This paper attempts to show that Scott Soames has not given us an example of a contingent a priori truth. (What it probably shows is how confused I am on this topic.).

This volume draws connections between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the work of Saul Kripke, especially his Naming and Necessity. Saul Kripke is regarded as one of the foremost representatives of contemporary analytic philosophy. His most important contributions include the strict distinction between metaphysical and epistemological questions, the introduction of the notions of contingent a priori truth and necessary a posteriori truth and original accounts of names, descriptions, identity, necessity and realism. The chapters in this book elucidate the relevant connections between (...) Kripke's work and Wittgenstein, specifically concerning the standard meter, contingent apriori and rule-following. The contributions shed light on how Kripke's philosophical outlook was influenced by Wittgenstein, and how mainstream analytic philosophy and Wittgensteinian philosophy can fruitfully engage with one another. Kripke and Wittgenstein will be of interest to philosophers working on Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

RESUMO Este artigo é dedicado ao argumento contra o Requisito de Existência fornecido por Takashi Yagisawa. Argumentamos que o cerne do argumento de Yagisawa – a Forte Iterabilidade – não pode ser inferido pela ideia de contingente a priori (Kripke) e é incompatível com a ideia de @-transformação (Plantinga). Assim, essas ideias, contrariamente a Yagisawa, não podem servir de base metodológica da Forte Iterabilidade. Também argumentamos que a Forte Iterabilidade é incompatível com o Princípio Constitutivo. Finalmente, mostramos que o conceito (...) de propriedades indexadas pelo mundo (o argumento de Yagisawa se fa na ideia de propriedades indexadas pelo mundo) é inconsistente e, mesmo que o defensor da Forte Iterabilidade possa resistir a esta objeção, a Forte Iterabilidade deve ser abandonada. (shrink)

Since Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, the view that there are contingent apriori truths has been surprisingly widespread. In this paper, I argue against that view. My first point is that in general, occurrences of predicates “a priori” and “contingent” are implicitly relativized to some circumstance, involving an agent, a time, a location. My second point is that apriority and necessity coineide when relativized to the same circumstance. That is to say, what is known apriori (by (...) an agent in a circumstance) cannot fail to be the case (in the same circumstance), hence it is necessary. (shrink)

The paper provides a reconstruction of the notion of material Apriori while exhibiting the anti-Kantian inspiration and factual grounding thereof. The attempt is made to show that a non-formal Apriori obtains because the sensuous has a normative character; further, that the difference between material and formal eidetic laws is rooted in the difference between sensuous contents, given in experience, and intellectual contents, originating in activities of judgement. The material Apriori is not independent of all experience, since it (...) is grounded on sensuous eidetic contents and thus depends on the latter’s givenness and characteristics. It is thanks precisely to this ,contingency‘ that it has an ontological significance. (shrink)

According to Kant our cognitive capacities result from synthetic functions _a priori, forming a complete and invariable system implemented into the human mind. From a Darwinian perspective such capacities are to be understood as genetic traits favored by selection, thus they are the variable components of contingent systems only. Kant intermingles two kinds of apriority: (1) Apriority as a result of inborn traits--judgments on this ground have only probability, not necessity; (2) Apriority as a result of the intentional construction (...) of closed systems--judgments on this ground have necessity, but they are not universal constituents of the human mind. (shrink)

A new theory of identity statements is put forward which appeals to a basic distinction between two notions of identity, i.e. strict and loose identity. The former is the traditional necessary relation of an object with the object itself, whereas the latter is a contingent relation of reduction of some (at least two) possible unactual objects to a possible actual object. By appealing to strict identity, one can maintain that some tokenings of identity sentences express a semantic content which (...) is both knowable apriori only and a necessary proposition. By appealing to loose identity instead, one can maintain that other tokenings of identity sentences express a semantic content which is both knowable a posteriori only and a contingent proposition. (shrink)

