Recent third person approaches to thought experiments and conceptual analysis through the method of surveys are motivated by and motivate skepticism about the traditional first person method. I argue that such surveys give no good ground for skepticism, that they have some utility, but that they do not represent a fundamentally new way of doing philosophy, that they are liable to considerable methodological difficulties, and that they cannot be substituted for the first person method, since the a priori (...) knowledge which is our object in conceptual analysis can be acquired only from the first person standpoint. (shrink)

This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point (...) with a historical debate between Gestalt psychologist and atomists, both of whom used first-person methods to investigate perception. (shrink)

In this commentary, I ask six questions concerning the implications of Philipp Berghofer’s experience-first approach for the epistemology of science, in general, and that of quantum mechanics, in particular. His responses will deepen my comprehension of his ideas. I also anticipate that these questions will aid him in further refining and strengthening his arguments.

This book offers a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that seeks to clarify why certain experiences are a source of immediate justification and what role experiences play in gaining (scientific) knowledge. Based on the author's account of experiential justification, this book exemplifies how a phenomenological experience-first epistemology can epistemically ground the individual sciences. More precisely, it delivers a comprehensive picture of how we get from epistemology to the foundations of mathematics and physics. The book is unique (...) as it utilizes methods and insights from the phenomenological tradition in order to make progress in current analytic epistemology. It serves as a starting point for re-evaluating the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to current analytic epistemology and making an important step towards paving the way for future mutually beneficial discussions. This is achieved by exemplifying how current debates can benefit from ideas, insights, and methods we find in the phenomenological tradition. (shrink)

This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience, and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View. (...) It then challenges two arguments which purport to show that emotional experience is not a source of reasons for evaluative belief. The first argument claims that because normative why-questions are always appropriate in the case of emotions, then emotions can never be conclusive reasons for corresponding evaluative beliefs. The second purports to show that appeal to emotional experience as a source of reasons for evaluative beliefs renders emotions problematically self-justifying, and since emotions cannot be self-justifying, they cannot provide any sort of reason for corresponding evaluative beliefs. This article responds to these arguments, and in doing so shows there is still much to be learned about the epistemology of emotional experience by drawing analogies with perceptual experience. (shrink)

This title was first published in 2002. This book builds on contemporary discussion of 'mysticism' and religious experience by examining the process and content of 'religious knowing' in classical and modern Advaita. Drawing from the work of William Alston and Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Forsthoefel examines key streams of Advaita with special reference to the conditions, contexts, and scope of epistemic merit in religious experience. Forsthoefel uniquely employs specific analytical categories of contemporary Western epistemologies as heuristics to examine (...) the cognitive dimension of religious experience in Indian Vedanta. Showing the developing nuances in the analysis of religious experience in the thought of Shankara and his immediate disciples (Suresvara and Padmapada) as well as in the teaching of Ramana Maharshi, an understudied but important South Indian saint of the 20th century, this book offers a substantial contribution to studies of Indian philosophy as well as to contemporary philosophy of religion. Using the tools of exegesis and comparative philosophy, Forsthoefel argues for a careful justification of claims following religious experience, even if such claims involve, as they do in the Advaita, a paradoxical 'knowing beyond knowledge'. (shrink)

This paper argues for two interrelated claims. The first is that the most innovative contribution of Timothy Williamson, Herman Cappelen, and Max Deutsch in the debate about the epistemology of thought experiments is not the denial of intuition and the claim of the irrelevance of experimental philosophy but the claim of epistemological continuity and the rejection of philosophical exceptionalism. The second is that a better way of implementing the claim of epistemological continuity is not Deutsch and Cappelen’s argument (...) view or Williamson’s folk psychological view. This is so because while the argument view makes the basis of the relevant classificational judgement evidentially too demanding; the folk psychological view makes it too weak and error-prone to count as an adequate explanation. Drawing from a certain reading of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics that flowers in Miranda Fricker and John McDowell, I argue for the reason-responsiveness view. Like the extant views, the reason-responsiveness view vindicates the claim of epistemological continuity. But unlike the extant views, it does not share those problematic features. Further, I show that the reason-responsiveness view offers a way for champions of the claim of epistemological continuity to resist Avner Baz’s objection to the claim of epistemological continuity and his objection to the philosophical use of thought experiments while taking on board some attractive elements of his view. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show how thought experiments help us learn about laws. After providing examples of this kind of nomic illumination in the first section, I canvass explanations of our modal knowledge and opt for an evolutionary account. The basic application is that the laws of nature have led us to develop rough and ready intuitions of physical possibility which are then exploited by thought experimenters to reveal some of the very laws responsible for those (...) intuitions. The good news is that natural selection ensures a degree of reliability for the intuitions. The bad news is that the evolutionary account seems to limit the range of reliable thought experiment to highly practical and concrete contexts. In the fifth section, I provide reasons for thinking that we are not as slavishly limited as a pessimistic construal of natural selection suggests. Nevertheless, I promote the idea that biology is a promising source of predictions and diagnoses of thought experiment failures. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show how thought experiments help us learn about laws. After providing examples of this kind of nomic illumination in the first section, I canvass explanations of our modal knowledge and opt for an evolutionary account. The basic application is that the laws of nature have led us to develop rough and ready intuitions of physical possibility which are then exploited by thought experimenters to reveal some of the very laws responsible for those (...) intuitions. The good news is that natural selection ensures a degree of reliability for the intuitions. The bad news is that the evolutionary account seems to limit the range of reliable thought experiment to highly practical and concrete contexts. In the fifth section, I provide reasons for thinking that we are not as slavishly limited as a pessimistic construal of natural selection suggests. Nevertheless, I promote the idea that biology is a promising source of predictions and diagnoses of thought experiment failures. (shrink)

In the Western tradition, at least since the 14th century, the philosophy of knowledge has been built around the idea of knowledge as a representation [BOU 99]. The question of the evaluation of knowledge refers at the same time (1) to the object represented (which one does one represent?), (2) to the process of knowledge formation, in particular with the role of the knowing subject (which one does one represent and how does one represent it?), and finally (3) to the (...) relationship between the representation and the represented object. Criteria of evaluation such as “validity”, “adequacy” or “truth”, as mentioned in [AMB 07], make sense only with respect to these three dimensions. An evaluation can thus (1) depend on the ontological nature of the object of knowledge, (2) relate to the relationship between subject and object—including the structures (cognitive, social) which organize this relationship, or (3) relate to the relation of similarity between the object and its representation as well. The relevant criteria of evaluation thus depend on the points of view adopted on these questions. As there are indeed a plurality of points of view in this field, the goal of this appendix is to summarize, as briefly as possible, the various positions adopted by the philosophers and to refer to the relevant texts of reference for more information (for a first outline [CHA 76, SCH 01]). The first section 1 introduces useful discussions about the philosophy of theoretical knowledge and general epistemology, from a quasi-historical perspective. Section two 2 discusses the intermediary but central notion of models. Section three 3, more exploratory, introduces an approach to simulation as “concrete experiment”. It suggests that such a frequent claim in the literature, when precisely evaluated, can, to some extent, renew both the representational and the linguistic views on simulation. (shrink)

Can epistemologies anchor processes of social inequality? In this paper, we consider how epistemological dominance in science, engineering, and health fields perpetuates disadvantages for students who enter higher education with alternative epistemologies. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Native American students enrolled at two US research universities who adhere to or revere indigenous epistemologies, we find that epistemological dominance in SE&H degree programs disadvantages students through three processes. First, it delegitimizes Native epistemologies and marginalizes and silences students who value them. (...) Second, in the process of imparting these dominant scientific epistemologies, SE&H courses sometimes require students to participate in pedagogical practices that challenge indigenous ways of knowing. Third, students encounter epistemological imperialism: most students in the sample are working to earn SE&H degrees in order to return to tribal communities to “give back,” yet, because the US laws regulating the practice of SE&H extend onto tribal lands, students must earn credentials in epistemologies that devalue, delegitimate, and threaten indigenous knowledge ways to practice on tribal lands. We examine how students navigate these experiences, discuss the implications of these findings for SE&H education, and describe how epistemological dominance may serve as a mechanism of inequality reproduction more broadly. (shrink)

