In this chapter I explore various facets of Addams' approaches to culture as art and as structures of life because they illuminate not only her struggles to reconcile competing perspectives and values, but also because these issues are recurring features in the development of feminist analyses of culture. -/- “This well-crafted collection of essays recognizes Jane Addams as the inspiring and occasionally provocative feminist she was. Connecting Addams’s pragmatism to social theory, political philosophy, queer theory, postcolonial theory, and more, the (...) book’s twelve authors sympathetically and critically explore Addams’s ongoing relevance to issues of art, culture, sexuality, prostitution, religion, cosmopolitanism, public/private divisions, and community organization. Scholarly experts on Addams, as well as those discovering her feminist pragmatism for the first time, will find this volume valuable.” -/- Although Jane Addams's Twenty Years at Hull-House is considered an American classic, her dozen books and hundreds of published articles have sometimes been thought of as quaint examples of an overly optimistic era. Beginning in the 1990s, feminist scholars rediscovered the vitality of Addams's social philosophy and challenged the marginalization of her ideas. Today, following a war-laden twentieth century and the failure of militarism and "get tough" approaches to solve domestic and global problems, Addams's social theorizing, which emphasizes cosmopolitan experiences and sympathetic connections, provides a provocative alternative to Western notions of individualism, transactional relations, and spectator epistemology. Feminist Interpretations of Jane Addams brings together many of the leading Addams scholars in North America to consider Addams's ongoing relevance to feminist thought. Aside from the editor, the contributors are Victoria Bissell Brown, Marilyn Fischer, Judith M. Green, Shannon Jackson, Katherine Joslin, Louise W. Knight, L. Ryan Musgrave Bonomo, Wendy Sarvasy, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Eleanor J. Stebner, and Judy D. Whipps. (shrink)

Chapter 4 demonstrates how white domination helps constitute the bodies of white people, focusing on white people’s stomachs and hearts in particular. Returning to the example of undergraduate student Brittney from the book’s Introduction, this chapter locates unconscious habits of white privilege in the clenching muscles of white people’s stomachs. It also argues that white people’s relatively good cardio health should be viewed a physiological effect of white privilege, rather than as a neutral or normal health condition. In the case (...) of both white stomachs and white hearts, a racialized knowledge grounded in white ignorance helps structure contemporary white physiology. (shrink)

Disagreeing with others about how to interpret a social interaction is a common occurrence. We often find ourselves offering divergent interpretations of others’ motives, intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Remarkably, philosophical accounts of how we understand others do not explain, or even attempt to explain such disagreements. I argue these disparities in social interpretation stem, in large part, from the effect of social categorization and our goals in social interactions, phenomena long studied by social psychologists. I argue we ought to expand (...) our accounts of how we understand others in order to accommodate these data and explain how such profound disagreements arise amongst informed, rational, well-meaning individuals. (shrink)

Methods of punishing corporations have changed from self-regulation to economic sanctions by government as corporations have evolved from small groups of entrepreneurs to multinational entities. It is proposed that the next stage in the evolution of punishment methods is modified vendettas, or organized attempts by non-government groups to influence corporations through the application of economic and non-economic sanctions.This paper develops the concept of modified vendettas as a complement to government-initiated economic sanctions. The effectiveness of modified vendettas is analyzed through two (...) case examples. As with any punishment method, however, the usefulness of a modified vendetta depends not only on its effectiveness but also on how well it meets society's needs to monitor and check corporate activity while preserving corporations' rights to operate. To resolve this issue, modified vendettas are assessed using a philosophical framework incorporating both retributive and utilitarian principles. It is found that modified vendettas extend society's ability to control corporate behavior while corporations have legal and public relations means to protect themselves from frivolous use of the technique. Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked? (Baron Thurlow). (shrink)

