An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...) the current popularity of extended cognition theory through critical analysis and by pointing out fallacies and shortcoming in the literature Stimulates discussions that will advance debate about the nature of cognition in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

This classic is the benchmark against which all modern books about Nietzsche are measured. When Walter Kaufmann wrote it in the immediate aftermath of World War II, most scholars outside Germany viewed Nietzsche as part madman, part proto-Nazi, and almost wholly unphilosophical. Kaufmann rehabilitated Nietzsche nearly single-handedly, presenting his works as one of the great achievements of Western philosophy. Responding to the powerful myths and countermyths that had sprung up around Nietzsche, Kaufmann offered a patient, evenhanded account of his (...) life and works, and of the uses and abuses to which subsequent generations had put his ideas. Without ignoring or downplaying the ugliness of many of Nietzsche's proclamations, he set them in the context of his work as a whole and of the counterexamples yielded by a responsible reading of his books. More positively, he presented Nietzsche's ideas about power as one of the great accomplishments of modern philosophy, arguing that his conception of the "will to power" was not a crude apology for ruthless self-assertion but must be linked to Nietzsche's equally profound ideas about sublimation. He also presented Nietzsche as a pioneer of modern psychology and argued that a key to understanding his overall philosophy is to see it as a reaction against Christianity. Many scholars in the past half century have taken issue with some of Kaufmann's interpretations, but the book ranks as one of the most influential accounts ever written of any major Western thinker. Featuring a new foreword by Alexander Nehamas, this Princeton Classics edition of Nietzsche introduces a new generation of readers to one the most influential accounts ever written of any major Western thinker. (shrink)

Walter applies the methodology of neurophilosophy to one of philosophy's centralchallenges, the notion of free will. Neurophilosophical conclusions are based on, and consistentwith, scientific knowledge about the brain and its functioning.

Originally published in 1959, The Faith of a Heretic is the most personal statement of the beliefs of Nietzsche biographer and translator Walter Kaufmann. A first-rate philosopher in his own right, Kaufmann here provides the fullest account of his views on religion. Although he considered himself a heretic, he was not immune to the wellsprings and impulses from which religion originates, declaring it among the most vital and radical expressions of the human mind. Beginning with an autobiographical prologue that (...) traces his evolution from religious believer to "heretic," the book touches on theology, organized religion, morality, suffering, and death—all examined from the perspective of a "quest for honesty." Kaufmann also subjects philosophy's faith in truth, reason, and absolute morality to the same heretical treatment. The resulting exploration of the faiths of a nonbeliever in a secular age is as fresh and challenging as when it was first published. In a new foreword, Stanley Corngold vividly describes the intellectual and biographical milieu of Kaufmann’s provocative book. (shrink)

Assertion plays a crucial dual role in Frege's conception of logic, a formal and a transcendental one. A recurrent complaint is that Frege's inclusion of the judgement-stroke in the Begriffsschrift is either in tension with his anti-psychologism or wholly superfluous. Assertion, the objection goes, is at best of merely psychological significance. In this paper, I defend Frege against the objection by giving reasons for recognising the central logical significance of assertion in both its formal and its transcendental role.

According to behavioural theories deriving from pragmatism, gestalt psychology, existentialism, and ecopsychology, knowledge about the world is gained by intentional action followed by learning. In terms of the neurodynamics described here, if the intending of an act comes to awareness through reafference, it is perceived as a cause. If the consequences of an act come to awareness through proprioception and exteroception, they are perceived as an effect. A sequence of such states of awareness comprises consciousness, which can grow in complexity (...) to include self-awareness. Intentional acts do not require awareness, whereas voluntary acts require self-awareness. Awareness of the action/perception cycle provides the cognitive metaphor of linear causality as an agency. Humans apply this metaphor to objects and events in the world to predict and control them, and to assign social responsibility. Thus, linear causality is the bedrock of technology and social contracts. Complex material systems with distributed non-linear feedback, such as brains and their neural and behavioural activities, cannot be explained by linear causality. They can be said to operate by circular causality without agency. The nature of self-control is described by breaking the circle into a forward limb, the intentional self, and a feedback limb, awareness of the self and its actions. The two limbs are realized through hierarchically stratified kinds of neural activity. Intentional acts are produced by the self-organized microscopic neural activity of cortical and subcortical components in the brain. Awareness supervenes as a macroscopic ordering state, that defers action until the self-organizing microscopic process has reached closure in reflective prediction. Agency, which is removed from the causal hierarchy by the appeal to circularity, re-appears as a metaphor by which events in the world are anthropomorphized, making them appear subject to human control. (shrink)

