Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience from the first-person point of view. Husserl used principles of formal ontology even as he bracketed the natural-cultural world in describing our experience, and Heidegger pursued fundamental ontology in his variety of phenomenology describing our own modes of existence. I shall address the role of ontology in phenomenology, and vice versa. Our account of what exists depends on our account of what and how we experience. But, moreover, (...) our understanding of the structure of consciousness depends on our understanding of structure, basic ontological structure, and hence of the place of consciousness in the structure of the world. What makes consciousness “hard” for contemporary philosophy of mind is understanding how intentionality and subjectivity fit into the structure of the world: how phenomenology fits with ontology. (shrink)

Phenomenology is the study of conscious experience from the first-person point of view. Husserl used principles of formal ontology even as he bracketed the natural-cultural world in describing our experience, and Heidegger pursued fundamental ontology in his variety of phenomenology describing our own modes of existence. I shall address the role of ontology in phenomenology, and vice versa. Our account of what exists depends on our account of what and how we experience. But, moreover, (...) our understanding of the structure of consciousness depends on our understanding of structure, basic ontological structure, and hence of the place of consciousness in the structure of the world. What makes consciousness “hard” for contemporary philosophy of mind is understanding how intentionality and subjectivity fit into the structure of the world: how phenomenology fits with ontology. (shrink)

The special importance of the system of Hedwig Conrad-Martius lies in that she takes up the ideas of her teacher Husserl and pursues them on an independent path of phenomenology carefully anchored in the history of philosophy. This above all made possible the philosophical grasping of the then revolutionary findings in the modern natural sciences, especially in physics and medicine. The question concerning the border between the natural sciences and philosophy is today still debated with just as much urgency—indeed, (...) ethically with even more urgency—as it was in her time. By virtue of this alone, her ideas can be of great help to us. The natural scientific progress made since her time does not, however, present a barrier; rather it corresponds to the spirit of phenomenology: not to produce results with rigid intellectual frameworks, but to make available a tool with which the world in its diversity—and thus also for its modern, ever-changing issues—can be disclosed ever anew. The essay will consist of an overview of the life of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, an introduction to the essential ideas of her work: her concept of essence and her formulation of phenomenological ideation [Wesensschau], a brief sketch of her epistemology and an exposition of her ontological conception of “real ontology” [Realontologie]. (shrink)

A certain type of metaphysical manicheism has become quite prevalent among Levinas readers who insist in declaring his ethics to be a morally and, ultimately, politically necessary departure from Heidegger’s ontology. This approach inadequately moralizes Levinas’ articulation of the ethical which, I argue here, ought to be understood as an account of the pre-reflective normative conditions of ontology as meaning. In this paper, I seek to show that Levinas account of Ethics is squarely rooted in the epistemology of (...) Heidegger’s Being and Time and that, his phenomenological articulation of pre-deliberative normativity may be read as the Deduction and Schematism of Being and Time, that is, as its central mechanism. (shrink)

lntentional ontology. Heidegger and the transformation of Husserlian phenomenology. The article will look inside in what Heidegger said in his first course in Marburgo about the issue of intentionality as the basis for a “fundamental ontological investigation.” Through the first Heidegger’s lessons, especially Freiburg, aspects of the Husserl’s idea of intentionality who suffered a hermeneutic appropriation by Heidegger, will be deployed. The text will focus on the relationship between Husserl’s intentionality and categorial intuition in order to interpret them (...) through the light of hermeneutic and understanding intuition that Heidegger speaks in his 1919’s Kriegsnotsemester. (shrink)

I deal with the issue of the environmental crisis from the perspective of a phenomenologically embedded qualitative social ontology. The first point I make is that our environment is a «personal world», and not a «naturalistic world»: a world that is experienced in the «personalistic attitude» and as such is an ontologically qualitative world, in which both natural and social entities are given to us as essentially constituted by value-qualities and meanings, and not as merely material things. The second (...) point I argue for is that our environment is also a «common-surrounding world» whose personal collectives are its essential correlate: «common-surrounding world» and personal collectives existentially depend on one another, and human persons, both individual and collective, are responsible for the existence of their environment and its entities. I apply the tools of phenomenological eidetics to the ideas of «personal world» and «common-surrounding world», and inquire into the ontologically qualitative implications that they have for our environment and its crisis. (shrink)

Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, raises an interesting philosophical issue, namely, how can one be in touch with past things if they no longer exist? It provides us with a way to address this issue by outlining an ontological view according to which past things still exist within a four-dimensional world. Although one cannot be in touch with past things by means of ordinary perception, one can do so by combining perception and memory. In this sense, In Search (...) of Lost Time helps us to reconcile a four-dimensionalist ontology according to which things have both spatial and temporal parts with a realist phenomenology according to which experience gives us access to things as they are. In so doing, Proust’s masterpiece allows us to shed some light on what it means for a subject of experience to exist in a four-dimensional world. (shrink)

Psychologists have generated numerous measures designed to capture the “spiritual,” “religious,” and “transcendent” structures of human cognition, emotion, and behavior. Researchers often identify...

