This paper surveys and evaluates the answers that philosophers and animal researchers have given to two questions. Do animals have thoughts? If so, are their thoughts conceptual? Along the way, special attention is paid to distinguish debates of substance from mere battles over terminology, and to isolate fruitful areas for future research.

La valeur du concept a donné lieu à de grandes controverses dans la philosophie et la théologie modernes. Alors qu'il déplace l'accent interne du concept au jugement pour parvenir à l'être, Rahner ne désire pas pour autant déprécier le concept. Une tension existe cependant dans sa pensée : tandis qu'il cherche à maintenir le mouvement dynamique de l'intellect qui transcende toute réalité dans sa marche vers l'infini, il entend bien éviter la complète relativisation du concept. L'article étudie la pensée de (...) Rahner sur le concept à travers son œuvre. (shrink)

Carruthers labels as “too strong” the thesis that language is necessary for all conceptual thought. Languageless creatures certainly do think, but when we get clear about what is meant by “conceptual thought,” it appears doubtful that conceptual thought is possible without language.

Romane Clark has complained of the dissimilarity between Sellars’s treatment of conceptual thought and his treatment of sense impressions. For sense impressions are intrinsic to perceptions and, on Sellars’s view, both conceptual thought and perception are species of judgment. In the first section of this paper I want to raise a converse sort of complaint: Sellars offers an ‘adverbial’ theory of sense impressions and a similar account of conceptual thought. But this similarity of treatment (...) is not justified by what Sellars says in its defence. If the adverbial theory of conceptual thought is true, as I believe it is, then a number of consequences, important for the philosophy of action, follow. Sellars traces some of these in his paper “Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person.” It would be desirable, therefore, if the adverbial theory of conceptual thought could be made secure. This is attempted in the second section and, in conclusion, the power of the theory is exhibited by directing it briefly at a long-standing problem in the philosophy of logic. (shrink)

Romane Clark has complained of the dissimilarity between Sellars’s treatment of conceptual thought and his treatment of sense impressions. For sense impressions are intrinsic to perceptions and, on Sellars’s view, both conceptual thought and perception are species of judgment. In the first section of this paper I want to raise a converse sort of complaint: Sellars offers an ‘adverbial’ theory of sense impressions and a similar account of conceptual thought. But this similarity of treatment (...) is not justified by what Sellars says in its defence. If the adverbial theory of conceptual thought is true, as I believe it is, then a number of consequences, important for the philosophy of action, follow. Sellars traces some of these in his paper “Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person.” It would be desirable, therefore, if the adverbial theory of conceptual thought could be made secure. This is attempted in the second section and, in conclusion, the power of the theory is exhibited by directing it briefly at a long-standing problem in the philosophy of logic. (shrink)

This paper explores the accounts of conceptual thought of Peter John Olivi (1248–1298) and Peter Auriol (1280–1322). While both thinkers are known for their criticism of representationalist theories of perception, it is argued that they part ways when it comes to analyzing conceptual cognition. To account for the human capacity for conceptual thought, Olivi is happy to make a number of concessions to indirect realist theories of representation. Insofar as he criticizes a specific branch of (...) indirect realism about conceptual thought, he does so for theological rather than strictly epistemological reasons. This goes to qualify recent philosophical interpretations of Olivi’s ‘Tractatus de verbo.’ By contrast, Auriol’s account of conceptual thought is thoroughly direct realist. According to Auriol, the natures of external things themselves appear to us directly in conceptual cognition, without the mediation of inner images or other representational devices. (shrink)

It is a challenge in teaching early modern philosophy to balance historical faithfulness to the arguments and concerns of early modern philosophers and interpreting them as relevant to the kinds of thinking that contemporary undergraduate students find plausible. Early modern philosophy is unique, however, in applying modern scientific method directly to problems concerning nonphysical aspects of reality that our contemporary scientific thought, and with it mainstream contemporary culture, no longer find amenable in their own, independent right to reliable reasoned (...) approaches. At the same time, early modern philosophy often also takes seriously purely conceptual or logically consequential thought in the investigation of these topics, as our mainstream contemporary culture does not. This kind of thought, we argue, is distinctive of philosophy in general and appropriate to nonphysical aspects of reality. Early modern philosophy, then, offers a bridge between the kind of reasoned, objective thought our mainstream culture finds plausible and thought about nonphysical reality or, in general, the thought that characterizes philosophy. (shrink)

This book offers a theory of how human conceptual life begins, and shows how perceptual information becomes transformed into concepts. Drawing on extensive research, Mandler describes the development of preverbal concept formation, inductive inference, and recall, and explains how these processes form the conceptual basis for language and adult thought.

