Search results for 'Extended mind' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
See also:
  1. John Sutton (2010). Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press 189--225.
    On the extended mind hypothesis (EM), many of our cognitive states and processes are hybrids, unevenly distributed across biological and nonbiological realms. In certain circumstances, things - artifacts, media, or technologies - can have a cognitive life, with histories often as idiosyncratic as those of the embodied brains with which they couple. The realm of the mental can spread across the physical, social, and cultural environments as well as bodies and brains. My independent aims in this chapter are: (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  2. Evan Thompson & Mog Stapleton (2009). Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories. Topoi 28 (1):23-30.
    This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  3.  28
    Kourken Michaelian (2012). Is External Memory Memory? Biological Memory and Extended Mind. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1154-1165.
    Clark and Chalmers claim that an external resource satisfying the following criteria counts as a memory: the agent has constant access to the resource; the information in the resource is directly available; retrieved information is automatically endorsed; information is stored as a consequence of past endorsement. Research on forgetting and metamemory shows that most of these criteria are not satisfied by biological memory, so they are inadequate. More psychologically realistic criteria generate a similar classification of standard putative external memories, but (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  4.  22
    Georg Theiner (2011). Res Cogitans Extensa: A Philosophical Defense of the Extended Mind Thesis. Peter Lang.
    For Descartes, minds were essentially non-extended things. Contemporary cognitive science prides itself on having exorcised the Cartesian ghost from the biological machine. However, it remains committed to the Cartesian vision of the mental as something purely inner. Against the idea that the mind resides solely in the brain, advocates of the situated and embodied nature of cognition have long stressed the importance of dynamic brain-body-environment couplings, the opportunistic exploitation of bodily morphology, the strategic performance of epistemically potent actions, (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  5. Giovanna Colombetti & Tom Roberts (2015). Extending the Extended Mind: The Case for Extended Affectivity. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1243-1263.
    The thesis of the extended mind (ExM) holds that the material underpinnings of an individual’s mental states and processes need not be restricted to those contained within biological boundaries: when conditions are right, material artefacts can be incorporated by the thinking subject in such a way as to become a component of her extended mind. Up to this point, the focus of this approach has been on phenomena of a distinctively cognitive nature, such as states of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Mark Rowlands (2009). Enactivism and the Extended Mind. Topoi 28 (1):53-62.
    According to the view that has become known as the extended mind , some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed (partly) of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. Enactivist models understand mental processes as (partly) constituted by sensorimotor knowledge and by the organism’s ability to act, in appropriate ways, on environmental structures. Given the obvious similarities between the two views, it is both tempting (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  7.  35
    Paul R. Smart (2012). The Web-Extended Mind. Metaphilosophy 43 (4):446-463.
    This article explores the notion of the Web-extended mind, which is the idea that the technological and informational elements of the Web can sometimes serve as part of the mechanistic substrate that realizes human mental states and processes. It is argued that while current forms of the Web may not be particularly suited to the realization of Web-extended minds, new forms of user interaction technology as well as new approaches to information representation do provide promising new opportunities (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8. Katalin Farkas (2012). Two Versions of the Extended Mind Thesis. Philosophia 40 (3):435-447.
    According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions—including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers—fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. John Sutton (2006). Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind and the Civilizing Process. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Ashgate 189--225.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  10. Gary Bartlett (2008). Whither Internalism? How Internalists Should Respond to the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.
    A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  11. Alexander Auf der Straße (2012). Simply Extended Mind. Philosophia 40 (3):449-458.
    For more than one decade, Andy Clark has defended the now-famous extended mind thesis, the idea that cognitive processes leak into the world. In this paper I analyse Clark’s theoretical justification for the thesis: explanatory simplicity. I argue that his way of justifying the thesis leads into contradiction, either at the level of propositional attitude ascriptions or at the theoretical level. I evaluate three possible strategies of dealing with this issue, concluding that they are all likely to fail (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  17
    Daniel Pearlberg & Timothy Schroeder (forthcoming). Reasons, Causes, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Erkenntnis:1-17.
    In this paper we develop a novel argument against the extended mind hypothesis. Our argument constitutes an advance in the debate, insofar as we employ only premises that are acceptable to a coarse-grained functionalist, and we do not rely on functional disanalogies between putative examples of extended minds and ordinary human beings that are just a matter of fine detail or degree. Thus, we beg no questions against proponents of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather, our (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  95
    Richard Menary (2010). The Extended Mind and Cognitive Integration. In The Extended Mind. MIT Press
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Victor Loughlin (2013). Sketch This: Extended Mind and Consciousness Extension. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):41-50.