In his book Welt und Unendlichkeit, László Tengelyi has enquired into the possibility of a phenomenological metaphysics. Among the many issues addressed in his book, he thematized a real necessity of a non-apriori kind at Aristotle and Husserl, a necessity which he called „a necessity of the fact“. His research settled the basis for the present enquiry, which will examine the relationship between the absolute and the conditional necessity of a fact as well as the contingent or accidental (...) features involved therein at Aristotle and Husserl, insofar as facticity is concerned. I intend to show that although both authors share the view that worldly beings are characterized by their contingency, they differ as to their necessity: Aristotle attributes a contingent necessity to the factual being i.e. to reality, a necessity characterized by its being temporarily conditioned by actuality and which can therefore be defined as the ,conditional necessity of a fact‘. As to Husserl, transcendental phenomenology must, upon the basis of the eidetic method, determine the possibilities out of which the ego constitutes the factual world. He states the necessity of the fact as an eidetic necessity, which has to be grounded on eidetic laws. Later on, enquiries into a „metaphysics in new sense“ lead to a revision of the meaning of „fact“ and to an inversion of the order of foundation as well: the original givenness of the world, the primal I, intersubjectivity and historicity as primal and absolute facts carry the eidetic necessities. Accidental causes, on the other hand, account not only for the contingency of the real but, at Husserl, for the ego‘s ,essential openness‘ and its core of primal contingency. In this context, I shall argue that facticity paired with the accidental allows for the irruption of something new that overwhelms us – an event as Ereignis. (shrink)

We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.

We think that Kripke’s arguments that there are contingent a priori truths and that there are necessary a posteriori truths about named and essentially described entities fail. They fail for the reasons that there are ambiguities in each of the three eases. In the first ease, what is known apriori is not what is contingent. In the latter two cases, what is necessary or essential is not what is known a posteriori.

In this paper, we propose a new variable selection method for "robust" exposure variables. We define "robust" as property that the same variable can select among original data and perturbed data. There are few studies of effective for the selection method. The problem that selects exposure variables is almost the same as a problem that extracts correlation rules without robustness. [Brin 97] is suggested that correlation rules are possible to extract efficiently using chi-squared statistic of contingency table having monotone property (...) on binary data. But the chi-squared value does not have monotone property, so it's is easy to judge the method to be not independent with an increase in the dimension though the variable set is completely independent, and the method is not usable in variable selection for robust exposure variables. We assume anti-monotone property for independent variables to select robust independent variables and use the apriori algorithm for it. The apriori algorithm is one of the algorithms which find association rules from the market basket data. The algorithm use anti-monotone property on the support which is defined by association rules. But independent property does not completely have anti-monotone property on the AIC of independent probability model, but the tendency to have anti-monotone property is strong. Therefore, selected variables with anti-monotone property on the AIC have robustness. Our method judges whether a certain variable is exposure variable for the independent variable using previous comparison of the AIC. Our numerical experiments show that our method can select robust exposure variables efficiently and precisely. (shrink)

Several authors have argued that, assuming we have apriori knowledge of our own thought-contents, semantic externalism implies that we can know apriori contingent facts about the empirical world. After presenting the argument, I shall respond by resisting the premise that an externalist can know apriori: If s/he has the concept water, then water exists. In particular, Boghossian's Dry Earth example suggests that such thought-experiments do not provide such apriori knowledge. Boghossian himself rejects the Dry Earth (...) experiment, however, since it would imply that externalism is true of empty concepts as well as non-empty concepts. Yet in this paper I respond by defending empty-concept externalism, from criticisms suggested by Boghossian and Brown, and recently developed further by Besson. My contention is that an externalist can give a non-ad hoc descriptivist account of empty concepts. Accordingly, apriori self-knowledge does not enable an externalist to know contingent features of the external world. (shrink)

