ObjectivesIndividuals with irregular physical activity participation are defined as fluctuators. This study aimed to comprehend how fluctuators’ perceived barriers and motivators in their subjective theories are exhibited and cognitively represented in relation to their everyday PA practices and lapses.MethodsThe design of “Research Program Subjective Theories” was used to explore and present fluctuators’ cognition concerning PA participation. Thirty fluctuators were invited to a semi-structured interview. By inductive and deductive coding, fluctuators’ verbal data were converted into word categories for extracting commonalities and (...) comparing differences. By retaining the remaining word categories of high frequency and exploring the interrelationships among the remained word categories using statistical analyses, a superstructure including fluctuators’ main PA motivators, barriers, and behavioral outcomes was compiled.ResultsFluctuators face common motivators as barriers, such as lack of time, lack of willpower, lack of social support, and physical reasons. Fluctuators’ subjective theories primarily differed in motivational configurations. The physically motivated fluctuators were more linked with low PA level, while the mixed motivated fluctuators were more likely associated with moderate PA level. The exemplars of the three typical fluctuators were also demonstrated to reveal their real experiences and situations in the daily life context.ConclusionDue to the fact that fluctuation research is still in its infancy, this study represents a significant opportunity to promote knowledge growth in this area. Future studies are recommended to convert findings of the present study into interventions that benefit fluctuators in overcoming perceived barriers and enhancing motivations to eventually participate in regular PA. (shrink)

Arguing for controversial readings of many of the canonical figures, the book also focuses on lesser-known writers such as Pierre-Sylvain Regis, Nicolas ...

Heintz & Scott-Phillips provide a useful synthesis for constructing a bridge between work by both cognitive scientists and evolutionary biologists studying the diversity of human communication. Here, we aim to strengthen their bridge from the side of evolutionary biology, to argue that we can best understand ostensive communication as a scaffold for more complex forms of intentional expressions.

This paper aims to articulate an anarchist challenge to a widespread assumption in the rapidly growing philosophical literature on models, modeling-practices, and model-based science. I argue that the various entities and practices called “models” and “modeling-practices” are too heterogeneous, too context-sensitive, and serve too many scientific purposes and roles, as to constitute unified scientific phenomena that would allow for useful epistemic and ontologies analyses. Just like Feyerabend once argued that there are no general useful inferences to be drawn about the (...) method of “science”, I argue that the same lesson will apply to “model-based science”, hence calling my view model anarchism. (shrink)

In this essay the visual arts of the machine age morph into literature and theory and then back again to images, gestures, and thought.

von Walter Burkert ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Z 58.63-10.

In a recent contribution to this journal, Andrew Fenton and Sheri Alpert have argued that the so-called “extended mind hypothesis” allows us to understand why Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) have the potential to change the self of patients suffering from Locked-in syndrome (LIS) by extending their minds beyond their bodies. I deny that this can shed any light on the theoretical, or philosophical, underpinnings of BCIs as a tool for enabling communication with, or bodily action by, patients with LIS: BCIs (...) are not a case of cognitive extension. I argue that Fenton and Alpert’s claim to the contrary is the result of a widespread confusion about some related, but significantly different, approaches to cognition that all fall under the heading of “situated cognition.” I first provide a short taxonomy of various situated approaches to cognition, highlighting (some of) their important commonalities and differences, which should dissolve some of the confusions surrounding them. Then I show why the extended mind hypothesis is unsuitable as a model of BCI enhancements of LIS patients’ capacity to interact with their surroundings, and I argue that the situated approach with obvious bearings on the sort of questions that were driving Fenton and Alpert is not the idea that cognition is extended , but the idea that cognition is enacted. (shrink)

This paper provides a general account of what nonconceptual content is, and some considerations in favor of its existence. After distinguishing between the contents and objects of mental states, as well as the properties of being conceptual and being conceptualized, I argue that what is phenomenologically distinctive about conceptual content is that it is not determined by, and does not determine, the intuitive character of an experience. That is, for virtually any experience E with intuitive character I, there is no (...) conceptual content C such that undergoing E entails that one is entertaining C, and that for virtually any conceptual content C, there is no experience E with intuitive character I such that entertaining C entails that one is undergoing E. I then argue that while perceptual states and conceptual states can, and in certain cases must, have the same objects, they have different sorts of intentional contents. Perception, I argue, has two kinds of mutually dependent contents that can be varied independently of any conceptual content: intuitive content and horizonal content. I finish by distinguishing between the manner in which intuitive contents “fulfill” conceptual contents in epistemic fulfillment, and the manner in which they fulfill empty horizonal contents in intuitive fulfillment. (shrink)

