Today, thanks to biomedical technologies advances, some persons with fertility issues can conceive. Transgender persons benefit also from these advances and can not only actualize their self-identified sexual identities but also experience parenthood. Based on clinical multidisciplinary seminars that gathered child psychiatrists and psychoanalysts interested in the fields of assisted reproduction technology and gender dysphoria, philosophers interested in bioethics, biologists interested in ART, and endocrinologists interested in pubertal suppression, we explore how new biotechnical advances, whether in gender transition or (...) procreation, could create new ways to conceive a child possible. After reviewing the various medical/surgical techniques for physical gender transition and the current ART options, we discuss how these new ways for persons to self-actualize and to experience parenthood can not only improve the condition of transgender persons but also introduce some elements of change in the habitual patterns of thinking especially in France. Finally, we discuss the ethical issues that accompany the arrival of these children and provide creative solutions to help society handle, accept, and support the advances made in this area. (shrink)

ABSTRACTLove is the basis for a moral psychology of forgiveness. I argue for an account of love based on Roy Bhaskar's conception of its five circles, and of the ethical nature of human beings as concrete universals/singulars. Linking this to work of ‘The Forgiveness Project’, I argue that forgiveness can be understood metaphysically in terms of its relation to love of self, of the other, of the relation of self and other, of self, other and the (...) wider community, and of self and other in their ontological depth as unique individuals. Forgiveness involves both a ‘giving to’ and a ‘giving up’, and this can lead to a profound sense of identity between a victim and a perpetrator. Forgiveness is different for each person; it may draw upon a public/legal setting as a proxy for universal judgement; and it confronts social-structural and political elements which may block its development. (shrink)

This study aims to apply self-congruity theory to examine the relationship between self-congruity of tourists and their perceived image of a gambling destination. This study employs the Euclidean distance model and extends Malhotra's pars of adjectives with five new items about gambling motives. A face-to-face questionnaire survey was used, and a total of 152 samples were collected from tourists in Macau. The results show that the actual self-image of tourists is more related to their perception of Macau (...) image. For actual congruence, tourists exhibit a greater tendency to match the informal, liberal, and emotional image of Macau. For ideal congruence, they have a tendency to match the contemporary, organized, and pleasant image of Macau. This study makes up for the deficiency of self-congruity theory in tourism research. This study helps tourism departments to develop appropriate strategies to promote gambling tourism and disseminate relevant information that can bring gambling destinations closer to tourists. (shrink)

Although research has demonstrated the benefit of psychological detachment for employee well-being, the explanatory mechanisms related to work behaviors underlying this effect remain underdeveloped. Addressing this research gap, we consider self-discrepant time allocation (preferred–actual allocation) as a mediating mechanism through which psychological detachment affects employee well-being. We hypothesize that psychological detachment is associated with self-discrepant time allocation at work. Specifically, we suggest that employees with low detachment tend to allocate more time than preferred to work activities that demand (...) fewer self-regulatory resources, and allocate less time than preferred to activities demanding greater self-regulatory resources. These self-discrepant time allocations at work are associated with employee well-being. Polynomial regression analysis and response surface methodology were used to test the hypotheses. The results, based on a sample of 390 faculty members from 19 universities, showed that, when psychological detachment during weekends is low and self-regulatory resources are insufficient, employees will allocate less time than preferred to work activities that require more self-regulatory resources (i.e., researching activities) during the subsequent work period. Instead, employees tend to allocate more time to activities that require less resources (i.e., teaching activities). These discrepancies between actual and preferred time allocation at work activities, in turn, negatively affect employee well-being and mediate the relationship between psychological detachment and employee well-being. (shrink)

This article argues that standard models of person-centred care (PCC) and shared decision making (SDM) rely on simplistic, often unrealistic assumptions of patient capacities that entail that PCC/SDM might have detrimental effects in many applications. We suggest a complementary PCC/SDM approach to ensure that patients are able to execute rational decisions taken jointly with care professionals when performing self-care. Illustrated by concrete examples from a study of adolescent diabetes care, we suggest a combination of moral and psychological considerations to (...) support the claim that standard PCC/SDM threatens to systematically undermine its own goals. This threat is due to a tension between the ethical requirements of SDM in ideal circumstances and more long-term needs actualized by the context of self-care handled by patients with limited capacities for taking responsibility and adhere to their own rational decisions. To improve this situation, we suggest a counseling, self-care, adherence approach to PCC/SDM, where more attention is given to how treatment goals are internalized by patients, how patients perceive choice situations, and what emotional feedback patients are given. This focus may involve less of a concentration on autonomous and rational clinical decision making otherwise stressed in standard PCC/SDM advocacy. (shrink)

Adolescence is a vital period of developing a moral self. As individuals enter adolescence, peers become increasingly important to them. This study aimed to explore the influence of peers' actual appraisals on moral self-representations. Based on Looking Glass Self Hypothesis, peers' reflected appraisals usually have a mediating effect on peers' actual appraisals and self-appraisals. This study used the Chinese Moral Trait Words Rating Scale to investigate 160 dyads of Chinese adolescents. The participants filled in the (...) class='Hi'>Self-Appraisals Questionnaire, Peers' Reflected Appraisals Questionnaire, and Peers' Actual Appraisals Questionnaire, respectively. The results showed that: peers' actual appraisals indirectly affected self-appraisals through peers' reflected appraisals in the process of forming the moral self of early Chinese adolescents; Chinese adolescents had a certain accuracy in peers' actual appraisals, but often underestimated their peers' actual appraisals of them. This study was conducive to understanding the influence of peers on forming adolescents' moral self in the context of collectivistic culture. (shrink)

Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, including the argument that it is impossible to owe anything to yourself, and the view that an obligation to improve (...) onself is overly 'moralistic'. Robert N. Johnson argues against Kantian universalization arguments for the duty of self-improvement, as well as arguments that bottom out in a supposed value humanity has. At the same time, he defends a position based on the notion that self- and other-respecting agents would, under the right circumstances, accept the principle of self-improvement and would leave it up to each to be the person to whom this duty is owed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology of FranceAndrew J. McKennaThe Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology of France, by Eugene Webb; ix & 268 pp. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993, $35.00.That psychology and sociology are one science is the fundamental premise guiding Eugene Webb’s The Self Between, which he defines early on as “a (...) self constituted dynamically and continuously by the relationships it finds itself involved i n.” The “new social psychology of France” designated by his subtitle is mostly the one inspired by René Girard’s mimetic model of human behavior, to which four of Webb’s seven chapters are specifically devoted.Girard’s idea, which he learned from our literary masterpieces, is that human desire is mimetic, that it imitates other desires in its choice of objects and in pursuit of their possession. As desires converge on a single object, the locus of conflict will be between subjects rather within their individual psyches, a consequence that motivates Girard’s ongoing critique of Freudian psychoanalysis.But Freud’s theories are everywhere disputed in this book, which reports reliably on the devastating critiques advanced by François Roustang, Marie Balmary, and Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen. Roustang has convincingly (and entertainingly) uncovered Freud’s blindness to the pathologies of transference and discipleship investing the foundation of psychoanalysis. A pattern of rivalry for recognition and preeminence guides Freud’s career in a way that is reenacted around Lacan. Balmary, somewhat a Lacanian her self, has turned psychoanalytic theory against Freud to explore his own family secrets, while severely questioning the master’s bid for a universal theory pursued via self-analysis amidst a period of emotional upheaval. And Borch-Jacobsen has shown how th e dynamics of hypnosis that Freud rejected early on were brought back as transference, while arguing for his own part that mimetic identification with the other, rather than any primordial drives, is what brings the subject into being. These informat ive chapters help bring us up to date on significant debates that have developed since Lacan drew the French intellectual world, and so many Americans after it, into the orbit of psychoanalysis.But by far the bulk of Webb’s attention goes to Girard’s work and to that of [End Page 191] scholars and practitioners who have sought to extend it further in the social sciences. Principle among them is Jean-Michel Oughourlian, whose Puppet of Desire (translated by Webb in 1991) demonstrates how the mimetic model plays out in psychotherapy, notably in the workings of hypnotism and somnambulism, in cases of demonic possession, and in obsessional neurosis. In each case, the subject is unwitt ingly captive of another’s desire in a way that produces behavioral anomalies and disorders that are nonetheless available to lucid, jargon-free diagnosis. What is appealing here is the deployment of a rational explanation for irrational behavior, once we grasp the paradoxical rationale of desire; equally appealing prospects of actual healing are outlined here and at the end of the book, where possibilities of freedom and responsibility are resurrected from a technical vocabulary that smothers them.Girard’s idea of the self as relation, as interdividuality, rather than as a discreet unit, has social and political dimensions to which we only find tantalizing allusions in his works. They have been pursued with acumen by such writers as André Orléan, Paul Dumouchel and especially Jean-Pierre Dupuy, who figures importantly among those aligning systems theory with theories of social and economic organization. Like Borch-Jacobsen and Roustang, Dupuy restores due attention to concep tions of crowd behavior outlined at the end of the last century by Tarde and Le Bon, whose best insights Freud studiously discarded.This is richly interdisciplinary work, strongly suggesting that we variously redraw and erase lines defining academic fields. Occam’s razor flicks often and decisively in these pages, which restore needed balance to the effects of some wild er French imports. Webb brings no new ideas of his own to this capable synthesis, but his accurate report will help guide researchers toward major recent developments in France around and mostly beyond Freudian psychoanalysis... (shrink)

The induction period is considered one of the most difficult in a teacher’s career. In Israel, support systems for beginning teachers include a learning community and a mentoring process, over a 2-year period. The study was based on self-determination theory and examined how support for BTs’ psychological needs and exploration from the LC facilitator and teacher-mentor contributed to their functioning. The study was conducted over 2 years during which BTs participated in LCs and were accompanied by a teacher-mentor. Questionnaires (...) were administered to Bedouin-Arab and Jewish teachers, 308 interns in the first year, and 205 new teachers in the second. Results of SEM analysis indicated that supporting BTs’ needs and exploration by LC facilitators in both years predicted their autonomous motivation, which in turn predicted positive feelings and satisfaction in the LC. The LC facilitators’ support also predicted the BTs’ autonomous motivation in teaching, which was also predicted by the teacher-mentors’ support. This in turn positively predicted the BTs’ sense of competence and self-actualization, and negatively predicted burnout. In both years, autonomous motivation mediated the association between the support the BTs received, and teacher outcomes in the LC and school. No significant differences were found between the two cultures. The effects found in the second year are above and beyond the effects of support from the LC facilitators and teacher-mentors in the first year. The study indicates the importance of combining multiple induction programs over time and highlights the importance of supporting BTs’ needs during the induction period. (shrink)

Even if many instances of reflexive, and even of interpersonal, deception do not involve knowledge or belief of the deceiver to the contrary of the belief he fosters, it is conceivable that some instances could. This is obscured in Stanley Paluch's treatment of self?deception by the dubious contention that one couldn't be self?deceived if one could affirm that one knew (was aware) that P and believed not?P, and that one couldn't be described as knowing P and believing not?P (...) unless one could affirm this (Inquiry, Vol. 10, 1967). The former claim would actually render the affirmation absurd, which it is not; and if it is not, the latter claim is harmless. Whatever can be said of ?self?deception? involving deviant uses of ?know?, the question remains how ?X knows P and believes not?P? could be true given a standard use. The standards of rationality permit one to sustain rival beliefs so long as one does not reflect on all the facts alleged in one of the beliefs. Self?deceit relies on withholding attention not from an unwanted belief as such, as Demos suggests, but from its detailed contents. (shrink)

