Introduction -- Part I: Willing as practical knowing -- The will and practical judgment -- Fundamental practical judgments : the wish for happiness -- Part II: From presuppositions of judgment to the idea of a categorical imperative -- The formal presuppositions of practical judgment -- Constraints on willing -- Part III: Interpretation -- The categorical imperative -- Applications -- Conclusion.

Greek antiquity saw the development of two distinct systems of logic: Aristotle’s theory of the categorical syllogism and the Stoic theory of the hypothetical syllogism. Some ancient logicians argued that hypothetical syllogistic is more fundamental than categorical syllogistic on the grounds that the latter relies on modes of propositional reasoning such asreductio ad absurdum. Peripatetic logicians, by contrast, sought to establish the priority of categorical over hypothetical syllogistic by reducing various modes of propositional reasoning to categorical (...) form. In the 17th century, this Peripatetic program of reducing hypothetical to categorical logic was championed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In an essay titledSpecimina calculi rationalis, Leibniz develops a theory of propositional terms that allows him to derive the rule ofreductio ad absurdumin a purely categorical calculus in which every proposition is of the formA is B. We reconstruct Leibniz’s categorical calculus and show that it is strong enough to establish not only the rule ofreductio ad absurdum, but all the laws of classical propositional logic. Moreover, we show that the propositional logic generated by the nonmonotonic variant of Leibniz’s categorical calculus is a natural system of relevance logic known as RMI$_{{}_ \to ^\neg }$. (shrink)

Deprivation views of the badness of death are almost universally accepted among those who hold that death can be bad for the person who dies. In their most common form, deprivation views hold that death is bad because (and to the extent that) it deprives people of goods they would have gained had they not died at the time they did. Contrast this with categorical desire views, which hold that death is bad because (and to the extent that) (...) it thwarts people’s categorical desires. Categorical desires are desires that are not conditional upon one being alive; yet provide reason for the agent to continue living to ensure that those very desires are satisfied. I argue that categorical desire views are subject to two serious problems that deprivation views are not. First, categorical desire views entail that it is not bad for someone to not be resuscitated after dying a bad death. Second, categorical desire views cannot account for cases in which it is good to prevent people from coming into existence or cases in which it is good to prevent them from continuing to exist. After considering, and rejecting, various replies on behalf of categorical desire proponents, I conclude that we have good reason to reject categorical desire views in favor of deprivation views. (shrink)

David Gauthier suggested that all genuine moral problems are Prisoners Dilemmas (PDs), and that the morally and rationally required solution to a PD is to co-operate. I say there are four other forms of moral problem, each a different way of agents failing to be in PDs because of the agents’ preferences. This occurs when agents have preferences that are malevolent, self-enslaving, stingy, or bullying. I then analyze preferences as reasons for action, claiming that this means they must not target (...) the impossible, they must be able to be acted on in the circumstances, their targets must be attainable, and having the preferences must make their targets more likely. For groups of agents to have a distribution of preferences, their preferences must jointly have those four features, this imposing a kind of universalizability requirement on possible preferences. I then claim that, if all agents began with preferences satisfying these requirements, their preferences would not be of the morally problematic sort (on pain, variously, of circularity or contradiction in the specification of their targets). Instead, they would be either morally innocent preferences, or ones which put the agents in PDs. And it would then be instrumentally rational for the agents to prefer mutual co-operation. Thus if all agents initially had rationally permissible preferences and made rational choices of actions and preferences thereafter, they would never acquire immoral preferences, and so never be rationally moved to immoral actions. Further, the states of affairs such agents would be moved to bring about would be compatible with what Rawls’ agents would chose behind a veil of ignorance. Morality therefore reduces to rationality; necessarily, the actions categorically required by morality are also categorically required by rationality. (shrink)

Two models of second-order ZFC need not be isomorphic to each other, but at least one is isomorphic to an initial segment of the other. The situation is subtler for impure set theory, but Vann McGee has recently proved a categoricity result for second-order ZFCU plus the axiom that the urelements form a set. Two models of this theory with the same universe of discourse need not be isomorphic to each other, but the pure sets of one are isomorphic (...) to the pure sets of the other. This paper argues that similar results obtain for considerably weaker second-order axiomatizations of impure set theory that are in line with two different conceptions of set, the iterative conception and the limitation of size doctrine. (shrink)