In the late eighteenth century, Adam Smith significantly shaped the modern world by claiming that when people individually pursue their own interests, they are together led towards achieving the common good. But can a population of selfish people achieve the economic common good in the absence of moral constraints on their behavior? If not, then what are the moral conditions of market interaction which lead to economically efficient outcomes of trade? Answers to these questions profoundly affect basic concepts and principles (...) of economic theory, legal theory, moral philosophy, political theory, and even judicial decisions at the appellate level. Walter Schultz illustrates the deficiencies of theories which purport to show that markets alone can provide the basis for efficiency. He demonstrates that efficient outcomes of market interaction cannot be achieved without moral normative constraints and then goes on to specify a set of normative conditions which make these positive outcomes possible. (shrink)

Some biographical remarks and philosophical questions within philosophy for children -- Celebrating thirty years of philosophy for children -- Good-bye to Matthew Lipman (and Ann Margaret Sharp) -- The politics of formation : a critique of philosophy for children -- Philosophy at public schools of Brasilia, DF -- (Some) reasons for doing philosophy with children -- Philosophizing with children at a philosophy camp -- Does philosophy fit in Caxias? A Latin American project -- Philosophy as spiritual and political exercise in (...) an adult literacy course. (shrink)

This paper discusses how to define logics as deductive limits of sequences of other logics. The case of da Costa's hierarchy of increasingly weaker paraconsistent calculi, known as $ \mathcal {C}$n, 1 $ \leq$ n $ \leq$ $ \omega$, is carefully studied. The calculus $ \mathcal {C}$$\scriptstyle \omega$, in particular, constitutes no more than a lower deductive bound to this hierarchy and differs considerably from its companions. A long standing problem in the literature (open for more than 35 years) is (...) to define the deductive limit to this hierarchy, that is, its greatest lower deductive bound. The calculus $ \mathcal {C}$min, stronger than $ \mathcal {C}$$\scriptstyle \omega$, is first presented as a step toward this limit. As an alternative to the bivaluation semantics of $ \mathcal {C}$min presented thereupon, possible-translations semantics are then introduced and suggested as the standard technique both to give this calculus a more reasonable semantics and to derive some interesting properties about it. Possible-translations semantics are then used to provide both a semantics and a decision procedure for $ \mathcal {C}$Lim, the real deductive limit of da Costa's hierarchy. Possible-translations semantics also make it possible to characterize a precise sense of duality: as an example, $ \mathcal {D}$min is proposed as the dual to $ \mathcal {C}$min. (shrink)

This thought-provoking book initiates a dialogue among scholars in rhetoric and hermeneutics in many areas of the humanities. Twenty leading thinkers explore the ways these two powerful disciplines inform each other and influence a wide variety of intellectual fields. Walter Jost and Michael J. Hyde organize pivotal topics in rhetoric and hermeneutics with originality and coherence, dividing their book into four sections: Locating the Disciplines; Inventions and Applications; Arguments and Narratives; and Civic Discourse and Critical Theory. Contributors to this (...) volume include Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Gerald L. Bruns, Charles Altieri, Richard E. Palmer, Calvin O. Schrag,.Victoria Kahn, Eugene Garver, Michael Leff, Nancy S. Streuver, Wendy Olmsted, David Tracy, Donald G. Marshall, Allen Scult, Rita Copeland, William Rehg, and Steven Mailloux. For readers across the humanities, the book demonstrates the usefulness of rhetorical and hermeneutic approaches in literary, philosophical, legal, religious, and political thinking. With its stimulating new perspectives on the revival and interrelation of both rhetoric and hermeneutics, this collection is sure to serve as a benchmark for years to come. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview over the debate about so-called “situated approaches to cognition” that depart from the intracranialism associated with traditional cognitivism insofar as they stress the importance of body, world, and interaction for cognitive processing. It sketches the outlines of an overarching framework that reveals the differences, commonalities, and interdependencies between the various claims and positions of second-generation cognitive science, and identifies a number of apparently unresolved conceptual and ontological issues.