This study investigates the Proteus effect from the first-person perspective and during avatar embodiment in actual exercise. In addition to the immediate measurements of the Proteus effect, prolonged effects such as next-day perception and exercise-related outcomes are also explored. We theorized the Proteus effect as altered perceived self-concept and explored the association between virtual reality avatar manipulation and self-concept in the exercise context. While existing studies have mainly investigated the Proteus effect in a non-VR environment or after VR (...) embodiment, we aim to contribute to the literature by addressing this concern to explore how the Proteus effect works in actual VR exercise. Through a 2 × 2 between-subject experiment, the results partially support the Proteus effect. Regarding actual physical activity, embodying an avatar with a six pack during exercise creates fewer body movements. No significant effect was found for perceived exertion. We also explored the role of sex as a potential moderator in the association of the Proteus effect on exercise outcomes. The Proteus effect was supported by immediate and next-day self-efficacy for core-muscle exercise only among female participants. The between-subject design allowed us to probe how avatar manipulation of muscular body shape with a six pack as opposed to normal body shape influences participants’ self-concept and exercise outcomes, as limited VR studies have employed within-subject comparisons. This also contributes to the literature by providing an upward comparison as opposed to the previous downward comparison regarding body fitness. The overall results supported the Proteus effect in the context of core-muscle exercise when comparing normal and ideal body shape avatars. However, the Proteus effect as an altered self-concept and its effects on self-efficacy for exercise were supported among females but not males. Whereas the female participants who embodied avatars with a six pack associated themselves more with the muscular concept than other people, the male participants who embodied avatars with a six pack perceived themselves as more normal than others. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

One distinct interest in self-knowledge concerns whether one can know about one’s own mental states and processes, how much, and by what methods. One broad distinction is between accounts that centrally claim that we look inward for self-knowledge (introspective methods) and those that claim that we look outward for self-knowledge (transparency methods). It is here argued that neither method is sufficient, and that we see this as soon as we move beyond questions about knowledge of one’s beliefs, (...) focusing instead on how one distinguishes, for oneself, one’s veridical visual memories from mere (non-veridical) visual images. Given robust psychological and phenomenal similarities between episodic memories and mere imagery, the following is a genuine question that one might pose to oneself: “Do I actually remember that happening, or am I just imagining it?” After critical analysis of the transparency method (advocated by Byrne 2010, following Evans 1982) to this latter epistemological question, a brief sketch is offered of a more holistic and inferential method for acquisition of broader self-knowledge (broadly following the interpretive-sensory access account of Carruthers 2011). In a slogan, knowing more of the mind requires using more of the mind. (shrink)

A fascinating survey of the forces that shape who we are and how we act-from the author of The Calculus Diaries Following her previous tours through the worlds of physics (Black Bodies and Quantum Cats) and calculus (The Calculus Diaries), acclaimed science writer Jennifer Ouellette now turns her attention to the mysteries of human identity and behavior with Me, Myself, and Why. She draws on genetics, neuroscience, and psychology-enlivened as always with her signature sense of humor and pop-culture references-to (...) explore how we become who we are. Ouellette lets readers in on her own surprising journey of self-discover, as she has her genome sequenced, her brain mapped, her personality typed, and even samples a popular hallucinogen. Bringing together everything from Mendel's famous pea plant experiments and mutations in The X-Men to our taste in food and our relationship with avatars and our online selves, Ouellette delivers another fun and enlightening work of popular science that's sure to be enjoyed by her many fans. (shrink)

Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental (...) rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's contemporary followers agree that our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. Dainton argues that that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost - provided our streams of consciousness flow on - we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. Phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any form of continuity. The Phenomenal Self is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise. The first task is arriving at an adequate understanding of phenomenal unity and continuity. This achieved, Dainton turns to the most pressing problem facing any experience-based approach: losses of consciousness. How can we survive them? He shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities. He then moves on to explore a range of further issues. How simple can a self be? How are we related to our bodies? Is our persistence an all-or-nothing affair? Do our minds consist of parts which could enjoy an independent existence? Is it metaphysically intelligible to construe ourselves as systems of capacities? The book concludes with a novel treatment of fission and fusion. (shrink)

A critique of mainstream psychology's ineffectiveness, neglect of the personal and social meaning behind people's suffering, lack of diversity-mindedness, and predisposition to shame rather than understand people. It takes Dr. Phil as a representative, a straw man, for this kind of thinking. Discussing sixteen specific episodes of the Dr. Phil show, the book provides alternative perspectives on such topics as lying, judging, labeling, dieting, anger, shame, addictions, relationships, domestic violence, race, and gender.--Publisher.

Every animal illustrates how they thrive, offering a model of how you might choose to thrive, too. If we're willing to listen--to follow the pawprints--we just might discover a kinder, braver, more courageous way of life.

What model of knowledge does Plato's Socrates use? In this book, Nicholas D. Smith argues that it is akin to knowledge of a craft which is acquired by degrees, rather than straightforward knowledge of facts. He contends that a failure to recognize and identify this model, and attempts to ground ethical success in contemporary accounts of propositional or informational knowledge, have led to distortions of Socrates' philosophical mission to improve himself and others in the domain of practical ethics. He shows (...) that the model of craft-knowledge makes sense of a number of issues scholars have struggled to understand, and makes a case for attributing to Socrates a very sophisticated and plausible view of the improvability of the human condition. (shrink)

Education, Self-consciousness and Social Action reconstructs the Hegelian concept of education, Bildung, and shows that this concept could serve as a powerful alternative to current psychologist notions of learning. Taking a Hegelian perspective, Stojanov claims that Bildung should be interpreted as growth of mindedness and that such a growth has two central and interrelated components, including the development of self-consciousness toward conceptual self-articulation and the formation of one's capacity for intelligent social action. The interrelation between the two (...) central components of education implies that learning is transformed into education only when it involves the self-consciousness and the identity of the learner. Since both are grounded in the ethical beliefs and values of the individual, transforming learning into education therefore requires that education also address students' everyday ethical assumptions, as well as their articulation and conceptualization. This claim has a number of implications for educational policy and pedagogy; one being that learning and teaching in schools are educative only if they have ethical significance for both students and teachers. Another implication is that the point of departure for educative teaching becomes the actual, everyday ethical beliefs and experiences of the students, rather than fixed curricular contents. Students' encountering with sciences and arts should aim at the conceptual articulation of those beliefs and experiences - an articulation which makes individual's rational autonomy and self-determination possible. Education, Self-consciousness and Social Action will be of great interest to academics, researchers and postgraduate students interested in the philosophy of education. It should also be essential reading for anyone engaged in the study of Hegel's work. (shrink)

Decolonizing the Body explores the traumatic physical and emotional effects of colonization and systemic racism on the body and mind. Written by a woman of color for women of color, it offers body-centered somatic practices to free women from internalized oppression, so they can reclaim confidence, dignity, and self-worth.