Die einwandfreie Bestimmung der Begriffe ist die Grundlage einer jeden wissenschaftlichen Arbeit. Im Sinne der modernen Logik und Axiomatik hat erstmals Walter Dubislav die Methode des Definierens von Begriffen systematisch wie auch an Beispielen entwickelt. Sein Werk zeichnet sich durch klare Gedankenführung und didaktisches Geschick bei der Vermittlung philosophischer Sachverhalte aus, und es diskutiert alle einschlägigen Fragen, die sich dem an Methoden interessierten Wissenschaftler stellen. Es hat daher auch heute noch seinen systematischen Wert. Den gegenwärtigen Stand der Forschung im (...) B... (shrink)

In this radical reinterpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, Walter E. Wehrle demonstrates that developmental theories of Aristotle are based on a faulty assumption: that the fifth chapter of Categories is an early theory of metaphysics that Aristotle later abandoned.

We humans and other animals continuously construct and main- tain our grasp of the world by using astonishingly small snippets of sensory information. Recent studies in nonlinear brain dynamics have shown how this occurs: brains imagine possible futures and seek and use sensory stimulation to select among them as guides for chosen actions. On the one hand the scientific explanation of the dynamics is inaccessible to most of us. On the other hand the philosophical foundation from which the sciences grew (...) is accessible through the work of one of its originators, Thomas Aquinas. The core concept of intention in Aquinas is the inviolable unity of mind, brain and body. All that we know we have constructed within ourselves from the unintelligible fragments of energy impacting our senses as we move our bodies through the world. This process of intention is transi- tive in the outward thrust of the body in search of desired future states; it is intransitive in the dynamic construction of predictions of the states in the sensory cortices by which we recognize suc- cess or failure in achievement. The process is phenomenologically experienced in the action-perception cycle. Enactment is through the serial creation of neurodynamic activity patterns in brains, by which the self of mind-brain-body comes to know the world first by shaping the self to an approximation of the sought-for input, and then by assimilating those shapes into knowledge and meaning. This conception of the self as closed, autonomous, and self- organizing, devised over 700 years ago and shelved by Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza 300 years ago, is now re-emerging in philos- ophy and re-establishes the meaning of intention in its original sense. The core Aquinian concept of the unity of brain, body and soul/mind, which had been abandoned by mechanists and replaced by Brentano and Husserl using the duality inherent in representa- tionalism, has been revived by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, but in phenomenological terms that are opaque to neurscientists. In my experience there is no extant philosophical system than that of Aquinas that better fits with the new _ndings in nonlinear brain dynamics. Therefore, a detailed reading and transcription of basic terms is warranted, comparing in both directions the significance of key words across 700 years from medieval metaphysics to 21st century brain dynamics. (shrink)

Study of electroencephalographic brain activity in behaving animals has guided development of a model for the self-organization of goal-directed behavior. Synthesis of a dynamical representation of brain function is based in the concept of intentionality as the organizing principle of animal and human behavior. The constructions of patterns of brain activity constitute meaning and not information or representations. The three accepted meanings of intention: "aboutness," goal-seeking, and wound healing, can be incorporated into the dynamics of meaningful behavior, centered in the (...) limbic system interacting with the sensory and motor systems. Evidence is noted for the maintenance in cortical neuropil of a felt work of synaptic connections, that have incorporated past experience by changes in learning, and that act as a unified whole in shaping each intentional action at each moment. This constitutes the intentional structure of the brain. Meaning is a focus having a place without edges in this structure. The focus continually moves through it along a chaotic trajectory; the meaning occupies the whole structure. In this view, consciousness is the active state of an intentional structure, and awareness is the subjective aspect of the shifting focus. (shrink)