A non-inferiority design accepts the possibility of some efficacy loss, as part of a “successful”, statistically significant result. That loss may be excessive when the non-inferiority threshold is lenient. However, even stringent significance thresholds and safety monitoring may fail to adequately protect study participants when the primary outcome is death. The OPTIMAAL trial, a large randomized clinical trial performed in high-risk patients, is discussed as an example, using the Belmont Report principles as an ethical frame of reference. OPTIMAAL compared losartan, (...) a new drug, to captopril, a drug known to reduce the risk of death in patients with heart failure after a myocardial infarction. Serious ethical challenges occurred in that study. Firstly, subjects had to tolerate captopril to participate, meaning that participation implied the possibility of higher risk of death if randomized to the losartan arm, as compared to the standard of care. Additionally, the stopping rules had to ensure enough powe... (shrink)

This book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the notion of childhood and its place in philosophical education. Childhood is not seen as a developmental state that needs to be overcome, but rather an existential state that constitutes a significant part of being human as well as the (forgotten) dimension of the world itself.

This is the first complete English translation of _On the Purity of the Art of Logic, _a handbook of logic written in Latin by English philosopher Walter Burley. The work circulated in the Middle Ages in two versions, a shorter and a longer one, both translated here by Paul Vincent Spade. The translations are based on the only complete edition of Burley’s treatises, corrected by Spade on the basis of one of the surviving manuscripts. The book also includes an (...) extensive introduction, explanatory notes, a table of corresponding passages between the two versions, a select annotated bibliography, and three indexes. A contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, Burley was active at the universities of both Paris and Oxford. He became one of the most important figures in the transformation of medieval logic and semantics that took place in the early fourteenth century. Burley used new tools and techniques of logical and semantical analysis, yet in many cases he used them in defense of traditional views, such as a realist metaphysical theory of “universals_._”_ On the Purity of the Art of Logic_ shows_ _both these sides of Burley—the innovator and the conservative—as well as some of the ways in which his views corresponded or clashed with those of William of Ockham. (shrink)

Although there are suggestions that the environmental attitudes of men and of women differ, there have been few studies that study and evaluate these differences at the workplace. Given the claim of Ecofeminist writers about the environmental superiority of women's environmental attitudes, and the proclaimed need of business to change attitudes and behaviour with regard to the environment, this is a surprise. The paper is based on 1022 (37% from women) questionnaires which were collected in a U.K. pharmaceutical company, and (...) it compares the empirical results with environmental attitude archetypes, such as those prescribed by O'Riordan. However, the attitude clusters that were found do not correspond greatly with such theoretical modes of environmental ethics. Instead, it appears that women were more likely to be actively involved in environmental behaviour, and showed greater scepticism towards the role of technology in the search for solutions to environmental problems. In addition, men sought to a much greater extent a consistency between an environmental rationality and their behaviour. Men's attitudes were also much more influenced by their position in the organisational hierarchy. There were few significant differences across age groups. (shrink)

It is a hotly contested issue whether polygenic scores should play a major role in the social sciences. Here, we defend a methodologically pluralist stance in which sociogenomics should abandon its hype and recognize that it suffers from all the methodological difficulties of the social sciences, yet nevertheless maintain an optimistic stance toward a more cautious use.

Despite the once-common idea that a universal ideography would have numerous advantages, attempts to develop such ideographies have failed. Here, we make use of the biological idea of fitness landscapes to help us understand the nonevolution of such a universal ideographic code as well as how we might reach this potential global fitness peak in the design space.