Category theory has become central to certain aspects of theoretical physics. Bain has recently argued that this has significance for ontic structural realism. We argue against this claim. In so doing, we uncover two pervasive forms of category-theoretic generalization. We call these ‘generalization by duality’ and ‘generalization by categorifying physical processes’. We describe in detail how these arise, and explain their significance using detailed examples. We show that their significance is two-fold: the articulation of high-level physical concepts, and the generation (...) of new models. 1 Introduction2 Categories and Structuralism 2.1 Categories: abstract and concrete 2.2 Structuralism: simple and ontic3 Bain’s Two Strategies 3.1 A first strategy for defending Objectless 3.2 A second strategy for defending Objectless4 Two Forms of Categorical Generalization 4.1 Generalization by duality 4.2 Generalization by categorification 4.3 The role of category theory in physics5 Conclusion. (shrink)

We prove a categoricity transfer theorem for tame abstract elementary classes. Theorem 0.1. Suppose that K is a χ-tame abstract elementary class and satisfies the amalgamation and joint embedding properties and has arbitrarily large models. Let λ ≥ Max{χ.LS(K)⁺}. If K is categorical in λ and λ⁺, then K is categorical in λ⁺⁺. Combining this theorem with some results from [37], we derive a form of Shelah's Categoricity Conjecture for tame abstract elementary classes: Corollary 0.2. Suppose K (...) is a χ-tame abstract elementary class satisfying the amalgamation and joint embedding properties. Let μ₀:= Hanf(K). If χ ≤ ‮ב‬(2μ0)+ and K is categorical in some λ⁺ > ‮ב‬(2μ0)+, then K is categorical in μ for all μ > ‮ב‬(2μ0)+. (shrink)

We follow the ideas given by Chen and Grätzer to represent Stone algebras and adapt them for the case of Stonean residuated lattices. Given a Stonean residuated lattice, we consider the triple formed by its Boolean skeleton, its algebra of dense elements and a connecting map. We define a category whose objects are these triples and suitably defined morphisms, and prove that we have a categorical equivalence between this category and that of Stonean residuated lattices. We compare our results (...) with other works and show some applications of the equivalence. (shrink)

The category \(\mathbb {DRDL}{'}\), whose objects are c-differential residuated distributive lattices satisfying the condition \(\textbf{CK}\), is the image of the category \(\mathbb {RDL}\), whose objects are residuated distributive lattices, under the categorical equivalence \(\textbf{K}\) that is constructed in Castiglioni et al. (Stud Log 90:93–124, 2008). In this paper, we introduce weak monadic residuated lattices and study some of their subvarieties. In particular, we use the functor \(\textbf{K}\) to relate the category \(\mathbb {WMRDL}\), whose objects are weak monadic residuated distributive (...) lattices, and the category \(\mathbb {WMDRDL}{'}\), whose objects are pairs formed by an object of \(\mathbb {DRDL}{'}\) and a center weak universal quantifier. (shrink)

00 In this innovative analysis, Plato's four eleatic dialogues are treated as a continuous argument. In Kenneth Dorter's view, Plato reconsiders the theory of forms propounded in his earlier dialogues and through an examination of the theory's limitations reaffirms and proves it essential. Contradicted are both those philosophers who argue that Plato espoused his theory of forms uncritically and those who argue that Plato in some sense rejected the theory and moved toward the categorical analysis developed byAristotle. Dorter's reexamination (...) of Plato's insights implies an important new direction for modern philosophical inquiry. In this innovative analysis, Plato's four eleatic dialogues are treated as a continuous argument. In Kenneth Dorter's view, Plato reconsiders the theory of forms propounded in his earlier dialogues and through an examination of the theory's limitations reaffirms and proves it essential. Contradicted are both those philosophers who argue that Plato espoused his theory of forms uncritically and those who argue that Plato in some sense rejected the theory and moved toward the categorical analysis developed byAristotle. Dorter's reexamination of Plato's insights implies an important new direction for modern philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Naturalism, as Binmore understands the term, is characterized by a scientific stance on moral behavior. Binmore claims that a naturalistic account of morality necessarily goes with the conviction “that only hypothetical imperatives make any sense”. In this paper it is argued that this claim is mistaken. First, as Hume’s theory of promising shows, naturalism in the sense of Binmore is very well compatible with acknowledging the importance of categorical imperatives in moral practice. Moreover, second, if Binmore’s own theory of (...) moral practice and its evolution is correct, then the actual moral practice does-and in fact must-incorporate norms, which have the form of a categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives are part of social reality and, therefore, any (normative) moral theory that adequately reflects moral practice must also include categorical imperatives. (shrink)