This thought-provoking book initiates a dialogue among scholars in rhetoric and hermeneutics in many areas of the humanities. Twenty leading thinkers explore the ways these two powerful disciplines inform each other and influence a wide variety of intellectual fields. Walter Jost and Michael J. Hyde organize pivotal topics in rhetoric and hermeneutics with originality and coherence, dividing their book into four sections: Locating the Disciplines; Inventions and Applications; Arguments and Narratives; and Civic Discourse and Critical Theory. Contributors to this (...) volume include Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Gerald L. Bruns, Charles Altieri, Richard E. Palmer, Calvin O. Schrag,.Victoria Kahn, Eugene Garver, Michael Leff, Nancy S. Streuver, Wendy Olmsted, David Tracy, Donald G. Marshall, Allen Scult, Rita Copeland, William Rehg, and Steven Mailloux. For readers across the humanities, the book demonstrates the usefulness of rhetorical and hermeneutic approaches in literary, philosophical, legal, religious, and political thinking. With its stimulating new perspectives on the revival and interrelation of both rhetoric and hermeneutics, this collection is sure to serve as a benchmark for years to come. (shrink)

Introduction to Special Issue on ‘Reclaiming Cognition: The Primacy of Action, Intention and Emotion’. Making sense of the mind is the human odyssey. Today, the cognitive sciences provide the vehicles and equipage. As do all culturally shaped activities, they manifest crystallized generalizations and ideological legacies, many of which go unquestioned for centuries. From time to time, these ideologies are successfully challenged, generating revisions and new forms of understanding. We believe that the cognitive sciences have reached a situation in which they (...) have been frozen into one narrow form by the machine metaphor. There is a need to thaw that form and move from a reductionist, atemporal, disembodied, static, rationalist, emotion- and culture-free view, to fundamentally richer understandings that include the primacy of action, intention, emotion, culture, real-time constraints, real-world opportunities, and the peculiarities of living bodies. These essays constitute an array of moves in that direction. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to investigate unconscious priming by the use of a spatial mirror-masking paradigm. Words and nonwords with no under-length letters are mirrored at their horizontal axis. The results are figures of geometric-like forms that contain letters in their upper part. In the three experiments reported in this study, a priming procedure used such mirrored words and nonwords as primes. Participants were ignorant of the nature of the construction of the stimuli. Perceptual reports of the participants (...) revealed that they did not realize that words were hidden in the primes. Nevertheless, they showed priming in all three experiments. Priming effects were replicated with prime–target SOAs of between 1 and 3 s. Functional dissociations were found between ignorant and informed participants. Informed groups showed perceptual and semantic priming, while ignorant groups showed only perceptual priming. (shrink)

A unifing theory of spatiotemporal brain dynamics should incorporate multiple spatial and temporal scales. Between the microscopic (local) and macroscopic (global) components proposed by Nunez, mesoscopic (intermediate-range) elements should be integral parts of models. The corresponding mathematical formalism requires tools of nonlinear dynamics and the use of aperiodic (chaotic) attractors. Some relations between local-mesoscopic and mesoscopic-global components are outlined.

Thelen et al. have a strong case for linking behavior with mind through nonrepresentational dynamics. Their case linking mind with brain is less compelling. Modified avenues are proposed for further exploration: greater emphasis on the dynamics of perception; use of chaotic instead of deterministic dynamics with noise; and use of intentionality instead of motivation, taking advantage of its creative dynamics to model genesis of goal-directed behaviors.