The paper is on the role of complex thought in the development of thought and scientific knowledge. According to Vigotsky, the complex thought is the first phase in the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of human thought. It is in this sense pre-conceptual. Also, according to Vigotsky, the complex thought has its internal genesis which begins with associative complexes and ends in pseudo-concepts. Complex also an explanatory role in scientific thought. Complex thought ppears on (...) all levels and stages of the development of scientific knowledge. Metaphors may appear in the complex thought as a dominant mode of thought or in the conceptual structure as the auxiliary in the explanation. Analogies present a certain structuration of the complex thought, which contributes to the creation of conceptual structure. The place of analogy is thus between a complex thought and conceptual thought. (shrink)

Models of working memory challenge some aspects of Carruthers’ account but enhance others. Although the nature of the phonological store and central executive appear fully congruent with Carruthers’ proposal, current models of the visuo-spatial sketchpad provide a better account of skilled action. However, Carruthers’ model may provide a way around the homunculus problem that has plagued models of working memory.

This paper delves into one particular topic within this Buddhist theory of cognition. I examine a single argument by Phywa pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109–1169) contained within his famous epistemology text, the Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel, drawing out the philosophical implications that this argument has on his theory of cognition and his account of ontological dependence. I make the case that Phywa pa’s argument fails to explain adequately the nature of the relation between certain cognitive episodes and (...) the contents of those episodes. In addition, I will show that Phywa pa is forced to accept an arguably dubious version of externalism about mental content. (shrink)

Further Thoughts on Counterfactuals, Compatibilism, Conceptual Mismatches, and Choices: Response to Commentaries Content Type Journal Article Pages 31-34 DOI 10.1007/s12152-010-9067-3 Authors Roy F. Baumeister, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA A. William Crescioni, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA Jessica L. Alquist, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA Journal Neuroethics Online ISSN 1874-5504 Print ISSN 1874-5490 Journal Volume Volume 4 Journal Issue Volume 4, Number 1.

In recent years a lot of metaphilosophical attention has been paid to the role of thought experiments in philosophical inquiry. According to the popular picture, thought experiments are among the most prominent methods for conceptual analysis. However, it is also often claimed that thought experiments in ethics differ from those that are used in other fields of philosophy as being of a different nature—they are not about the concepts, but rather about the things in the world (...) (what those things exactly are depends on the particular metaethical theory one subscribes to). In the paper I argue that this claim is wrong. Conceptual analysis is of a huge value to ethics for it substantially helps to clarify the concepts one uses while making a moral judgment. It is very often the case that the apparent moral disagreement between two subjects turns out to be superficial since it is rooted in the misunderstanding on the conceptual level, for example when one uses some concept equivocally. Moreover, through thought experiments conceptual analysis can help to bring out the tacit assumptions that relate to the concepts involved. (shrink)

_Historied Thought, Constructed World_ offers a fresh vision: one that engages the reigning philosophies of the West, endorses the radical possibilities of historicity and flux, and reconciles the best themes of Anglo-American and continental European philosophy. Margolis sketches a program for the philosophy of the future, addressing topics such as the historical character of thinking, the intelligible world as artifact, the inseparability of theory and practice, and the reliability of a world without assured changeless structures. Through the use of (...) numbered theorems that construct an interlocking argument, Margolis carefully articulates his distinctive ideas in the context of work by Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, Derrida, Habermas, and Foucault. The discussion includes all the central topics of the philosophical tradition: from science to morality, from language to world, from persons to objects, from nature to culture, from causality to purpose, from change to history. What emerges is an argument against essentialism, one that champions the historicity of thought and cultural constructionism. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is thought to face an ‘implementation challenge’: the challenge of securing uptake of engineered concepts. But is the fact that implementation is challenging really a defect to be overcome? What kind of picture of political life would be implied by making engineering easy to implement? We contend that the ambition to obviate the implementation challenge goes against the very idea of liberal democratic politics. On the picture we draw, the implementation challenge can be overcome by institutionalizing (...) control over conceptual uptake, and there are contexts—such as professions that depend on coordinated conceptual innovation—in which there are good reasons to institutionalize control in this fashion. But the liberal fear of this power to control conceptual uptake ending up in the wrong hands, combined with the democratic demand for freedom of thought as a precondition of genuine consent, yields a liberal democratic rationale for keeping implementation challenging. (shrink)

