This paper addresses the question of whether probabilistic coherence is a requirement of rationality. The concept of probabilistic coherence is examined and compared with the familiar notion of consistency for simple beliefs. Several reasons are given for thinking rationality does not require coherence. Finally, it is argued that incoherence does not necessarily involve fallacious reasoning.

Quine and Putnam argued for mathematical realism on the basis of the indispensability of mathematics to science. They claimed that the mathematics that is used in physical theories is confirmed along with those theories and that scientific realism entails mathematical realism. I argue here that current theories of confirmation suggest that mathematics does not receive empirical support simply in virtue of being a part of well confirmed scientific theories and that the reasons for adopting a realist view of scientific theories (...) do not support realism about mathematical entities, despite the use of mathematics in formulating scientific theory. (shrink)

In his recent book The Advancement of Science, Philip Kitcher endorses eliminative induction, or the view that confirmation of hypotheses proceeds by the elimination of alternatives. My intention here is to critically examine Kitcher's eliminativist view of confirmation, and his rejection of the widely held Bayesian position, according to which an hypothesis H is confirmed by evidence E just in case the probability of H conditional on E is greater than the simple unconditional probability of H [i.e. p > p]. (...) Here, I will maintain that while there are aspects of the eliminative approach which Bayesianism must incorporate, as has been argued by John Earman, the eliminativism advocated by Kitcher is unsatisfactory. In addition, I will suggest that Kitcher's reasons for rejecting Bayesian confirmation theory are unconvincing and depend on an overly restrictive version of the position and that indeed Bayesianism has resources needed by an eliminativist account of confirmation. (shrink)

For quite some time the indispensability arguments of Quine and Putnam were considered a formidable obstacle to anyone who would reject the existence of mathematical objects. Various attempts to respond to the indispensability arguments were developed, most notably by Chihara and Field. Field tried to defend mathematical fictionalism, according to which the existential assertions of mathematics are false, by showing that the mathematics used in applications is in fact dispensable. Chihara suggested, on the other hand, that mathema­tics makes true existential (...) assertions, but that these can be interpreted so as to remove the commitment to abstract objects. More recently, there have been various attempts to show that the indispensability arguments contain assumptions that are conceptually misguided in ways having little to do with mathematical content. All of this work is of considerable interest, and the result has been a gathering consensus that the indispensability arguments, as put forth by Quine and Putnam, do not provide convincing reason to accept mathematical realism. The focus here will be on the ways of responding to the indispensability arguments, and in particular on the obstacles to fictionalism that remain after the versions of Quine and Putnam are undercut. (shrink)

In the curve fitting problem two conflicting desiderata, simplicity and goodness-of-fit, pull in opposite directions. To this problem, we propose a solution that strikes a balance between simplicity and goodness-of-fit. Using Bayes’ theorem we argue that the notion of prior probability represents a measurement of simplicity of a theory, whereas the notion of likelihood represents the theory’s goodness-of-fit. We justify the use of prior probability and show how to calculate the likelihood of a family of curves. We diagnose the relationship (...) between simplicity of a theory and its predictive accuracy. (shrink)