Die spekulative Frage, wie das Denken sich und somit ein Selbst denken kann, ist die prinzipientheoretische Grundfrage der Philosophie. In ihr ist auch die transzendentale Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Denkens eines Gegenstandes überhaupt enthalten. Wie sie darin enthalten ist und inwiefern die transzendentale Fragestellung auf die spekulative verweist und ihrer bedarf, wird im Anschluß an Kant zu zeigen sein, denn die spekulative Frage ist nicht die Ausgangsfrage Kantens. Kant geht aus von der Antinomie von empiristischem Skeptizismus und (...) ontologischem Dogmatismus und spielt sie an der Differenz von Ding und Denken durch, die dieser Antinomie zugrundeliegt. Die Ontologie wird darum von ihm belehrt, daß sie das Gedankending nicht mit dem Gegenstand der Erfahrung und das Denken nicht mit dem Erkennen verwechseln dürfe. Der Empirismus wird hingegen belehrt, daß die Gegen-stände der Erfahrung und ihre Zusammensetzungen kein Gegebenes, sondern ein vom Denken mit Bezug auf das Anschauungsmaterial Gemachtes sind. Die Differenz von Ding und Denken bleibt solcherart in Kants transzendentaler Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Denkens eines Gegenstandes überhaupt aufbewahrt. Sie macht sich in Kants Antworten auf diese Frage aber auch geltend und bleibt als bloße Differenz von Verstandesspontaneität und rezeptiver Sinnlichkeit der blinde Fleck, um den seine Argumentationen kreisen. Die ersten vier Kapitel des vorliegenden Buches folgen diesem Kreisgang der Kantischen Beweisführung. Das Beweisziel: die transzendentallogische Entdeckung der Formen des Denkens eines Gegenstandes überhaupt, versuchen die Kapitel 5 und 6 einzulösen, indem - im Gegensatz zur ‚exoterischen‘ Lehre Kantens und zur nach-idealistischen Standardinterpretation des Kritizismus - die Vereinbarung von transzendentalem Idealismus und empirischem Realismus nicht in einem Apriori gesucht wird, das schlechterdings mit dem ‚Verstande‘ zu identifizieren wäre, sondern das gegenstandskonstitutive Verstandesapriori vielmehr aus ursprünglichen - die Differenz von Verstand und Sinnlichkeit allererst ermöglichenden - Weisen der Synthesis entwickelt wird. Diese genetische Grundlegung des Apriori ist anhand der Prinzipien der klassischen Logik und einer Analyse des Seinssinnes der Kopula “ist” als transzendentallogische Differenzierung der Urteilssynthesis durchzuführen und mit Bezug auf die Gegebenheitsweisen Raum und Zeit durch eine korrespondierende transzendental-phänomenologische Analyse zu vervollständigen. Da das genetische Apriori aber nicht unmittelbar, sondern nur vermittels der reflexiv-synthetischen Bewußtseinsstruktur auf die Kantischen Gegenstandskategorien bezogen werden kann, bleibt in Fortführung des Nachweises der Vollständigkeit der Kantischen Kategorientafel die spekulative Frage zu beantworten, wie Synthesis (Vermittlung) und damit das Denken selbst zu denken ist. Dieser Aufgabe und den damit untrennbar verbundenen Problemen der Verhältnisbestimmung von transzendentaler und formaler Logik, sowie von regulativer und konstitutiver Apriorität, sind die letzten vier Kapitel gewidmet, wobei in diesem Problemzusammenhang der Begriff der Transzendentalphilosophie in Auseinandersetzung mit einigen ihrer vor- und nach-kantischen Positionen noch näher zu klären sein wird. Wollte man das Ergebnis dieser Klärung vorweg zusammenfassen, dann ließe sich in Abwandlung eines oft zitierten Kantischen Satzes sagen, daß die transzendentale Logik seit Platon keinen Schritt rückwärts und mit Kant erst einen Schritt vorwärts hat tun dürfen und folglich schon von den ältesten Zeiten her nahezu vollendet sei. Vordergründig betrachtet, relativiert dieses Resultat den historischen Anspruch, den Kant an seine ‚Revolution der Denkungsart‘ geknüpft hat, es bekräftigt dafür jedoch um so mehr den systematischen Anspruch, den die Transzendentalphilosophie als Prinzipientheorie erheben und auch einlösen muß. (shrink)