    This paper will defend the claim that, under certain circumstances, the material vehicles responsible for an agent’s conscious experience can be partly constituted by processes outside the agent’s body. In other words, the consciousness of the agent can extend. This claim will be supported by the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) example of the artist and their sketchpad (Clark 2001, 2003). It will be argued that if this example is one of EMT, then this example also supports an argument (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2011). The Extended Mind: Born to Be Wild? A Lesson From Action-Understanding. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):377-397.
    The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  63
    Tom Buller (2013). Neurotechnology, Invasiveness and the Extended Mind. Neuroethics 6 (3):593-605.
    According to a standard view, the physical boundary of the person—the skin-and-skull boundary—matters morally because this boundary delineates between where the person begins and the world ends. On the basis of this view we make a distinction between invasive interventions that penetrate this boundary and non-invasive interventions that do not. The development of neuroprosthetics, however, raises questions about the significance of this boundary and the relationship between person and body. In particular it has been argued by appeal to the (...) Mind thesis that mind and person can extend beyond the body, and hence the skin-and-skull boundary is of questionable significance. In this paper I argue that the Extended Mind thesis is consistent with the ethical relevance of the skin-and-skull barrier. Although it can be argued that cognitive processes and aspect of mind can extend beyond the skin-and-skull boundary as EM claims, it does not follow that the person is also extended beyond this boundary. The moral sense of person is closely related to the notion of person as a subject of experiences and this, in turn, is related to the sensory and somatosensory aspects of the body. The development of neuroprosthetics provides us with reason to see that persons can be variously embodied, but this is consistent with the functional and ethical significance of the skin-and-skull boundary. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  33
    Ciano Aydin (2015). The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the ‘Inside–Outside’ Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):73-94.
    This paper explains why Clark’s Extended Mind thesis is not capable of sufficiently grasping how and in what sense external objects and technical artifacts can become part of our human cognition. According to the author, this is because a pivotal distinction between inside and outside is preserved in the Extended Mind theorist’s account of the relation between the human organism and the world of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to have overcome. Inspired (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  33
    Georg Theiner (2013). Onwards and Upwards with the Extended Mind: From Individual to Collective Epistemic Action. In Linnda Caporael, James Griesemer & William Wimsatt (eds.), Developing Scaffolds. MIT Press 191-208.
    In recent years, philosophical developments of the notion of distributed and/or scaffolded cognition have given rise to the “extended mind” thesis. Against the popular belief that the mind resides solely in the brain, advocates of the extended mind thesis defend the claim that a significant portion of human cognition literally extends beyond the brain into the body and a heterogeneous array of physical props, tools, and cultural techniques that are reliably present in the environment in (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  8
    Georg Theiner (2013). Writing in Mind. Introduction to the Special Issue on “Language, Literacy, and Media Theory: Exploring the Cultural History of the Extended Mind”. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 4 (2):15-29.
    Proponents of the “literacy” thesis share with proponents of the “extended mind” thesis the viewpoint that communication systems such as language or writing have cognitive implications that go beyond their purely social and communicative purposes. Conceiving of media as extensions of the mind thus has the potential to bring together and cross-fertilize research programs that are currently placed in distant corners of the study of mind, language, and society. In this issue, we bring together authors with (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Joerg Fingerhut (2014). Extended Imagery, Extended Access, Or Something Else? Pictures and the Extended Mind Hypothesis. In Marienberg & Trabant (eds.), Bildakt at the Warburg Institute. De Gruyter
    This paper introduces pictures more generally into the discussion of cognition and mind. I will argue that pictures play a decisive role in shaping our mental lives because they have changed (and constantly keep changing) the ways we access the world. Focusing on pictures will therefore also shed new light on various claims within the field of embodied cognition. In the first half of this paper I address the question of whether, and in what possible ways, pictures might be (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Riccardo Fusaroli, Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Kristian Tylén (2013). The Dialogically Extended Mind: Language as Skilful Intersubjective Engagement. Cognitive Systems Research.
    A growing conceptual and empirical literature is advancing the idea that language extends our cognitive skills. One of the most influential positions holds that language – qua material symbols – facilitates individual thought processes by virtue of its material properties (Clark, 2006a). Extending upon this model, we argue that language enhances our cognitive capabilities in a much more radical way: the skilful engagement of public material symbols facilitates evolutionarily unprecedented modes of collective perception, action and reasoning (interpersonal synergies) creating dialogically (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Richard Menary (ed.) (2010). The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    Leading scholars respond to the famous proposition by Andy Clark and David Chalmers that cognition and mind are not located exclusively in the head.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  23. Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate (...)