This essay presents a defence of the hermeneutical and existential standpoint of Being and Time against Cristina Lafont’s historicist and relativist reading. I show that there are substantive and textual difficulties with the Kantian reading of the understanding of being she endorses, which leads her to ignore the existential and hermeneutical aspects of Heidegger’s theory of meaning. The first section shows that the understanding of being is neither an unrevisable synthetic apriori nor a historically contingent conceptual scheme but (...) that it originates from care and that its articulation depends on the disclosure of a world . The second section turns to Heidegger’s theory of meaning qua worldhood. In the first place, I demonstrate that the relativity of meaning to Dasein doesn’t entail the kind of relativism Lafont ascribes to Heidegger and, in the second, how it avoids the supposed tension Lafont identifies in Being and Time between the claim that Dasein constitutes the world and the claim that it depends on a historically and linguistically constituted world. I conclude with some remarks on what is novel about Heidegger’s existential and hermeneutical outlook on meaning. (shrink)

This article examines the Kantian thesis of the a priori nature of our knowledge of space. Because it makes the representation of objects possible as external to us and all others, and consequently, as distinct and individualized, space (whatever its structure may be) claims the status as necessary condition and as apriori possibility of all knowledge. However, in the light of various physical, psychological and philosophical considerations, it seems that the particular structure allocated by Kant to space (i.e. uniqueness, (...) infinity, continuity, homogeneity, isotropy, Euclidean character and three-dimensional character) is neither necessary nor a priori but is rather contingent and dependent on experience. For this reason a pragmatist relativization of the transcendental approach appears to be necessary: the structure of space which makes knowledge possible is not apriori in an absolute sense, but rather, it is determined within the context of a certain practice, which is characterized by a certain mode of interaction with the environment and reveals particular empirical constraints to which this spatial structure must fit. (shrink)

This article examines the Kantian thesis of the a priori nature of our knowledge of space. Because it makes the representation of objects possible as external to us and all others, and consequently, as distinct and individualized, space (whatever its structure may be) claims the status as necessary condition and as apriori possibility of all knowledge. However, in the light of various physical, psychological and philosophical considerations, it seems that the particular structure allocated by Kant to space (i.e. uniqueness, (...) infinity, continuity, homogeneity, isotropy, Euclidean character and three-dimensional character) is neither necessary nor a priori but is rather contingent and dependent on experience. For this reason a pragmatist relativization of the transcendental approach appears to be necessary: the structure of space which makes knowledge possible is not apriori in an absolute sense, but rather, it is determined within the context of a certain practice, which is characterized by a certain mode of interaction with the environment and reveals particular empirical constraints to which this spatial structure must fit. (shrink)