Allan Hazlett has recently developed an alternative to the most popular form of anti-realism about epistemic normativity, epistemic expressivism. He calls it “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse”. The view deserves more attention. In this paper, I give it attention in the form of an objection. Specifically, my objection turns on a distinction between inescapable and categorical norms. While I agree with Hazlett that convention-relativism is consistent with inescapable epistemic norms, I argue that it is not consistent with (...) class='Hi'>categorical epistemic norms. I then argue that Hazlett's account of a controversial upshot of convention-relativism – namely, that epistemic discourse is not “normative” – should, but does not, adequately address the question of whether epistemic norms are categorical. This leads to a more general discussion of anti-realism in epistemology. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to make sense of the Keynes–Johnson octagon of oppositions. We will discuss Keynes' logical theory, and examine how his view is reflected on this octagon. Then we will show how this structure is to be handled by means of a semantics of partition, thus computing logical relations between matching formulas with a semantic method that combines model theory and Boolean algebra.

Studies of the conceptual abilities of nonhuman primates demonstrate the substantial range of these abilities as well as their limitations. Such abilities range from categorization on the basis of shared physical attributes, associative relations and functions to abstract concepts as reflected in analogical reasoning about relations between relations. The pattern of results from these studies point to a fundamental distinction between monkeys and apes in both their implicit and explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys, but not apes, might be best regarded as (...) “paleo‐logicans” in the sense that they form common class concepts of identity on the basis of identical predicates (i.e., shared features). The discrimination of presumably more abstract relations commonly involves relatively simple procedural strategies mediated by associative processes likely shared by all mammals. There is no evidence that monkeys can perceive, let alone judge, relations‐between‐relations. This analogical conceptual capacity is found only in chimpanzees and humans. Interestingly, the “analogical ape,” like the child, can make its analogical knowledge explicit only if it is first provided with a symbol system by which propositional representations can be encoded and manipulated. (shrink)

In this article, I critically reassess Iris Marion Young's late works, which centre on the distinction between liability and social connection responsibility. I concur with Young's diagnosis that structural injustices call for a new conception of responsibility, but I reject several core assumptions that underpin her distinction between two models and argue for a different way of conceptualising responsibility to address structural injustices. I show that Young's categorical separation of guilt and responsibility is not supported by the writings of (...) Hannah Arendt, which Young draws on, and that it is also untenable on independent systematic grounds. Furthermore, I argue that several of Young's other criteria fail to clearly demarcate two distinct phenomena. I therefore propose to transcend Young's distinction between two models in favour of a related, but conceptually different distinction between two forms of responsibility: interactional and structural. Embracing this terminology facilitates the conceptualisation of the general features of responsibility that are shared by both forms, including their retrospective and prospective time-direction and their applicability to individual, joint and group agency. The distinction between interactional and structural responsibility also yields a more compelling general account of the role of background structures, and of blame within ascriptions of political responsibility. (shrink)

In proof-theoretic semantics, model-theoretic validity is replaced by proof-theoretic validity. Validity of formulae is defined inductively from a base giving the validity of atoms using inductive clauses derived from proof-theoretic rules. A key aim is to show completeness of the proof rules without any requirement for formal models. Establishing this for propositional intuitionistic logic raises some technical and conceptual issues. We relate Sandqvist’s (complete) base-extension semantics of intuitionistic propositional logic to categorical proof theory in presheaves, reconstructing categorically the soundness (...) and completeness arguments, thereby demonstrating the naturality of Sandqvist’s constructions. This naturality includes Sandqvist’s treatment of disjunction that is based on its second-order or elimination-rule presentation. These constructions embody not just validity, but certain forms of objects of justifications. This analysis is taken a step further by showing that from the perspective of validity, Sandqvist’s semantics can also be viewed as the natural disjunction in a category of sheaves. (shrink)

