Privacy is a sociocultural perception, depending on the dominant values of a society, sociocultural heritage, and contemporary technological developments. This article focuses on privacy perception among adolescents based on a European school survey (PRACTIS), and presents comparative results of an exploratory study conducted among over 1,428 adolescents in six countries. The results reveal that adolescents attribute high value to privacy and are prepared to actively oppose if an online corporation is challenging their personal interests. However, they tend to trade off (...) privacy for other perceived benefits. Adolescents’ privacy perception and data protection are affected by cultural diversity, age, gender, and most of all their various social network sites activities and their attitudes toward importance of sharing and controlling personal information. (shrink)

Sleep-related experiences [Watson, D. . Dissociations of the night: Individual differences in sleep-related experiences and their relation to dissociation and schizotypy. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110, 526–535] refer to a host of nocturnal altered-consciousness phenomena, including narcoleptic tendencies, nightmares, problem-solving dreams, waking dreams, and lucid dreams. In an attempt to clarify the meaning of this construct, we examined cross-sectional and longitudinal associations of sleep-related experiences , altered-consciousness tendencies , psychological distress, childhood maltreatment , and life stress in young adults. Both (...) types of SREs were found to be distinguishable from altered-consciousness tendencies. Transliminality emerged as a longitudinal predictor of both general SREs and lucid dreams. Psychological distress and an increase in life stress predicted an increase in general SREs over a 3-month interval. We conclude that transliminality is a general altered-consciousness trait that accounts for some of the individual differences in sleep-related experiences, and that general sleep experiences are an outcome of psychological distress and life stress. (shrink)

It is an ancient view, to be found even in Aristotle’s analysis of friendship, that the other is an alter ego, another myself. More recently, this conception has provoked spirited debate within and without the phenomenological tradition. It can be found in a wide variety of texts, from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations to Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?” The basic position can be summarized as follows. Intentional experiences are subjective, first-person experiences, not objective, third-person experiences.

Most theories and hypotheses in psychology are verbal in nature, yet their evaluation overwhelmingly relies on inferential statistical procedures. The validity of the move from qualitative to quantitative analysis depends on the verbal and statistical expressions of a hypothesis being closely aligned – that is, that the two must refer to roughly the same set of hypothetical observations. Here, I argue that many applications of statistical inference in psychology fail to meet this basic condition. Focusing on the most widely used (...) class of model in psychology – the linear mixed model – I explore the consequences of failing to statistically operationalize verbal hypotheses in a way that respects researchers' actual generalization intentions. I demonstrate that although the “random effect” formalism is used pervasively in psychology to model intersubject variability, few researchers accord the same treatment to other variables they clearly intend to generalize over. The under-specification of random effects imposes far stronger constraints on the generalizability of results than most researchers appreciate. Ignoring these constraints can dramatically inflate false-positive rates, and often leads researchers to draw sweeping verbal generalizations that lack a meaningful connection to the statistical quantities they are putatively based on. I argue that failure to take the alignment between verbal and statistical expressions seriously lies at the heart of many of psychology's ongoing problems, and conclude with a discussion of several potential avenues for improvement. (shrink)

This work develops an epistemology of measurement, that is, an account of the conditions under which measurement and standardization methods produce knowledge as well as the nature, scope, and limits of this knowledge. I focus on three questions: (i) how is it possible to tell whether an instrument measures the quantity it is intended to? (ii) what do claims to measurement accuracy amount to, and how might such claims be justified? (iii) when is disagreement among instruments a sign of error, (...) and when does it imply that instruments measure different quantities? Based on a series of case studies conducted in collaboration with the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), I argue for a model-based approach to the epistemology of physical measurement. To measure a physical quantity, I argue, is to estimate the value of a parameter in an idealized model of a physical process. Such estimation involves inference from the final state (‘indication’) of a process to the value range of a parameter (‘outcome’) in light of theoretical and statistical assumptions. Contrary to contemporary philosophical views, measurement outcomes cannot be obtained by mapping the structure of indications. Instead, measurement outcomes as well as claims to accuracy, error and quantity individuation can only be adjudicated relative to a choice of idealized modelling assumptions. (shrink)

We are currently witnessing a sharp rise in the use of algorithmic decision-making tools. In these instances, a new wave of policy concerns is set forth. This article strives to map out these issues, separating the wheat from the chaff. It aims to provide policy makers and scholars with a comprehensive framework for approaching these thorny issues in their various capacities. To achieve this objective, this article focuses its attention on a general analytical framework, which will be applied to a (...) specific subset of the overall discussion. The analytical framework will reduce the discussion to two dimensions, every one of which addressing two central elements. These four factors call for a distinct discussion, which is at times absent in the existing literature. The two dimensions are the specific and novel problems the process assumedly generates and the specific attributes which exacerbate them. While the problems are articulated in a variety of ways, they most likely could be reduced to two broad categories: efficiency and fairness-based concerns. In the context of this discussion, such problems are usually linked to two salient attributes the algorithmic processes feature—its opaque and automated nature. (shrink)