Résumé — 1 / Par « métaphysique » j’entends, d’accord avec la tradition, la réflexion philosophique sur l’être en tant que tel, sur la totalité de ce qui est, et, par suite éventuellement, sur ce qui est au-delà de l’être – à savoir, le divin. 2 / C’est dans le domaine du rapport quotidien qui relie l’homme avec le monde qu’on trouve les manifestations les plus riches de l’être, à condition que la réflexion soit capable de les déceler. 3 / (...) L’essence de ce rapport dans son unité intégrale et originaire est ce que j’appelle présence, qui est à la fois présence du monde pour l’homme et présence de l’homme dans le monde dont il est une partie – rapport réciproque ontologique et gnoséologique. 4 / Les structures de la présence sont celles de l’espace et du temps vécus avec leurs perspectives et horizons, et centrées dans le hic et nunc du corps humain. 5 / La fonction ontologique de la mémoire consiste en une représentification du passé dont le souvenir fait directement partie du présent vécu. 6 / Parallèlement à cette antériorité temporelle, il y a une antériorité de l’apriori eidétique par rapport à l’apparaître du phénomène ; celui-ci est déterminé dans son essence par le quid qui le transcende d’une manière atemporelle . 7 / Le problème du sens de l’être se pose à partir de la finalité de l’action humaine, qui est l’élément proprement intégratif de la présence. L’aspect contingent de l’action signale une absence de signification, tandis que c’est de la part de la détermination eidétique du but de l’action que lui accroît un supplément de sens relatif et provisoire. 8 / Dans la présence même il y a toujours de l’absence. C’est là qu’est enraciné le dynamisme de la réalité relationnelle aussi bien que la transcendance de l’absolu. 9 / En suivant d’une certaine manière le principe de la théologie négative , il est – sous réserve du paradoxe – philosophiquement possible d’affirmer la transcendance absolue du divin qui est de même immanence absolue.10 / Repenser la dimension religieuse de l’existence humaine pourrait être une tâche importante pour la philosophie contemporaine.— 1 / By « metaphysics » I mean, in accordance with tradition, the philosophical thought on the being as such, on the totality of what is and eventually as well on what is beyond the being, that is the divine. 2 / We can find the richest demonstrations of the being in the daily relationship that links man to the world, providing that the mind is open to finding. 3 / The essence of this relationship in its integral and innate unity is what I call presence, which is at the same time presence of the world for man and presence of man in the world, of which he is a part – a mutually ontological and gnoseological relationship. 4 / The structures of the presence are those of the lived space and time with their viewpoints and horizons and they are centered in the hic et nunc of the human body. 5 / The ontological function of memory lays in the representation of the past, of which recollections directly belong to the lived present. 6 / In parallel with this worldly precedence there is a precedence of the eidetical apriori linked with the coming appearance of the phenomenon which is determined in its essence by the quid that transcends it timelessly . 7 / The problem of the meaning of the being is linked with the end of human action, that is the properly integrating element of the presence. The contingent aspect of action shows an absence of meaning while the eidetical determination of the aim of action gives it an increasing supplement of relative and temporary meaning. 8 / In the very presence there is always absence. It is there that the roots of the dynamism of the relational reality as well as the transcendence of the absolute can be found. 9 / Following in a certain way the principle of the negative theology , it is philosophically possible – subject to paradox – to assert the absolute transcendence of the divine which is at the same time absolute immanence.10 / A rethinking of the religious dimension of human life could be an important task assigned to contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

My double aim in this paper is to argue for the claims that, when they are formed in certain ways, some judgements expressed by “I am here now” are both (a) apriori (although not solely in virtue of their meaning), and (b) necessary (albeit trivially so). I will submit that such judgements are “analytic” in the same sense that some judgements are “immune to error through misidentification” when this notion is understood in a relativistic way: in both cases, no (...) component of the content determines the referents upon which the truth of the corresponding judgement depends. I will attempt to show that, beyond conventionally-analytic sentences which are supposed to be (known apriori to be) true just in virtue of (knowledge of their) meaning, there are also contextuallyanalytic judgements that are (known apriori to be) true in virtue of (apriori knowledge of the) reflexive relation between the context of the judgement and the circumstance of evaluation which it targets. (shrink)

For over half a century I have been interested in the role of intuitive spatial reasoning in mathematics. My Oxford DPhil Thesis (1962) was an attempt to defend Kant's philosophy of mathematics, especially his claim that mathematical proofs extend our knowledge (so the knowledge is "synthetic", not "analytic") and that the discoveries are not empirical, or contingent, but are in an important sense "a priori" (which does not imply "innate") and also necessarily true. -/- I had made my views (...) clear in courses on philosophy of science and mathematics when teaching at Sussex University (from 1964) which was why one of our former students, Mary Pardoe (then Mary Ensor) who had become a mathematics teacher informed me, while visiting the university, that she had found a new diagrammatic proof of the triangle sum theorem. I reported her proof in some papers and presentations on methods of representation and reasoning, e.g. here, but neither she nor I has encountered anyone else who knew about the proof. (shrink)

This study explored the global cyberspace security issues, with the purpose of breaking the stereotype of people’s cognition of cyberspace problems, which reflects the relationship between interdependence and association. Based on the Apriori algorithm in association rules, a total of 181 strong rules were mined from 40 target websites and 56,096 web pages were associated with global cyberspace security. Moreover, this study analyzed support, confidence, promotion, leverage, and reliability to achieve comprehensive coverage of data. A total of 15,661 sites (...) mentioned cyberspace security-related words from the total sample of 22,493 professional websites, accounting for 69.6%, while only 735 sites mentioned cyberspace security-related words from the total sample of 33,603 non-professional sites, accounting for 2%. Due to restrictions of language, the number of samples of target professional websites and non-target websites is limited. Meanwhile, the number of selections of strong rules is not satisfactory. Nowadays, the cores of global cyberspace security issues include internet sovereignty, cyberspace security, cyber attack, cyber crime, data leakage, and data protection. (shrink)