According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), ordinary perceptual experience ensures an opportunity for perceptual knowledge. In recent years, two distinct models of this idea have been developed. For Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012, Oxford University Press; Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing, 2012, Princeton University Press), perception provides distinctly powerful reasons for belief. By contrast, Clayton Littlejohn (Journal of Philosophical Research, 41, 201; Knowledge first, 2017, Oxford University Press; Normativity: Epistemic and practical, 2018, Oxford University (...) Press) and Alan Millar (The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations, 2010, Oxford University Press; Philosophical Issues, 21, 332) argue for a version of ED in terms of a “knowledge first” program, on which perception directly provides knowledge, without relying on antecedent reasons or justification. Specifically, both Littlejohn and Millar argue that “reasons first” ED faces a problematic regress. In this article, I defend “reasons first” ED by arguing that experience provides a type of reason that escapes the regress. I also argue that reasons are a fundamental aspect of ED, especially in its anti-skeptical stance. (shrink)

In the Western tradition, at least since the 14th century, the philosophy of knowledge has been built around the idea of knowledge as a representation [Boulnois 1999]. The question of the evaluation of knowledge refers at the same time (1) to the object represented (which one does one represent?), (2) to the process of knowledge formation, in particular with the role of the knowing subject (which one does one represent and how does one represent it?), and finally (3) to the (...) relationship between the representation and the represented object. Criteria of evaluation such as “validity”, “adequacy” or “truth”, as mentioned in chapter 4, make sense only with respect to these three dimensions. An evaluation can thus (1) depend on the ontological nature of the object of knowledge, (2) relate to the relationship between subject and object—including the structures (cognitive, social) which organize this relationship, or (3) relate to the relation of similarity between the object and its representation as well. The relevant criteria of evaluation thus depend on the points of view adopted on these questions. As there are indeed a plurality of points of view in this field, the goal of this appendix is to summarize, as briefly as possible, the various positions adopted by the philosophers and to refer to the relevant texts of reference for more information. The first section introduces useful discussions about the philosophy of theoretical knowledge and general epistemology, from a quasi-historical perspective. Section two discusses the intermediary but central notion of models. Section three, more exploratory, intro-duces an approach to simulation as “concrete experiment”. It suggests that such a frequent claim in the literature, when precisely evaluated, can, to some extent, renew both the representational and the linguistic views on simulation. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there are two kinds of epistemic reasons. One kind is irreducibly first personal -- what I call deliberative reasons. The other kind is third personal -- what I call theoretical reasons. I argue that attending to this distinction illuminates a host of problems in epistemology in general and in religious epistemology in particular. These problems include (a) the way religious experience operates as a reason for religious belief, (b) how we (...) ought to understand religious testimony, (c) how religious authority can be justified, (d) the problem of religious disagreement, and (e) the reasonableness of religious conversion. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea (...) that consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

Albert Einstein insists that his epistemology made his discovery of relativity possible. He believed it was his understanding of the relationship of experience and reason that allowed him to reconsider certain “truths” of physics. Specifically, he believed that reality and thought were independent but related, and that conceptual systems are independent of but conditioned by experience. Failure to understand the relation between experience and reason had, Einstein believed, limited progress in science. His understanding of the relation, (...) on the other hand, enabled him to formulate relativity theory and therefore provides one example of the relevance of philosophy to scientific inquiry. When Albert Einstein discussed his discoveries in physics, particularly the theory of relativity, he often began with an explanation of his epistemology and referred to thinkers like Hume and Kant. Einstein may have been a physicist, but he had definite ideas about how we know and regarded epistemological theories as crucial to science, especially to physics. Indeed, he placed such importance on the question of how we know that the discussion of his work in his “Autobiographical Notes” begins with the question, “What, precisely, is ‘thinking?'” (1951, 7). The correct answer to this philosophical question, he believed, makes progress in science possible. The present article focuses on the relationship of the two elements, experience and reason, in Einstein's epistemology. Einstein himself frequently concentrates on what he characterizes as “the eternal antithesis between the two inseparable components of our knowledge, the empirical and the rational” (1934b, 271) in his papers and lectures on physics, for he regards them as independent in origin but related in scientific truth. His insistence that experience and reason do not determine one another yet must be related proved, for him, to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the formulation of relativity theory and for scientific progress in general. The discussion of the relationship has four parts. First, experience and reason are explained; included in this explanation are Einstein's reasons for maintaining that the two are independent. The second section discusses the connection between the two that produces truth and knowledge. The third section follows with discussion of the way that Einstein believes reason can be both conditioned by and independent of experience. Finally, the significance of this understanding of the relation for relativity theory is examined. (shrink)

Thought experiments play a prominent role in philosophical inquiry. And yet we lack a good understanding of how they work and how they are supposed to supply evidence or knowledge in inquiry. This dissertation offers a novel account of the epistemology of philosophical thought experiments, namely, the reason-responsiveness view. The view is inspired by a virtue ethical tradition that flowers in John McDowell (1994) and Miranda Fricker (2007). Drawing on this virtue ethical tradition, I argue that knowing in philosophical (...) thought experiments is achieved through the exercise of the virtue of sensibility, which has three distinct features. First, it is social in origin, acquired through our training in a human language and as ordinary members of a community. Second, it is recognitional in the sense that although our sensibility gives us the ability to classify situations, whether real or hypothetical and to resonate with rational considerations for or against a given classificational judgement (i.e., the judgements we form in thought experiments), it does not equip us with a reflective ability to fully articulate those reasons in an infallible way. And third, it allows us to project across various contexts, both in real and in hypothetical situations. And this ability to project, I argue further, does not come from the ability of people to grasp concepts or to have certain mental episodes or phenomenology or to grasp universals or to have mastery of the application conditions of rules or from belonging to some exclusive club or from enjoying a certain superior access to concepts or access to philosophically interesting phenomena not available to ordinary people. On the contrary, that we do comes down to “our sharing routes of interest and feeling, mode of response, senses of humour and of significance, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the while of organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life” (Cavell, 1969, p.52). The account is then used to shore up the claim of epistemological continuity, which asserts that the epistemology of thought experiments is an extension of social cognition or social epistemology (Cappelen, 2012; Deutsch, 2015; Williamson 2007), and to offer a claim of epistemological-continuity-style defence of philosophical thought experiments against two major objections in the literature, namely, the negative experimentalist challenge (see Machery, 2017) and the ordinary language challenge ( Baz, 2016, 2017). (shrink)

"The Personal is Political": This was an often-heard slogan of feminist groups in the late sixties and early seventies. The slogan is no doubt open to many interpretations. There is one interpretation which touches on the epistemology of social facts, viz. the slogan claims that in assessing the features of a political system, personal experiences have privileged evidentiary value. For instancte, in the face of third person reports about political corruption, I may remain unmoved in my belief that the (...) political powers are morally upstanding, and it is only when I myself am adversely affected, that I come to change my views. There are two standard patterns of explanation of this type of belief formation: (i) We know that third-person reports may be lessreliable than first-person experiences; (ii) If the third-person reports are no less reliable than first-person experiences, we may just be dealing with a standard pattern of epistemic irrationality. However, we argue that there is also a much more surprising pattern of explanation: under certain conditions, a Bayesian argument can be proffered to the effect that it is rational to change one's beliefs in the face of personal experiences and not in the face of third-person reports, even if these experiences and reports are equally reliable. Hence, the feminist slogan (at least on one particular interpretation of it) receives unexpected support from Bayesian comers. We also show that this pattern of explanation has surprising repercussions on the question of the evidentiary value of miracles in philosophy of religion. (shrink)