Ecological theory is built upon assumptions about the fundamental nature of organism-environment interactions. We argue that two mutually exclusive sets of such assumptions are available and that they have given rise to alternative approaches to studying ecology. The fundamentally different premises of these approaches render them irreconcilable with one another. In this paper, we present the first logical formalisation of these two paradigms.The more widely-accepted approach - which we label the demographic paradigm - includes both population ecology and community ecology (...) (synecology). Demographic ecology assumes that the environment is relatively stable and that biotic processes, governed predominantly by resource availability, are the most important of ecological and evolutionary influences. Moreover, ecological processes are assumed to translate into directional selection pressures that drive significant evolutionary change on a local scale through the process of optimisation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.3 (2002) 265-269 [Access article in PDF] The Psychology and Physiology of Depression Walter Glannon Trauma and stressful events can disrupt the physiologic homeostasis of our bodies and brains. The physiologic stress response consists of neural and endocrine mechanisms whose function is to reestablish homeostasis. These mechanisms include the secretion of glucocorticoids (cortisol) and catecholemines (epinephrine and norepinephrine). Once an external event has ceased (...) to be a stressor or threat to a human organism, an integrated system of negative feedback loops inhibits the continued production of these hormones and effectively shuts down the stress response. These mechanisms are adaptive in the sense that they ensure the survival of the organism by reestablishing homeostasis. But prolonged exposure to real or perceived stressors can trigger prolonged secretion of stress hormones, thereby disrupting the feedback systems and causing a cascade of pathogenic events. The stress response is a double-edged sword. An acute stress response can protect an organism from external threats and reestablish homeostasis. But a chronic stress response can cause the body's defenses to become damaging rather than protective and to result in various disorders. Acute stress responses are adaptive. Chronic stress responses are often maladaptive and pathogenic.In "Depression as a Mind-Body Problem," I characterized major clinical depression as a disorder resulting from a maladaptive chronic stress response (Glannon 2003). Specifically, I argued that depression often results when our beliefs and emotions are out of proportion to the true nature of external events. The mind prolongs rather than constrains the physiologic stress response. Depression is not a disorder of the brain alone or the mind alone, however. Endocrine and immune dysfunction can contribute to the dysfunction in the brain and central nervous system that are involved in depression. Moreover, the contents of the mental states that initiate the sequence of events leading to depression are reflections of the person's natural and social environment. Thus, a satisfactory account of depression requires an analysis of the interconnections among the central nervous, endocrine, and immune systems, as well as the mind and the environment. All of these factors support the description of depression as a psychoneuroimmunologic disorder.Mike Martin (Martin 2003) and Thomas Fuchs (Fuchs 2003) discuss important aspects of depression that I did not elaborate in my paper. Martin argues that I fail to distinguish between depression as a mood and depression as a disorder. This is pertinent to the distinction evolutionary psychiatrists draw between moods that are adaptive and moods that are maladaptive. In contrast to my negative characterization of depression, Martin also makes a case for the positive [End Page 265] contributions of depression to meaningful life. Fuchs explores the notion of the brain as an organ of translation enabling patients to have meaningful subjective experience. The emphasis on subjectivity has important implications for potential preventive and therapeutic interventions for depression. For whether a person perceives an external event as a stressor may play a crucial role in the physiologic stress response. I will address the main points of these two authors in turn.Contrary to what Martin claims, I explicitly defined chronic depression as an affective (mood) disorder. My focus was on the clinical definition of major depression as a moderately severe to severe chronic disorder. It consists of affective, cognitive, and even physical dysfunction that interferes with a person's ability to carry out the normal tasks of daily life. This characterization of major chronic depression distinguishes it from milder forms of depression, such as dysthymia. Because these milder forms do not involve the same type or degree of dysfunction as more severe forms, they are not appropriately characterized as pathologies. For this reason, I focused on Nesse's (2000) discussion of depression rather than on his discussion of low mood. In fairness to Nesse and Stevens and Price (2000), not all forms of depression are pathologic according to the evolutionary view they defend. Some passive aspects of mild depression may be useful in alerting us to dangerous or wasteful behavior. It does seem plausible to describe depressed moods as falling along a continuum from those that... (shrink)

Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose, viz., defends non-reductive physicalism against (...) Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument according to which non-reductive physicalism is committed to epiphenomenalism because irreducible mental properties are ‘screened off’ from causal relevance by their physical realizers. Jackson and Pettit’s most promising explication of a program explanation appeals to the idea of invariance of effect under variation of realization , but I show that invariance of effect under variation of realization is neither necessary nor sufficient for causal relevance. (shrink)

There is no doubt that soybean is the most important crop for Argentina, with a planted surface that rose 11,000,000 hectares and a production of around 35,000,000 metric tons. During the 1990s, there was a significant agriculture transformation in the country, motorize by the adoption of transgenic crops (soy-bean, maize, and cotton) under the no-tillage system. The expansion of this model has been spread not only in the Pampas but also in very rich areas with high biodiversity, opening a new (...) agricultural border to important eco-regions like the Yungas, Great Chaco, and the Mesopotamian Forest. Transgenic cropping is a powerful technology. This produced relevant transformations over the environment and society where it is allowed. Migration, concentration of agribusiness, and loss of food sovereignty are some of the social results. Landscape transformation in the rural sector is evident, and the appearance of tolerance weeds to glyphosate is a reality. Nutrient depletion, soil-structure degradation, potential desertification, and loss of species are other consequences on the environmental level. (shrink)