Distinct among contemporary philosophical studies focused on education, this book engages the history of phenomenological thought as it moves from philosophy proper (the European phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition) through curriculum studies. It thus presents the "best of both worlds" for the reader; there is a "play" or movement from philosophy proper to educational philosophy and then back again in order to locate and explicate what is intimated, suggested, and in some cases, left "unsaid" by educational philosophers. This amounts to a work on (...) education-philosophy that elucidates, through various permutations within the unique foci of each essay, the general phenomenological theme of the fundamental ontology of the human being as primordial learner. Reflecting his experience as scholar, teacher, and perennial learner, the author suggests how research in phenomenology might prove beneficial to the enhancement of both the theoretical and practical aspects of education; readers are invited to envision education as far more than merely a means by which to organize an effective learning experience in which knowledge is assimilated and skill sets are efficiently imparted, but rather as a holistic and integrated process in which knowing, acting, and valuing are original ways of Being-in-the-world. (shrink)

이 논문에서 콘라드-마티우스가 구상하고 있는 존재론적 현상학의 특징과 의미를 밝히고자 한다. 이미 20세기 초반에 소위 ‘뮌헨-괴팅겐 현상학파’의 멤버였던 팬더와 가이거 등이 존재론적 현상학을 구상하여 발전시키게 되며 콘라드-마티우스는 후설과 이들로부터 직간접으로 영향을 받게 된다. 초기 후설에게 있어서 사태가 의식을 의미한다면, 존재론적 현상학자들은 사태를 실재와 연관하여 이해한다. 콘라드-마티우스는 현상학의 흐름을 크게 ‘후설의 선험적이고 관념론적 현상학’, 하이데거의 ‘실존론적 현상학’, 그리고 뮌헨-괴팅겐 현상학자의 ‘존재론적 현상학’으로 분류하면서 자신의 철학 역시 ‘존재론적 현상학’에 포함시킨다. 존재론적 현상학의 특징을 잘 나타내는 초기 실재 존재론이 지향하는 목표는 실재 존재의 기초가 (...) 되는 구성요소들을 파악하는 데 있다. 실재 존재론의 목적은 궁극적으로 사물을 알고자 하는 것이 아니라 사물에 속한 그리고 사물이 알려 주는 것을 드러내고자 하는 데 있다. 콘라드-마티우스는 후설로부터 철학적 영감을 받았음에도 불구하고 관념론적 색깔을 강하게 풍기는 선험적 현상학에 대해서는 비판적 태도를 취한다. 그녀는 존재보다 의식을 우위에 두는 관념론을 비판하면서 의식을 존재론적 지평에서 탐구할 것을 강조한다. 칸트의 초월철학과 달리 실재 존재론은 실재를 문제 삼으면서도 사물 자체를 인식할 수 있다는 점을 견지한다. 이 논문에서 실재와 존재, 빛과 같은 실재 존재론의 핵심개념들을 해명함으로써 그녀가 구상하는 존재론적 현상학에 보다 가까이 다가서고자 한다. (shrink)

"Phenomenology or Deconstruction? challenges traditional understandings of the relationship between phenomenology and deconstruction through new readings of the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Luc Nancy. A constant dialogue with Jacques Derrida's engagement with phenomenological themes provides the impetus to establishing a new understanding of 'being' and 'presence' that exposes significant blindspots inherent in traditional readings of both phenomenology and deconstruction." "This new reading of being and presence fundamentally re-draws our understanding of the relation of deconstruction (...) and phenomenology, and provides the first sustained discussion of the possibilities and problems for any future 'deconstructive phenomenology.'" --Book Jacket. (shrink)

This contribution highlights the importance of the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, a student of Husserl and early phenomenological thinker, in the context of a review of James Hart’s 1972 dissertation on her work, now published under the title _Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Ontological Phenomenology_. It provides some context for Conrad-Martius’ thought, gives a brief chapter-by-chapter account of Hart’s treatment, and raises some further questions about his discussion of her work.