Decoupling a modestly construed Narrative Self Shaping Hypothesis from Strong Narrativism this paper attempts to motivate devoting our intellectual energies to the former. Section one briefly introduces the notions of self-shaping and rehearses reasons for thinking that self-shaping, in a suitably tame form, is, at least to some extent, simply unavoidable for reflective beings. It is against this background that the basic commitments of a modest Narrative Self-Shaping Hypothesis are articulated. Section two identifies a foundational commitment—the (...) central tenet—of all Strong Narrativist proposals, those that posit a necessary link between narrative self-shaping and narrative self-experience. As will be shown, in the hands of Strong Narrativists the latter notion is unpacked in stronger or weaker ways by appeal to the notion of implicit Narrativizing. Section three reminds the reader of Strawson’s challenge to Strong Narrativism. It is revealed that Strawson’s objections are most effective if they target Strong Narrativism’s central tenet construed as a phenomenological revelation about what is necessary for self-experience and not merely the psychological Narrativity thesis, construed as an empirical hypothesis about typical Narrativizing proclivities. Having set the stage, section four critically examines two different strategies, pursued by Rudd and Schechtman respectively, for escaping the horns Strawson’s dilemma poses for Strong Narrativism. In the end both strategies invoke the notion of implicit Narrativizing at a crucial juncture. Section five reveals that a substantive proposal about what implicit Narrativizing might be is lacking, hence we have no reason to believe that it actually occurs. It is concluded that, as things stand, Strong Narrativism has no way of avoiding the horns of Strawson’s dilemma. Brief concluding remarks in the final section are a reminder why, despite their modesty, softer versions of the NSSH—when coupled with a developmental proposal about the narrative basis of our folk psychological competence—are non-trivial and worthy of further development and investigation. (shrink)

It is generally acknowledged that confabulation undermines the authority of self-attribution of mental states. But why? The mainstream answer is that confabulation misrepresents the actual state of one’s mind at some relevant time prior to the confabulatory response. This construal, we argue, rests on an understanding of self-attribution as first-person mindreading. Recent developments in the literature on folk psychology, however, suggest that mental state attribution also plays an important role in regulating or shaping future behaviour in conformity (...) with normative expectations. We explore an analogue understanding of self-attribution of mental states in terms of first-person mindshaping. The main aim of this paper is to explore how this insight alters the implications of empirical confabulation studies on first-person authority. We also indicate how this sheds new light on the phenomenon of confabulation itself. (shrink)

_Naturalization of the Soul_ charts the development of the concepts of soul and self in Western thought, from Plato to the present. It fills an important gap in intellectual history by being the first book to emphasize the enormous intellectual transformation in the eighteenth century, when the religious 'soul' was replaced first by a philosophical 'self' and then by a scientific 'mind'. The authors show that many supposedly contemporary theories of the self were actually discussed in the (...) eighteenth century, and recognize the status of William Hazlitt as one of the most important Personal Identity theorists of the British Enlightenment, for his direct relevance to contemporary thinking. Now available in paperback, _Naturaliazation of the Soul_ is essential reading for anyone interested in the issues at the core of the Western philosophical tradition. (shrink)

In this interdisciplinary study, Dr Levin offers an account of personal growth and self-fulfilment based on the development of our capacity for listening.

A book of beauty and simple wisdom that all can relate to, The Three Supreme Gifts provides a clear path and an in depth understanding of the three supreme truths introduced in its companion book, Love is the Seed: Teachings from the Spirit World. Lisa Hromada eloquently illustrates that you have all you need to attain self-mastery and create a life of your choosing-one of much greater joy, ease and inner peace-and improve any aspect of your life moving forward. (...) The three supreme gifts help you to more consciously grow beyond negative karmic and thought patterns, which in turn not only changes the course of your life at the very moment you begin to apply these supreme gifts, but forevermore. In Lisa's words, "You are about to delve into a subject of love, thought and free will from a different perspective than you may have previously considered." If you have ever wanted to know the meaning or purpose of your life, how to master or navigate your life, and really any question you may have about your life, it all comes down to what you have at this very moment. What you have is love, thought and free will. (shrink)