ACCORDING TO HUSSERL, THE REVOLUTION brought about by the new mathematical science of the seventeenth century was primarily an ontological one: a shift in the conception of the real. That Husserl opposes the new Galilean-Cartesian ontology is clear. This much is evident from the potent rhetoric of the Crisis declaiming Galileo as an "entdeckender und verdeckender Genius", forgetful of the lifeworld, failing to grasp what the mathematical-empirical method he brought to such a degree of perfection actually achieves. Indeed, even without (...) the ringing Crisis passages, one could already expect that Husserl, the phenomenologist, would oppose the Platonizing scientific realism of a Galileo or a Descartes. However, Husserl's critique of Galileo poses many puzzling questions, questions which are not directly addressed in the Crisis, and which can be answered only in terms of the broader position outlined by Husserl elsewhere. To whit: what is the more precise content of Husserl's objections against Galileo, and how are these justified? Further, if scientific realism is to be rejected on phenomenological grounds, does this imply that a phenomenological approach is necessarily instrumentalist? Finally, what solution does Husserl's thought offer to the realism/instrumentalism debate? (shrink)

The digital age brings with it novel forms of data flow. As a result, individuals are constantly being monitored while consuming products, services and content. These abilities have given rise to a variety of concerns, which are most often framed using “privacy” and “data protection”-related paradigms. An important, oft-noted yet undertheorized concern is that these dynamics might facilitate the manipulation of subjects; a process in which firms strive to motivate and influence individuals to take specific steps and make particular decisions (...) in a manner considered to be socially unacceptable. That it is important and imperative to battle manipulation carries with it a strong intuitive appeal. Intuition, however, does not always indicate the existence of a sound justification or policy option. For that, a deeper analytic and academic discussion is called for. This Article begins by emphasizing the importance of addressing the manipulation-based argument, which derives from several crucial problems and flaws in the legal and policy setting currently striving to meet the challenges of the digital age. Next, the Article examines whether the manipulation-based concerns are sustainable, or are merely a visceral response to changing technologies which cannot be provided with substantial analytical backing. Here the Article details the reasons for striving to block manipulative conduct and, on the other hand, reasons why legal intervention should be, in the best case, limited. The Article concludes with some general implications of this discussion for the broader themes and future directions of privacy law, while trying to ascertain whether the rise of the manipulation-based discourse will lead to information privacy’s expansion or perhaps its demise. (shrink)

IN SCIENCE, PERCEPTION, AND REALITY, Sellars marvels at the power of fashion in philosophy, which all too often offers us the spectacle of a stampede rather than a careful sifting of gold from dross. Sellars was worried that the flight from phenomenalism would lead to the familiar pendulum effect and so thwart his effort to “usher analytic philosophy out of its Humean and into its Kantian stage,” as Rorty has put it. Accordingly, Sellars’s critique of the Myth of the Given (...) aimed to show that what was really wrong with phenomenalism was nothing particular to the sense-data of the positivists but the framework of givenness itself. (shrink)

Philosophy and the Disdain for History: Reflections on Husserl's Ergiinzungsband to the Crisis GAIL SOFFER HUSSERL'S RECENTLY PUBLISHED Erganzungsband to the Cr/s/s' is a highly inti- mate statement, almost a confession, of hope and despair at the end of a philosophical life, a compendium of urgent, world-historical tasks not yet laid to rest. Above all, it abounds in reflections on history. In these, two things are poignantly clear: the late Husserl is completely convinced that history is of the utmost (...) importance to philosophy; he is not certain why. On a superfi- cial interpretation, the reason may seem obvious: Husserl's philosophical proj- ect is founded on the ideal of presuppositionless rational insight, and hence is Cartesian and ahistorical in its essence. The turn to history is to something external, and an implicit admission of the limitations of phenomenology itself, its inability to address the most pressing and meaningful problems of human existence: the crisis in European society and values, the ultimate significance of a man's life, work, and death. For those who would seek external motives for Husserl's turn to history, material is not lacking in this volume. There are moving philosophical discussions -- set in the atemporal phenomenological present tense -- of nationalism, of territoriality and the search for Lebensraum, of racism and xenophobia, of the forced emigration of families to a "no man's land. '' There is an attack on.. (shrink)