The German-Hungarian phenomenologist became one of the few philosophers at the beginning of the 21st century who analyzed the foundations of transcendentalism in terms of the continental tradition. As a philosopher working within the framework of the Cartesian attitude, he posed the same questions as other philosophers after Heidegger - is it possible an alternative to ontotheology, is metaphysics possible after the rejection of metaphysics? But his answer quite accurately reflects both the internal contradictions of phenomenology and the heuristic (...) possibilities of modern non-classical ontology. The purpose of this article is to analyze the idea of L. Tengelyi's metaphysical phenomenology as a methodological project, with an emphasis on the concept of infinity. His work “World and Infinity. Towards the Problem of Phenomenological Metaphysics ”concentrates in itself an analysis of both the prehistory and the prospects of the phenomenological method at the beginning of the 21st century regarding post-metaphysical thinking. (shrink)

This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between speaking and spoken speech, and the relation between the two, in his Phenomenology of Perception. Against a common interpretation, I argue on exegetical and philosophical grounds that the distinction should not be understood as one between two kinds of speech, but rather between two internally related dimensions present in all speech. This suggests an interdependence between speaking and spoken aspects of speech, and some commentators have critiqued Merleau-Ponty for claiming a priority of speaking (...) over spoken speech. However, there is a sense in which Merleau-Ponty is right to emphasize the priority, namely, in terms of the ontological priority of the speaking subject with respect to language understood as a constituted cultural ideality. The latter only maintains its ontological status insofar as it is taken up by a language community. I favorably contrast Merleau-Ponty’s views on this question to those of the late Heidegger and de Saussure, and suggest potential applications of this clarified position for contemporary discussions in philosophy of language. (shrink)

I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. (...) Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain empty. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend an ontologically minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) vindicates Aristotelianism about types and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience. (shrink)

Heidegger’s later philosophy is marked by two conflicting claims about phenomenology. On the one hand, phenomenology and philosophy generally is tasked with “responding to the claim of what is to be thought” in a novel and unprecedented manner. On the other hand, Heidegger recognizes that there have been earlier attempts at thus doing justice to phenomena; in the ontological commitments of earlier thinkers, Heidegger finds accounts of the “things themselves,” each of which has different implications for what (...) class='Hi'>phenomenology should concern itself with. Phenomenology, as Heidegger conceives it, should thus both incorporate the history of philosophy and exceed it, yet it is unclear how these ideas can be reconciled. This chapter calls this problem the “dilemma of the historicity of phenomenology” and identifies different versions of it in Heidegger’s works after 1935/6. (shrink)

There have been renewed calls to use phenomenology in psychiatry to improve knowledge about causation, diagnostics, and treatment of mental health conditions. A phenomenological approach aims to elucidate the subjective experiences of mental health, which its advocates claim have been largely neglected by current diagnostic frameworks in psychiatry (eg, DSM-5). The consequence of neglecting rich phenomenological information is a comparatively more constrained approach to theory development, empirical research, and care programmes. Although calls for more phenomenology in psychiatry have (...) been met with enthusiasm, there is still relatively little information on how to practically facilitate this integration. In this Personal View, we argue that phenomenological approaches need a shared semantic framework to drive their innovative potential, thus enabling consistent data capture, exchange, and interoperability with current mental health data and informatics approaches (eg, the Research Domain Criteria project). We show how an applied ontology of phenomenological psychopathology offers a suitable method to address these challenges. (shrink)

The idea inspiring the eco-phenomenological movement is that phenomenology can help remedy our environmental crisis by uprooting and replacing environmentally-destructive ethical and metaphysical presuppositions inherited from modern philosophy. Eco-phenomenology's critiques of subject/object dualism and the fact/value divide are sketched and its positive alternatives examined. Two competing approaches are discerned within the eco-phenomenological movement: Nietzscheans and Husserlians propose a naturalistic ethical realism in which good and bad are ultimately matters of fact, and values should be grounded in these proto-ethical (...) facts; Heideggerians and Levinasians articulate a transcendental ethical realism according to which we discover what really matters when we are appropriately open to the environment, but what we thereby discover is a transcendental source of meaning that cannot be reduced to facts, values, or entities of any kind. These two species of ethical realism generate different kinds of ethical perfectionism: naturalistic ethical realism yields an eco-centric perfectionism which stresses the flourishing of life in general; transcendental ethical realism leads to a more 'humanistic' perfectionism which emphasizes the cultivation of distinctive traits of Dasein. Both approaches are examined, and the Heideggerian strand of the humanistic approach defended, since it approaches the best elements of the eco-centric view while avoiding its problematic ontological assumptions and anti-humanistic implications. (shrink)

