include reference to the significance of genetic heritage as it is affecting guidelines for donor insemination and surrogacy. (shrink)

Listening to other cultures offers challenges to our fundamental assumptions and world views. In New Zealand public policy on Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) is being worked out in a society committed to the development of bicultural partnership honouring the Treaty of Waitangi, a treaty with the indigenous people.Strong claims to the cultural significance of genetic heritage by Maori have made apparent to non‐Maori (Pakeha) their own assumptions. These claims also resist reductive understandings of genetics.In this paper I review, as a (...) Pakeha ethicist, initiatives taken in New Zealand, and the impact of bicultural development on public policy on ART. I also discuss some of the issues this raises for western bioethics as it relates to non‐western approaches and include reference to the significance of genetic heritage as it is affecting guidelines for donor insemination and surrogacy. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor has long championed the view, recently dubbed “scientific intentional realism” (Loewer and Ray, 1991, p. xiv), that “a scientifically adequate psychology will contain laws that quantify over intentional phenomena in intentional terms.” On such a view our belief/desire psychology will be “vindicated” through empirical investigation; that is, it will be shown to denote the explanatory (or causally salient) states or events in the production of thought and behavior. That intentional properties, states, or events have causal efficacy---are not mere (...) epiphenomena---is necessary for any such vindication. This paper investigates whether intentional properties can if fact ground or sustain the causal relations empirical psychology aims to reveal. I conclude that intentional properties are not amenable to such an explanatory role, and that, therefore, a different vindication of intentional description is required of the realist. (shrink)

Over a decade ago, Grant Tavinor’s first book, The Art of Videogames (2009), brought academic philosophy face to face with a seemingly alien artform. With The A.

Inspired by the work of intellectual historian J. G. A. Pocock, this 1993 collection explores the political ideologies of early modern Britain.

One of the most puzzling things about Stoicism has always been its position concerning the so-called “indifferents”. Let me summarize it. The Stoics seem to hold that all states of affairs other than virtue are indifferent as to goodness. At the same time they seem to think that virtue is partially constituted by a propensity to choose certain such indifferent states of affairs. For they maintain that the end, which they identify with virtue and the sole good, is “to live (...) in agreement with nature”, in a sense that is taken to involve selecting things that are in accord with nature, even though these things, it seems, are indifferent. They make two seemingly evaluative distinctions within the class of indifferents, one between things that are “preferred” and things that are “dispreferred”, and another between “appropriate acts” and others. All of this is well known and uncontroversial. (shrink)

This article reassesses Suárez’s claim that real essences are intrinsically logically possible. (Henceforth, this claim is referred to as ‘ILP.’) Most scholars have understood ILP as asserting the independence of logical possibility from God’s power; on their view, it in fact asserts that real essences in themselves explain logical possibility. As a result, the claim is in tension with Suárez’s other thesis that real essences are nothing in themselves. Scholars have taken two main approaches to assessing this tension. Some, like (...) John Doyle and Norman Wells, argue that Suárez contradicts himself. There is no way for real essences both to be intrinsically logically possible and also to be nothing. More recently, however, scholars have jumped to Suárez’s defense. They argue that he avoids contradiction because they claim that he accepts some further radical thesis which allows him to remove the tension. But these scholars still accept the claim that ILP asserts that real essences explain logical possibility. This article contests this basic interpretation. I will argue that ILP is not a thesis about the explanation or ground of logical possibility. First, it abstracts from notions of actual existence; as a result, it cannot be a claim about ontological explanation. Second, in order to conceive of logical possibility, intellectual operation is necessary; thus, it is not the sort of property which can have an ontological explanation in the usual sense. Third and finally, insofar as logical possibility can be explained, Suárez turns out to explain it through God’s power. (shrink)

A RELEVÂNCIA DO PRÉVIO ESGOTAMENTO DAS INSTÂNCIAS DESPORTIVAS E AS SANÇÕES AO SEU DESCUMPRIMENTO.