I defend an account of when and why anger is morally virtuous or vicious. Anger often manifests what we care about; a sports fan gets angry when her favorite team loses because she cares about the team doing well. Anger, I argue, is made morally virtuous or vicious by the underlying care or concern. Anger is virtuous when it manifests moral concern and vicious when it manifests moral indifference or ill will. In defending this view, I reject two common views (...) about anger and moral character. First, I respond to several arguments that attempt to show that all anger is vicious. Then I respond to the view that some anger is required to be a virtuous person. Anger, on my view, can be morally virtuous but is not a necessary condition for being a virtuous person. This best accommodates not only morally irrelevant failures to get angry but also allows for emotional variation among virtuous people. (shrink)

A translation and analysis of a short ethical treatise written in Tibet in the late 18th or early 19th century. The Khache Phalu includes references to both Buddhist and Islamic thought in providing ethical and spiritual advice. The analysis gives an overview of the secondary literature in both Tibetan and English that is accessible to non-specialists and defends the claim that many passages are deliberately ambiguous. The translation was done with Tenzin Norbu Nangsal and also includes the full Tibetan text.

What does it mean to be a morally good person? It can be tempting to think that it is simply a matter of performing certain actions and avoiding others. And yet there is much more to moral character than our outward actions. We expect a good person to not only behave in certain ways but also to experience the world in certain ways within.

The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in certain ways. By analyzing modesty in this way, we (...) can best explain the distinct features of modesty, keep much of what is intuitive in contemporary accounts, and better understand why modesty is a virtue at all. (shrink)

Many of us, even on our happiest days, struggle to quiet the constant buzz of anxiety in the background of our minds. All kinds of worries--worries about losing people and things, worries about how we seem to others--keep us from peace of mind. Distracted or misled by our preoccupations, misconceptions, and, most of all, our obsession with ourselves, we don't see the world clearly--we don't see the world as it really is. In our search for happiness and the good life, (...) this is the main problem. But luckily there is a solution, and on the path to understanding it, we can make use of the rich and varied teachings that have developed over centuries of Buddhist thought. With clarity and compassion, Nicolas Bommarito explores the central elements of centuries of Buddhist philosophy and practice, explaining how they can improve your life and teach you to live without fear. Mining important texts and lessons for practical guidance, he provides a friendly guide to the very practical goals that underpin Buddhist philosophy. After laying out the basic ideas, Bommarito walks readers through a wide range of techniques and practices we can adopt to mend ingrained habits. Rare for its exploration of both the philosophy that motivates Buddhism and its practical applications, this is a compassionate guide to leading a good life that anyone can follow. (shrink)

This article discusses conceptions of modesty and humility and their key features. It gives a brief historical overview of debates about whether or not they’re really virtues at all. It also discusses theories of modesty and humility that root them in the presence or absence of particular beliefs, emotions, desires, and attention. it also discusses related phenomena in epistemology: rational limits on self-ascription of error, attitudes to disagreement, and openness to alternative views.

The picture of moral development defended by followers of Aristotle takes moral cultivation to be like playing a harp; one gets to be good by actually spending time playing a real instrument. On this view, we cultivate a virtue by doing the actions associated with that virtue. I argue that this picture is inadequate and must be supplemented by imaginative techniques. One can, and sometimes must, cultivate virtue without actually performing the associated actions. Drawing on strands in Buddhist philosophy, I (...) explain several methods of moral development that rely on imagination and visualization rather than overt action. These techniques are essential in cases where cultivating virtue the way one practices the harp is impossible. In particular, I focus on single-event virtues, first-time virtuous acts, and morally dangerous situations. (shrink)

A natural way to think of epistemic virtue is by analogy with an archer. Just as a skilled archer is able to take aim and hit a target, a skilled epistemic agent will aim at truth and, if things go well, get things right. Here we highlight aspects of epistemic virtue that do not fit this model, particularly ways in which epistemic virtues can be non-voluntary and not goal-directed. In doing so, we draw on two important figures in the history (...) of philosophy: the 6th-century Indian Buddhist Buddhaghosa and the 20th-century French philosopher Simone Weil. Despite many differences, both thinkers emphasize the importance of attention in moral and epistemic virtue. Their work highlights ways in which attention that is neither voluntary nor goal-directed can nevertheless play an important role in moral and epistemic life. (shrink)

I argue that self-ascribed anti-expertise, taking our own beliefs to be false, is not always irrational.