This chapter argues that given affect and emotion’s importance both to the operation of unconscious habit and to a non-reductive, psychologically complex account of human physiology, feminist philosophy and critical philosophy of race need an account of affect and emotion as thoroughly somatic, not something “mental” or extra-biological, layered on top of the body. They also need an account of human physiology that appreciates how emotion and affect are interpersonal, social, and can be transactionally transmitted between people. Developing that account, (...) Chapter 1 takes the hips and pelvis as a case study, using an example of tight pelvic and hamstring muscles to argue for the transactional physiology of affect and emotion. Setting the stage for subsequent chapters, “The Hips” draws on William James to develop an account of the affective body as the psychosomatic substrate from which biologically unconscious habits develop. (shrink)

The concluding chapter explores how the unjust physiological effects of racism and sexism might be countered as part of feminist and critical race movements for social justice. Social-political change can result in physiological transformation, and this change can take place in a number of ways. Most important are institutional changes. In addition, however, physiological changes can take place on a personal, individual level, and those transformations can range from greater to lesser involvement of conscious awareness of physiological states. In particular, (...) this chapter focuses on transformative methods on the individual level that work directly with biologically unconscious habits, rather than detouring through conscious thought. Developing the notion of a physiological therapy that does not prioritize bringing unconscious habits to conscious awareness, the book’s conclusion proposes a double-barreled approach of working for institutional change and transforming biologically unconscious habits as a response to the physiological effects of racism and sexism. (shrink)

This chapter introduces the book by arguing that feminist and critical philosophy of race need to engage more robustly with the medical and biological sciences. It explains physiological habits as transactional, that is, as co-constituted in a dynamic relationship with the social-political world. It also argues that both race and sex/gender are biological, but not in the pre-critical sense of static, essential categories. Rather, they are biological in the critical, dynamic way in which they become biological through the embodiment of (...) racial inequalities. As the book demonstrates, sexism and racism have put down some of their toughest roots in the physiological habits of human bodies, and thus it is there that feminist philosophy and critical philosophy of race also must work. (shrink)

This chapter examines non-genetic, psychophysiological inheritance across generational lines in the context of white domination. Focusing on the effects of racism in black bodies, this chapter draws on the field of epigenetics to show how people of color can biologically inherit the deleterious effects of racism. Examining disparities in preterm birth rates between African American and white women, Chapter 3 details how transgenerational racial health disparities are in fact racist health disparities that can be manifest physiologically, helping constitute the chemicals, (...) hormones, cells, and fibers of the human body. Epigenetics helps demonstrate how racism can have durable effects on the biological constitution of human beings that are not limited to the specific person who is the target of racism, but instead extend to that person’s children and grandchildren. In this way, the field of epigenetics can help philosophers and others understand the transgenerational biological impact of social forces such as racism. (shrink)