(This is for the series Elements of Decision Theory published by Cambridge University Press and edited by Martin Peterson) -/- Our beliefs come in degrees. I believe some things more strongly than I believe others. I believe very strongly that global temperatures will continue to rise during the coming century; I believe slightly less strongly that the European Union will still exist in 2029; and I believe much less strongly that Cardiff is east of Edinburgh. My credence in something is (...) a measure of the strength of my belief in it; it represents my level of confidence in it. These are the states of mind we report when we say things like ‘I’m 20% confident I switch off the gas before I left' or ‘I’m 99.9% confident that it is raining outside'. -/- There are laws that govern these credences. For instance, I shouldn't be more confident that sea levels will rise by over 2 metres in the next 100 years than I am that they'll rise by over 1 metre, since the latter is true if the former is. This book is about a particular way we might try to establish these laws of credence: the Dutch Book arguments (For briefer overviews of these arguments, see Alan Hájek’s entry in the Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice and Susan Vineberg’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopaedia.) -/- We begin, in Chapter 2, with the standard formulation of the various Dutch Book arguments that we'll consider: arguments for Probabilism, Countable Additivity, Regularity, and the Principal Principle. In Chapter 3, we subject this standard formulation to rigorous stress-testing, and make some small adjustments so that it can withstand various objections. What we are left with is still recognisably the orthodox Dutch Book argument. In Chapter 4, we set out the Dutch Strategy argument for Conditionalization. In Chapters 5 and 6, we consider two objections to Dutch Book arguments that cannot be addressed by making small adjustments. Instead, we must completely redesign those arguments, replacing them with ones that share a general approach but few specific details. In Chapter 7, we consider a further objection to which I do not have a response. In Chapter 8, we'll ask what happens to the Dutch Book arguments if we change certain features of the basic framework in which we've been working: first, we ask how Dutch Book arguments fare when we consider credences in self-locating propositions, such as It is Monday; second, we lift the assumption that the background logic is classical and explore Dutch Book arguments for non-classical logics; third, we lift the assumption that an agent's credal state can be represented by a single assignment of numerical values to the propositions she considers. In Chapter 9, we present the mathematical results that underpin these arguments. (shrink)

Philosophising, as Spinoza conceives it, is the project of learning to live joyfully. This in turn is a matter of learning to live together, and the most obvious test of philosophical insight is our capacity to sustain a harmonious way of life. Susan James defends this interpretation and explores Spinoza's influence on contemporary debates.

Celebrates a half century of television history, from "The Howdy Doody Show" and "I Love Lucy" to "The Simpsons" and "The Sopranos," and the personalities, shows, and landmark events that changed entertainment history.

In this book, Abraham argues that a theological imagination can expand the contours of postcolonial theory through a reexamination of notions of subjectivity, gender, and violence in a dialogical model with Karl Rahner. She raises the question of whether postcolonial theory, with its disavowal of religious agency, can provide an invigorating occasion for Catholic theology.

The human sensory system is continuously engaged in experiencing and interpreting every interaction with other living beings, objects, and the environment. The purpose of this article is to describe the impact limited opportunities for rich sensory experiences have on students with severe disabilities in two middle school classrooms situated in a public separate school in the southeastern USA. The study employed a postcritical ethnographic approach and grounded theory thematic analysis of fieldnotes gathered over a two-year period. Three major themes supported (...) by the data are presented and discussed in depth. They are: students are afforded limited sensory rich experiences, everyday routines make students passive recipients to school, and instructional approaches result in little interaction with extended periods of waiting. The implications of the findings for improved sensory experiences and possible future directions are described. (shrink)

Organizations are increasingly embedded with consultants and other non-employees who have the opportunity to engage in wrongdoing. However, research exploring the reporting intentions of employees regarding the discovery of wrongdoing by consultants is scant. It is important to examine reporting intentions in this setting given the enhanced presence of consultants in organizations and the fact that wrongdoing by consultants changes a key characteristic of the wrongdoing. Using an experimental approach, the current paper reports the results of a study examining employees' (...) reporting intentions subsequent to their discovery of wrongdoing by a consultant. The results of the study indicate that perceptions about the seriousness of a wrongdoing, personal costs and personal responsibility related to reporting a wrongdoing, and moral-equity judgments are significantly associated with reporting intentions for a normal reporting channel. Only perceptions of seriousness and personal costs are significantly associated for an anonymous reporting channel. Lastly, while personal costs for the anonymous reporting channel were lower than the normal reporting channel, reporting intentions were similar across the two channels. (shrink)

Mathematical idealizations are scientific representations that result from assumptions that are believed to be false, and where mathematics plays a crucial role. I propose a two stage account of how to rank mathematical idealizations that is largely inspired by the semantic view of scientific theories. The paper concludes by considering how this approach to idealization allows for a limited form of scientific realism. ‡I would like to thank Robert Batterman, Gabriele Contessa, Eric Hiddleston, Nicholaos Jones, and Susan Vineberg (...) for helpful discussions and encouragement. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Beering Hall, Purdue University, 100 N. University Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2098; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Doctoral learning entails transition from experienced student to stance-defending researcher, exposed to international critique: a disorientation and reorientation into a new identity. Arts and Hum...

