A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought Chad Hansen, 1992 New York; Oxford University Press xvi + 448 pp., hb $65.00.

This essay examines the ways that the terms "self and "no-self can illuminate the views of classical Chinese thinkers, particularly Confucians such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, and the Daoist thinker Zhuangzi. In particular, the use of the term "no-self" to describe Zhuangzi's position is defended. The concepts of self and no-self are analyzed in relation to other terms within the thinkers' "concept clusters" - specifically temporality, nature, and social roles - and suggestions are given for constructing typologies that sort (...) out the range of meanings of self and no-self based on the characteristics of the relations among terms within the concept clus- ters. The essay focuses on the way that the Confucians and Zhuangzi use concepts of self and no-self, respectively, as soteriological strategies that aim at making connections with larger systems or wholes, and it concludes that different connections are emphasized by the Confucians and Zhuangzi precisely because the various connections are made possible and sustained by different conceptions of self, temporality, nature, and social roles. (shrink)

This is a full length review in which I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of Jane Geaney's On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought. Geaney's strengths lie in her refusal to import Western epistemological presuppositions into depictions of Early Chinese philosophy, her meticulous canvassing of key Warring States texts, and her insightful reconstruction of Early Chinese epistemology as based on perception rather than abstract concepts. Her weaknesses are the limited range of her representative texts and her occasional (...) overgeneralizations. In the first half of the review, I summarize Geaney's solid conclusions: knowledge in Warring States texts was stated in terms of, and even constituted by, seeing and hearing (as opposed to the primacy of sight in the West); seeing and hearing were referred to in paired tropes; the epistemology of seeing and hearing generally involved moral evaluation; and the heartmind had a triple role in this process as verifier, as ruler, and as a sense in its own right. In the second half of the review, I demonstrate the limitations of Geaney's methodology, using her example of the relationship of qi and wind. (shrink)

In a 1967 article, A. C. Graham made the claim that 情 qing should never be translated as "emotions" in rendering early Chinese texts into English. Over time, sophisticated translators and interpreters have taken this advice to heart, and qing has come to be interpreted as "the facts" or "what is genuine in one." In these English terms all sense of interrelationality is gone, leaving us with a wooden, objective stasis. But we also know, again partly through the work of (...) Graham, that interrelationality was of fundamental importance in the early Chinese cosmology and that qing, by later carrying the meaning of "emotions," expressed that interrelationality. I take as my project in this article the recovery of an emotional adumbration in the qing of early Chinese texts, notably the Mencius, from which Graham begins his discussion. With an eye to explicating qing in the Mencius, and with a sensitivity to an implied notion of interrelationality in early texts, I survey early literature from the Shu Jing to late commentaries on the Yi Jing. I find that usages of qing and contexts in which qing is used inevitably illuminate it as key term in the evocation of interrelationality, shading it with emotional overtones. Emotions, of course, are inherently interrelational, and even more so in a Chinese world in which the internal and the external are in constant communication by way of a cosmic interchange of arousal and response among all things. That qing, as a term which later comes to explicitly mean "emotions," should have a centuries old convention of emotional connotation prior to its explicit definition should come as no surprise. The corroboration of this supposition entails a complex investigation and analysis, however, and it is a preliminary step in this investigation and analysis that I undertake here. (shrink)

Abstract This is a new attempt at an analysis of classical Chinese (Confucian) ethics which is still inappropriately explained by Western philosophy as a traditional normative ethical system. Special conditions of ancient Chinese anthropogeny and social and economic development gave rise in this cultural region to an original theory of being, which in modern terminology can be referred to as an ontological model of a fundamental Yin?Yang dialectic of a bipolar and non?homogeneous synergy of being. This theory of being became (...) a cornerstone for the whole complex of ancient Chinese philosophy, socio?anthropology and ethics. Its most leading representatives?several ancient Taoist philosophers as well as the whole ancient Confucian ethical philosophy?proposed an original approach to issues which could be, for the modem world of philosophical research, a very suggestive source of inspiration. (shrink)