Since the emergence of psychology, its relation with religion has been inconsistent. Their different sources and methodologies but common aims made them close or distanced. Today these disciplines acknowledged and learned to benefit from each other. The affect of religion/spirituality on human’s lives raised the attention of psychology and required the integration of these into psychotherapy. In order to approach the psychology-religion relation via the traces of religion within psychotherapy the paper deals with the necessity, the knowledge (...) needed, the principles when integrating religious/spiritual principles and practices into psychotherapy; finally the religious traces in psychotherapy. The paper comprises few Turkish examples together with the huge body of theoretical and practical examples on the topic. These theories and practices should be important examples for Turkey. By addressing the religious traces in psychotherapy the aim of the paper is to show that the cliff between psychology and religion is in fact not that deep.SummaryIt can be argued that psychology and religion have common interests relating the well-being of individuals. There is a huge body of research that emphasizes the implementation and necessity of cultural, religious, spiritual principles in professional psychology. The proprium of these models is to integrate the client’s religious/spiritual sources into therapy. Especially religious clients benefit from therapies that define their treatment goals around their religious views. However, it must be considered that if the disorder has a biological dimension and/or is severe psychopathologic pure religious interventions will not be sufficient. This paper traces the religious/spiritual principles within psychotherapies and shows that the cliff between religion and psychology is not that deep.At different places in the world therapy is done according to western standards. However, determining mental health or disorders according to western criteria might be problematic. In societies in which religious/spiritual life is an essential part of culture, religion plays a crucial role in people’s perception of disease and treatment. In mental health, spirituality is an important and primary source for coping. Empirical studies reveal the positive outcomes of religious practices such as personal prayer, repentance, meditation, and dhikir on mental and physical health. In light of this data it becomes clear that psychotherapies should be revised socio-culturally and culturally sensitive psychotherapies that cover belief and religious practices should be developed. Another need for the integration of religion, belief, and spirituality with psychotherapy is the significant effect of these experiences on individual’s lives. With regard to the broad impact of religion, psychological interventions solely might not be sufficient to fulfill human psychological needs. As studies show, religious clients expect religious practices in treatment as well as a therapist who is open and respectful to religious principles, ready to talk about own religious beliefs, willing to integrate religious matters into therapy. To fulfill these expectations therapists, need to be trained and educated in religious/spiritual matters. Additionally, the therapist must acknowledge and be conscious about her/his own worldview, religious commitment, and spiritual life. However, the therapist needs not to be religious him/herself or share the same religion as the client. It is sufficient that the therapist is open and receptive to the client’s beliefs so that these can be used as effective sources in therapy. Spiritual psychotherapy considers spirituality as one of the main sources of clients. Thus, it might be critical when the therapist has poor knowledge about religion when the client considers it as significant. This source might be helpful for the client in coping with his/her problems and limitations. Having knowledge about the client’s religion and culture might also be important to acknowledge his/her perceptions and beliefs. Because individuals’ understanding of disease, their beliefs about reasons for mental disorders, their expectations from the health system are important factors in seeking help and choosing therapy.Therapists who decide to integrate spiritual/religious principles into psychotherapy have to adhere to some ethical principles. The source and the degree of the psychological disorder are important, too. Even though the efficacy of religious rituals and spiritual interventions are extensive in each case it has to be investigated whether religiosity/spirituality is part of the problem or the solution. Certain aspects will guide the therapist in deciding whether to integrate religiosity/spirituality into the therapy process or not. Additionally, he/she has to gather information about the client’s religious/spiritual life (spiritual anamneses) in order to choose the most appropriate religious method and intervention. Today psychotherapy deals with coping, questions about the meaning, purpose, and way of life. Actually, these are issues with which religious traditions has dealt and proposed solutions for thousands of years ago. For example, ethical principles for mental health professionals correspond to those of religious teachings. The attitudes and the type of relationship recommended by the client-centered approach are also commended by religious teachings for all human relations. Beginning with the 1960’s an increasing interest in Buddhist teachings is observable among psychotherapists. Mental exercises (especially meditation) cause transformations in the self-perception and lead to enduring changes in consciousness. Religions such as Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism recommend meditation technics like contemplation, dhikr, and yoga. Confession in the Catholic Church has similarities with psychotherapeutic catharsis. Many cultures own one kind of forgiveness rituals of confessions. As studies report people benefit from these rituals. Forgiveness is a multifaceted issue with psychological and spiritual dimensions and involves cognitive, emotional, relational, and spiritual processes. Research indicates the religious and psychological functions of forgiveness. Many subjects such as personal prayer, hope, empathy, love, and tolerance are common issues of both, psychotherapy and religion/spirituality. Different psychotherapeutic approaches and especially positive psychology integrate these values that are valued by religion/spirituality into their theories and practices.In conclusion, the cliff between psychology and religion/spirituality is not that deep at it seems at first sight. They have many subjects in common. Individuals turn to religion and spirituality in times of crises. This makes it inevitable to include religion and spirituality into the therapeutic process. Because religions provide ways of coping, hope, and meaning in difficult times. This fact is recognized and accepted abroad and lead to the religious/spiritual psychotherapy movement, which will hopefully an inspiration for Turkish psychology as well. (shrink)

Recently, two apparent truisms about self-control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self-control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self-control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self-control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self-control should be (...) understood as a mechanism, suggesting that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self-control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self-control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self-control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self-control and goodness/activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non-mechanistic understanding of self-control as a normative capacity. (shrink)

This study aims to explore the positive psychological effects of culinary experiences during the COVID-19 lockdown days. Qualitative research methods adopted to provide a deeper understanding. Data was collected through a structured online survey from 30 participants in Turkey. This occurred between April 10th and June 3rd, 2020 when the strict confinement measures were applied. Content analysis was deductively applied according to the Stebbins’s Theory of Casual vs. Serious Leisure which classifies the well-being according to characteristics of leisure experiences. The (...) results revealed that at the first stage people went into the kitchen with the motivation of pure happiness and relaxation indicating hedonic well-being. However, people who intended to spend time with culinary activities with the expectations of pure happiness left the kitchen with eudaimonic outcomes by gaining special skills and knowledge, self-actualization and self-enrichment. When these outcomes are evaluated based on the Stebbins’s theoretical framework, culinary activities have both casual and serious leisure experience characteristics in terms of psychological well-being. It is understood that culinary activities have versatile leisure characteristics. Thanks to the culinary activities, people do not only obtain pure happiness and relaxation but can draw wider inferences about their life by realizing their own potential during the psychologically challenging COVID-19 lockdown days. (shrink)

The Naked Self explores Søren Kierkegaard's understanding of selfhood by situating his work in relation to central problems in contemporary philosophy of personal identity: the role of memory in selfhood, the relationship between the notional and actual subjects of memory and anticipation, the phenomenology of diachronic self-experience, affective alienation from our past and future, psychological continuity, practical and narrative approaches to identity, and the intelligibility of posthumous survival. By bringing his thought into dialogue with major living and recent (...) philosophers of identity, Stokes reveals Kierkegaard as a philosopher with a significant--if challenging--contribution to make to philosophy of self and identity. (shrink)