I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they have owners: persons in interpretational practices. (...) That thesis is grounded on inferentialism and on the endorsement of the idea that "meaning is normative". After having recapitulated this heritage and after having presented that thesis, the paper especially attempts to articulate how, in that framework, we may then positively conceive the relations there are between conceptual mental episodes, intracranial events and inferential behaviour. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the viability and importance of conceptual analysis to philosophical inquiry. My argument proceeds in two steps. In a first step, I argue that we rely on the notions guiding how we do and would apply our terms in order to evaluate the counterfactual conditionals we find at the heart of philosophical thought experiments. In a second step, I argue that our notions determine what the relevant terms mean in our mouth. In order to (...) defend the resulting neo-descriptivist semantics, I put forth an epistemic argument for descriptivism—the argument from communication. I conclude that philosophical thought experiments are exercises in conceptual analysis. (shrink)

The idea that claims about the physical world might be arrived through a priori reasoning has a long history in physics. But it is clear that empiricist notions of the nature of science, and in particular the empirical nature of physics, have held sway in this century. Yet, in the idea of thought experiments in science, we might find the survival of earlier a priori reasoning to the truth of claims about the physical world. This paper challenges the notion (...) that science can be understood as a purely empirical endeavor and points out what reforms would be necessary for teaching the image of science to our young. (shrink)

On the denial of traditional thought as philosophy Scholars, including philosophers, tend to squirm a little at the mention of African philosophy, ...

This paper is a new non-descriptivist defense of non- conceptualism, based on a new interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of concepts. We advance the following claim: What distinguishes non-conceptual from conceptual singular representations is the way partial representations of the object’s features are integrated into the whole representation of the object: while at the non-conceptual level this integration takes the form of images of the object’s features that are stored and projected, at the conceptual level this integration (...) takes the form of the recognition that those features are properties of a same object, what Kant calls “synthetic unity of Aperception”. (shrink)

This paper claims that palliative care is a suitable approach for offering comprehensive support to patients with life-threatening illness and unavoidable asthenia, to enhance their quality of life in aging and chronic illness. There are however some conceptual barriers to accessing that care on the Chinese Mainland: Death-denying culture and society; Misguidance and malpractice derived from the biomedical model; Prejudice against PC and certain deviant understandings of filial piety culture. To counter these obstacles, the study introduces the philosophy of (...) Chinese Taoist Chuang-tze to enlighten the public from ignorance and remove some illusions about death and dying; inspire people to face and accept illness and death calmly, and keep harmony and inner peace of mind to alleviate suffering, with the aim of providing wisdom and a shift of attitude toward life and death. Chuang-tze’s thoughts are consistent with the provision of palliative care, and to a certain degree, can promote its acceptability and delivery, and the conception of good death in practice. (shrink)

Roger Schank's research in AI takes seriously the ideas that understanding natural language involves mapping its expressions into an internal representation scheme and that these internal representations have a syntax appropriate for computational operations. It therefore falls within the computational approach to the study of mind. This paper discusses certain aspects of Schank's approach in order to assess its potential adequacy as a (partial) model of cognition. This version of the Language of Thought hypothesis encounters some of the same (...) difficulties that arise for Fodor's account. (shrink)

The Thought of Matter advances current debates around materialism, arguing that matter is the ‘other’ of thought and, therefore, requires a method that allows that other to emerge in thought without being appropriated by it.

Your conceptual toolkit for the study of political thoughtPraise for the first edition'This seems really to have been written with the first-year student in mind. The editors write in a way that is clear, intelligent and engaging without being at all condescending.'Politics Studies Review New for this edition* Brand new chapter on international political thought, reflecting one of the most striking developments in contemporary political theoryThis textbook gives you all the vocabulary you need - political, conceptual and (...) historical - to engage confidently and deeply with political thought and the moral and political worlds in which we live.It traces the history of political thought from Plato and Aristotle to Kymlicka and Rorty, following a unique dual structure that introduces key thinkers and core concepts together, making it suitable for any course structure. (shrink)

Review of Baig, M., & Gleave, R. (Eds.). (2021). Violence in Islamic Thought from European Imperialism to the Post-Colonial Era (Vol. 3). Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP.

How can thought experiments lead to new empirical knowledge if they do not make use of empirical information? This puzzle has been widely discussed in the philosophy of science. It arises in conceptual metaphor research as well and is especially important for the clarification of its empirical foundations. The aim of the paper is to suggest a possible solution to the puzzle of thought experiments in conceptual metaphor research. The solution rests on the application of a (...) novel metatheoretical framework that conceives of linguistic theorizing as a process of plausible argumentation. The central idea of the solution is that through the dynamic feedback mechanism of the cyclic, prismatic and retrospective re-evaluation of information, thought experiments in conceptual metaphor research may indirectly supply the process of plausible argumentation with empirical knowledge. (shrink)