IN SCIENCE, PERCEPTION, AND REALITY, Sellars marvels at the power of fashion in philosophy, which all too often offers us the spectacle of a stampede rather than a careful sifting of gold from dross. Sellars was worried that the flight from phenomenalism would lead to the familiar pendulum effect and so thwart his effort to “usher analytic philosophy out of its Humean and into its Kantian stage,” as Rorty has put it. Accordingly, Sellars’s critique of the Myth of the Given (...) aimed to show that what was really wrong with phenomenalism was nothing particular to the sense-data of the positivists but the framework of givenness itself. (shrink)

Philosophy and the Disdain for History: Reflections on Husserl's Ergiinzungsband to the Crisis GAIL SOFFER HUSSERL'S RECENTLY PUBLISHED Erganzungsband to the Cr/s/s' is a highly inti- mate statement, almost a confession, of hope and despair at the end of a philosophical life, a compendium of urgent, world-historical tasks not yet laid to rest. Above all, it abounds in reflections on history. In these, two things are poignantly clear: the late Husserl is completely convinced that history is of the utmost (...) importance to philosophy; he is not certain why. On a superfi- cial interpretation, the reason may seem obvious: Husserl's philosophical proj- ect is founded on the ideal of presuppositionless rational insight, and hence is Cartesian and ahistorical in its essence. The turn to history is to something external, and an implicit admission of the limitations of phenomenology itself, its inability to address the most pressing and meaningful problems of human existence: the crisis in European society and values, the ultimate significance of a man's life, work, and death. For those who would seek external motives for Husserl's turn to history, material is not lacking in this volume. There are moving philosophical discussions -- set in the atemporal phenomenological present tense -- of nationalism, of territoriality and the search for Lebensraum, of racism and xenophobia, of the forced emigration of families to a "no man's land. '' There is an attack on... (shrink)

Iterability, the repetition which alters the idealization it reproduces, is the engine of deconstructive movement. The fact that all experience is transformative-dissimulative in its essence does not, however, mean that the momentum of change is the same for all situations. Derrida adapts Husserl's distinction between a bound and a free ideality to draw up a contrast between mechanical mathematical calculation, whose in-principle infinite enumerability is supposedly meaningless, empty of content, and therefore not in itself subject to alteration through contextual change, (...) and idealities such as spoken or written language which are directly animated by a meaning-to-say and are thus immediately affected by context. Derrida associates the dangers of cultural stagnation, paralysis and irresponsibility with the emptiness of programmatic, mechanical, formulaic thinking. This paper endeavors to show that enumerative calculation is not context-independent in itself but is instead immediately infused with alteration, thereby making incoherent Derrida's claim to distinguish between a free and bound ideality. Along with the presumed formal basis of numeric infinitization, Derrida's non-dialectical distinction between forms of mechanical or programmatic thinking (the Same) and truly inventive experience (the absolute Other) loses its justification. In the place of a distinction between bound and free idealities is proposed a distinction between two poles of novelty; the first form of novel experience would be characterized by affectivites of unintelligibility , confusion and vacuity, and the second by affectivities of anticipatory continuity and intimacy. (shrink)

This paper draws attention to an increasingly common method of using computer simulations to establish evidential standards in physics. By simulating an actual detection procedure on a computer, physicists produce patterns of data (‘signatures’) that are expected to be observed if a sought-after phenomenon is present. Claims to detect the phenomenon are evaluated by comparing such simulated signatures with actual data. Here I provide a justification for this practice by showing how computer simulations establish the reliability of detection procedures. I (...) argue that this use of computer simulation undermines two fundamental tenets of the Bogen–Woodward account of evidential reasoning. Contrary to Bogen and Woodward’s view, computer-simulated signatures rely on ‘downward’ inferences from phenomena to data. Furthermore, these simulations establish the reliability of experimental setups without physically interacting with the apparatus. I illustrate my claims with a study of the recent detection of the superfluid-to-Mott-insulator phase transition in ultracold atomic gases. (shrink)

Heidegger's attacks against humanism have come under renewed scrutiny, especially in France, as the latest wave of polemics over his political engagement has metamorphosed into a debate over the nature of humanism itself. Yet these recent discussions give rise to a number of perplexities. Firstly, for all their differences, it is remarkable how Heidegger's critics and defenders alike distort his position. On the one side, his French defenders hold that humanism is the attribution of a fixed essence to man, according (...) to which definition "even Nazism is a humanism." The fact that the early Heidegger was still enmeshed in the snares of humanism is then invoked to explain his political views in the thirties. (shrink)

When discrepancies are discovered between the outcomes of different measurement procedures, two sorts of explanation are open to scientists. Either some of the outcomes are inaccurate or the procedures are not measuring the same quantity. I argue that, due to the possibility of systematic error, the choice between and is underdetermined in principle by any possible evidence. Consequently, foundationalist criteria of quantity individuation are either empty or circular. I propose a coherentist, model-based account of measurement that avoids the underdetermination problem, (...) and use this account to explain how scientists individuate quantities in practice. (shrink)

Thinking after Derrida and Deconstruction.