Literary ontology is essentially a phenomenological issue rather than one of epistemology, sociology, or psychology. It is a theory of the phenomenological essence intuited from a sense of beauty, based on the phenomenological ontology of beauty, which puts into brackets the sociohistorical premises and material conditions of aesthetic phenomena. Beauty is the objectified emotion. This is the phenomenological definition of the essence of beauty, which manifests itself on three levels, namely emotion qua selfconsciousness, sense of beauty qua emotion, (...) and sentiment qua sense of beauty. Art on the other hand is the objectification of emotion whose most general and closest manner to humanity is literature and poetry. Poetry is the origin of language and the linguistic essence is a metaphor. Language as the house of being is both thinking and poetry. Literature expresses the essence of art in the most direct way and, in traditional Chinese aesthetic terminology, literature is the language of emotion conveyed by the writer based on his own emotion towards the language of scene. (shrink)

Postphenomenologists and performativists criticize classical approaches to phenomenology for isolating human subjects from their socio-material relations. The purpose of this essay is to repudiate their criticism by presenting a nuanced account of phenomenology thus making it evident that phenomenological theories have the potential for meshing with the performative idiom of contemporary science and technology studies. However, phenomenology retains an apparent shortcoming in that its proponents typically focus on human–nonhuman relations that arise in localized contexts. For this reason, (...) it seems to contrast with one of the core assumptions behind practical ontologies: that socio-practical significance extends beyond an agent’s immediate situatedness in a localized context. Turning to Heidegger’s phenomenology and his notion of ‘de-distancing’, the essay explores how localized phenomena that pertain to human experience connect with global practices and, thus, the possibility of consilience between phenomenological research and present-day STS. (shrink)

This paper addresses the persistent philosophical problem posed by the amoralist—one who eschews moral values—by drawing on complementary resources within phenomenology and care ethics. How is it that the amoralist can reject ethical injunctions that serve the general good and be unpersuaded by ethical intuitions that for most would require neither explanation nor justification? And more generally, what is the basis for ethical motivation? Why is it that we can care for others? What are the underpinning ontological structures that (...) are able to support an ethics of care? To respond to these questions, I draw on the work of Merleau-Ponty, focusing specifically on his analyses of perceptual attention. What is the nature and quality of perceptual attention that underwrite our capacities or incapacities for care? I proceed in dialogue with a range of philosophers attuned to the compelling nature of care, some who have also drawn on Merleau-Ponty and others who have examined the roots of an ethics of care inspired or incited by other thinkers. (shrink)

This book studies the phenomenological ontology of breathing. It investigates breathing and air as a question of phenomenological philosophy and looks at phenomenological questions concerning respiratory methodology, ontological experience of respiration, respiratory spirituality and respiratory embodiment. Drawing on the ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gaston Bachelard, Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Luce Irigaray and David Kleinberg-Levin, the book argues for the ontological primacy of breathing and develops a new principle of philosophy that the author calls "Silence of Breath, Abyss/Yawn of Air". (...) It asserts that breathing is not a thing- or person-oriented relation, but perpetual communication with the immense elemental atmosphere of open and free air. This new phenomenological method of breathing offers readers a chance to begin to wonder, rethink, re-experience and reimagine all questions of life in an innovative and creative way as aerial and respiratory questions of life. Part of the Routledge Critical Perspectives on Breath and Breathing series, the book breaks new ground in phenomenology and phenomenological ontology by offering a decisive and insightful treatment of breath. It will be indispensable for students and researchers of philosophy, phenomenology, and ontology. It will also be of special interest to Merleau-Ponty scholars as it investigates uncharted dimensions of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. (shrink)

Heidegger connected his name with the endeavor of renewing the question regarding Being (Seinsfrage). In BT (1927), he attempted to bring the issue of Being and everything concerning it back to the fore, by investigating the question of what the things themselves (die Sache selbst) are in its case. In this way, he managed to maintain his distance from the inherited and uninterpellated theories and speculations around "Being" (είναι). At the time, he continued to think that the precondition for arriving (...) at the very things themselves was—more or less—the phenomenological method that Husserl introduced in his breakthrough phenomenological opus, the Logical Investigations (1900-01). On this basis, in his "What is Metaphysics?” (1929) (WM). Heidegger explicitly maintained that the truth with regard to the issue of Being could and should be mediated—no matter how paradoxical this may sound—through the question regarding Nothing (Nichts). Parmenides, to be sure, had warned that nothing (μηδέν) is not, for that which is the έόν, and that only with what is can understanding (νοείν) and speaking (λέγειν) be correlated. The possibility of arriving at truths depends on propositions that say “is” with regard to what is, and “is not" with regard to what is not. Heidegger, however, thought that the most important issue for philosophy as ontology (but even for humans as beings engaged in praxis) was Nothing (Nichts)—and, moreover. Nothing as Being! But how could someone conceive of and bring to language these obviously limit subject matters? Haven’t we seen that Logic, following Parmenides' instruction, has progressively burked all talk of Being, and barred all talk about Nothing? (shrink)

It is rare to come across a philosophical work that breaks away from what has come before it and augurs a new way of doing philosophy. Petri Berndtson’s remarkable new book, Phenomenological Ontolo...