Zhong 中 (variously translated as “middle,” “center,” “centrality,” “the mean,” and “equilibrium”) is an important notion in early Chinese thought. This essay offers a brief survey of the possible connotations of zhong found in the Baoxun 保訓 (Instructions for Preservation) text of the Tsinghua University’s Collection of bamboo manuscripts of the Warring States period (475-221 BCE). By making a preliminary textual analysis and philosophical interpretation of the concept of zhong in relation to ideal rulership as presented in this newly discovered (...) ancient text it is hoped that it will shed some light on the continuing debate on the notion of zhong in early Chinese thought. (shrink)

The debate over whether human nature is good or bad and how this is related to self-cultivation was central in the minds of traditional Chinese thinkers. This essay analyzes the interrelationship between the key concepts of xing 性 (human nature), qing 情 (human emotions/feelings), and xin 心 (heart-mind) in the Guodian text of the Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 (Nature Derives from Mandate) discovered in 1993 in Hubei province. The intellectual engagements evident in this Guodian text emerge as more syncretic (...) and dynamic than those that can be found in the discourse of any single tradition, such as Gaozi, Mencius, or Xunzi. Its thesis on human nature and moral cultivation reveals the existence of a possibly more diverse intellectual discourse from which the different foci of philosophical debate represented by later thinkers developed. (shrink)

The notions of Di (Emperor), Shangdi (God in heaven), and Tian (Heaven) were endowed with a variety of meanings and were used to refer to different objects of worship in ancient Chinese religion. In different eras, Di referred to the earthly emperor as well as to the heavenly emperor; Tian referred to the physical sky as well as to a supreme personal god in different contexts. Hegel oversimplified these three notions when he characterized ancient Chinese religion as a kind of (...) natural religion. This article aims to clarify Hegel’s misunderstanding of ancient Chinese religion by clarifying the meanings and references of these three notions as they appeared in the Yin-Shang and the Zhou Dynasties. (shrink)

The epistemic stances of both Whitehead and the Book of Changes are founded on the assumption that process is reality; there are important resonances with respect to perception, meaning and significance. Such a process-oriented approach is productive for developing non-representational and non-dualistic theories in the fields of epistemology, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. An exploration of these resonances will further provide an appropriate foundation for dialogue between the philosophy of the Book of Changes and that of contemporary Euro-American (...) philosophy. The important differences between the Book of Changes and Whiteheadian philosophy will also become apparent. (shrink)

I discuss several areas of classical Chinese philosophy such as Confucianism, Daoism, Yijing philosophy, and the Mingjia, in terms of their global relevance for humankind today. I contend that despite the critique of 4 May 1919 and Great Cultural Revolution of 1965–1976, these philosophical schools have remained latent in the consciousness of the Chinese people. I argue that classical Chinese philosophy is very relevant for the present worldwide rebirth (renaissance) of human civilization. It is, in fact, crucial to the development (...) of a “global” humanistic philosophy needed for the survival of the human species, the resolution of cultural crises, the improvement of the quality of life, and the axiological enrichment of community living. (shrink)

This volume, an assemblage of essays previously published in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy, conveniently and strategically brings together some of the trenchant interpretations and analyses of the salient, structural aspects of the philosophy of the Yijing. They reveal how the ancient Classic offers a graphically vivid and conceptually dynamic dramaturgy of the ways in which the natural world works in conjunction with the human one. Its cosmological architectonics and philosophical worldview continue to have enormous purchase on our current imagination, (...) even though readerly imperatives and responses have rendered this classic into a text of multiple significances, catering to pluralistic readerships and clienteles. Nonetheless, the essays in this volume lay bare some of the original authorly visions and insights of the Yijing, clearly showing that their apparent truthfulness to our cosmic and human conditions inspire philosophical and even theological questions. The Yijing's authorial designs of the eight trigrams and hexagrams, which encapsulate the primordial state of homo-cosmic phenomena and situations, together with the yin-yang forces and the dao, are taken for granted as integers in a grand universal equation, factored out to represent a ceaselessly changing cosmos in which heaven, earth and humanity commingle, such that the whole and unity can be found in the individual and the opposite, and vice versa. (shrink)

T he nine papers of this Supplement on these significant issues and important ideas are closely accentuated and critically discussed by well-established specialists, philosophers and historians, from various relevant disciplines of study.