A commutative BCK-algebra with the relative cancellation property is a commutative BCK-algebra (X;*,0) which satisfies the condition: if a ≤ x, a ≤ y and x * a = y * a, then x = y. Such BCK-algebras form a variety, and the category of these BCK-algebras is categorically equivalent to the category of Abelian ℓ-groups whose objects are pairs (G, G 0), where G is an Abelian ℓ-group, G 0 is a subset of the positive cone generating G (...) + such that if u, v ∈ G 0, then 0 ∨ (u - v) ∈ G 0, and morphisms are ℓ-group homomorphisms h: (G, G 0) → (G′,G′0) with f(G 0) ⫅ G′0. Our methods in particular cases give known categorical equivalences of Cornish for conical BCK-algebras and of Mundici for bounded commutative BCK-algebras (= MV-algebras). (shrink)

I show that the model-theoretic meaning that can be read off the natural deduction rules for disjunction fails to have certain desirable properties. I use this result to argue against a modest form of inferentialism which uses natural deduction rules to fix model-theoretic truth-conditions for logical connectives.

Abstract:Recently, the idea that every hypothetical imperative must somehow be ‘backed up’ by a prior categorical imperative has gained a certain influence among Kant interpreters and ethicists influenced by Kant. Since instrumentalism is the position that holds that hypothetical imperatives can by themselves and without the aid of categorical imperatives explain all valid forms of practical reasoning, the influential idea amounts to a rejection of instrumentalism as internally incoherent. This paper argues against this prevailing view both as an (...) interpretation of Kant and as philosophical understanding of practical reason. In particular, it will be argued that many of the arguments that claim to show that hypothetical imperatives must be backed up by categorical imperatives mistakenly assume that the form of practical reasoning must itself occur as a premise within the reasoning. An alternative to this assumption will be offered. I will conclude that while instrumentalism may well be false, there is no reason to believe it is incoherent. (shrink)

Future Logic is an original, and wide-ranging treatise of formal logic. It deals with deduction and induction, of categorical and conditional propositions, involving the natural, temporal, extensional, and logical modalities. Traditional and Modern logic have covered in detail only formal deduction from actual categoricals, or from logical conditionals (conjunctives, hypotheticals, and disjunctives). Deduction from modal categoricals has also been considered, though very vaguely and roughly; whereas deduction from natural, temporal and extensional forms of conditioning has been all but totally (...) ignored. As for induction, apart from the elucidation of adductive processes (the scientific method), almost no formal work has been done. This is the first work ever to strictly formalize the inductive processes of generalization and particularization, through the novel methods of factorial analysis, factor selection and formula revision. This is the first work ever to develop a formal logic of the natural, temporal and extensional types of conditioning (as distinct from logical conditioning), including their production from modal categorical premises. Future Logic contains a great many other new discoveries, organized into a unified, consistent and empirical system, with precise definitions of the various categories and types of modality (including logical modality), and full awareness of the epistemological and ontological issues involved. Though strictly formal, it uses ordinary language, wherever symbols can be avoided. Among its other contributions: a full list of the valid modal syllogisms (which is more restrictive than previous lists); the main formalities of the logic of change (which introduces a dynamic instead of merely static approach to classification); the first formal definitions of the modal types of causality; a new theory of class logic, free of the Russell Paradox; as well as a critical review of modern metalogic. But it is impossible to list briefly all the innovations in logical science — and therefore, epistemology and ontology — this book presents; it has to be read for its scope to be appreciated. (shrink)

Kant taught us that there are two kinds of norms: Categorical imperatives that one ought to follow regardless of one's personal aims and circumstances, and hypothetical imperatives that direct us to employ the means towards our chosen ends. Kant's distinction separates two approaches to normative epistemology. On the one hand, we have principles of "inductive rationality", typically supported by considerations such as intuitive plausibility, conformity with exemplary practice, and internal consistency. On the other hand, we may assess rules for (...) forming belief by how well they attain the objectives that motivate inquiry; in Levi's words, "the ends of inquiry control the legitimacy of inferences" [Levi 67, p. 241]. A doctrinaire attitude would ignore one of these perspectives in favour of the other; a balanced approach is to develop both and compare [cf. Helmann 97, Sec.2]. There are three possible relationships between hypothetical and categorical imperatives for empirical inquiry. (shrink)

A new case of Shelah's eventual categoricity conjecture is established: Let be an abstract elementary class with amalgamation. Write and. Assume that is H2‐tame and has primes over sets of the form. If is categorical in some, then is categorical in all. The result had previously been established when the stronger locality assumptions of full tameness and shortness are also required. An application of the method of proof of the mentioned result is that Shelah's categoricity conjecture holds (...) in the context of homogeneous model theory (this was known, but our proof gives new cases): If D be a homogeneous diagram in a first‐order theory T and D is categorical in a, then D is categorical in all. (shrink)