This article deals with the euthanasia debate in light of new life-sustaining technologies such as the left ventricular assist device (LVAD). The question arises: does the switching off of a LVAD by a doctor upon the request of a patient amount to active or passive euthanasia, i.e. to ‘killing’ or to ‘letting die’? The answer hinges on whether the device is to be regarded as a proper part of the patient's body or as something external. We usually regard the switching (...) off of an internal device as killing, whereas the deactivation of an external device is seen as ‘letting die’. The case is notoriously difficult to decide for hybrid devices such as LVADs, which are partly inside and partly outside the patient's body. Additionally, on a methodological level, I will argue that the ‘ontological’ arguments from analogy given for both sides are problematic. Given the impasse facing the ontological arguments, complementary phenomenological arguments deserve closer inspection. In particular, we should consider whether phenomenologically the LVAD is perceived as a body part or as an external device. I will support the thesis that the deactivation of a LVAD is to be regarded as passive euthanasia if the device is not perceived by the patient as a part of the body proper. (shrink)

Anna Jani interprets the relationship between phenomenology and ontology by redefining its goals, methodological focuses, and key figures. The common methodology of hermeneutical phenomenology originates from the question on being, which resembles religious experiences in certain ways.

The term ‘supervenience’ has acquired central status in contemporary philosophy in the wake of Davidson’s discussion of mental e physical properties. We want to recover Davidson’s original setting and to tackle the same problem by an alternative route, which resorts to a phenomenological approach. The notion of supervenience emerges at the crossroad between three theses: 1) the background of ontological monism; 2) the interpretation of monism as physicalism; 3) the dependence of mental events on physical events. ‘Supervenience’ bears the task (...) to express simultaneously the ontological dependence of the mental on the physical and the apparent irreducibility of the former to the latter. In this framework, we are going, first, to grant ontological monism while rejecting physicalism. We will argue for an ontological framework that acknowledges some of the reasons of classical idealism, without abandoning a materialist framework. Secondly, we are going to show why intentional phenomena can never be regarded as epiphenomena. This move recommends a renewed methodological ‘respect’ for phenomena, consistent with the phenomenological tradition. Thirdly, by reinterpreting the old notion of formal causality, we will make room for an understanding of ‘mental causation’ that avoids both dualism and any violation of the principle of conservation of energy. In conclusion, we are going to argue that the reasons that originally motivated the introduction of ‘supervenience’ are inconsistent and that, in the theoretical context that we argue for, resorting to the notion of supervenience is either superfluous or misleading. (shrink)

This article has two objectives. In the first part, I present a critical overview of the extensive anthropological literature that may be deemed “phenomenological.” Following this critique, which is built up around a classification into four different varieties of phenomenological anthropology, I discuss the relationship between phenomenological anthropology and the ontological turn (OT). Contrary to received wisdom within the anthropological discipline, I suggest that OT has several things in common with the phenomenological project. For the same reason, I argue, it (...) is not accurate to posit OT and phenomenology as opposing or antagonistic projects, as they are often depicted among critics and advocates of OT alike. On the contrary, I go as far as suggesting, OT may be understood as one of the most concerted attempts anthropology has produced to realize a distinctly anthropological version of Husserl’s method of phenomenological bracketing, namely what could be called the ontological epoché. (shrink)

Few researchers of the past made sense of the collapse of representations in the quantum domain, and looked for a new process of sense-making below the level of representations: the level of the phenomenology of perception and action; the level of the elaboration of knowledge out of experience. But some recent philosophical readings of quantum physics all point in this direction. They all recognize the fact that the quantum revolution is a revolution in our conception of knowledge. In these (...) recent readings of quantum physics, quantum states are primarily generators of probabilistic valuations. Accordingly, they should not be seen as statements about what is the case, but as statements about what each agent can reasonably expect to be the case. Three features of such non-interpretational, non-committal approaches to quantum physics strongly evoke the phenomenological epistemology. These are: their deliberately first-person stance; their suspension of judgment about a presumably external domain of objects, and subsequent redirection of attention towards the activity of constituting these objects; their perception-like conception of quantum knowledge. But beyond phenomenological epistemology, these new approaches of quantum physics also make implicit use of a phenomenological ontology. Chris Fuch’s participatory realism thus formulates a non-external variety of realism for one who is deeply immersed in reality. But participatory realism strongly resembles Merleau-Ponty’s endo-ontology, which is a phenomenological ontology for one who deeply participates in Being. This remarkable analogy is supported by Merleau-Ponty himself. Indeed, 50 years before QBism, Merleau-Ponty acknowledged the strong kinship between the status of quantum mechanics and his phenomenology of embodiment. He did so in two texts that remained unpublished until after his death: Visible and invisible, and the Lectures on Nature. The final part of this article is then devoted to a study of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of quantum physics. (shrink)