The contrast Rips et al. draw between and approaches to understanding the origin of the capacity for representing natural number is a false dichotomy. Its plausibility depends upon the sketchiness of the authors' own proposal. At least some of the proposals they characterize as bottom-up are worked-out versions of the very top-down position they advocate. Finally, they deny that the structures that these putative bottom-up proposals consider to be sources of natural number are even precursors of concepts of natural number. (...) This denial depends upon an idiosyncratic, and mistaken, idea of what a precursor is. (shrink)

This paper presents and discusses a model for environmental decision making. The model defines ends, means, subjects, objects and contexts in relation to particular decisions, and hence in relation to particular problems. This entails definition that is flexible with regard to content—for example, whether a particular entity is subject or object. To improve understanding of the limits of applied knowledge, likely types and levels of ignorance regarding ends, means, subjects, objects, and contexts are discussed. This provides guidance to the selection (...) of appropriate means for defining and addressing environmental problems. (shrink)

Developing a vision of morality that is at once compelling and comprehensive is an enormous task. The questions and answers all interlock, making it difficult to know where to start. Most of us, I think, just jump in, with whatever issue or controversy grabs us. We make what headway we can with the section of the moral puzzle on which we choose to work and hope or trust that when we or others work on other sections, the results will fit (...) smoothly, consistently, even supportively with our current attempts. (shrink)

This book explores the breadth of philosophical interest in life and death during the early modern period. It connects debates in philosophy with the life sciences, linking the study of organisms to the practical aspect of philosophy, and reminding us that that philosophers were concerned with learning how to live and how to die.

When I first agreed to undergo chemotherapy, I found myself haunted by Franz Kafka's parable “In the Penal Colony.” The grisly short story was easy to translate into language pertinent to my ominous sense of the standard treatment of advanced ovarian cancer. About to be attached to a remarkable piece of apparatus, the condemned woman tastes fear rising off her tongue as she finds herself led forward into a maze of equipment, but is assured that the machinery should go on (...) working continuously for six hours or six days. If anything were to go wrong, it would only be a small matter that could then be set right at once by the uniformed technician. So my variation began. (shrink)

This new six-volume collection from Routledge and Edition Synapse brings together key documents from the Victorian feminist campaign to establish and improve girls’ and women’s education. The set is divided into two sections, both of which incorporate materials that argue for the improvement of girls’ and women’s education as well as arguments made against education for girls and women. The first section focuses on the debate surrounding the quality of women’s education and the question of access to higher education for (...) women. This section also brings together documents from the feminist campaign with writing from the established press on the question of women’s higher education, and writings from the Social Sciences Association where many education reformers aired their views. The second section concentrates on the strengths and successes of Victorian women as educators, and highlights some of the most influential women in the field of education during this era. Drawing widely on articles from the feminist and established press, government papers, newspapers, professional and association journals, as well as memoirs, addresses, pamphlets, and reviews, this essential collection gives researchers excellent and comprehensive access to nineteenth-century debates on improving girls’ and women’s education, and women’s work as educators. (shrink)

As already emerges in his 1961 book, Significato, comunicazione e parlare comune, Rossi-Landi reflects on sign and language relatedly to the American tradition in pragmatism from Peirce to Morris (he published a monograph on Morris in 1953). He also recovers the contribution made by Giovanni Vailati, who was among the first in Italy to recognize the importance of Peirce’s pragmatism. Through Peircean pragmatism, Rossi-Landi oriented his work from the very beginning in the direction of a semiotics of interpretation in contrast (...) to a semiotics – or better semiology in this case – of the code, of decodification. His “philosophical methodics” continues to be characterized in terms of “pragmatism,” from his works of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Linguaggio come lavoro e come mercato, 1968, and Semiotica e ideologia, 1972), to his last book Metodica filosofica e scienza dei segni (1985, the year of his death), in which recovering Wittgenstein he reconsiders the question of the “traps of language” in the Marxian terms of “linguistic alienation.”. (shrink)