This essay starts from a consideration of Deleuze's theory of time. It begins with the empty form of time. But the essay's aim is to understand Deleuze's reversal of Platonism in his 1968 Difference and Repetition. There is no question that the stakes of the reversal of Platonism are ontological. But I argue that what is really at stake is a movement of demoralisation. The essay proceeds in three steps. First, we determine what sufficient reason or grounding is, for (...) Deleuze. Sufficient reason is struck with an irreducible ambiguity. It is this ambiguity in sufficient reason that allows it to be taken advantage of, to be used by representation and good sense for a moral purpose. The second part of the essay will therefore concern ‘the moralisation of sufficient reason’. Its focus will be good sense. But then, third, we must understand Deleuze's ‘demoralisation of sufficient reason’, which necessarily passes through others. Like sufficient reason, others are ambiguous, at once lending themselves to what cancels differences, and opening the way towards difference and intensity. The third step focuses on what Deleuze calls ‘the ethics of intensive quantities’. In the Conclusion, I examine Deleuze's famous, almost cliché, definition of ethics as not being unworthy of the event and, through the empty form of time, I connect it to Kant's formalistic ethics. (shrink)

Is logical consistency required for a set of beliefs or propositions to be categorically coherent? An affirmative answer is often assumed by mainstream epistemologists, and yet it is unclear why. Cases like the lottery and the preface call into question the assumption that beliefs must be consistent in order to be epistemically rational. And thus it is natural to wonder why all inconsistent sets of propositions are incoherent. On the other hand, Easwaran and Fitelson have shown that particular kinds of (...) inconsistency entail the epistemically ‘irrationality’ of holding certain sets of beliefs. In cases of the latter kind of inconsistency, it seems more reasonable to insist that such sets of beliefs or propositions are categorically incoherent. What the precise relationship is between coherence and consistency depends on the nature of the coherence relation. We shall examine recent attempts to explicate the coherence relation in terms of probabilistic measures of confirmation or agreement to see what they can teach us about the relationship between coherence and consistency. We shall show that some probabilistic measures of coherence allow for inconsistent sets to be categorically coherent, while satisfying plausible epistemic rationality constraints. Other probabilistic measures of coherence impose very strong logical consistency requirements, and some measures are tolerant of most forms of inconsistency. As we try to understand what distinguishes coherence measures in this respect, we will also draw some important lessons about Bayesian confirmation measures and differences in the way that they treat contradictory propositions. (shrink)

In Perception: First Form of Mind, Tyler Burge develops an understanding of the most primitive type of representational mind: perception. Focusing on its form, function, and underlying capacities, as indicated in the sciences of perception, Burge provides an account of the representational content and formal representational structure of perceptual states, and develops a formal semantics for them. The account is elaborated by an explanation of how the representational form is embedded in an iconic format. These structures are (...) then situated in current theoretical accounts of the processing of perceptual representations, with an emphasis on the formation of perceptual categorizations. An exploration of the relationship between perception and other primitive capacities-conation, attention, memory, anticipation, affect, learning, and imagining-clarifies the distinction between perceiving, with its associated capacities, and thinking, with its associated capacities. Drawing on a broad range of historical and contemporary research, rather than relying on introspection or ordinary talk about perception, Perception: First Form of Mind is a scientifically rigorous and agenda-setting work in the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

I aim to show that standard theories of counterfactuals are mistaken, not in detail, but in principle, and I aim to say what form a tenable theory must take. Standard theories entail a categorical interpretation of counterfactuals, on which to state that, if it were that A, it would be that C is to state something, not relative to any supposition or hypothesis, but categorically. On the rival suppositional interpretation, to state that, if it were that A, it (...) would be that C is to state that it would be that C relative to the supposition that it were that A. The two interpretations make incompatible predictions concerning the correct evaluation of counterfactuals. I argue that the suppositional interpretation makes the correct prediction. (shrink)

This study undertakes a hermeneutical reading of some texts in which the question of the embodiment of the categorical imperative, the responsibility enjoined by the procedural form of the moral law, is introduced. It is hoped that this reading will contribute to our understanding of the body of experience, the so-called body-subject, showing the body to be not only an object-body, not only, as in the work of Foucault, a material substratum for the application of power, but also, (...) as Levinas thought, the primordial bearer of a certain rudimentary moral compass, at the very heart of which there lies, if only deeply encrypted, the categorical assignment of the moral law. (edited). (shrink)