This paper critically discusses Charles Taylor’s ethical views in his little known paper “Ethics and Ontology” : 305–320, 2003) by confronting it with the moral phenomenology of Maurice Mandelbaum, as laid out in his The Phenomenology of Moral Experience. The aim of the paper is to explore the significance of Taylor’s views for the dispute between naturalists, non-naturalists, and quietists in contemporary metaethics. It is divided in six sections. In the first section, I examine Taylor’s critique of (...) naturalism. I continue to discuss his moral phenomenology in more detail in the second and third sections, arguing that Taylor’s move from phenomenology to ontology is problematic. In the fourth section, I evaluate Taylor’s strategy by comparing it with Mandelbaum’s understanding of moral phenomenology, while also extending this comparison to the issue of how to locate the source of moral experience in the fifth section. Based on these discussions, I finally conclude in the sixth section that Taylor’s hermeneutical position, although ontologically incomplete and underdemonstrated, draws attention to a question to which current moral theory does not adequately respond. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ work implies four criteria that moral phenomenology must be capable of meeting if it is to be a viable field of study that can make a worthwhile contribution to moral philosophy. It must be (a) about a unifed subject matter as well as being, (b) wide, (c) independent, and (d) robust. Contrary to some scepticism about the possibility or usefulness of this field, I suggest that these criteria can be met by elucidating the very (...) foundations of moral experience or what I call a moral ontology of the human person. I attempt to partially outline such an ontology by engaging with Robert Sokolowski's phenomenology of the human person from a moral perspective. My analysis of Sokolowski's thought leads me to five core ideas of a moral ontology of the human person: well-being, virtue, freedom, responsibility, and phronesis. Though I do not by any means boast a complete moral ontology of the human person, I go on to demonstrate how the account I have presented, or something like it, can go a long way to helping moral phenomenology meet the criteria it requires to be a viable and worthwhile pursuit. (shrink)

Shaun Gallagher [2019] argues for a ‘non-classical’ conception of nature, which includes subjects as irreducible constituents. As such, first-person phenomenology can be naturalised and at the same time resist reduction to the third-person. In the first part of this paper, I raise three concerns for the claim that nature is irreducibly subject-involving. In the second part of the paper, I suggest that embracing a process ontology could help strengthen Gallagher’s proposal.

Most of the essays that follow have originally appeared in philosophical journals, Indian and Western. They are reprinted here with the hope that in spite of the wide variety of topics with which they deal there is nevertheless a certain unity of treatment. A few major ideas and distinctions run through all the essays: I need not further single them out here. For permission to reprint, I have to thank the editors of the journals and books in which the essays (...) originally appeared. My former pupil Miss Manjusree Ray has been kind enough to help me in preparing the book for the press. J. N. MOHANTY May, I968, Calcutta CONTENTS Preface v Part One I. Modes of Givenness 3 II. The Given 12 III. Thought and Action 22 IV. Meaning and Truth-I 0 3 V. Meaning and Truth-II 50 VI. Language and Reality 60 VII. On Reference 2 7 VIII. Remarks on the Content Theory 84 IX. Phenomenology and Ontology 2 9 Part Two X. A Note on Modern Nominalism I07 XI. A recent Criticism of the Foundations of Nicolai Hartmann's Ontology II5 XII. Remarks on Nicolai Hartmann's Modal Doctrine 129 XIII. The 'Object' in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology 138 XIV. Individual Fact and Essence in Edmund Husserl's Philosophy 152 XV. Gilbert Ryle's Criticisms of the Concept of Conscio- ness 163 XVI. On G. E. Moore's Defence of Common sense 170 Part Three XVII. (shrink)

This collection explores the structure of consciousness and its place in the world, or inversely the structure of the world and the place of consciousness in it. Amongst the topics covered are: the phenomenological aspects of experience, dependencies between experience and the world and the basic ontological categories found in the world at large. Developing ideas drawn from historical figures such as Descartes, Husserl, Aristotle, and Whitehead, the essays together demonstrate the interdependence of ontology and phenomenology and its (...) significance for the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This paper is focused on the possibility of a dialogue between Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and phenomenology, a dialogue concerning the problem of objects and relations. In the first part, the author shows what is interesting in OOO from a phenomenological perspective and why it should be considered as a challenge for contemporary philosophy. The second part develops the phenomenological perspective of the author, a perspective based on Merleau-Ponty’s “carnal” phenomenology, as well as some suggestions coming from the (...) Italian school of Gaetano Kanizsa. The third part is dedicated to the objections of the author to the OOO view regarding the separation between objects and relations: a separation which leads to Harman’s quadruple object. In the concluding portion, the author shows that, despite evident differences between phenomenological and OOO’s views of relations, OOO offers new starting points for phenomenological reflections, thanks to its specific focus on objects and its pluralistic view of reality. (shrink)