Mohanty, J.N. Understanding Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.--Fink, E. The problem of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Operative concepts in Husserl's phenomenology.--Funke, G. A transcendental-phenomenological investigation concerning universal idealism, intentional analysis, and the genesis of habitus: archē, phansis, hexis, logos.--Pentzopoulou-Valalas, T. Reflections on the foundation of the relation between the a priori and the eidos in the phenomenology of Husserl.--Landgrebe, L. Regions of being and regional ontologies in Husserl's phenomenology. The problem posed by the transcendental science of the a priori of the (...) life world.--Wahl, J. Notes on the first part of Experience and judgment by Husserl.--Landgrebe, L. A letter from Ludwig Landgrebe to Jean Wahl.-- Wahl, J. A note on some empiricist aspects of the thought of Husserl.--Toulemont, R. The specific character of the social according to Husserl. (shrink)

There is a familiar debate between Russell and Strawson concerning bivalence and ‘the present King of France’. According to the Strawsonian view, ‘The present King of France is bald’ is neither true nor false, whereas, on the Russellian view, that proposition is simply false. In this paper, I develop what I take to be a crucial connection between this debate and a different domain where bivalence has been at stake: future contingents. On the familiar ‘Aristotelian’ view, future contingent propositions (...) are neither true nor false. However, I argue that, just as there is a Russellian alternative to the Strawsonian view concerning ‘the present King of France’, according to which the relevant class of propositions all turn out false, so there is a Russellian alternative to the Aristotelian view, according to which future contingents all turn out false, not neither true nor false. The result: contrary to millennia of philosophical tradition, we can be open futurists without denying bivalence. (shrink)

In this 1989 book Rorty argues that thinkers such as Nietzsche, Freud, and Wittgenstein have enabled societies to see themselves as historical contingencies, rather than as expressions of underlying, ahistorical human nature or as realizations of suprahistorical goals. This ironic perspective on the human condition is valuable on a private level, although it cannot advance the social or political goals of liberalism. In fact Rorty believes that it is literature not philosophy that can do this, by promoting a genuine sense (...) of human solidarity. A truly liberal culture, acutely aware of its own historical contingency, would fuse the private, individual freedom of the ironic, philosophical perspective with the public project of human solidarity as it is engendered through the insights and sensibilities of great writers. The book has a characteristically wide range of reference from philosophy through social theory to literary criticism. It confirms Rorty's status as a uniquely subtle theorist, whose writing will prove absorbing to academic and nonacademic readers alike. (shrink)

Identities formed with proper names may be contingent. this claim is made first through an example. the paper then develops a theory of the semantics of concrete things, with contingent identity as a consequence. this general theory lets concrete things be made up canonically from fundamental physical entities. it includes theories of proper names, variables, cross-world identity with respect to a sortal, and modal and dispositional properties. the theory, it is argued, is coherent and superior to its rivals, (...) in that it stems naturally from a systematic picture of the physical world. (shrink)

According to the scientific ideal of modernity, the propositions of science are considered fundamentally fallible. On the other hand, science strives for objective knowledge. Kant saw in the apriori the precondition for objective knowledge. But with the new conception of science the apriori (if it is not to be only logic) has become problematic. With it, however, the objectivity of scientific knowledge is at stake. As long as one grants objectivity to scientific knowledge, the question of the (...) class='Hi'>apriori remains topical. On the one hand, this volume wants to trace the historical roots as well as the different interpretations of the apriori, and on the other hand, it wants to ask for approaches for a contemporary reinterpretation of this basic concept. (shrink)