ABSTRACT“How should a person lead her life?” The purpose of this paper is to suggest some principles (not a complete list) which will serve us ‘intellectual instruments’ for assessing forms of life. These principles are utilitarian in nature, and, as I will argue, essential to a reasonably rich account of personal well-being. The principles suggested are not instrumental, that is, they determine the worthiness of a form of life led by an agent irrespective of whether it satisfies her existing (...) desires and meet her actual preferences. Hence, I will argue that a person can be deprived, that is, categorically deprived, even when most of her desires are satisfied. In the last section of the paper I will argue for the role of education in ‘initiating’ the agent into worthy forms of life, and hence evading the charge of categorical deprivation and that of irrationality. (shrink)

A natural extension of Natural Deduction was defined by Schroder-Heister where not only formulas but also rules could be used as hypotheses and hence discharged. It was shown that this extension allows the definition of higher-level introduction and elimination schemes and that the set $\{ \vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \bot \}$ of intuitionist sentential operators forms a {\it complete} set of operators modulo the higher level introduction and elimination schemes, i.e., that any operator whose introduction and elimination rules are instances of (...) the higher-level schemes can be defined in terms of $\{ \vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \bot \}$.The aim of the present work is to extend the well-known connections between Proof Theory and Category Theory to higher-level Natural Deduction. To be precise, we will show how an adjointness between cartesian closed categories with finite coproducts can be associated, in a systematic way, with any operator $\phi$ defined by the higher-level schemes. The objects in the categories will be rules instead of formulas. (shrink)

According to the standard definition, a first-order theory is categorical if all its models are isomorphic. The idea behind this definition obviously is that of capturing semantic notions in axiomatic terms: to be categorical is to be, in this respect, successful. Thus, for example, we may want to axiomatically delimit the concept of natural number, as it is given by the pre-theoretic semantic intuitions and reconstructed by the standard model. The well-known results state that this cannot be done (...) within first-order logic, but it can be done within second-order one. Now let us consider the following question: can we axiomatically capture the semantic concept of conjunction? Such question, to be sure, does not make sense within the standard framework: we cannot construe it as asking whether we can form a first-order (or, for that matter, whatever-order) theory with an extralogical binary propositional operator so that its only model (up to isomorphism) maps the operator on the intended binary truth-function. The obvious reason is that the framework of standard logic does not allow for extralogical constants of this type. But of course there is also a deeper reason: an existence of a constant with this semantics is presupposed by the very definition of the framework1. Hence the question about the axiomatic capturability of concunction, if we can make sense of it at all, cannot be asked within the framework of standard logic, we would have to go to a more abstract level. To be able to make sense of the question we would have to think about a propositional ‘proto-language’, with uninterpreted logical constants, and to try to search out axioms which would fix the denotations of the constants as the intended truth-functions. Can we do this? It might seem that the answer to this question is yielded by the completeness theorem for the standard propositional calculus: this theorem states that the axiomatic delimitation of the calculus and the semantic delimitation converge to the same result.. (shrink)

This paper offers a sympathetically critical discussion of one of the central features of Neil MacCormick’s last book, Practical Reason in Law and Morality (2008), namely, what he called ‘the Smithian Categorical Imperative’ (SCI). The SCI is presented by MacCormick as a synthesis of the best of Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith’s contributions to moral philosophy. The paper proceeds in three parts: the first two are dedicated to articulating and evaluating MacCormick’s understanding of Kant and Smith. The focus in (...) these two parts is on the following concepts: autonomy and universality in the case of Kant, and imagination and sympathy in the case of Smith. The third part then discusses the formulation and two applications of the SCI, the first of these relates to the practice of lying and breaking promises, and the second to the conjoined twins’ case. It is argued that MacCormick’s rapprochement between Kant and Smith in the form of the SCI is a genuinely important and original contribution to moral philosophy, and has important implications for theories of legal judgement. Nevertheless, the paper also considers whether, by modifying MacCormick’s interpretation of Kant and Smith (and especially the latter), we may be able to further extend MacCormick’s characteristically generous capacity to tread a middle path between otherwise antagonistic theoretical traditions. (shrink)