일상의 자연어로 인간과 소통하는 기계가 우리 주변을 채우고 있다. 이는 기계가 인간의 언어를 이해하는 것처럼 보이게 만든다. 물론 기계가 인간의 언어를 실제로 이해하는 것은 아니다. 기계가 인간의 언어를 이해하는 것처럼 보이는 까닭은 기계가 인간의 자연어가 갖고 있는 구조와 어휘들을 학습함으로써 자연어의 의미론적 구조를 모방할 수 있게 되었기 때문이다. 정보공학에서는 기계가 인간과 의사소통할 수 있도록 정보를 구조화하는 작업을 ‘온톨로지(ontology)’라고 부른다. 최근 정보공학 분야에서 사용하는 온톨로지는 후설의 형식적 존재론과 영역 존재론의 프로젝트와 구조적으로 대단히 유사하다. 이는 정보공학과 후설 현상학이 서로 협업할 수 (...) 있는 접점이 있음을 뜻한다. 이 논문은 기계가 인간의 자연어를 이해하는 것처럼 보이는 일이 어떻게 가능한지를 살펴보고 현상학과 정보공학이 협업할 수 있는 접점을 시사하고자 한다. (shrink)

이 논문은 영상커뮤니케이션 세계 속에서 소통되고 있는 사진 영상이미지들과 동영상 이미지들의 현상학적, 살-존재론적 특성, 즉 교차로서의 살을 통한 영상이미지들의 특성을 메를로-퐁티의 현상학과 살-존재론을 토대로 밝히는 것을 목적으로 한다. 아울러 이런 밝힘은 사진 영상이미지와 동영상이미지와 상호작용하는 소통자들로 하여금 존재 의미를 인식하게 할 것이다. 영상이미지들의 현상학적인 살-존재론적 특성은 크리에이터의 영상이미지 제작에 활용될 것이다.BR 차이장을 지평으로 한 차이들이 일어나고 있는 사진 영상이미지는 사진 속 형태와 형태, 색깔과 색깔, 형태와 색채, 부분이미지와 전체이미지 간의 차이와 상호적 교차로서의 살을 통해 사진 영상이미지의 사태 자체를 드러내는 현상학적, (...) 살-존재론적 특성을 가진다. 사진영상이미지와 사용자는 접속에서 서로 교차의 살을 가지고, 더욱이 사용자는 그 사진 영상이미지에 대해 공감의 살을 가지고 자기 존재 의미를 느끼고 의식할 수 있으며, 동시에 사진 영상이미지는 그 공감에 대한 살을 가진다.BR ‘소확행 동영상이미지, 브이로그 먹방 동영상이미지, 1인 방송 동영상이미지’와 ‘크리에이터와 사용자’ 간에는 즐거움, 감미로움, 재미, 소확행 느낌 등의 살이 작용하고 있고, 감각적 느낌논리가 있다. 크리에이터와 사용자는 동영상이미지를 통해서 소확행의 삶과 존재의미 및 어떤 가치를 느낄 수 있다. (shrink)