This article focuses on the pendulum-like change in the way people read and use text, which was triggered by the introduction of new reading and writing technologies in human history. The paper argues that textual features, which characterized the ancient pre-print writing culture, disappeared with the establishment of the modern-day print culture and has been “revived” in the digital post-modern era. This claim is based on the analysis of four cases which demonstrate this textual-pendulum swing: (1) The swing from concrete (...) iconic-graphic representation of letters and words in the ancient alphabet to abstract phonetic representation of text in modern eras, and from written abstract computer commands “back” to the concrete iconic representation in graphic user interfaces of the digital era; (2) The swing from scroll reading in the pre-print era to page or book reading in the print era and “back” to scroll reading in the digital era; (3) The swing from a low level of authorship in the pre-print era to a strong authorship perception in the print era, and “back” to a low degree of authorship in the digital era; (4) The swing from synchronic representation of text in both visual and audio formats during the pre-print era to a visual representation only in print, and “back” to a synchronic representation in many environments of the digital era. We suggest that the print culture, which is usually considered the natural and preferred textual environment, should be regarded as the exception. (shrink)

The dream argument and its role in Cartesian doubt continue to engage commentators. As recent scholarship shows, a consensus has yet to be attained. In what follows I attempt to resolve the current debate by offering an account of the dream doubt which captures Descartes’s rhetorical strategy in Meditation I. A faithful reading of the text, I propose to show, reveals that the dream doubt is not entertained seriously nor is it proposed merely for the sake of methodological skepticism. It (...) is rather an integral part of a dogmatic intrusion of Cartesian science at a pivotal point in the critique of prescientific experience. After presenting the proposed interpretation, I examine the accounts offered in the current scholarship. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show the way in which the Discourse on Method participates in the antitheological launching of the modern project---the securing of a secular paradise by the “universal instrument” of human reason. It is argued that the order of the presentation of the parts of the Discourse conceals the true architectonic order of the Cartesian edifice because the physics of Part Five is more foundational than the metaphysics which seemingly must ground it in Part Four.

The past two decades have witnessed a flourishing of studies on Descartes by English language commentators. The focus of attention has been the Meditations, which continues to be regarded as the Archimedian point of Cartesian philosophy. The schism that has characterized the history of Cartesian scholarship persists throughout this most recent revival of interest in Descartes. The fundamental issue continues to be the question concerning the sincerity or insincerity of Descartes' theological metaphysics.

The philosophy of measurement studies the conceptual, ontological, epistemic, and technological conditions that make measurement possible and reliable. A new wave of philosophical scholarship has emerged in the last decade that emphasizes the material and historical dimensions of measurement and the relationships between measurement and theoretical modeling. This essay surveys these developments and contrasts them with earlier work on the semantics of quantity terms and the representational character of measurement. The conclusions highlight four characteristics of the emerging research program in (...) philosophy of measurement: it is epistemological, coherentist, practice oriented, and model based. (shrink)

Focusing on Socrates' proposals concerning women in The Republic Book V, in what follows I will attempt to show that Plato did not intend them as an argument for the desirability and feasibility of gender-neutral politics. A reading of Book V as the first feminist manifesto is thus anachronistic. I will also try to show that Socrates' rejection of gender-neutral politics is not to be explained as a chauvinist reaction to a perceived female incursion into the properly male domain of (...) politics. Because the Socratic discussion of gender and politics comprises issues that relate to and transcend embodiment, a proper reading of Book V must appreciate the ways in which it operates on both a gender and transgender level. On the gender level the question is the extent to which differential embodiment precludes sexual equality and communism. In agreement with the nonfeminist reading of Book V, I argue that problems pertaining to embodiment prevent the arguments for equality and communism from succeeding. But, because gender does not prevent women from becoming philosophers, on the transgender level the question concerns not the possibility of female philosopher rulers but the possibility of the guardian personality as such. In an attempt to further the case for reading Book V in the light of Socratic dissimulation, I argue that a second, perhaps deeper layer of irony is revealed when the possibility of the guardian nature as such is shown to be incompatible with what can be called psychic heterogeneity -- the irreconcilability, irrespective of gender, within the soul of what Socrates refers to as the natures of the spirited, the philosophic, and the warlike. (shrink)