“How should a person lead her life?” The purpose of this paper is to suggest some principles (not a complete list) which will serve us ‘intellectual instruments’ for assessing forms of life. These principles are utilitarian in nature, and, as I will argue, essential to a reasonably rich account of personal well-being. The principles suggested are not instrumental, that is, they determine the worthiness of a form of life led by an agent irrespective of whether it satisfies her existing (...) desires and meet her actual preferences. Hence, I will argue that a person can be deprived, that is, categorically deprived, even when most of her desires are satisfied. In the last section of the paper I will argue for the role of education in ‘initiating’ the agent into worthy forms of life, and hence evading the charge of categorical deprivation and that of irrationality. (shrink)

Seemingly, “independent genesis” refers to the independent existence and changes of each thing, but it is clear that there cannot be any truly “independent” things at all. Each thing in the world has to stay in connection or relationship with other things outside itself if it wants to represent its own “independence” and “genesis” in terms of form; and inevitably such connection or relationship itself has to be embodied in the internal nature of each thing. In the metaphysical thought (...) of Guo Xiang, the former was known as the quality of “interdependence”; and the latter the characteristics of “quality” or “quality image.” Such characteristics of “quality” or “quality image” were interdependent, which constituted the essence of each thing itself as “beingness” and “beinglessness,” and thus resulted in the independent manifestation and change of things in terms of their external forms. The grasping of essence of things as “beingness” and “beinglessness” depended upon comprehension or rational intuition, and that was the realm of “profundity” in Guo Xiang’s terms. (shrink)

Equivalent deductive systems were introduced in [4] with the goal of treating 1-deductive systems and algebraic 2-deductive systems in a uniform way. Results of [3], appropriately translated and strengthened, show that two deductive systems over the same language type are equivalent if and only if their lattices of theories are isomorphic via an isomorphism that commutes with substitutions. Deductive equivalence of π-institutions [14, 15] generalizes the notion of equivalence of deductive systems. In [15, Theorem 10.26] this criterion for the equivalence (...) of deductive systems was generalized to a criterion for the deductive equivalence of term π-institutions, forming a subclass of all π-institutions that contains those π-institutions directly corresponding to deductive systems. This criterion is generalized here to cover the case of arbitrary π-institutions. (shrink)

The ethics of Kant and the ethics of Crusius are strikingly similar. This is manifested in a whole range of principles and concepts. Crusius’ moral teaching hinges on the rigorous moral law which has to be obeyed absolutely, and which makes it different from other prescriptions that are binding only to a relative degree. This is very close to the Kantian distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Another salient feature of Crusius’ moral teaching is the stress laid on the (...) sphere of internal motives. It is the inner motive that determines the morality of an act, rather than the external form of the act. These and some other features of Crusius’ ethics suggest a possible influence of Crusius on Kant. The possibility of such influence has repeatedly come under close scrutiny. The first works devoted to this problem date to the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Pointers to the possibility of such influence are semantic and structural similarities of the two thinkers’ systems. Besides, it is an unchallengeable fact that Kant was fairly familiar with the main theses of Crusian philosophy. Some scholars proceed from the study of Kantian vocabulary. Some of the terms Kant uses, especially in his early works which later formed the basis of his ethical teaching in the critical period, can be traced to the terms of Crusian philosophy. However, an alternative view is that Kant was primarily influenced by Wolffian philosophy (mainly through Baumgarten), while the direct influence of Crusius remains unproven. I examine both points of view and propose my own solution to the problem. (shrink)

For Kant and Levinas, the categorical imperative is the only possible formula for universalization. It has a structural necessity. Its claim is ultimate, valid without exception, and therefore reason-based. What differentiates Levinas from Kant is Kant’s assumption that “pure reason, practical of itself” is “immediately lawgiving.” Levinas contradicted this form of reason legislating itself as an end in itself: according to Levinas, reason has no self-generated power. Although both agree that the achievement of an ethical insight depends on (...) “passivity,” in contrast to Kant Levinas does not consider this “passivity” to be part of a conceptual insight. Its place is outside the subject. Instead of an “archetype” that already exists in the subject, Levinas advocates the conception of a counter-image whose form is based on the face. This face is not speechless. His speech is based on a universalizable commandment, namely the commandment: You shall not kill me. In its full extent, this claim can only be understood via a body-based understanding of the categorical imperative. (shrink)