This essay is written in the belief that it is possible to say both where Max Weber's philosophy of social science is mistaken and how these mistakes can be put right. Runciman argues that Weber's analysis breaks down at three decisive points: the difference between theoretical pre-suppositions and implicit value-judgements; the manner in which 'idiographic' explanations are to be subsumed under causal laws; and the relation of explanation to description in sociology. The arguments which Weber put forward are fundamental to (...) the methodology of the social sciences, and since his death it has come to be increasingly widely held that with perhaps the sole exception of Mill's System of Logic there is still no other body of work of comparable importance in the academic literature on these topics. Runciman's attempt to correct Weber's mistakes therefore constitutes in itself a valuable contribution to the philosophy of social science. (shrink)

Frege seems committed to the thesis that the senses of the fundamental notions of arithmetic remain stable and are stably grasped by thinkers throughout history. Fully competent practitioners grasp those senses clearly and distinctly, while uncertain practitioners see them, the very same senses, “as if through a mist”. There is thus a common object of the understanding apprehended to a greater or lesser degree by thinkers of diverging conceptual competence. Frege takes the thesis to be a condition for the possibility (...) of the rational intelligibility of mathematical practice. I argue however that the idea that senses could be grasped as a matter of degree is in tension with the constitutive theses that Frege held with regard to sense. Given those theses, there can in fact be no such thing as misty grasp of sense, since any uncertainty as to the logical features of a given sense will entail that one is getting hold of a different sense or of no sense at all. I consider various ways of resolving the tension and conclude that Frege’s thesis cannot be defended if we take it to be a thesis about our competence with concepts. This leaves unresolved what I call the problem of normative guidance, that is, the problem of explaining how the fundamental notions of logic and arithmetic can provide inferential guidance to thinkers. (shrink)

Evaluation studies of the Bayh-Dole Act are generally concerned with the pace of innovation or the transgressions to the independence of research. While these concerns are important, I propose here to expand the range of public values considered in assessing Bayh-Dole and formulating future reforms. To this end, I first examine the changes in the terms of the Bayh-Dole debate and the drift in its design. Neoliberal ideas have had a definitive influence on U.S. innovation policy for the last thirty (...) years, including legislation to strengthen patent protection. Moreover, the neoliberal policy agenda is articulated and justified in the interest of competitiveness. Rhetorically, this agenda equates competitiveness with economic growth and this with the public interest. Against that backdrop, I use Public Value Failure criteria to show that values such as political equality, transparency, and fairness in the distribution of the benefits of innovation, are worth considering to counter the policy drift of Bayh-Dole. (shrink)

Biology arises from the crowded molecular environment of the cell, rendering it a challenge to understand biological pathways based on the reductionist, low‐concentration in vitro conditions generally employed for mechanistic studies. Recent evidence suggests that low‐affinity interactions between cellular biopolymers abound, with still poorly defined effects on the complex interaction networks that lead to the emergent properties and plasticity of life. Mass‐action considerations are used here to underscore that the sheer number of weak interactions expected from the complex mixture of (...) cellular components significantly shapes biological pathway specificity. In particular, on‐pathway—i.e., “functional”—become those interactions thermodynamically and kinetically stable enough to survive the incessant onslaught of the many off‐pathway (“nonfunctional”) interactions. Consequently, to better understand the molecular biology of the cell a further paradigm shift is needed toward mechanistic experimental and computational approaches that probe intracellular diversity and complexity more directly. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/T19X_zYaBzg. (shrink)

A discussion with ChatGPT showing both its weaknesses and strengths for researchers in the humanities.

It has been claimed by Diana Raffman, that atonal (and in particular serial) music can have no aesthetic value, because it is in an important sense meaningless. This worthlessness is claimed to result from cognitive/psychological facts about human listeners that have been confirmed by empirical investigations such as those conducted by Lerdahl and Jackendoff. Similar assertions about the necessary inferiority of 12-tone music have been made by, among others, Taruskin, Cavell, and Goldman, some of whom echo Raffman’s suggestion that both (...) composers and performers of atonal music are committing a kind of fraud. This paper responds to all of those allegations. In particular, it points out that even if the empirical claim about human cognitive capacities with respect to the discernment of “local structure” in atonal works is assumed to be correct (which is actually quite doubtful), all the arguments brought by the “prosecution” against atonal music that rely on this claim are invalid. It is noted that such arguments by tonality advocates somewhat ironically rely on their own variety of what Taruskin has called “the poietic fallacy,” a gaff which he has frequently accused serialists (and perhaps alea supporters) of committing. Readers are reminded that the main basis for claims of aesthetic worth (or worthlessness) can never be primarily theoretical, but must be principally based on the experiences of beholders. (shrink)

This book aims merely to study the human values that were sought and realized by Greek democracy, the chief problems that it faced, the measure of success and ...