This article examines the origins of and philosophical justifications for Aristotelian friendship (philia) and early Confucian filial piety (xiao). What underlying assumptions about bonds between friends and family members do the philosophies share or uniquely possess? Is the Aristotelian emphasis on relationships between equals incompatible with the Confucian regard for filiality? As I argue, the Aristotelian and early Confucian accounts, while different in focus, share many of the same tensions in the attempt to balance hierarchical and familial associations with those (...) between friends who are on the same footing. (shrink)

Introduction: Chinese philosophy and the translation of disciplines -- The faces of masters literature until the Eastern Han -- Scenes of instruction and master bodies in the Analects -- From scenes of instruction to scenes of construction: Mozi -- Interiority, human nature, and exegesis in Mencius -- Authorship, human nature, and persuasion in Xunzi -- The race for precedence: polemics and the vacuum of traditions in Laozi -- Zhuangzi and the art of negation -- The self-regulating state, paranoia, and rhetoric (...) in Han Feizi -- Epilogue: a future for masters literature and Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

This essay applies John Searle’s account of weakness of will to explore the classical Chinese problem of weak-willed action. Searle’s discussion focuses on the shortcomings of the Western classical model of rationality in explaining weakness of will, so he naturally says little about the practical ethical problem of overcoming weak-willed action, the focus of the relevant Chinese texts. Yet his theory of action, specifically his notion of the Background, suggests a compelling approach to the practical issue, one that converges with (...) a plausible account of the classical Chinese conception of agency. On this approach, the practical problem is due to weaknesses of the self in carrying out intentions. The key to overcoming the problem lies not in restructuring the agent’s affective states, as suggested by prominent interpreters of Chinese thought such as David Nivison, but in strengthening the agent’s Background capacities, much as we do when mastering new skills. (shrink)

John Searle’s “thesis of the Background” is an attempt to articulate the role of nonintentional capacities—know-how, skills, and abilities—in constituting intentional phenomena. This essay applies Searle’s notion of the Background to shed light on the Daoist notion of wú-wéi—“non-action” or non-intentional action—and to help clarify the sort of activity that might originally have inspired the wú-wéi ideal. I draw on Searle’s work and the original Chinese sources to develop a defensible conception of a wú-wéi-like state that may play an intrinsically (...) and instrumentally valuable role in the exercise of agency. At the same time, however, I argue that Searle’s view that “Intentionality rises to the level of the Background abilities” convincingly explains why the conception of wú-wéi presented in ancient texts is untenable. Wú-wéi-like states can generally occur only as components of an intentional flow of activity, and thus they are not fundamentally nonintentional. (shrink)

In this lecture, I present a sketch of how action and agency are conceived of in pre-Qín 先秦, or classical, Chinese thought, along the way drawing some contrasts with familiar Western conceptions of action. I will also comment briefly on how the ideas I present might affect our interpretation of early Chinese texts and how they might help us to relate early Chinese thought to contemporary action theory and ethics.

Drawing primarily on the Mòzǐ and Xúnzǐ, the article proposes an account of how knowledge and error are understood in classical Chinese epistemology and applies it to explain the absence of a skeptical argument from illusion in early Chinese thought. Arguments from illusion are associated with a representational conception of mind and knowledge, which allows the possibility of a comprehensive or persistent gap between appearance and reality. By contrast, early Chinese thinkers understand mind and knowledge primarily in terms of competence (...) or ability, not representation. Cognitive error amounts to a form of incompetence. Error is not explained as a failure to accurately represent the mind-independent reality due to misleading or illusory appearances. Instead, it can be explained metaphorically by appeal to part-whole relations: cognitive error typically occurs when agents incompetently respond to only part of their situation, rather than the whole. (shrink)

v. 1. Chapters I, 1-XI, 34, and XX, 64-XXI, 65-66 --.