This chapter examines the human enteric nervous system to discern some of the physiological effects of sexism, sexual abuse, and male privilege. It argues that to understand the gut, we must appreciate the affective relationship of the entire digestive tract with both itself and the pelvic floor. Examining the body’s digestive tube from the throat to the cloaca—the phylogenetic common origin of the pelvic floor’s separate urinary, genital, and anal tracts—Chapter 2 develops cloacal thinking, which treats the gut and pelvic (...) floor as psychosomatically integrated. Cloacal thinking blurs without erasing boundaries between the function and substance of the digestive tract’s “parts,” refusing to consider them as isolated from either each other or from the “outside” world. It also can help us appreciate gut functioning as transgenerational. The gut’s particular relationship with the world can result in a person’s physiologically passing the harmful effects of sexism and sexual abuse to her offspring. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 349-351 [Access article in PDF] Mystical States or Mystical Life?Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu Perspectives Marek Marzanski and Mark Bratton THIS IS AN ORIGINAL and conceptually precise paper. It is a significant attempt to bring religion and psychiatry into conversation. With particular reference to three Oriental epistemologies—Tibetan and Zen Buddhism and Tantric Hinduism—Caroline Brett seeks to offer a means of differentiating mystical states from (...) psychotic ones. She is critical of reductionism in modern psychiatry that seeks either to elide religious experience into psychopathology, or seeks too sharp a distinction between them. Brett claims, by implication, to offer a more fundamental level of discrimination between religious experience and psychopathology than the "cognitive problem-solving model" that Jackson and Fulford propose (1997a).In both mystical and psychotic states, the author argues, there are radical alterations in the structure of experience. Psychotic states, however, result from failures to complete, or, at least, to negotiate smoothly, the transition from a commitment to an epistemology based on illusory reality to one structured according to ultimate reality—a reality that is brought into focus through an alignment of transcendent vision and mundane cognition. Although this epistemological "stuck-ness" can manifest itself in action as destructive behavior, for example, psychological isolation or social and occupational dysfunction, the basis of the distinction between mystical and psychotic states lies in real differences in the states themselves.In our view, there is a tendency in much psychiatric and theological literature to homogenize mystical states and to treat experiences that (arguably) occur on a number of different levels as if they were on the same level. It is still widely thought that a mystical consciousness can somehow be abstracted from the religious traditions out of which this consciousness emerges. It is assumed that we can talk about experience in abstraction from the shared consciousness produced by schooling in a specific historical religion (Shannon 1985, 493). Thus, the altered mystical state of a Zen Master or Saint Teresa of Avila in ecstasy are regarded as identical states of consciousness. Yet it is far from clear that mystical states can be talked about without explicit reference to the language and tradition in which the self is formed, or, in terms that would have different meanings in Abrahamic and Oriental religious traditions, un-selfed. [End Page 349]There is a related tendency to regard religious doctrines as attempts to interpret mystical experience, as second-order reflections on the language of experience, as if religious doctrines were local religious dialects into which core experiences could be translated. We suggest, rather, that there is an iterative relationship between a mystical experience and the religious framework out of which it emerges. Religious doctrines are better seen as sets of instructions designed to guide the movement of prayer, and the movement of prayer, in turn, exemplifies the religious doctrine that shapes it.So could mystical states within the framework of Tibetan and Zen Buddhism and Tantric Hinduism better be understood as exemplification's of the worldviews of those particular religious traditions? For example, the relinquishing of ego structures, the dissolution of subject/object boundaries, the yielding of the contrastive identity between experience and the world, and progress toward undifferentiated union of the self with the cosmic self, seem to exemplify the monist cosmology associated with some of those traditions. By the same token, the psychotic state could be interpreted as an exemplification of an existential stance that has for some reason defected from the movement toward transcendental cognition. The point is that the "real differences" Brett identifies in the two states cannot be understood apart from the religious epistemology and doctrines, which those states, positively or negatively, exemplify. "So far 'from mystical states' being a sort of paradigm of certainty, they have authority only within a frame of reference which is believed in on quite other grounds and are therefore properly to be tested according to their consistency with this" (Williams 1991, 149)The force of Brett's paper, like Jackson and Fulford, is to identify the boundaries... (shrink)

We have various strategies available to us for understanding another person’s state of mind. Cognitive empathy may be achieved by mental simulation, i.e. by imagining yourself in another’s situation and figuring out what you would think and feel in that situation. Alternatively, you could consider all the relevant information about the person’s situation and folk psychology and draw a sophisticated inference to the best explanation of that person’s perspective. In this chapter, I examine the conditions under which we are likely (...) to use these two familiar strategies for cognitive empathy and when they are likely to be effective. In addition, I discuss a third underexplored pattern of reasoning in understanding others. Self-serving goals, such as anxiety reduction, self-esteem, and confirmation of one’s worldview, distort cognitive empathy. I consider these different strategies in light of hybrid theories of cognitive empathy. (shrink)

This paper will examine the topic of identity in Roman Catholicism from the perspective of topics contained in or absent from mission statements of 25 Catholic health care institutions. In particular, I will look at these from the perspective of social justice as well as how this and other topics such as human dignity, the sanctity of life, stewardship, pastoral care and the likelihood of mergers with other institutions will affect the healing ministry of Catholic health care providers. The article (...) will conclude that there are three key dimensions to Catholic health care: leadership in advocating reform of the current health care system, care for the marginalized and under-insured, and the provision of pastoral care in all institutions. (shrink)