The Principle of Ariadne, formulated in 1988 ago by Walter Carnielli and Carlos Di Prisco and later published in 1993, is an infinitary principle that is independent of the Axiom of Choice in ZF, although it can be consistently added to the remaining ZF axioms. The present paper surveys, and motivates, the foundational importance of the Principle of Ariadne and proposes the Ariadne Game, showing that the Principle of Ariadne, corresponds precisely to a winning strategy for the Ariadne Game. (...) Some relations to other alternative. set-theoretical principles are also briefly discussed. (shrink)

Political theorists advocating the abolition of instrumental uses of groups of animals are divided with respect to how they evaluate welfare reforms. Radical abolitionists maintain that welfare reforms are only dubiously described as moral improvements while pragmatic abolitionists maintain that welfare reforms are moral improvements, even if the conditions they permit are unjust. This article examines Wyckoff’s interest model against the case of a Cincinnati coalition’s efforts to reform the local food chain. This article argues that the coalition’s program of (...) choice is a welfare reform and that the interest model must evaluate the program as a moral improvement. This article concludes that if the interest model is the most appropriate political theory of animal rights, pragmatic abolitionism is philosophically more appropriate than radical abolitionism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.3 (2002) 265-269 [Access article in PDF] The Psychology and Physiology of Depression Walter Glannon Trauma and stressful events can disrupt the physiologic homeostasis of our bodies and brains. The physiologic stress response consists of neural and endocrine mechanisms whose function is to reestablish homeostasis. These mechanisms include the secretion of glucocorticoids (cortisol) and catecholemines (epinephrine and norepinephrine). Once an external event has ceased (...) to be a stressor or threat to a human organism, an integrated system of negative feedback loops inhibits the continued production of these hormones and effectively shuts down the stress response. These mechanisms are adaptive in the sense that they ensure the survival of the organism by reestablishing homeostasis. But prolonged exposure to real or perceived stressors can trigger prolonged secretion of stress hormones, thereby disrupting the feedback systems and causing a cascade of pathogenic events. The stress response is a double-edged sword. An acute stress response can protect an organism from external threats and reestablish homeostasis. But a chronic stress response can cause the body's defenses to become damaging rather than protective and to result in various disorders. Acute stress responses are adaptive. Chronic stress responses are often maladaptive and pathogenic.In "Depression as a Mind-Body Problem," I characterized major clinical depression as a disorder resulting from a maladaptive chronic stress response (Glannon 2003). Specifically, I argued that depression often results when our beliefs and emotions are out of proportion to the true nature of external events. The mind prolongs rather than constrains the physiologic stress response. Depression is not a disorder of the brain alone or the mind alone, however. Endocrine and immune dysfunction can contribute to the dysfunction in the brain and central nervous system that are involved in depression. Moreover, the contents of the mental states that initiate the sequence of events leading to depression are reflections of the person's natural and social environment. Thus, a satisfactory account of depression requires an analysis of the interconnections among the central nervous, endocrine, and immune systems, as well as the mind and the environment. All of these factors support the description of depression as a psychoneuroimmunologic disorder.Mike Martin (Martin 2003) and Thomas Fuchs (Fuchs 2003) discuss important aspects of depression that I did not elaborate in my paper. Martin argues that I fail to distinguish between depression as a mood and depression as a disorder. This is pertinent to the distinction evolutionary psychiatrists draw between moods that are adaptive and moods that are maladaptive. In contrast to my negative characterization of depression, Martin also makes a case for the positive [End Page 265] contributions of depression to meaningful life. Fuchs explores the notion of the brain as an organ of translation enabling patients to have meaningful subjective experience. The emphasis on subjectivity has important implications for potential preventive and therapeutic interventions for depression. For whether a person perceives an external event as a stressor may play a crucial role in the physiologic stress response. I will address the main points of these two authors in turn.Contrary to what Martin claims, I explicitly defined chronic depression as an affective (mood) disorder. My focus was on the clinical definition of major depression as a moderately severe to severe chronic disorder. It consists of affective, cognitive, and even physical dysfunction that interferes with a person's ability to carry out the normal tasks of daily life. This characterization of major chronic depression distinguishes it from milder forms of depression, such as dysthymia. Because these milder forms do not involve the same type or degree of dysfunction as more severe forms, they are not appropriately characterized as pathologies. For this reason, I focused on Nesse's (2000) discussion of depression rather than on his discussion of low mood. In fairness to Nesse and Stevens and Price (2000), not all forms of depression are pathologic according to the evolutionary view they defend. Some passive aspects of mild depression may be useful in alerting us to dangerous or wasteful behavior. It does seem plausible to describe depressed moods as falling along a continuum from those that... (shrink)