Although Karl Marx and Søren Kierkegaard are both major figures in nineteenth-century Western thought, they are rarely considered in the same conversation. Marx is the great radical economic theorist, the prophet of communist revolution who famously claimed religion was the "opiate of the masses." Kierkegaard is the renowned defender of Christian piety, a forerunner of existentialism, and a critic of mass politics who challenged us to become "the single individual." But by drawing out important themes bequeathed them by their shared (...) predecessor G. W. F. Hegel, Jamie Aroosi shows how they were engaged in parallel projects of making sense of the modern, "dialectical" self, as it realizes itself through a process of social, economic, political, and religious emancipation. In The Dialectical Self, Aroosi illustrates that what is traditionally viewed as opposition is actually a complementary one-sidedness, born of the fact that Marx and Kierkegaard differently imagined the impediments to the self's appropriation of freedom. Specifically, Kierkegaard's concern with the psychological and spiritual nature of the self reflected his belief that the primary impediments to freedom reside in subjectivity, such as in our willing conformity to social norms. Conversely, Marx's concern with the sociopolitical nature of the self reflected his belief that the primary impediments to freedom reside in the objective world, such as in the exploitation of the economic system. However, according to Aroosi, each thinker represents one half of a larger picture of freedom and selfhood, because the subjective and objective impediments to freedom serve to reinforce one another. By synthesizing the writing of these two diametrically opposed figures, Aroosi demonstrates the importance of envisioning emancipation as a subjective, psychological, and spiritual process as well as an objective, sociopolitical, and economic one. The Dialectical Self attests to the importance and continued relevance of Marx and Kierkegaard for the modern imagination. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold constitutive theories of self-knowledge in the sense that they think either that a person’s psychological states depend upon her having true beliefs about them, or that a person’s believing that she is in a particular psychological state depends upon her actually being in that state. One way to support this type of view can be found in Shoemaker’s well-known argument that an absurd condition, which he calls “self-blindness”, would be possible if a subject’s psychological states (...) and her higher-order beliefs about them were wholly distinct existences. A second reason to endorse a constitutive theory is the widespread conviction that first-person access is epistemically special. In this essay, I shall argue that even if self-blindness is impossible, the best explanation for this does not deny that a person’s psychological states are wholly distinct from her beliefs about them. I shall then attempt to account for the epistemic distinctiveness of first-person access on the basis of fundamental features of rational cognition. One advantage of this account over constitutive theories of self-knowledge is that it is better placed to explain our fallibility and ignorance. (shrink)

Recently, two apparent truisms about self‐control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self‐control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self‐control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self‐control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self‐control should be (...) understood as a mechanism, suggesting that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self‐control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self‐control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self‐control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self‐control and goodness/activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non‐mechanistic understanding of self‐control as a normative capacity. (shrink)

This book is an inquiry into ki-energy, its role within Eastern mind-body theory, and its implications for our contemporary Western understanding of the body. Yuasa examines the concept of ki-energy as it has been used in such areas as acupuncture, Buddhist and Taoist meditation, and the martial arts. To explain the achievement of mind-body oneness in these traditions he offers an innovative schematization of the lived body. His approach is interdisciplinary and cross-cultural, offering insights into Western philosophy, religion, medical science, (...) depth psychology, parapsychology, theater, and physical education. To substantiate the relationship that ki-energy forms between the human body and its environment, Yuasa introduces contemporary scientific research on ki-energy in China and Japan, as well as evidence from acupuncture medicine and from the experience of meditators and martial arts practitioners. This evidence requires not only a rethinking of the living human body and of the mind-body and mind-matter relation, but also calls into question the adequacy of the existing scientific paradigm. Yuasa calls for an epistemological critique of modern science and explores the issue of the relation of teleology to science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Self of Book 1 and the Selves of Book 2 Terence Penelhum One ofthe more familiar problems ofinterpretationin Hume's Treatise is that of reducing the sense of shock that arises from the apparent differences between what he says about the selfin book 1 and what he says about it in book 2. One way in which scholars have attempted to reduce it is to take him very (...) seriously when he distinguishes, in the book 1 discussion, "betwixt personal identity, as itregards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves."1 If one does this, it becomes possible to see that what might seem to be inconsistent positions are compatible, and merely represent complementary aspects of an extended account of how human beings represent their natures and identities to themselves in thought and feeling and choice. This, at least, is now widely believed. The belief has led to very illuminating accounts of Hume's analysis of the emotional life and ita relationship to his more famous theories in epistemology.2 In spite of these, I think there is an egregious gap in Hume's psychology which we should not be tempted to suppose he has filled. Unless I have misread them, two recent authors have yielded to this very temptation. Since I have said Hume's psychology has an important gap in it, I should begin by making clear what the gap is, and emphasize that I do not think I have uncovered an inconsistency in Hume's theories of the self. He has, of course, been accused of such inconsistencies.3 His account in book 1 has itself been said to be inconsistent because he ascribes to the self there a tendency to confuse invariance and succession in telling us how we come to generate the fiction of continuing identity; such a story seems to ascribe a continuing reality to the mind in the very process ofshowing how the beliefin it can come toexistwhen there are onlysuccessive perceptions toconstitute it. This is a special application of a wider charge sometimes levelled against him, thatalthoughhisassociationism appearstoreduce allexplanation to relationships between perceptions, he is bound to depart from this restriction in ascribing tendencies and mistakes to the mind. Given the nature ofthe beliefhe is explainingwhen he discusses self-identity, the special application is troubling.4 He has also been accused of Volume XVIII Number 2 281 TERENCE PENELHUM inconsistencyin assumingat the outset ofhis discussion oftheindirect passions in book 2 that we have an idea, or even an impression, ofthe self, when in book 1 he has appeared to deny this. Many have argued (and I have been among them) that Hume can be acquitted of these charges. Mercer, for example, has made short workofthe last one.5 When Hume introduces the selfin book 2, he says clearly that he is referring to "self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (T 277), not to the idea of the pure ego constructed by rationalist philosophers. The charge of confusion in the argument of Treatise 1.4.6 has been rebutted by several writers, beginning with Nelson Pike.6 In the briefest summary: since the mind is nothing but a series of perceptions, Hume's question in book 1 is not a question about how it is that a mind he tacitly assumes to be more than this comes to think it is more than this, but a question about how the series that the mind actually is, comes to include within it from time to time perceptions ofthe series that represent it as having an identity that it (strictly) lacks. The actual relationship of the mind to its perceptions is one ofinclusion, and Hume's puzzle is how certain perceptionsofthe mind come to be in the mind. This reading ofHume may well leave him with some unattractive problems, but it does not convict him of contradicting himself. If something like this is accepted, we can see Hume in book 1 as combining scepticism about philosophical defences of a natural belief with the assumption of an obUgation to give an account of how... (shrink)

Psychological and philosophical perspectives are employed in an exploration of the reasons particular individuals experience an activity as personally expressive while others may find the same activity neutral or even aversive. The relationships between personal expressiveness and intrinsic motivation, flow, and self-actualization are considered. The construct of personal expressiveness is shown to have its roots in eudaimonistic philosophy. Living in a manner consistent with one's daimon or "true self" gives rise to a cognitive-affective state labeled "eudaimonia" that (...) is distinguishable from hedonic enjoyment. A personally expressive personality pattern is described integrating concepts from diverse theories including a sense of personal identity, self-actualization, an internal locus of control, and principled moral reasoning. A series of empirical investigations is proposed to test the theoretical concepts of personal expressiveness advanced. (shrink)