The question asked in this paper is: How can we investigate our phenomenal experience in ways that are accurate, in principle repeatable, and produce experiences that help clarify what we understand about the processes of sensing, perceiving, moving, and being in the world? This sounds like an impossible task, given that introspection has so often in scientific circles been considered to be unreliable, and that first-person accounts are often coloured by mistaken ideas about what and how we are (...) experiencing. The first-person experiments I suggest are different from experiments done in the psychology laboratory in that there is no narrowing down of the experiments to looking at a singular aspect of a question, and that they are to be carried out in most instances in a natural or specially structured environment without strict task controls or statistical experimental design. There is no intent to replace formal second- and third-person investigation, but to use a phenomenological approach to conjoin with hard research, and to suggest ways of awareness training that can enhance the skills of researchers. I take as a model an informal phenomenological approach for experimentation. I also suggest that it is possible through directing and broadening the attention process to turn consciousness towards what is non-conscious or unattended to in order to develop an improved sensory awareness and an ability to be open to experiencing without prejudging and without expectations. The idea is to go back to experience without first creating a theoretical stance from which to interpret what happens. I conclude with some other examples of this approach. (shrink)

Religious experience differs from the empirical experience of the subject by psychologicality, the transcendental vitality of understanding objective phenomena. The main criterion of a person's religious experience is his belief in the truth of the existing a priori and the interrelations of things and phenomena of the objective and subjective world revealed to him in personal experience. Faith is a sense of the interconnection between the subject and the object, which has an experienced transcendental character. Human (...) experience in this respect acts as a factor in the disclosure of depth and effectiveness: a subject-object relationship accepted on faith: the disclosure of the meaning and directions of its development relative to the object of faith; as a set of acts of self-knowledge in the context of the existence of the object and, only thanks to the object of faith, brought into a whole, meaningful existence. Thus, the self-knowledge of a person depends, first of all, on the choice of an object of faith for him, as the meaning of his development. (shrink)

Science aims to transform the subjectivity of individual observations and ideas into more objective and universal knowledge. Yet if there is any area in which first-person experience holds a particularly special and delicate role, it is the sciences of the mind. According to a widespread view, first-person methods were largely discarded from psychology after the fall of introspectionism a century ago and replaced by more objective behavioral measures, a step that some authors have begun to criticize. To (...) examine whether these views are sufficiently informed by actual scientific practice, we conducted a review of methodological approaches in the cognitive science literature. We found that reports of subjective experience are in fact still widely used in a broad variety of different experimental paradigms, both in studies that focus on subjective experience, and in those that make no explicit reference to it. Across these studies, we documented a diverse collection of approaches that leveraged first-person reports, ranging from button presses to unstructured interviews, while continuing to maximise experimental reproducibility. Common to these studies were subjects acting as sensors, intentionally communicating their experience to the experimenter, which we termed “second-person” methods. We conclude that, despite views to the contrary, first-person experience has always been and is still central to investigations of the mind even if it is not recognized as such. We suggest that the conversation ought to be reframed: instead of debating whether to accept subjects’ first-person knowledge we should discuss how best to do so. (shrink)

This book assesses and defends Kant's Critical epistemology, and the rich yet neglected resources it provides for understanding and resolving fundamental issues regarding human experience, perceptual judgment, empirical knowledge and cognitive sciences. Kenneth Westphal first examines Kant's methods and strategies for examining human sensory-perceptual experience, and then examines Kant's central, proper, and subtle attention to judgment, and so to the humanly possible valid use of concepts and principles to judge particulars we confront. This provides a comprehensive (...) account of Kant's anti-Cartesianism, the integrity of his three principles of causal judgment, and Kant's account of disciminatory perceptual-motor behaviour, including both sensory reafference and perceptual affordances. Westphal then defends the significance of Kant's subtle and illuminating account of causal judgment for three main philosophical domains: history and philosophy of science, theory of action and human freedom, and philosophy of mind. Kant's Critical Epistemology will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in Kant and the relations of his thought to contemporary philosophical debates and to the sciences of the mind. (shrink)

While numerous commentators have discussed Kant’s views on mysticism in general, very few of them have examined Kant’s specific views on different types of mystical experience. I suggest that Kant’s views on direct mystical experience differ substantially from his views on indirect mystical experience (IME). In this paper, I focus on Kant’s complex views on IME in both his pre-critical and critical writings and lectures. In the first section, I examine Kant’s early work, Dreams of a (...) Spirit-Seer, where he defends the possibility that the Swedish mystic Emanuel Swedenborg’s alleged visions of the spirit-world are veridical cases of IME. In the second section, I discuss Kant’s views on IME during his critical period. I first argue that the epistemology of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason accommodates the possibility of IME. I then examine Kant’s views on Swedenborgian visions in his lectures from the 1770s to the 1790s and argue that his critical views on Swedenborg are largely continuous with his pre-critical views in Dreams. Finally, I examine passages in Kant’s late works, Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone and The Conflict of the Faculties, where he discusses three non-Swedenborgian types of IME. In the final section, I explore briefly how Kant’s views on IME relate to contemporary debates among analytic philosophers of religion regarding the nature and possibility of mystical experience. (shrink)

The authors provide an overview of philosophical discussions about the roles of experiment in science. First, they cover two approaches that took shape under the heading of “new experimentalism” in the 1980s and 1990s. One approach was primarily concerned with questions about entity realism, robustness, and epistemological strategies. The other has focused on exploratory experiments and the dynamic processes of experimental research as such, highlighting its iterative nature and drawing out the ways in which such research is grounded in (...) experimental systems, concepts and operational definitions. Second, the authors look at more recent philosophical work on the epistemology of causal inference, in particular highlighting discussions in the philosophy of the behavioral and social sciences, concerning the extrapolation from laboratory contexts to the world. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that we can understand how original intentionality (i.e., a genuine mental life) fits into a natural and scientific understanding of the world through an understanding of the import of the intentionality of emotions to our knowledge of the world in which we live. To do so, I first argue that emotions demonstrate our original intentionality (i.e., a genuine mental life). I then explain how the intentionality of emotions is necessary for us to have knowledge (...) of the world in virtue of our emotional responses. I conclude with a brief discussion of how the neuroscience of emotion can help to provide an explanation of how we can know in virtue of our emotional experiences—how epistemology can be naturalized via emotions. (shrink)