    Direct download (21 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   121 citations  
  24. Victor Loughlin (2013). Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):891-897.
    Andy Clark once remarked that we make the world smart so we don’t have to be (Clark, 1997). What he meant was that human beings (along with many other animals) alter and transform their environments in order to accomplish certain tasks that would prove difficult (or indeed impossible) without such transformations. This remarkable insight goes a long way towards explaining many aspects of human culture, ranging from linguistic notational systems to how we structure our cities. It also provides the basis (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  7
    Georg Theiner (2007). Where Syllogistic Reasoning Happens: An Argument for the Extended Mind Hypothesis. In McNamara D. S. & Trafton J. G. (eds.), Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society
    Does cognition sometimes literally extend into the extra-organismic environment (Clark, 2003), or is it always “merely” environmentally embedded (Rupert, 2004)? Underlying this current border dispute is the question about how to individuate cognitive processes on principled grounds. Based on recent evidence about the active role of representation selection and construction in learning how to reason (Stenning, 2002), I raise the question: what makes two distinct, modality-specific pen-and-paper manipulations of external representations – diagrams versus sentences – cognitive processes of the same (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26. Andy Clark (2005). Intrinsic Content, Active Memory, and the Extended Mind. Analysis 65 (285):1-11.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  27.  24
    Robert A. Wilson (2010). Review of Robert D. Rupert, Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28.  29
    Jennifer Greenwood (2013). Is Mind Extended or Scaffolded? Ruminations on Sterelney's (2010) Extended Stomach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):1-22.
    In his paper, in this journal, Sterelney (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9:465–481, 2010) claims that cases of extended mind are limiting cases of environmental scaffolding and that a niche construction model is a more helpful, general framework for understanding human action. He further claims that extended mind cases fit into a corner of a 3D space of environmental scaffolds of cognitive competence. He identifies three dimensions which determine where a resource fits into this space and (...)
  29.  26
    Robert D. Rupert (2009). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. OUP Usa.
    Robert Rupert argues against the view that human cognitive processes comprise elements beyond the boundary of the organism, developing a systems-based conception in place of this extended view. He also argues for a conciliatory understanding of the relation between the computational approach to cognition and the embedded and embodied views.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  30.  47
    D. D. Hutto (2011). The Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Analysis 71 (4):785-787.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  27
    J. M. Fritzman & Kristin Parvizian (2012). The Extended Mind Rehabilitates The Metaphysical Hegel. Metaphilosophy 43 (5):636-658.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Mark Rowlands (2010). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. A Bradford Book.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   30 citations  
  33. John Sutton (2006). Introduction: Memory, Embodied Cognition, and the Extended Mind. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):281-289.
    I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, Je´roˆme Dokic, Richard Menary, Jenann Ismael, Sue Campbell, Doris McIlwain, and Mark Rowlands. This paper explains the motivation for an alliance between the sciences of memory and the extended mind hypothesis. It examines in turn the role of worldly, social, and internalized forms of scaffolding to memory and cognition, and also highlights themes relating to affect, agency, and individual differences.
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  34.  9
    Hajo Greif (forthcoming). What is the Extension of the Extended Mind? Synthese:1-26.
    Two aspects of cognitive coupling, as brought forward in the Extended Mind Hypothesis, are discussed in this paper: how shall the functional coupling between the organism and some entity in his environment be spelled out in detail? What are the paradigmatic external entities to enter into that coupling? These two related questions are best answered in the light of an aetiological variety of functionalist argument that adds historical depth to the “active externalism” promoted by Clark and Chalmers and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  24
    Armin W. Schulz (2013). Overextension: The Extended Mind and Arguments From Evolutionary Biology. [REVIEW] European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):241-255.
    I critically assess two widely cited evolutionary biological arguments for two versions of the ‘Extended Mind Thesis’ (EMT): namely, an argument appealing to Dawkins’s ‘Extended Phenotype Thesis’ (EPT) and an argument appealing to ‘Developmental Systems Theory’ (DST). Specifically, I argue that, firstly, appealing to the EPT is not useful for supporting the EMT (in either version), as it is structured and motivated too differently from the latter to be able to corroborate or elucidate it. Secondly, I extend (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  36.  27
    Robert A. Wilson & Bartlomiej Lenart (2014). Extended Mind and Identity. In Jens Clausen & Neil Levy (eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer 423-439.
    Dominant views of personal identity in philosophy take some kind of psychological continuity or connectedness over time to be criterial for the identity of a person over time. Such views assign psychological states, particularly those necessary for narrative memory of some kind, special importance in thinking about the nature of persons. The extended mind thesis, which has generated much recent discussion in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, holds that a person’s psychological states can physically extend (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Andy Clark (2010). Memento's Revenge : The Extended Mind Extended. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press 43--66.
    In the movie, Memento, the hero, Leonard, suffers from a form of anterograde amnesia that results in an inability to lay down new memories. Nonetheless, he sets out on a quest to find his wife’s killer, aided by the use of notes, annotated polaroids, and (for the most important pieces of information obtained) body tattoos. Using these resources he attempts to build up a stock of new beliefs and to thus piece together the puzzle of his wife’s death. At one (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  38. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2013). Superdupersizing the Mind: Extended Cognition and the Persistence of Cognitive Bloat. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):791-806.