The general topic of my philosophical dissertation is phenomenological ontology of breathing. I do not investigate the phenomenon of breathing as a natural scientific problem, but as a philosophical question. Within our tradition, breathing has been normally understood as a mechanistic-materialistic physiological life-sustaining process of gas exchange and cellular respiration which does not really seem to have any essential connection to human being’s spiritual, mental or philosophical capacities. On the contrary to this natural scientific view, I argue that breathing (...) can be understood as a philosophical question that has phenomenological, experiential, ontological, spiritual, bodily, mental, poetic, elemental, ethical, voluntary and mystical dimensions. My investigation conceptualizes breathing in the first place as a question of phenomenological ontology. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenologico-ontological method of interrogation of the lived body’s experiential openness to the world and Being provides the most fundamental point of departure in this dissertation. Merleau-Ponty emphasized in his investigations the lived body’s perceptual openness to the world and Being. He argued famously for the primacy of perception. His thesis of the primacy of perception means that perception as the perceptual openness to the world and Being is the foundation which is always presupposed by all the other levels of our existence and being-in-the-world. In this dissertation, I challenge this idea of the primacy of perception with Merleau-Ponty’s own remarks about breathing. I argue that in his own remarks about breathing, he implicitly points toward a level which is even more fundamental than the primacy of perception. In this dissertation, this level of our being-in-the-world I call the primacy of breathing. Breathing as the lived body’s respiratory openness to the world and Being is now understood as the foundation which is always presupposed by all the other dimensions of our being-in-the-world. These dimensions are, for example, our theoretical, practical, social and perceptual ways of relating with the world. If the idea of the primacy of breathing is taken seriously, it means that all the questions of philosophy could be rethought, reexamined and re-experienced within the fundamental atmosphere of respiratory openness to the world and Being. In this dissertation, I initially try to rethink philosophy as a new philosophy of breathing. This new philosophy of breathing would be phenomenological ontology of breathing. The bases of this new phenomenological ontology of breathing are Merleau-Ponty’s remarks about breathing. My task is to explicate and interpret them with the help of Merleau- Ponty’s own phenomenological ontology. In my task of beginning philosophy anew as philosophy of breathing or as respiratory philosophy, I will also use the ideas of Martin Heidegger, Gaston Bachelard, Paul Claudel, Luce Irigaray, Edmund Husserl and David Kleinberg-Levin. My dissertation is divided into two main sections. In Section One, I construct within the framework of phenomenological ontology a new notion of breathing as the primacy of breathing. In Section Two, I develop a phenomenological method that I call the method of ontologico-respiratory reduction. This method will lead us back to the primacy of breathing. (shrink)

Despite recent interest in his work, little has been written about Løgstrup’s relation to phenomenology—what he thinks phenomenology is, how it informs his approach to ethics, and what he believes it can accomplish. Here I hope to stimulate further discussion of these matters. In this, consideration of Levinas’s understanding of phenomenology will be useful. While sharing many of Løgstrup’s concerns, Levinas insists on a distinction between phenomenological ontology and “metaphysics,” one that Løgstrup tends to blur in (...) support of his argument that “absolute nihilism is an impossibility.” After showing why this distinction matters, I will argue that Løgstrup’s goal is better achieved if we embrace Heidegger’s transcendental version of phenomenology rather than follow Løgstrup or Levinas, despite much that remains phenomenologically valuable in both. (shrink)

This essay is dominated by three themes that recur contrapuntally in Heisenberg’s writings: observation, description, and ontology—prompted always by a concern about the role played by the subjective inquirer in scientific meaning-making, and by the ontology of scientific claims. Among the related themes are; the tension between paradigmatic concerns with structure and philosophical concerns with reality, the possibility of scientific revolutions, such as relativity and quantum mechanics, that can overthrow the classical traditions of natural science and the inadequacy (...) of a psychophysical parallelism for an epistemology of reason. The influence of Husserl and Heidegger is in his neokantian concern about the role of subjectivity. Heisenberg was a long-time friend of Heidegger and familiar with Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology and its critique of Greek philosophy; he also contributed an essay to a Festschrift in Heidegger’s honor in 1959. (shrink)

The aim of what follows is to explore how to raise the question of Being by way of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. Phenomenological ontology is a way of approaching and conducting philosophy exemplified in the work of German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s, and specifically in his magnum opus Being and Time. In preparation to raise the question of Being a more nuanced understanding of Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses on truth and language are summarized. Following, the manner in which Being is referenced (...) is analyzed before considering the way of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. In conclusion, existing attempts and continuing efforts into the question of Being in education through phenomenological ontology are shared. At a time when decontextualized and reductive ways of knowing and being are becoming the norm within education, phenomenological ontology offers new possibilities for scholarship and practice. The present inquiry does not offer solutions in the traditional sense but rather traces a path that opens and keeps in tension the question of Being in education in order to support further study. (shrink)

This essay suggests loosening pedagogical boundaries in order to prepare children for useful philosophical reflection, particularly ontological boundaries. The argument for this is that the analytic-contmental distinction is muddier than most realize. I explain analytical developments in logic from 1884 to 1931 in a way designed to show there should be no real distinction between analytic and Contmental philosophy. I suggest this explanation provides sufficient support for dismissing ontological boundaries in certain philosophical contexts as well as in early philosophical education.

Freedom, value, power, justice, government, legitimacy are major themes of the present inquiry. It explores the ontological structure of human beings associating with one another, the basic phenomenon of society. We human beings strive to become who we are in an ongoing power interplay with each other. Thinkers called as witnesses include Plato, Aristotle, Anaximander, Protagoras, Hobbes, Locke, Adam Smith, Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Schumpeter, Hayek, Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, et al.