This essay develops a new conceptual framework of science and engineering ethics education based on virtue ethics and positive psychology. Virtue ethicists and positive psychologists have argued that current rule-based moral philosophy, psychology, and education cannot effectively promote students’ moral motivation for actual moral behavior and may even lead to negative outcomes, such as moral schizophrenia. They have suggested that their own theoretical framework of virtue ethics and positive psychology can contribute to the effective promotion of motivation (...) for self-improvement by connecting the notion of morality and eudaimonic happiness. Thus this essay attempts to apply virtue ethics and positive psychology to science and engineering ethics education and to develop a new conceptual framework for more effective education. In addition to the conceptual-level work, this essay suggests two possible educational methods: moral modeling and involvement in actual moral activity in science and engineering ethics classes, based on the conceptual framework. (shrink)

The article is devoted to problems of creative and reproductive strategies of modern Russian pedagogy with regard to the asynchrony of cultural personality layers of students. The asynchrony of cultural and psychological personality layers means that a system of personal attitudes consists of orientations that prevailed in different historical periods and therefore is able to combine both harmony and disharmony of interaction between them. Orientation on the reproduction or on the creativity has a particularly strong influence on the formation and (...) dominance over private personal attitudes. Special attention is paid to active group learning methods that are capable of intensifying the creative development of a personality. The cause of many of the shortcomings of the modern education is the state bureaucratic activity armed of consolidating the archaic reproductive attitudes in teachers and students practices and at enhancing the asynchrony of cultural layers of personality, which hampers the further development of creativity. Much attention is paid to the traditions of Russian humanitarian thought and experience of outstanding Russian teachers largely determined the development of modern pedagogical practice. The activity of the most talented native teachers of the twentieth century was aimed at reducing the specified cultural asynchrony of pupils through active intragroup interaction with increasing inclusion of each in the process of development of modern cultural skills of creativity. Not ‘stucking‘ on the tasks that the group could decide for herself, the teacher worked "for the future", focusing it on the broader educational interests and creativity. Typology of culture correlates with cognitive mechanisms of socialization. (shrink)

Moral psychology as a discipline is centrally concerned with psychological issues that arise in connection with the moral evaluation of actions. It deals with the psychological presuppositions of valid morality, that is, with assumptions it seems necessary for us to make in order for there to be such a thing as objective or binding moral requirements: for example, if we lack free will or are all incapable of unselfishness, then it is not clear how morality can really apply to (...) human beings. Moral psychology also deals with what one might call the psychological accompaniments of actual right, or wrong, action, for example, with questions about the nature and possibility of moral weakness or self-deception, and with questions about the kinds of motives that ought to motivate moral agents. Moreover, in the approach to ethics known as ‘virtue ethics’ questions about right and wrong action merge with questions about the motives, dispositions, and abilities of moral agents, and moral psychology plays a more central role than it does in other forms of ethical theory. (shrink)

_Jung, Psychology, Postmodernity_ explores points of confluence and, more often, contradictions between Jungian and postmodern ideas. Throughout the book Raya Jones examines how personal meaning emerges in human activity. Jung addressed this in terms of symbol formation, with particular attention to dreams, myths, art and other fantasy productions. Postmodern psychologists tend to address issues of meaning in terms of peoples self-understanding and identity construction, with a focus on self-positioning in actual conversation or on autobiographical narratives. Jones draws (...) a line of critical comparison between postmodern psychology and Jung’s descriptions of the symbolic dimension, myth, and the structure of the psyche. The book culminates with an evaluation of Jung’s psychic energy concept, for which there is no direct counterpart in postmodern psychology. _Jung, Psychology, Postmodernity_ is an original critique of two key moments in the history of psychology. It will be welcomed by Jungians, as well as psychotherapists, and students of psychology. (shrink)

It has been hypothesized that actors tend to attribute behavior to the situation whereas observers tend to attribute behavior to the person (Jones & Nisbett 1972). The authors argue that this simple hypothesis fails to capture the complexity of actual actor-observer differences in people’s behavioral explanations. A new framework is proposed in which reason explanations are distinguished from explanations that cite causes, especially stable traits. With this framework in place, it becomes possible to show that there are a number of (...) distinct actorobserver asymmetries in explanation, each stemming from a distinct psychological process by which explanations are generated. (shrink)

Aquinas's argument against the possibility of genuine self-hatred runs counter to modern intuitions about self-hatred as an explanatorily central notion in psychology, and as an effect of alienation. Aquinas's argument does not deny that persons experience hatred for themselves. It can be read either as the claim that the self-hater mistakes what she feels toward herself as hatred, or that, though she hates what she believes is her "self," she actually hates only traits of herself. (...) I argue that the argument fails on both readings. The first reading entails that all passions are really self-love, and so is incompatible with Aquinas's own "cognitivist" view of what it is that distinguishes specific passions in experience. The second reading entails that persons have no phenomenal access to "self," rendering self-reference--how it is that the self can be an intentional object of conscious mental states---a mystery. Augustine's claim, which Aquinas accepts on authority, that all sin originates in inordinate self-love seems to entail the impossibility of genuine self-hatred because both thinkers fail to distinguish between two distinct forms of self-love: amor concupiscentiae and amor benevolentiae. (shrink)

Most previous research on self-disclosure (SD) focused on its perceived retrospective aspects using self-report questionnaires. Few studies investigated actual SD as reflected in interpersonal interaction. We propose a comprehensive approach that combines new objective and dynamic measures of SD that evaluate situated SD with the traditional measures that evaluate stable SD properties. As SD is essentially verbal, we build on linguistic parameters for assessing actual SD, including acoustic features such as intonation and fluency, and verbal features such as (...) the particular choice of words. Critically, the new measures highlight SD here and now and may reveal transient situational factors that affect it, such as the dynamics of interpersonal interaction. Based on these measures, we propose a 3-dimensional evaluation that can portray different profiles of SD and offer a better prediction of SD behavior in different situations. The theoretical and clinical implications of the proposed approach are discussed. (shrink)