    Extended Cognition (EC) hypothesizes that there are parts of the world outside the head serving as cognitive vehicles. One criticism of this controversial view is the problem of “cognitive bloat” which says that EC is too permissive and fails to provide an adequate necessary criterion for cognition. It cannot, for instance, distinguish genuine cognitive vehicles from mere supports (e.g. the Yellow Pages). In response, Andy Clark and Mark Rowlands have independently suggested that genuine cognitive vehicles are distinguished from supports (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Mark Rowlands (2009). The Extended Mind. Zygon 44 (3):628-641.
    According to the view known variously as the extended mind (Clark & Chalmers 1998), vehicle externalism (Hurley 1998; Rowlands 2003, 2006) active externalism (Clark and Chalmers 1998), locational externalism (Wilson 2004) and environmentalism (Rowlands 1999), at least some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed, partly (and, on most versions, contingently), of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. More precisely, what I shall refer to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  40. Lynne Rudder Baker (2009). Persons and the Extended-Mind Thesis. Zygon 44 (3):642-658.
    The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  41. Mark Rowlands (2009). The Extended Mind. Zygon 44 (3):628-641.
    The extended mind is the thesis that some mental—typically cognitive—processes are partly composed of operations performed by cognizing organisms on the world around them. The operations in question are ones of manipulation, transformation, or exploitation of environmental structures. And the structures in question are ones that carry information pertinent to the success or efficacy of the cognitive process in question. This essay examines the thesis of the extended mind and evaluates the arguments for and against it.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  42. Robert D. Rupert (2010). Representation in Extended Cognitive Systems : Does the Scaffolding of Language Extend the Mind? In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press
  43.  86
    Helen De Cruz (2008). An Extended Mind Perspective on Natural Number Representation. Philosophical Psychology 21 (4):475 – 490.
    Experimental studies indicate that nonhuman animals and infants represent numerosities above three or four approximately and that their mental number line is logarithmic rather than linear. In contrast, human children from most cultures gradually acquire the capacity to denote exact cardinal values. To explain this difference, I take an extended mind perspective, arguing that the distinctly human ability to use external representations as a complement for internal cognitive operations enables us to represent natural numbers. Reviewing neuroscientific, developmental, and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  44. Colin Klein (2010). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW] Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (3-4).
    Robert Rupert is well-known as a vigorous opponent of the hypothesis of extended cognition . His Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind is a first-rate development of his "systems-based" approach to demarcating the mind. The results are impressive. Rupert's account brings much-needed clarity to the often-frustrating debate over HEC: much more than just an attack on HEC, he gives a compelling picture of why the debate matters.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Michael Madary (2011). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (1).
    One of the latest labels to emerge for anti-classical cognitive science is “4E.” The four Es here are the embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended approaches to cognition. Since there are a number of different, and likely incompatible, lines of thought within the 4E group, more work needs to be done to articulate how the Es can and should fit together. Mark Rowlands’ newest book, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology, addresses (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Neil Levy (2007). Rethinking Neuroethics in the Light of the Extended Mind Thesis. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):3-11.
    The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  47.  99
    Joel Krueger (2009). Empathy and the Extended Mind. Zygon 44 (3):675-698.
    I draw upon the conceptual resources of the extended mind thesis (EM) to analyze <span class='Hi'>empathy</span> and interpersonal understanding. Against the dominant mentalistic paradigm, I argue that <span class='Hi'>empathy</span> is fundamentally an extended bodily activity and that much of our social understanding happens outside of the head. First, I look at how the two dominant models of interpersonal understanding, theory theory and simulation theory, portray the cognitive link between folk psychology and <span class='Hi'>empathy</span>. Next, I challenge their (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  48.  9
    Anthony Crisafi & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Hegel and the Extended Mind. AI and Society 25 (1):123-129.
    We examine the theory of the extended mind, and especially the concept of the “parity principle” (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58.1:7–19, 1998), in light of Hegel’s notion of objective spirit. This unusual combination of theories raises the question of how far one can extend the notion of extended mind and whether cognitive processing can supervene on the operations of social practices and institutions. We raise some questions about putting this research to critical use.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49.  82
    U. M. D. Cole, The Over-Extended Mind.
    There’s a possibly more interesting general question: does technology transform and extend the mind and our mental powers? In a widely discussed 1998 paper titled “The Extended Mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that mind and cognition can extend outside the head and can include items and processes in the world. In their thought experiment, Otto has alzheimer’s syndrome but does not lose his ability to function because he records information he learns in a notebook (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50. Terence M. Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but (we argue) highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000