Examined as an isolated situation, and through the lens of a rare and feared disease, Mr. Duncan's case seems ripe for second-guessing the physicians and nurses who cared for him. But viewed from the perspective of what we know about errors and team communication, his case is all too common. Nearly 440,000 patient deaths in the U.S. each year may be attributable to medical errors. Breakdowns in communication among health care teams contribute in the majority of these errors. The culture (...) of health care does not seem to foster functional, effective communication between and among professionals. Why? And more importantly, why do we not do something about it? (shrink)

The concept of supererogation is an act that it is right to do but not wrong not to do. The moral trinity of the deontic logic excludes such acts from moral theory. A moral theory that is based on duty or obligation unqualified seems inevitably to make all good acts obligations, whether construed from a teleological or deontological point of view. If supererogation is a moral fact, no moral theory can survive without acknowledging it. One way to distinguish supererogation from (...) obligation that is not arbitrary is to draw the line of obligation at death and dismemberment. Such a limit to obligation is often implicit in moral theory. Inclusive obligation requires us all to be heroes all of the time. The moral limit to obligation is one of Hobbes's teachings. Though it is seldom noted in contemporary political and moral theory, it is, for example, implied in Rawls's definition of ‘supererogation.’ In this definition it is said that heroic supererogation would be a duty but for the high cost associated with it. This cost is the risk of life and limb;.it distinguishes supererogation from both benevolence and obligation.A supererogation is a good act with a high cost. The goodness of the act, however determined, must be proportionate to the cost to the agent. If life is risked, life or something deemed no less valuable must be gained. The intention to effect such important goods for others is sufficient for an act to be supererogatory even if it fails.If moral reality is inevitably vague, complex, and incomplete, then it is no surprise that moral theory is that way, too. The challenge is that moral theory be no more vague, complex, and incomplete than necessary and in ways justified by the nature of moral reality. A science, Aristotle advised, can be no more precise than its subject matter permits. (shrink)

This essay considers the ways in which the various contexts – abortion, prenatal diagnosis, fetal research, and the use of fetuses in transplantation – shape the American debate on the moral standing of the fetus. This discussion gives rise to several philosophical debates on the status of the preimplantation embryo, particularly the debate over when the preimplantation embryo becomes individuated. How that question is resolved has critical ethical and policy implications.

My dissertation is a study of the relationships among aesthetics, ethics and politics in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In this project I use primary texts, records of conversations, and correspondence to describe Wittgenstein's "moral perfectionism." I then consider what place there might be for political action within his conception of the good life. The aim of the dissertation is twofold. First, it is an analysis of Wittgenstein's ethical thought and the continuity it provides between his early and later work. (...) I begin with Wittgenstein's claim that "Ethics and aesthetics are one," and then I trace the development of his views on ethics through the middle and later periods of his work. Second, the study of Wittgenstein's ethical views is an occasion for the study of the relationships among aesthetics, ethics, and politics. I argue that Wittgenstein's views on ethics and ethical language suggests a "politics of health". I read Wittgenstein as a critic of modernity whose work suggests both that our future political endeavors should be detached from questions of certainty, and that we should return to the Aristotelian model of allowing the good person to stand as a moral and political exemplar without epistemic or scientific justification. (shrink)

Ethics has become an increasingly important issue within engineering as the profession has become progressively more complex. The need to integrate ethics into an engineering curriculum is well documented, as education does not often sufficiently prepare engineers for the ethical conflicts they experience. Recent research indicates that there is great diversity in the way institutions approach the problem of teaching ethics to undergraduate engineering students; some schools require students to take general ethics courses from philosophical or religious perspectives, while others (...) integrate ethics in existing engineering courses. The purpose of this paper is to propose a method to implement the integration of ethics in engineering education that is pedagogically based on Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development. (shrink)

This paper argues that the path to knowledge concerning the right account of proper names attends to their representational and epistemological roles — to, that is, their contribution in sentences of the form "A is F" to how things are being represented to be by the sentence, to the information about how things are that such sentences deliver to us, and to the way this information is used to justify the production of such sentences. These considerations, I argue, support a (...) version of the description theory of reference for names. (shrink)