IntroductionHistory of depression symptoms, including before and during pregnancy, has been identified as an important risk factor for postpartum depression symptoms. This condition has also been associated with diverse implications, namely, on the quality of mother–infant bonding. Moreover, the role of self-criticism on PPD has been recently found in several studies. However, the link between these factors has not been explored yet. Furthermore, anxiety symptoms in postpartum has been less studied.MethodsThis study analyzed whether the history of depression symptoms predicted (...) mother–infant bonding, via self-criticism and PPD symptoms. The same model was repeated with a history of anxiety and postpartum anxiety symptoms. A total of 550 mothers of infants <24 months old participated in this cross-sectional study and answered an online survey.ResultsThrough a parallel–serial mediation model, the results show that in a first step, self-criticism dimensions of inadequate-self, hated-self, and reassuring-self, and in a second step, PPD symptoms, mediate the relationship between the history of depression symptoms and mother–infant bonding. However, the relationship between the history of anxiety symptoms and bonding is not mediated by all the considered chain of mediators, being only mediated by one of the self-criticism dimensions, inadequate self.ConclusionsThe current study confirmed the association of history of both depression and anxiety with mother–infant bonding. While in the case of history of anxiety symptoms, the relation was only mediated by inadequate self-dimension of self-criticism, in the case of history of depression symptoms, the relation was mediated by self-criticism and postpartum depressive symptoms. The buffering effect of reassuring-self on bonding and negative affect was also evidenced. Psychological and preventive interventions should address this evidence to target interventions for mother–infant bonding problems in accordance with previous and actual current maternal risk factors. (shrink)

A guide to retelling your personal, family, and cultural stories to transform your life, your relationships, and the world [bullet] Applies the latest neuroscience research on memory, brain mapping, and brain plasticity to the field of narrative therapy [bullet] Details mind-mapping and narrative therapy techniques that use story to change behavior patterns in ourselves, our relationships, and our communities [bullet] Explores how narrative therapy can help replace dysfunctional cultural stories with ones that build healthier relationships with each other and the (...) planet We are born into a world of stories that quickly shapes our behavior and development without our conscious awareness. By retelling our personal, family, and cultural narratives we can transform the patterns of our own lives as well as the patterns that shape our communities and the larger social worlds in which we interact. Applying the latest neuroscience research on memory, brain mapping, and brain plasticity to the field of narrative therapy, Lewis Mehl-Madrona and Barbara Mainguy explain how the brain is specialized in the art of story-making and story-telling. They detail mind-mapping and narrative therapy techniques that use story to change behavior patterns in ourselves, our relationships, and our communities. They explore studies that reveal how memory works through story, how the brain recalls things in narrative rather than lists, and how our stories modify our physiology and facilitate health or disease. Drawing on their decades of experience in narrative therapy, the authors examine the art of helping people to change their story, providing brain-mapping practices to discover your inner storyteller and test if the stories you are living are functional or dysfunctional, healing or destructive. They explain how to create new characters and new stories, ones that excite you, help you connect with yourself, and deepen your intimate connections with others. Detailing how shared stories and language form culture, the authors also explore how narrative therapy can help replace dysfunctional cultural stories with those that offer templates for healthier relationships with each other and the planet. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.2 (2002) 123-125 [Access article in PDF] The Self as Relatum in Life and Language Grant Gillett THE STUDY REPORTED by van Staden is extremely interesting to any psychological theorist influenced by Jacques Lacan because of Lacan's insistence that the unconscious is not only structured like a language but actually reflects and is produced by linguistic interactions between the subject and others.The distinction (...) he draws, on the basis of Frege's analysis of logical and grammatical structure, is not straightforwardly evident on a superficial inspection of the sentences concerned. It is also less clear than the agent-patient or subject-object distinction that one might look for on the basis of considering the action being performed. van Staden makes both of these points in the course of illustrating the relevant deep grammatical property on which the study turns. In doing so he engages with the subtle work on subject and object by Strawson (1959) who was one of the first, in the "descriptive metaphysics" of Individuals, to explore the resonance between what we might call (after Frege) "logical grammar" and the deep metaphysical structure of our thought. Strawson noted that the position of grammatical subject in a sentence was typically occupied by a particular or individual substance rather than the accident or property of a substance so that the subject predicate structure of language reflects a basic feature of our world picture whereby the world is seen to be populated by particular objects that instance universal features.Chomsky is the other player whose thought is important in this area in that he argues that we have an innate sense of deep structure, which allows us to disambiguate any sentence so as to reveal the state of affairs that is being represented. Thus we discern that what is denoted by "John loves Mary" is the same thought as that conveyed by "Mary is loved by John." van Staden focuses on something more general—the deep structure that expresses semantic relations or positions. This is not the same as the agent or the simply grammatical subject and van Staden calls it the owner of the relation involved as distinct from the accident of that relation. The terms are well chosen because ownership is a term a la mode in postmodern thought to express the relationship of a human being to the events and attributes associated with him or her. When we look at this subtle grammatological or semantic feature of language we see that the linguistic feature in question is the kind of thing that could easily be overlooked were it not for a post-Fregean analysis of the type van Staden offers.The content that van Staden identifies in relation to what is signified or represented by an utterance is difficult to characterize. It is not what Frege would call logical content in that it does not contribute to the truth value of any of the propositions concerned. It is also problematic to call it psychological content because it is not part of the conscious message conveyed by the utterance. Nevertheless, the study concerned raises [End Page 123] the possibility that it is psychic in a very significant way, which is best approached by considering the relationships between language and the unconscious.Chomsky is regarded as having defined a number of linguistic operations that take propositional or meaningful content and transform it into the form in which it is uttered. The relevant cognitive operations are usually regarded as being performed by the cognitive unconscious, which in some sense applies the rules of grammar to yield well-formed utterances on the basis of speaker intentions. In any event, nobody would seriously question the idea that there are unconscious operations that underpin the production of grammatically structured utterances.If we add to this the possibility that a more dynamic aspect to the unconscious has a role to play in the semantic content of our utterances, then a fruitful line of thought begins to emerge. The dynamic unconscious has to do with self-image and those influences that form the psyche... (shrink)