I accomplish two things in this paper. I explain the motivation for including experimental research in philosophical projects on epistemic reasons and the basing relation. And I present the first experimental contributions to these projects. The results from two experiments advance our understanding of the ordinary concepts of reasons and basing and set the stage for further research on the topics. More specifically, the results support a causal theory of the basing relation, according to which reasons are causes, and (...) a dualist theory of epistemic reasons, according to which reasons include both psychological and non-psychological items. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 353-358 [Access article in PDF] The Application of Nondual Epistemology to Anomalous Experience in Psychosis Caroline Brett THE COMMENTARIES PROVIDED by Marzanski and Bratton, and McGhee have drawn my attention to several ways in which my analysis could benefit from clarification or supplementation, and the range of the specific phenomena to which it can be applied. Since writing this paper nearly (...) 3 years ago, my own views of the area have developed, and in some aspects, shifted; nevertheless, within this response I shall comment on the specific aspects of the original paper that I feel may have been misunderstood or overlooked by the commentators, and those aspects that benefit from the broader perspective they provided.To clarify the direction of the original paper: I would describe it as an attempt to make a deeper examination of processes involved in some kinds of anomalous experience than is provided by the "cognitive problem-solving model"; in other words, to supplement rather than challenge or undermine this perspective. Moreover, the focus is intended to be more on identifying the point at which the experience, or the response to the experience (more on the relation between these two below) becomes pathological, than on cleanly distinguishing a psychotic state from a mystical one. However, because I do use these terms contrastively throughout the paper, I concede that these aims become blurred and may in fact be indistinguishable.Third, the paper concerns only a relatively narrow arena of both mystical and psychotic phenomenology, selected for the purpose of a tight conceptual analysis and comparability, and possibly suffers a lack of generalizability or scope of application as a result. Most notably, I leave aside the paranoid or persecutory interpretative framework often seen as paradigmatic of the psychotic state (although a brief mention of how emotionally relevant themes may arise out of anomalous cognition is included), focussing instead on the more "Schneiderian" aspects of psychotic phenomenology, in which there is a self-observed alteration of normal experience. 1 It may be an important point of contrast that I do not specifically focus on "hallucinations, voices, and visions" as described by McGhee and, to an extent, Jackson and Fulford. It may also be worth [End Page 353] flagging up the fact that I do not focus on "delusional beliefs" at all, instead choosing to focus on the "delusional mood," which notably does not involve crystallized delusions as such. As a result, the main aim is not to compare two descriptively defined states of mind, as seems to be suggested by McGhee in his commentary, but rather to see to what extent a certain form of experience can be understood within a particular epistemological structure, and the implications of this.Further to this issue, Marzanski and Bratton raise an objection to a view in which a common core of mystical experience is posited; one which could be identified interculturally and independently of "the language and tradition in which the self is formed." They make an important point that the perspective gained by applying the epistemology of Zen Buddhism or Advaita Vedanta may have no authority in helping to understand the locus of pathology in anomalous experiences that have occurred in an individual who is not established in these cultures or traditions or for a person who does not accept these epistemologies in the first place. The issue of the existence of some core mystical experiences that are translated into religious experiences in different cultures is a matter of comparative religion and theology, and outside the scope of this paper (although my own opinion is that such a core exists). In the absence of any argument to support this opinion, it must be conceded that this may severely limit the applicability of my analysis, especially if irreconcilable differences are thought to exist between the epistemologies of, for example, theistic and monistic philosophies. However, I would suggest that whatever wisdom can be gleaned from the various spiritual doctrines in existence around the world with regard to unusual and/or distressing states of mind should be absorbed where... (shrink)

The philosophical transformation carried out Xavier Zubiri, especially in his mature work: Sentient intelligence allows to rethink the bases of rationality in structural unity with the senses, allowing a plurality of ways of accessing reality on its foundation, and surpass, in that way, the monological rationality promoted by positivism and pragmatism. To this end, we move through the different landmarks of Zubiri’s work: first, the primordial apprehension of reality from its multiple sentient openings; then, we stop at the constitution (...) of meaning by logos emphasizing how culture prioritize one type of sense over the rest, forging a type of openness to reality and determining a horizon of meaning for it; later, we inquire into how reason accesses the foundation of the real, this allows us to show how the different rationalities settle their options for meaning. From here we contrast with religious rationality founded on historical-scientific criterion, and a strictly religious one, which, ultimately, allow us to finish systematizing and giving a unity of meaning to the previews proposals that were made. Finally, all this enables us to explore the consequences for a sociology of knowledge, and to think about the conditions of intercultural dialogue, and, subsequently, the scenarios of and interlogical construction. (shrink)

This chapter explores whether and when experience can be evidence. It argues that experiences can be evidence, and that this claim is compatible with just about any epistemological theory. It evaluates the most promising argument for the conclusion that certain experiences (e.g., seeming to see) are always evidence for believing what the experiences represent. While the argument is very promising, one premise needs further defense. The argument also depends on a certain connection between reasonable belief and the first (...) person perspective. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Elizabeth Gould, “The Nomadic Turn: Epistemology, Experience, and Women College Band Directors”Stephen Franklin ZdzinskiI want to thank Elizabeth Gould for providing us with a thought-provoking paper examining the journeys of women university band directors through a post-modernist and feminist perspective. As a music education professor who deals with students from undergraduate through doctoral levels, I have the opportunity to provide professional guidance to many (...) students, both female and male. A number of my female instrumental music education students ask me about becoming high school and university band directors. I want to be honest with them about the realities of the profession, but I want also to encourage them to pursue their [End Page 195] professional dreams and goals despite any potential structural limitations. I found this paper to provide me with very good insights that I can use to advise my students.According to Gould, there are a number of factors that contribute to the under-representation of women in the field of college band directing. For example, we can see that historically the first band directors and instrumental music educators came either from military or professional performance backgrounds and as a result, most instrumental music teachers were initially male. In addition, early college band organizations, particularly marching musical organizations, were entirely male in composition. While these conditions have not continued to the present day, they set the stage for what was to follow.Socialization and Women University Band DirectorsThe different socialization of girls and boys may also be found to play a role in the under-representation of women as university band directors. A number of researchers have found gender differences in instrument selection,1 and other research points to additional familial socialization differences by gender.2According to Paul Woodford,3 the primary socialization of music education majors and the formation of a music teacher's identity occur during their own pre-collegiate schooling. Several researchers have suggested that precollegiate teaching experiences may be influential in decisions to choose music teaching as a career.4 Through countless hours of observation in their own programs, female and male students may be socialized to professional expectations of band directing before they ever enter a university-based instrumental music education program. Sylvia Tibbets, Winifred Shepard and David Hess, Stan Albrecht, Philip Griswold, and Denise Chroback all found that instrumental music teaching was viewed by both children and adults as a masculine profession.5 Woodford found that many of our current teacher education programs merely recreate existing practices, thus replicating inequitable situations in regards to opportunities for women in the profession of high school and college band directing.6After graduation, the outcome of a gender-influenced instrument choice may be inhibiting the career aspirations of future women band directors. Research by Barry Kopetz examined the influences of gender, school type, and instrument on instrumental music teacher selection by school principals.7 While significant gender differences in favor of males were found, they accounted for only 3% of the variance in teacher selection. Also important was the type of school being attended (performance versus music education institution), also accounting for 3% of the variance. Instrument, on the other hand, accounted for 10% of the variance in teacher selection, with teachers being selected in the following order: [End Page 196] trumpet, clarinet, oboe, and violin. If one examines the instruments commonly played by female instrumentalists, the research by Kopetz may suggest that gender discrimination in band hiring may in fact be exaggerated by playing the "wrong" instrument. If the student in addition comes from a performance-oriented school, that is considered by hiring officials as another negative factor that reduces their job possibilities.Structural Difficulties and Woman University Band DirectorsGould makes an interesting point when she states that while it is useful to know about the reasons for a lack of women in the band directing profession, this information by itself is not going to change things until we actually understand the structural underpinnings of the problem. The use of the metaphor of the nomad is helpful in attempting to explain the structural difficulties inherent in women becoming university band directors. In fact, I... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Elizabeth Gould, “The Nomadic Turn: Epistemology, Experience, and Women College Band Directors”Stephen Franklin ZdzinskiI want to thank Elizabeth Gould for providing us with a thought-provoking paper examining the journeys of women university band directors through a post-modernist and feminist perspective. As a music education professor who deals with students from undergraduate through doctoral levels, I have the opportunity to provide professional guidance to many (...) students, both female and male. A number of my female instrumental music education students ask me about becoming high school and university band directors. I want to be honest with them about the realities of the profession, but I want also to encourage them to pursue their [End Page 195] professional dreams and goals despite any potential structural limitations. I found this paper to provide me with very good insights that I can use to advise my students.According to Gould, there are a number of factors that contribute to the under-representation of women in the field of college band directing. For example, we can see that historically the first band directors and instrumental music educators came either from military or professional performance backgrounds and as a result, most instrumental music teachers were initially male. In addition, early college band organizations, particularly marching musical organizations, were entirely male in composition. While these conditions have not continued to the present day, they set the stage for what was to follow.Socialization and Women University Band DirectorsThe different socialization of girls and boys may also be found to play a role in the under-representation of women as university band directors. A number of researchers have found gender differences in instrument selection,1 and other research points to additional familial socialization differences by gender.2According to Paul Woodford,3 the primary socialization of music education majors and the formation of a music teacher's identity occur during their own pre-collegiate schooling. Several researchers have suggested that precollegiate teaching experiences may be influential in decisions to choose music teaching as a career.4 Through countless hours of observation in their own programs, female and male students may be socialized to professional expectations of band directing before they ever enter a university-based instrumental music education program. Sylvia Tibbets, Winifred Shepard and David Hess, Stan Albrecht, Philip Griswold, and Denise Chroback all found that instrumental music teaching was viewed by both children and adults as a masculine profession.5 Woodford found that many of our current teacher education programs merely recreate existing practices, thus replicating inequitable situations in regards to opportunities for women in the profession of high school and college band directing.6After graduation, the outcome of a gender-influenced instrument choice may be inhibiting the career aspirations of future women band directors. Research by Barry Kopetz examined the influences of gender, school type, and instrument on instrumental music teacher selection by school principals.7 While significant gender differences in favor of males were found, they accounted for only 3% of the variance in teacher selection. Also important was the type of school being attended (performance versus music education institution), also accounting for 3% of the variance. Instrument, on the other hand, accounted for 10% of the variance in teacher selection, with teachers being selected in the following order: [End Page 196] trumpet, clarinet, oboe, and violin. If one examines the instruments commonly played by female instrumentalists, the research by Kopetz may suggest that gender discrimination in band hiring may in fact be exaggerated by playing the "wrong" instrument. If the student in addition comes from a performance-oriented school, that is considered by hiring officials as another negative factor that reduces their job possibilities.Structural Difficulties and Woman University Band DirectorsGould makes an interesting point when she states that while it is useful to know about the reasons for a lack of women in the band directing profession, this information by itself is not going to change things until we actually understand the structural underpinnings of the problem. The use of the metaphor of the nomad is helpful in attempting to explain the structural difficulties inherent in women becoming university band directors. In fact, I... (shrink)