For Kant and Levinas, the categorical imperative is the only possible formula for universalization. It has a structural necessity. Its claim is ultimate, valid without exception, and therefore reason-based. What differentiates Levinas from Kant is Kant’s assumption that “pure reason, practical of itself” is “immediately lawgiving.” Levinas contradicted this form of reason legislating itself as an end in itself: according to Levinas, reason has no self-generated power. Although both agree that the achievement of an ethical insight depends on (...) “passivity,” in contrast to Kant Levinas does not consider this “passivity” to be part of a conceptual insight. Its place is outside the subject. Instead of an “archetype” that already exists in the subject, Levinas advocates the conception of a counter-image whose form is based on the face. This face is not speechless. His speech is based on a universalizable commandment, namely the commandment: You shall not kill me. In its full extent, this claim can only be understood via a body-based understanding of the categorical imperative. (shrink)

Here we suggest a formal using of N.A. Vasil’ev’s logical ideas in categorical logic: the idea of “accidental” assertion is formalized with topoi and the idea of the notion of nonclassical negation, that is not based on incompatibility, is formalized in special cases of monoidal categories. For these cases, the variant of the law of “excluded n-th” suggested by Vasil’ev instead of the tertium non datur is obtained in some special cases of these categories. The paraconsistent law suggested by (...) Vasil’ev is also demonstrated with linear and tensor logics but in a form weaker than he supposed. As we have, in fact, many truth-values in linear logic and topos logic, the admissibility of the traditional notion of inference in the categorical interpretation of linear and intuitionistic proof theory is discussed. (shrink)

Equivalent deductive systems were introduced in [4] with the goal of treating 1‐deductive systems and algebraic 2‐deductive systems in a uniform way. Results of [3], appropriately translated and strengthened, show that two deductive systems over the same language type are equivalent if and only if their lattices of theories are isomorphic via an isomorphism that commutes with substitutions. Deductive equivalence of π‐institutions [14, 15] generalizes the notion of equivalence of deductive systems. In [15, Theorem 10.26] this criterion for the equivalence (...) of deductive systems was generalized to a criterion for the deductive equivalence of term π‐institutions, forming a subclass of all π‐institutions that contains those π‐institutions directly corresponding to deductive systems. This criterion is generalized here to cover the case of arbitrary π‐institutions. (shrink)

On a standard interpretation, the aim of the formula of universal law is to provide a decision procedure for determining the deontic status of actions. By contrast, this chapter argues for the practical significance of the CI centering on Kant’s account of the dynamics of incentives. This approach avoids some widespread misconceptions about how the CI operates and false expectations about what it promises and delivers. In particular, it explains how it differs from deductive practical inferences. The CI is the (...) supreme form of morality, and yet not in the sense that particular categorical principles can be derived deductively from it, once the relevant details are supplied. The efficacy of practical reasoning primarily concerns agents, and consists in their reorientation toward the right end. Moral knowledge is knowledge about what we ought to do, but it is also a distinctive variety of self-knowledge, that is, knowledge of ourselves as rationally efficacious agents. (shrink)

The Russian intuitivist philosopher Nikolay Lossky repeatedly admitted Kant’s substantial formative influence on him as a scholar. Moreover, Lossky was a disciple of the Russian Kantian Aleksander Vvedensky, and was one of the most successful translators of the first Critique. However, his own philosophical project is rather the opposite of the critical programme. While in the framework of Lossky’s epistemology the specificities of his reading of Kant have received a fair amount of attention in Russian scholarship, in the ethical field (...) the Russian philosopher’s comments on Kant have passed largely unnoticed. My task is to reveal the link between Kant’s practical philosophy and Lossky’s ethics. A demonstration of the degree of Kant’s influence in this field will enlarge and concretise the current thinking about Lossky’s perception of Kant. We are looking at a whole range of parallels and borrowings. My comparative analysis focuses on the following aspects: 1) definition and uses of the term “categorical imperative”, 2) free will as the condition of the possibility of moral action, 3) the cause of moral evil, 4) the role of the idea of God in ethics. As a result, I reveal how Lossky used elements of Kant’s practical philosophy as conceptual, terminological and rhetorical resources in his theonomic ethics, and how the Russian philosopher interpreted them in line with his own doctrine. I argue that Lossky’s use of the Kantian moral terminology is incautious and debatable and point out several intersections of ethical argumentations in the light of its projection on radically different ontological and epistemological principles. (shrink)