Curiosity and creativity are central pillars of human growth and invention. Although they have been studied extensively in isolation, the relationship between them has not yet been established. We propose that both curiosity and creativity emanate from the same mechanism of novelty seeking. We first present a synthesis showing that curiosity and creativity are affected similarly by a number of key cognitive faculties such as memory, cognitive control, attention, and reward. We then review empirical evidence from neuroscience research, indicating that (...) the same brain regions are involved in both curiosity and creativity, focusing on the interplay between three major brain networks: the default mode network, the salience network, and the executive control network. After substantiating the link between curiosity and creativity, we propose a novelty-seeking model (NSM) that underlies them and suggests that the manifestation of the NSM is governed by one's state of mind. (shrink)

ABSTRACTShould conciliating with disagreeing peers be considered sufficient for reaching rational beliefs? Thomas Kelly argues that when taken this way, Conciliationism lets those who enter into a disagreement with an irrational belief reach a rational belief all too easily. Three kinds of responses defending Conciliationism are found in the literature. One response has it that conciliation is required only of agents who have a rational belief as they enter into a disagreement. This response yields a requirement that no one should (...) follow. If the need to conciliate applies only to already rational agents, then an agent must conciliate only when her peer is the one irrational. A second response views conciliation as merely necessary for having a rational belief. This alone does little to address the central question of what is rational to believe when facing a disagreeing peer. Attempts to develop the response either reduce to the first response, or deem necessary an unnecessary doxastic revision, or imply that rational dilemmas obtain in cases where intuitively there are none. A third response tells us to weigh what our pre-disagreement evidence supports against the evidence from the disagreement itself. This invites epistemic akrasia. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show the way in which the Discourse on Method participates in the antitheological launching of the modern project---the securing of a secular paradise by the “universal instrument” of human reason. It is argued that the order of the presentation of the parts of the Discourse conceals the true architectonic order of the Cartesian edifice because the physics of Part Five is more foundational than the metaphysics which seemingly must ground it in Part Four.

Sense and Affect exposes the limits of important recent strands in continental philosophy. It questions the necessity of a certain language of violence, otherness, disruption and pathos saturating Jacques Derrida's texts and the texts of those having a proximity to Derrida's deconstructionist project. This book establishes a connection between such affective terminology and a common, if heterogeneously expressed, theoretical inadequacy binding Derrida and writers such as Lyotard, Foucault, Caputo and Nancy. Their failure to penetrate a presumed irreducibility of suffering in (...) the world is shown to be linked to their dependence on the assumption of an irreducible tension at the origin of meaning. This book develops a fresh method of thought thoroughly unraveling the presuppositions of deconstructive orientations and uncovering a finer silt of the world than is seen via such discourses. (shrink)

The implementation of skills labs in Danish nursing education can, in itself, be viewed as a complexity. The students are expected to eventually carry out their work in a situated hospital practice, but they learn their professional skills in a different space altogether, detached and removed from the hospitals and practising on plastic dummies. Despite the apparent artificiality of the skills lab, this article will show that it is possible to analyse some of the fundamental aspects of care in nursing (...) by ethnographically following this phenomenon of simulation‐based training. These particular aspects of care are not explicated in the curriculum or textbooks; however, they surfaced once this crooked approach to studying care in a simulated practice was applied. The article start from the assertion that detached engagements are not recognized within the field of nursing education as an equal component to attachments. Yet empirical cases from the skills lab and hospitals illustrate how students sometimes felt emotionally attached to plastic dummies and how experienced nurses sometimes practised a degree of detachment in relation to human patients. Detached engagements will therefore be presented as part of care practices of nurses – rendering the ability to detach in engagement with patients a professional skill that students also need to learn. In the analysis to follow, attached and detached engagements are located on an equal plane by integrating both into the same conceptual framework, rather than imposing a priori notions about their dialectic relation. The analysis shows that it is the particular intertwinement of attachment and detachment that gives care its fundamental meaning. In conclusion, the need for a conceptual shift from a strong emphasis on attached engagement to a more balanced analytical approach to care work, as involving both attached and detached engagement within Danish nursing education, is advocated. (shrink)

We examine whether the "evidence of evidence is evidence" principle is true. We distinguish several different versions of the principle and evaluate recent attacks on some of those versions. We argue that, whatever the merits of those attacks, they leave the more important rendition of the principle untouched. That version is, however, also subject to new kinds of counterexamples. We end by suggesting how to formulate a better version of the principle that takes into account those new counterexamples.