In the present article, I compare Ernst Mach’s and Heinrich Gomperz’s contributions to the German-speaking positivist tradition by showing how, in trying to refound epistemology on the basis of one definite category of experiential element, namely, sensation and feeling, respectively, they each epitomized one major trend of Immanenzpositivismus. I demonstrate that, besides Mach’s “sensualist” conception of positivism – in light of which historians have tended thus far to interpret all German-speaking positivist research of that period – there also existed (...) an “affectivist” conception of positivism, which originated in Avenarius’s empiriocriticism and culminated in Gomperz’s pathempiricism. Here I aim to provide a new perspective on the history of positivism by highlighting the role played in it by psychological concerns. First, I revisit the notion of Immanenzpositivismus, the form of positivism that prevailed in both Germany and Austria between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: in addition to addressing the definition of this philosophical school of thought, I discuss the issue of “pure experience”, from which the positivists tried to reinterpret the foundations of knowledge. Second, I deal with Mach’s sensation-based approach to Immanenzpositivismus by commenting on his ontological and typological analysis of the constitutive elements of experience and emphasizing the fact that his concept of Empfindung is a relatively ill-defined notion in light of contemporary psychological standards. Moreover, I show that, despite his pretense of confining his epistemological developments to the analysis of sensations, Mach did not deny the involvement of feelings in epistemology, as clearly evidenced by some passages of Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Third, I analyze Gomperz’s feeling-based conception of Immanenzpositivismus, that is, pathempiricism, by highlighting how he strove to radically refound epistemology on the basis of the most recent advances of affective psychology. Focusing on the question of language sciences, I also discuss how he considered the role of feelings in the various forms of theoretical knowledge, the only field of investigation that he revisited in detail in his unfinished book, the Weltanschauungslehre. Fourth and last, I contrast Gomperz’s with Mach’s positivist model and argue that the former is more coherent and has a higher explanatory power than the latter. In conclusion, I insist on the importance of revisiting pathempiricism within the broader framework of affective epistemology. (shrink)