An important role for all health care professionals is to be an advocate for their patients, and there is no question that many patients need advocacy to reach their health care goals. The role of advocate takes many forms, but one is to speak up when one is concerned for the safety or well‐being of a patient. A nurse is often the member of a health care team most likely to notice changes that might signal problems or poor responses to (...) treatment. The duty of the nurse is to speak up in a timely and urgent manner when the nurse believes—or fears—that the patient's safety may be at risk. Yet the role of nurses as advocates for their patients has assumed near‐mythic status. Rather than seeing advocate as one among many equally important and interrelated professional roles, the nurse, when asked, “Who are you?” is likely to give the heartfelt and passionate answer, “The patient's advocate!” This essay examines and critically analyzes the advocacy role adopted by the nursing profession and outlines the challenges it has created to nursing's contributions to collaborative practice, ethics, and policy in health care. (shrink)

Assuming AD + (V = L(R)), it is shown that for κ an admissible Suslin cardinal, o(κ) (= the order type of the stationary subsets of κ) is "essentially" regular and closed under ultrapowers in a manner to be made precise. In particular, o(κ) ≫ κ +, κ ++ , etc. It is conjectured that this characterizes admissibility for L(R).

Brannon Ellis’s book Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son is a detailed historical theological study of Calvin’s defense of the doctrine of the self-existence of the person of the Son. The text emphasizes and endorses Calvin’s defense of the necessity and authority of special revelation and the biblical credentials of a distinction between two ways of speaking of God: nonrelatively as to the divine essence, and relatively as to the persons. With these commitments in mind, Calvin’s defense (...) of the aseity of the Son brings the full authority of Trinitarian confession to bear on philosophical theology and implicates at a methodological level the rationalistic tendencies of Thomistic natural theology and perfect being theology. (shrink)

This article seeks to recover a familiar but unappreciated female voice from English Puritanism of the seventeenth century, that of Margaret Baxter. Various challenges to such recovery are examined, most notably the nature of her relationship to her pastor and husband, Richard. Extant literature from Margaret’s hand focuses on the events surrounding her conversion and life-threatening illness shortly thereafter. The present analysis of these texts and their circumstances concludes that Margaret was a faithful but critical heir of the practical theology (...) of her day, and that in her lived expression of that tradition one observes the enduring scars of the trauma of her conversion. (shrink)

This volume contains eleven essays dealing with the question of how to face the current challenges of globalization. The essays included in this volume were originally presented at the Renvall Institute for Area and Cultural Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, on the occasion of the Sixth World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue (ISUD) Presents Keynote addresses or prize-winning papers from the Congress Central theme explores the need to rethink our concepts of nature, culture, and freedom in an (...) age of increased globalization Topics examined range from global justice, international law, and human rights to ecoterrorism, cultural relativism, and the challenges of autonomy. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 61 Heft: 3 Seiten: 333-353.

This paper considers Hegel’s treatment of the dispute between modern philosophy and faith in his Phenomenology of Spirit. The paper shows that Hegel is concerned with this dispute as part of his systematic program to advance the true philosophical concept of self and world, but, by so doing, he supports ahumanistic reconciliation between Christianity and the secular values of the Enlightenment. The paper contains extensive discussions of Hegel’s views on the French philosophes, and it shows how he used their writings (...) in his criticism of the popular notions within denominational religion. It also shows why Hegel did not fully support the philosophes’ assumptions, but, instead, he was willing to accept Christian notions of the incarnation and redemption. (shrink)

In the section called “Observation of Nature” in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel considers and criticizes a particular form of methodology which seeks final purposes by analogy. Through this methodology what is essential for thought is the recognition and demarcation of differentiae, which are imputed to natural objects as qualities by which things maintain their distinct and separate character - what Hegel calls their “being-for-self.” By these differentiae, then, the objects are categorized into types, or “natural kinds,” which, in turn, (...) are interpreted by natural philosophers according to a projected teleological system. Hegel’s critique is not aimed primarily at the categorization of objects, but at the method of interpretation used to characterize these categories as purposeful. In particular, Hegel is not criticizing the use of analogy as discussed in the biological writings of Aristotle, but the use of analogy by the transcendental idealists, especially Kant, who employs this method in the Critique of Judgment. (shrink)