The essay aims at demonstrating that it is dangerous to try to reconstruct a philosophical doctrine taking into account solely or predominantly the analysis of vocabulary. This is particularly true of the philosophical doctrines of the ancients, who generally did not feel obliged to adopt a coherent and unambiguous technical terminology. Starting from the essay of F. Camera, Sui molteplici significati di hermeneia in Platone, which was published in 2004 and then re-edited in 2011 with few modifications but with a (...) different title, the author shows that the method of facing Plato’s hermeneutics through the ἑρμηνεύειν-words is a source of distortions and over-interpretations; that is, it causes excessive density and conceptual significance to be attributed to words used instead in their current meaning. One must remember, even if it should be well known to anyone who devotes himself to these themes, that not all words, expressions and concepts become philosophical entities only because they appear in the works of an author tagged “philosophy.”. (shrink)

This paper responds to Saul Fisher’s critical note (in the current volume) on Peter Lamarque and Nigel Walter’s ‘The Application of Narrative to the Conservation of Historic Buildings’ (Estetika 1/2019). Walter restates the argument, underlining the context of ‘living' buildings whose identities are still in formation. He then responds to points raised by Fisher, commenting on persistence and identity, Noël Carroll’s views on narrative connection, the usefulness of Carroll's engagement with spatial relations, and addressing some of Fisher’s specific (...) challenges. Lamarque then comments, framing the central question as whether conservation work to a building preserves its character, integrity, and coherence, noting that these are core aspects of narrative, before concluding with some reflections on the application of metaphor, including the metaphorical personification of buildings. (shrink)

Gramsci, An italian marxist intellectual politically active when fascism rose and later imprisoned by mussolini, Offers a sensitive and non-Stereotyped communist interpretation of fascism. He rejected the crude "fascism as last stage of capitalism thesis," the view that it was merely the "agent of the big bourgeoisie" and even the view that it reflected a particular set of class interests. He recognized that it was not merely reactionary, That it had complex internal divisions, That it exemplified the "relative autonomy of (...) politics," and that it was best understood as a response to a "hegemonic crisis.". (shrink)

Adamson argues that Marxism "teaches us how to interpret social and historical reality, and to relate that interpretation to our current political concerns.".

Helmut Fleischer has distinguished three different approaches to history in the development of Marx's thinking: the "anthropological" , the "pragmatological" , and the "nomological" . However, these represent a less continuous and coherent development than Fleischer claims. The 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse can be instanced as a fourth view, more focused than the others on historiography, and at variance with what Marx says elsewhere. The sequence and overlapping of these four views call into question both the interpretation of Marx's (...) development as smoothly continuous and the interpretation of his development as "ruptured" into "early" and "late.". (shrink)