First published in 1976, this is a comprehensive study of practical thinking. Professor Körner shows the complex relations which a person's practical attitudes bear to each other, and shows in particular how their moral or prudential character depends not only on their content and form but also on their place in the system constituted by them. There are detailed accounts of the concepts of morality, prudence, justice, welfare and legality, as well as the logical foundations, epistemology and metaphysics (...) of practical thinking. The book is intended for philosophers and for those political theorists and social scientists who are concerned with the philosophical presuppositions and implications of their enquiries. The book is deliberately organized so that those with less interest in the logical issues dealt with in Part I can proceed quickly and easily to the more substantive issues in Parts II and III. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Elizabeth Gould, “Nomadic Turns:Epistemology, Experience, and Women University Band Directors” Epistemology, Experience, and Women University Band Directors”Julia Eklund KozaClimate and its impact on women in instrumental music education is a tremendously important subject, and I thank Liz Gould for her thoughtful analysis. Rather than offering a critique of her work, I will respond as one might answer in a call and response. (...) Gould has sung a call that articulates a definition of feminism and invites us to explore climate in the professions, specifically in instrumental music education; I will answer in affirmation, confirmation, and extension. The nomadic metaphor, which is central to her paper, has been appropriated by a number of postmodern [End Page 187] theoreticians, including, among others, Baudrillard, Grisoni, Deleuze and Guattari, and of course, Braidotti.1 I have decided not to talk about this metaphor, however, principally because the complexities of any analysis of Western constructions of nomadism—constructions that are rife with exoticism, fascination, revulsion, and fear—are multiplied at this moment, as my country wages war against Iraq, a land of nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples, after having recently engaged in military action in Afghanistan, which is similarly home to nomads. An incisive discussion of postmodern use of nomadic metaphors appears in Caren Kaplan's book Questions of Travel, which I recommend to anyone interested in the subject.2My response has two goals: first, to forward another, not necessarily competing, postmodern understanding of feminism and power; and second, keeping this understanding in mind, to expand Gould's project of examining professional climate. According to my working postmodern definition, feminism is a constellation of dynamic political positions, which address and attempt to change the unequal power relations and material conditions that are produced and supported by a normative regulatory ideal called sex. In speaking of a constellation of political positions, I acknowledge the existence of a multiplicity of modern and post-modern feminisms, and by calling these positions dynamic I acknowledge their fluidity. In asserting that sex is a regulatory ideal, I rely on the work of feminist theorist Judith Butler, who posits that sex and sexual difference are discursively constructed; distinguishing herself from feminists who draw a distinction between gender, which is assumed to be socially constructed, and sex, which is theorized as a pre-social given or surface, Butler not only questions such a distinction by arguing that both sex and gender are culturally produced, but also theorizes about how materializations of bodies are accomplished. Drawing on the work of philosopher Michel Foucault, she maintains that sex is a regulatory norm, "part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs,"3 and she claims that this materialization is accomplished through a reiterative process called performativity. A performative, according to Butler, is a "discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names."4 Butler claims that "the regulatory norms of 'sex' work in a performative fashion to constitute the materiality of bodies and, more specifically, to materialize the body's sex, to materialize sexual difference in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexual imperative."5 She provides an example of how this reiterative process works: when a particular child is born, the child is cited as a girl at birth and many times afterward; each citation helps to constitute that child as a girl and also to reinforce the discursive formation "girl."6 To summarize, Butler asserts that sex is "a cultural norm which governs the materialization of bodies,"7 and she posits that materiality is a productive effect of power.8She also theorizes that subject formation necessitates both an "identification with the normative phantasm of 'sex,'" and the creation of a zone of abjection.9 Bodies relegated to this abject zone, according to Butler, can be a valuable and "critical resource in the struggle to rearticulate the very terms of symbolic legitimacy and intelligibility."10 She maintains that disidentification can be a fruitful way to mobilize feminist and queer politics.11 Collective disidentifications, Butler states, can facilitate a "reconceptualization of which bodies matter," which bodies count.12 [End Page 188]Finally, my definition of feminism relies on several Foucauldian assumptions about... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Elizabeth Gould, “Nomadic Turns:Epistemology, Experience, and Women University Band Directors” Epistemology, Experience, and Women University Band Directors”Julia Eklund KozaClimate and its impact on women in instrumental music education is a tremendously important subject, and I thank Liz Gould for her thoughtful analysis. Rather than offering a critique of her work, I will respond as one might answer in a call and response. (...) Gould has sung a call that articulates a definition of feminism and invites us to explore climate in the professions, specifically in instrumental music education; I will answer in affirmation, confirmation, and extension. The nomadic metaphor, which is central to her paper, has been appropriated by a number of postmodern [End Page 187] theoreticians, including, among others, Baudrillard, Grisoni, Deleuze and Guattari, and of course, Braidotti.1 I have decided not to talk about this metaphor, however, principally because the complexities of any analysis of Western constructions of nomadism—constructions that are rife with exoticism, fascination, revulsion, and fear—are multiplied at this moment, as my country wages war against Iraq, a land of nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples, after having recently engaged in military action in Afghanistan, which is similarly home to nomads. An incisive discussion of postmodern use of nomadic metaphors appears in Caren Kaplan's book Questions of Travel, which I recommend to anyone interested in the subject.2My response has two goals: first, to forward another, not necessarily competing, postmodern understanding of feminism and power; and second, keeping this understanding in mind, to expand Gould's project of examining professional climate. According to my working postmodern definition, feminism is a constellation of dynamic political positions, which address and attempt to change the unequal power relations and material conditions that are produced and supported by a normative regulatory ideal called sex. In speaking of a constellation of political positions, I acknowledge the existence of a multiplicity of modern and post-modern feminisms, and by calling these positions dynamic I acknowledge their fluidity. In asserting that sex is a regulatory ideal, I rely on the work of feminist theorist Judith Butler, who posits that sex and sexual difference are discursively constructed; distinguishing herself from feminists who draw a distinction between gender, which is assumed to be socially constructed, and sex, which is theorized as a pre-social given or surface, Butler not only questions such a distinction by arguing that both sex and gender are culturally produced, but also theorizes about how materializations of bodies are accomplished. Drawing on the work of philosopher Michel Foucault, she maintains that sex is a regulatory norm, "part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs,"3 and she claims that this materialization is accomplished through a reiterative process called performativity. A performative, according to Butler, is a "discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it names."4 Butler claims that "the regulatory norms of 'sex' work in a performative fashion to constitute the materiality of bodies and, more specifically, to materialize the body's sex, to materialize sexual difference in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexual imperative."5 She provides an example of how this reiterative process works: when a particular child is born, the child is cited as a girl at birth and many times afterward; each citation helps to constitute that child as a girl and also to reinforce the discursive formation "girl."6 To summarize, Butler asserts that sex is "a cultural norm which governs the materialization of bodies,"7 and she posits that materiality is a productive effect of power.8She also theorizes that subject formation necessitates both an "identification with the normative phantasm of 'sex,'" and the creation of a zone of abjection.9 Bodies relegated to this abject zone, according to Butler, can be a valuable and "critical resource in the struggle to rearticulate the very terms of symbolic legitimacy and intelligibility."10 She maintains that disidentification can be a fruitful way to mobilize feminist and queer politics.11 Collective disidentifications, Butler states, can facilitate a "reconceptualization of which bodies matter," which bodies count.12 [End Page 188]Finally, my definition of feminism relies on several Foucauldian assumptions about... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Elizabeth Gould, “The Nomadic Turn: Epistemology, Experience, and Women College Band Directors”Stephen Franklin ZdzinskiI want to thank Elizabeth Gould for providing us with a thought-provoking paper examining the journeys of women university band directors through a post-modernist and feminist perspective. As a music education professor who deals with students from undergraduate through doctoral levels, I have the opportunity to provide professional guidance to many (...) students, both female and male. A number of my female instrumental music education students ask me about becoming high school and university band directors. I want to be honest with them about the realities of the profession, but I want also to encourage them to pursue their [End Page 195] professional dreams and goals despite any potential structural limitations. I found this paper to provide me with very good insights that I can use to advise my students.According to Gould, there are a number of factors that contribute to the under-representation of women in the field of college band directing. For example, we can see that historically the first band directors and instrumental music educators came either from military or professional performance backgrounds and as a result, most instrumental music teachers were initially male. In addition, early college band organizations, particularly marching musical organizations, were entirely male in composition. While these conditions have not continued to the present day, they set the stage for what was to follow.Socialization and Women University Band DirectorsThe different socialization of girls and boys may also be found to play a role in the under-representation of women as university band directors. A number of researchers have found gender differences in instrument selection,1 and other research points to additional familial socialization differences by gender.2According to Paul Woodford,3 the primary socialization of music education majors and the formation of a music teacher's identity occur during their own pre-collegiate schooling. Several researchers have suggested that precollegiate teaching experiences may be influential in decisions to choose music teaching as a career.4 Through countless hours of observation in their own programs, female and male students may be socialized to professional expectations of band directing before they ever enter a university-based instrumental music education program. Sylvia Tibbets, Winifred Shepard and David Hess, Stan Albrecht, Philip Griswold, and Denise Chroback all found that instrumental music teaching was viewed by both children and adults as a masculine profession.5 Woodford found that many of our current teacher education programs merely recreate existing practices, thus replicating inequitable situations in regards to opportunities for women in the profession of high school and college band directing.6After graduation, the outcome of a gender-influenced instrument choice may be inhibiting the career aspirations of future women band directors. Research by Barry Kopetz examined the influences of gender, school type, and instrument on instrumental music teacher selection by school principals.7 While significant gender differences in favor of males were found, they accounted for only 3% of the variance in teacher selection. Also important was the type of school being attended (performance versus music education institution), also accounting for 3% of the variance. Instrument, on the other hand, accounted for 10% of the variance in teacher selection, with teachers being selected in the following order: [End Page 196] trumpet, clarinet, oboe, and violin. If one examines the instruments commonly played by female instrumentalists, the research by Kopetz may suggest that gender discrimination in band hiring may in fact be exaggerated by playing the "wrong" instrument. If the student in addition comes from a performance-oriented school, that is considered by hiring officials as another negative factor that reduces their job possibilities.Structural Difficulties and Woman University Band DirectorsGould makes an interesting point when she states that while it is useful to know about the reasons for a lack of women in the band directing profession, this information by itself is not going to change things until we actually understand the structural underpinnings of the problem. The use of the metaphor of the nomad is helpful in attempting to explain the structural difficulties inherent in women becoming university band directors. In fact, I... (shrink)