At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being (...) true that, looking backwards, it was the case that there would be a sea battle? This tension forms, in large part, what might be called the problem of future contingents. A dominant trend in temporal logic and semantic theorizing about future contingents seeks to validate both intuitions. Theorists in this tradition--including some interpretations of Aristotle, but paradigmatically, Thomason (1970), as well as more recent developments in Belnap, et. al (2001) and MacFarlane (2003, 2014)--have argued that the apparent tension between the intuitions is in fact merely apparent. In short, such theorists seek to maintain both of the following two theses: (i) the open future: Future contingents are not true, and (ii) retro-closure: From the fact that something is true, it follows that it was the case that it would be true. It is well-known that reflection on the problem of future contingents has in many ways been inspired by importantly parallel issues regarding divine foreknowledge and indeterminism. In this paper, we take up this perspective, and ask what accepting both the open future and retro-closure predicts about omniscience. When we theorize about a perfect knower, we are theorizing about what an ideal agent ought to believe. Our contention is that there isn’t an acceptable view of ideally rational belief given the assumptions of the open future and retro-closure, and thus this casts doubt on the conjunction of those assumptions. (shrink)

Contingent transcranialists claim that the physical mechanisms of mind are not exclusively intracranial and that genuine cognitive systems can extend into cognizers' physical and socio-cultural environments. They further claim that extended cognitive systems must include the deep functional integration of external environmental resources with internal neural resources. They have found it difficult, however, to explicate the precise nature of such deep functional integration and provide compelling examples of it. Contingent intracranialists deny that extracranial resources can be components of (...) genuine extended cognitive systems. They claim that transcranialists fallaciously conflate coupling with constitution and construe cognition as extending always from brains into world rather than world into brains. By using insights from recent research in developmental psychology and by explicating the nature of one form that deep functional integration can take, I argue that (i) transcranialists do not fallaciously conflate coupling wth constitution, and (ii) human emotional ontogenesis is a world-to-brain transcranial achievement. Jennifer Greenwood is a PhD Candidate in Philosophy at the School of History, Philosophy, Religion, and Classics, University of Queensland. (shrink)

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (‘PSR’), every fact has an explanation for why it obtains. If the PSR is true, there must be a sufficient reason for why God chose to create our world. But a sufficient reason for God’s choice plausibly necessitates that choice. It thus seems that God could not have done otherwise, and that our world exists necessarily. We therefore appear forced to pick between the PSR, and the contingency of creation and divine choice. I (...) show that a third option remains open, and thus that it is possible to preserve the contingency of creation and divine choice even while endorsing the PSR. My solution depends on the coherence of a restricted modal realism. On this modal realism, there is more than one possible morally optimal created world, and for each such world there is an existing possibility in which God creates that world. (shrink)

In his 1920 monograph Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori the young Reichenbach distinguished between two meanings of the a priori: ‚apodictically valid, true for all time‘ and ‚constituting the concept of object‘. At the end of the 1990s Michael Friedman drew again the attention of philosophers of science to this forgotten distinction. In the spirit of Reichenbach’s early Kantianism Friedman attempted to construct a relativized or temporally variable a priori, which is nevertheless constitutive of the object of knowledge. Friedman rejects (...) an alternative historicized version of the a priori elaborated by the Marburg school and in particular by Cassirer. According to Friedman, Cassirer defended a regulative, but absolute version of the a priori, the existence of a yet-to-be-found set of final principles that are conditions of all scientific experience. This paper suggests that using the constitutive/regulative distinction as a basis for comparison is misleading. In order to understand the Marburg school’s conception of the a priori one should get back to Hermann Cohen’s interpretation of Kant and in particular to his own distinction between two meanings of the a priori. A more suitable comparison is that between Cohen’s opposition metaphysical-vs.-transcendental a priori and Reichenbach’s distinction apodictic-vs.-constitutive a priori. If the comparison is conducted along these lines—as already suggested in the mid-1920 s by the Dutch neo-Kantian Alfred C. Elsbach—it turns out that Cohen and the Marburg school and not Reichenbach provided a good example of a relativized a priori. (shrink)