The representatives of modern Neo-Confucianism all greatly value Yi Zhuan and regard it as one of their spiritual resources, and give their own creative interpretations and transformations. Xiong Shili’s ontological-cosmological theory takes “qian yuan” as its center; Ma Yifu has a theory of ontology-cultivation centered on “nature-principle”; Fang Dongmei has a metaphysics of production and reproduction; Mou Zongsan takes the view of “completely knowing the fathomless and understanding transformation” (...) as a moral metaphysics; and in Tang Junyi there is a theory of the harmony of doctrines on Heaven and man in which “the knowledge of divine understanding” is its key concept. They employ modern philosophical concepts and thinking to illustrate the cosmology, ontology, theory of life, theory of human nature, theory of spiritual worlds, axiology and their connections in Zhou Yi. They affirm that the characteristics of Chinese philosophy that are different from Western philosophy consist in a naturalist view of vital life, a harmonious view of totality, an axiological view that values exist in natural universe and the world of fact, the pursuit of Good and Beauty, and intuitive experience of inner world. (shrink)

In 300 BCE, the tutor of the heir-apparent to the Chu throne was laid to rest in a tomb at Jingmen, Hubei province in central China. A corpus of bamboo-strip texts that recorded the philosophical teachings of an era was buried with him. The tomb was sealed, and China quickly became the theater of the Qin conquest, an event that proved to be one of the most significant in ancient history. For over two millennia, the texts were forgotten. But in (...) October 1993, they were unearthed. The discovery of the Guodian texts, together with other recently discovered Warring States manuscripts, has revolutionized the study of early Chinese intellectual history. Kenneth Holloway argues that the Guodian corpus puts forth a political philosophy based on the harmonious interconnection of individuals engaged in moral self-cultivation. This unique worldview, says Holloway, cannot meaningfully be categorized as "Confucian" or "Daoist," because it shares important concepts and vocabulary with a number of different textual traditions that have anachronistically been characterized as competing or incompatible "schools" of thought. He finds that within the Guodian corpus familiar philosophical concepts and texts are applied in distinctive ways, presenting a worldview that is quite different from the received textual traditions. In the corpus, the most important function of government is to assist in the harmonization of state and family relations. It sees the relationship between these two entities - the family and the collection of families that ultimately constitute the state - as being inherently conflicting social groupings. The texts posit an interesting solution: State and family disharmony can be overcome by developing a hybrid government that employs both meritocratic and aristocratic methods. Without knowledge of the emphasis on hybridization found in the Guodian texts, however, scholars were unable to understand the interrelationships between these two methods of government. This new understanding illuminates central issues of government, religion, and philosophy in early China that were overlooked in received texts. As part of the contribution to our understanding of this particular body of texts, Holloway proposes a methodology for assessing a corpus of texts without relying on assumptions and definitions that derive from two thousand years of scholarship. The Guodian corpus, and Holloway's analysis of it, are now absolutely indispensable to any student or scholar of ancient Chinese intellectual history. (shrink)

This article offers a study of the early formation and development of the ideal of harmony in ancient Chinese philosophy and ancient Greek philosophy. It shows that, unlike the Pythagorean notion of harmony, which is primarily based on a linear progressive model with a pre-set order, the ancient Chinese concept of harmony is best understood as a comprehensive process of harmonization. It encompasses spatial as well as temporal dimensions, metaphysical as well as moral and aesthetical dimensions. It is a fundamentally (...) open notion in the sense that it does not aim to conform to any pre-set order. This broader, richer, and more liberal understanding of harmony has had a profound influence on Chinese culture as whole in its long history. (shrink)

The idea of “just war” is not alien to Chinese thought. The term “yi zhan” (usually translated as “just war” or “righteous war” in English) is used in Mencius, was renewed by Mao Zedong, and is still being used in China today (zhengyi zhanzheng). The best place to start exploring this Chinese idea is in the enormous Art of War corpus in premodern China, of which the Seven Military Classics is the best representative. This set of treatises served as the (...) military bible in imperial China from 1078 CE. Ideas analogous to ius ad bellum and ius in bello can be found in these texts. These norms are present in these military texts, elaborated in subsequent commentaries, understood as a matter of fact in Chinese political history, and recently and briefly acknowledged by a few Chinese military scholars in the mainland and in Taiwan. This Chinese just war ethics has its distinctiveness vis-à-vis James Turner Johnson's articulation of the Western classic view. It differs from Johnson's claims that military lethal violence is intrinsically morally neutral and that last resort is not a primary consideration in deciding for war. Contemporary Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) military publications show that the PLA understands the general idea of just war, but they acknowledge only the ad bellum part, not the in bello components. (shrink)