Whilst the role of Maturation or M‐phase Promoting Factor (MPF) as a universal M‐phase regulator is well documented, much less attention has been paid to its role in nuclear transplantation experiments and especially to its influence upon remodelling of transplanted nuclei. There is currently wide acceptance that successful nuclear transplantation using differentiated nuclei is possible only in a cytoplasmic environment that is capable of inducing rapid nuclear de‐differentiation to a pronuclear‐like form. In this review our purpose is firstly, to outline (...) the conditions under which such remodelling can be induced, and secondly, to extend the debate to include a consideration of whether complete nuclear remodelling is an absolute necessity for clonal development. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a development of a variety of approaches for examining lived experience in the context of cognitive science. However, the field of first-person research has yet to develop a pragmatic epistemological framework that would enable researchers to compare and integrate – as well as understand the epistemic status of – different methods and their findings. In this article, we present the foundation of such a framework, grounded in an epistemological investigation of gestures involved in acquiring (...) data on experience. We examine the acts of turning towards one’s experiential field and attending to experience within the process of reflection. We describe what we call the _horizon of attending to experience_ by analogy to the “experimental arrangement” in quantum observation: this horizon, we argue, co-defines experiential phenomena that end up being observed and reported; at the same time, it itself forms an element of experience and is therefore amenable to phenomenological investigation. Drawing on the constructivist notion of enaction, we show that acknowledging the inherently constructive nature of attending to experience and accepting one’s lack of epistemic access to the “original”, observation-independent pre-reflective experience is not a dead end for first-person research when situated in a constructivist (but not relativist) understanding of the reflective act and its results. Expanding the notion of the horizon to encompass all epistemic acts involved in producing phenomenological data and final results of a first-person study (i.e., _horizon of the method_), we suggest some lines of inquiry that would allow researchers to identify and articulate horizons of particular methods, opening a way towards integrating past and future findings of different complementary first-person approaches into a comprehensive map of lived experience. (shrink)

The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemological status of thought experiments. I deal with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, I criticize an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, I introduce the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, I present objections to (...) the theory, focusing on the critique of eliminativism by Tamar Szabó Gendler based on the reconstruction of famous Galileo's Pisa experiment. I show that her reconstruction is simplistic and that more elaborate reconstruction is needed for an appropriate assessment of the epistemic power of general argument. I propose such a reconstruction and demonstrate that general version of Pisa experiment is epistemically equal to the particular one. Thus, from an epistemological perspective, Galileo's thought experiment is reducible to a straightforward argument without particular premises. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a development of a variety of approaches for examining lived experience in the context of cognitive science. However, the field of first-person research has yet to develop a pragmatic epistemological framework that would enable researchers to compare and integrate – as well as understand the epistemic status of – different methods and their findings. In this article, we present the foundation of such a framework, grounded in an epistemological investigation of gestures involved in acquiring (...) data on experience. We examine the acts of turning towards one’s experiential field and attending to experience within the process of reflection. We describe what we call the horizon of attending to experience by analogy to the “experimental arrangement” in quantum observation: this horizon, we argue, co-defines experiential phenomena that end up being observed and reported; at the same time, it itself forms an element of experience and is therefore amenable to phenomenological investigation. Drawing on the constructivist notion of enaction, we show that acknowledging the inherently constructive nature of attending to experience and accepting one’s lack of epistemic access to the “original”, observation-independent pre-reflective experience is not a dead end for first-person research when situated in a constructivist (but not relativist) understanding of the reflective act and its results. Expanding the notion of the horizon to encompass all epistemic acts involved in producing phenomenological data and final results of a first-person study (i.e., horizon of the method), we suggest some lines of inquiry that would allow researchers to identify and articulate horizons of particular methods, opening a way towards integrating past and future findings of different complementary first-person approaches into a comprehensive map of lived experience. (shrink)

Feminist epistemology is both a paradox and a necessity. Epistemology is a highly general inquiry – into the meaning of knowledge claims and attributions, into conditions for the possibility of knowledge, into the nature of truth and justification, and so on. Feminism is a family of positions and inquiries characterized by some common sociopolitical interests centering on the abolition of sexual and gender inequality. What possible relation could there be between these two sets of activity? Furthermore, feminist inquiry (...) results in substantive claims and analyses of whose adequacy and correctness feminists hope to persuade nonfeminists as well as other feminists. How could such persuasion occur without some highly general and shared conceptions of knowledge and rationality to set the ground rules within which this persuasion will occur? How could this be anything but a general and uniformly applicable epistemology? A feminist epistemology is oxymoronic. On the other hand, feminist scholars have demonstrated the gender bias infusing most other academic disciplines – a gender bias that is expressed in particular claims and facilitated by disciplinary first principles. Women's experience is made invisible or distorted, as are gender relations. What reason have we for thinking philosophy and its subdisciplines might be immune? And how can feminists pursue philosophical inquiry without subjecting our own discipline and subdisciplines to the same kind of searching scrutiny to which other feminist scholars have subjected their disciplines? Indeed, since the traditional academic disciplines have rested on philosophical presuppositions that may be implicated in sexist or androcentric outcomes, it is imperative that we do so. Feminist epistemology is a necessity. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 21 In the past two and a half decades, Frank Ankersmit has developed a complex notion of historical experience. Despite its many virtues it has at least one major difficulty: it implies a sharp separation between experience and language. This essay aims to bridge this gap, while preserving the positive aspects of Ankersmit’s theory. To do this, I will first present the ontological and epistemological implications of Ankersmit’s notion of historical experience. Next, (...) I will present my objections to his idea. Finally, I will propose two modifications to his notion of historical experience: first, in the epistemological sense by considering historical experience as a form of Louis Mink’s configurational comprehension and, second, in the ontological sense by relating historical experience with the _vitalist_ ontology of José Ortega y Gasset. (shrink)

Hans Reichenbach was a formidable figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy of science. Educated in Germany, he was influential in establishing the so-called Berlin Circle, a companion group to the Vienna Circle founded by his colleague Rudolph Carnap. The movement they founded—usually known as "logical positivism," although it is more precisely known as "scientific philosophy" or "logical empiricism"—was a form of epistemology that privileged scientific over metaphysical truths. Reichenbach, like other young philosophers of the exact sciences of his generation, was deeply (...) impressed by the far-reaching changes in physics brought about by Einstein's special and general theories of relativity. Reichenbach responded to scientific advances by doing fundamental work in space-time theories, in quantum mechanics, in statistical mechanics, and in the development of probability theory—making him the most important philosopher of physics in the first generation of logical empiricism. Forced from his academic position by the Nazi race laws in 1933, Reichenbach wrote _Experience and Prediction_ at the University of Istanbul, where had had fled, expressly to introduce logical positivism to English speakers. In the two decades following World War II, during the explosion of scientific advances in North America, logical positivism was the reigning theory of the philosophy of science and Reichenbach was at the peak of his career. But, inevitably, support for logical positivism began to wane as it became obvious that the justification of scientific theories could not be entirely resolved by relying on strictly formal, technical processes. The growth of the discipline of the history of philosophy of science, which has created an audience of scholars eager for seminal classics in scientific philosophy, and the evidence supporting a historicist paradigm within logical positivism are two important reasons to make _Experience and Prediction_ available once again. "Hans Reichenbach's_ Experience and Prediction_ is one of the most important books in twentieth-century philosophy of science. Its author was, along with Rudolf Carnap, one of the two principal ambassadors to North America of the exciting new European philosophical movement known here under the names 'Logical Positivism' and 'Scientific Philosophy.' In 1938, when the book was published, Reichenbach was an exile from his native Germany, teaching in Istanbul, Turkey, and about to emigrate to the United States to take up a prestigious position at UCLA. He wrote_ Experience and Prediction_ in English as his calling card to his new American colleagues. More than any other single book,_ Experience and Prediction_ set the agenda for the new discipline of the philosophy of science that was to emerge after World War II as, perhaps, the most exciting new area in North American philosophy. Many of the problems still at the focus of discussion were given their classic formulations in this book. Long out of print,_ Experience and Prediction_ appears here in a new edition accompanied by a splendid historical introduction by the noted young philosopher and historian of the philosophy of science, Alan Richardson. A jewel of a book may once again be appreciated in its proper setting." —Don A. Howard, University of Notre Dame. (shrink)

The efforts to prove God's existence in the history of thought have been one of the fundamental problems of philosophy and theology, and even the most important one. The evidences put furword to prove the existence of God constitute the center of philosophy of religion’s problems not only philosophy of religion, but also the disciplines such as theology-kalam and Islamic philosophy are also seriously concerned. When we look at the history of philosophy, it is clear that almost all philosophers are (...) interested in the evidence in favour of and against the existence of God. Especially in recent times, religious experience has often been regarded as evidence of the existence of God. Studies in the field of religious and mystical experience have put forward many arguments concerning the use of religious experience as evidence. However, this study has been limited to experience of sense and pure consciousness claims rather than examining all of these arguments. In this study firstly, the analogy between experience of sense and religious experience will be deal with, and then claims that conciousness can be emptied by a number of methods which are defended by mystics. In addition, it will be tried to defend the opinion that the mystical experiences which are the common point of the two approaches are valid. The main emphasis of the article will be that these arguments can be used as evidence for the existence of God.Summary: Religious experience - which has not been considered as one of the classical evidences regarding the existence of God before being popular by recent studies – is started to be called one of the arguments. The most important reason for not arguing religious experience among the evidences of God’s existence is that it is a personal experience and therefore contains subjective perspectives. However, many researchers, who refuse to accept the criticism raised against religious experience with restricting to subjectivity, emphasized the importance of religious experience by highlighting the objective aspects of such experiences. This emphasis was not only on its significance, but also on the fact that it had a cognitive feature and thus it could provide evidence for the existence of God. The argument of religious experience is generally defined as an effort for demonstrating to existence of God with reference to several feelings such as spiritual experiences of human in face of creator and sacred Being, encounter with God, uniting, and annihilating selfness in Him. The emergence of such efforts, especially after the XVIIIth century, indicates that the history of the evidence does not go back much earlier. However, even if notas evidence, it is possible to extend the traces of religious and mystical experience to the history of religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism. Considering a great amount of the previous literature focused on religious experience in the West, It is easily seen that such research is still new. The main purpose in addressing such a controversial issue is to make the argument on the religious experience more current and to show whether the religious experience would be able to use as evidence for the existence of God.First title of this study comprises many different claims such as Walter T. Stace’s The Argument from Unanimity Richard Swinburne’s The Principle of Credulity, William P. Alston’s Perceiving God, John Hick’s Experience-as. However, instead of briefly giving out very different claims, the study chooses to focus on two arguments which are less discussed and can be given in more detail. The first is the argument based on the analogy between the religious experience and the sense experience. The fundamental point of this argument is sense experience. With reference to the similarities between the sense experience and the religious experience, it can be argued that religious experience is also cognitive and may function as an evidence for the existence of God. In other words, being perceptual and noetic, namely cognitive, of sense experience is addressed as a similar side of religious experience. Whether it is imaginary or real, eventually, it is necessary for an experience to have an object and being experience of something. Therefore, the religious experience includes the perception of a Transcendent Being that is beyond and in excess of the individual who experiences. Perception of the sense experience will definitely be different from the perception of religious experience. Researchers who think that the five sense organs do not run the perception of Sacred Beings, identified broader and various meanings for the perception. Thereby, in this approach, where the semantic field of perception is expanded, it was contended that human beings were able to perceive the transcendent, eternal, and unlimited God, and this can be explained in the epistemological sense. In order to use religious experiences as an evidence for the existence of God, it is necessary to determine whether such experiences are caused by God rather than something else. This raises the issue of the validity of religious experience. The researchers in this area have propounded various criteria to identify whether religious experience is existed or not. Experiences, which do not meet the criteria, are not considered existed even if they claim to be religious experience.The second is the argument that discusses whether it is possible to suggest an evidence for the existence of God by utilizing pure consciousness events. In general, this argument claims that the consciousness gets clear, and thus, mystic or Sufi experiences the Divine One with pure consciousness by discharging consciousness from all sensual contents and removing it from secular desire and wishes. The argument, which claims the experience of Divine One is direct, therefore uninterpretable, and experienced by pure consciousness, believes clearing the consciousness of mystics from sensual qualities such as seeing, hearing, and tasting. It is stated that it is possible for mystics to empty their sensory images and get rid of them, and thus, their desires and wishes could be lost. Especially, the thinkers who are connected with the philosophy of perennialism and defend this approach, thought that people, who have distinct religion, culture, and beliefs in different parts of the world and in various time periods, had the same experience and considered such experiences were universal by suggesting that this similarity could be called as common essence.Even though the claim which offers that the events of pure consciousness are the same everywhere have been criticized in many respects, the advocates of this approach have argued that the experience has the common essence, but the interpretation is different. This relationship, which was tried to be established between experience and commentary, caused a lot of work for both the thinkers who put forward the claims of pure consciousness and the researchers who opposed it. However, examining the relationship between experience and interpretation requires serious studies in socio-psychological, cultural and religious fields. Therefore, in order not to exceed the limits of the article, the relationship between experience and interpretation is briefly mentioned.While discussing two arguments, the main claims of the arguments were addressed, and the criticisms directed to this argument were not discussed as much as possible. However, some fundamental criticisms have been mentioned shortly for a better understanding of the discussion. Since such western-oriented claims mostly were deployed in a western context, the study excluded the comparison of the claims across different cultures. (shrink)

For Kant, experience is epistemological, whereas ontological experience is in the first instance poetic and Romantic. In contradistinction to Kantian Erfahrung, it is most often called Erlebniß. We note further that Erfahrung is cognitive experience while Erlebnis is also aesthetic experience. Dilthey and Husserl understand experience pertaining to knowledge through Erlebnis. In epistemological or classificatory knowledge the parts add up to the whole. Ontological knowledge instead is holistic in which the whole is present in (...) each of the parts. In ontological knowledge we can know things themselves. Ontological experience is particularly important for global knowledge. This is because knowing another culture is not reducible to a culture's qualities or predicates. Culture as a way or form of life is a thingitself. A third type of experience is informational experience. This collapses the epistemological into the ontological and is also increasingly present today. This sort of experience of non-linear information theory can account for the experience of societies, of individual humans, of digital media, of neuronal networks, of phenotypes, urban forms, of cellular organisms, or of inorganic matter. (shrink)

According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-person experience, which in the case of multifaceted mental phenomena are of key importance. In this paper, we fill this gap and consider the question whether information about first-person experience can constrain dynamic-mechanistic models and what the (...) character of this relation is. We discuss two cases of such explanatory models in neuroscience, namely that of migraine and of epilepsy. We argue that, in these cases, first-person insights about the target phenomena significantly contributed to explanatory models by shaping explanatory hypotheses and by indicating the dynamical properties that the explanatory models of these phenomena should account for, and thus directly constraining the space of possible explanations. (shrink)

The sudden move to online learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic has created an influx of epistemological, psycho-social, emotional and financial challenges for first year students. Lecturers and academics had to find creative and sustainable ways of ensuring that all students were epistemologically included. New policies and practices were introduced rapidly at universities to facilitate the unavoidable move to online learning. As initial teacher educators at a public University in South Africa we noted that the sudden move to working (...) online has presented various challenges to first year students’ overall well-being which has further exacerbated issues of exclusion and marginalization for many. We argue that it is against this backdrop that this paper explores how the move to online learning has affected first year students’ overall well-being, at one teacher education institution. The Index for Inclusive Education was used as a theoretical lens to explore student’s perceptions of the institution’s policy, teaching and learning practices, and the institutional culture during this period. One hundred and eighty-seven purposively selected first year students participated in this qualitative, phenomenological research study. Data were collected by means of open-ended questionnaires. Responses were categorized by means of an emergent thematic analysis. The findings indicated that online learning compromised various aspects of well-being including physical, emotional, psycho-social and financial well-being for many students. The experiences of online learning and impact on well-being did, however, differ across students depending on their individual contexts and circumstances indicating that considerations of well-being need to take contextual realities into account to support the well-being and learning of all. We recommend that higher education institutions prioritize the psycho-social, emotional, and financial well-being of students during the period of online learning and not just the pedagogic needs of the qualification. (shrink)