It’s natural to think of acts of solidarity as being public acts that aim at good outcomes, particularly at social change. I argue that not all acts of solidarity fit this mold - acts of what I call ‘private solidarity’ are not public and do not aim at producing social change. After describing paradigmatic cases of private solidarity, I defend an account of why such acts are themselves morally virtuous and what role they can have in moral development.

I offer a Buddhist-inspired account of how patience can count as a moral virtue, arguing that virtuous patience involves having a perspective on the place of our own desires and values among others and a sense of their relative importance.

In his famous text the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the 8th century Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva argues that anger towards people who harm us is never justified. The usual reading of this argument rests on drawing similarities between harms caused by persons and those caused by non-persons. After laying out my own interpretation of Śāntideva's reasoning, I offer some objections to Śāntideva's claim about the similarity between animate and inanimate causes of harm inspired by contemporary philosophical literature in the West. Following this, I argue (...) that by reading Śāntideva's argument as practical advice rather than as a philosophical claim about rational coherence, his argument can still have important insights even for those who reject his philosophical reasoning. (shrink)

Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935-1991) was a Harvard-educated Indian philosopher best known for his contributions to logic, but who also wrote on wide variety of topics, including metaethics. Unfortunately, the latter contributions have been overlooked. Engaging with Anglo-American figures such as Gilbert Harman and Bernard Williams, Matilal defends a view he dubs ‘pluralism.’ In defending this view he draws on a wide range of classical Indian sources: the Bhagavad-Gītā, Buddhist thinkers like Nāgārjuna, and classical Jaina concepts. This pluralist position is somewhere (...) between relativism and absolutist realism. Unlike the relativist, he argues that there is a genuinely universal morality; unlike the absolutist, he argues that there are multiple, but often conflicting and incommensurable, moral frameworks and ideals. This paper will explain his objections to relativism, as well as flesh out his suggestive remarks about his own pluralistic account. (shrink)

Responding to Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage, I discuss how the book touches on the difficulties of disentangling emotions and their expressions. Then I suggest two ways in which destructive rage might be good, one on Kantian grounds and another via extension from experience. Finally, I raise the issue of whether there might be other Lordean emotions.

A brief introduction to some of the major issues in Tibetan philosophy.

This chapter contains sections titled: Epicurus' Death is Nothing to Us Argument Lucretius'Symmetry Argument.

A review of Nicolas Bommarito's book, "Inner Virtue", which argues persuasively that our "inner states" - emotions, pleasures, attentional habits - can be virtuous if they manifest what he calls our "moral concerns".

In Seeing Clearly, Nicolas Bommarito brings together Buddhist theory and practice with a deceptively simple sophistication that few have managed in the contemporary era. Meditation teachers have contributed to the self-help section an abundance of guides to Buddhism and meditation, many of them elegantly worded and sometimes simple and practical. Yet many of these works also stumble unwittingly into philosophical problems discussed with great care and complexity in footnoted academic volumes read mostly by a small circle of scholars. (...) Bommarito's accomplishment as a philosopher is evident not only in the clarity of his exposition, but also in what he doesn't say, in the many philosophical blunders he does not fall... (shrink)

Bommarito raises many interesting questions about the nature of moral virtue and vice, and it establishes inner virtue as an interesting and worthwhile topic. His book will motivate readers to debate the merits of various general accounts and, even though it does not offer a compelling argument for the manifest care account, it establishes that account as an option worthy of further discussion and development. I want to emphasize that the book contains numerous interesting discussions of specific inner virtues (...) and vices, including ones commended by Buddhist and Confucian philosophers. Moral philosophers in general, and especially ones working on virtue theory, are sure to benefit from it. (shrink)

© Mind AssociationThis article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model...Suppose I told you that the person you consider your best friend often dwells on your faults in his own mind; while he behaves in a warm and affectionate manner when the two of you are together, privately, he ruminates on his advantages over you. He likes to compare himself to you because he finds the comparisons flattering. He does not see (...) you as his equal and the thought that he is better pleases him.This is a chilling thought. But why is it chilling? Part of the reason has to do with the connection between inner states and actions. Perhaps you think that your friend will, sooner or later, do something contrary to the spirit of friendship. Secret feelings and desires may surface and shape... (shrink)

Taste as Experience puts the pleasure of food at the center of human experience. It shows how the sense of taste informs our preferences for and relationship to nature, pushes us toward ethical practices of consumption, and impresses upon us the importance of aesthetics. Eating is often dismissed as a necessary aspect of survival, and our personal enjoyment of food is considered a quirk. Nicola Perullo sees food as the only portion of the world we take in on a daily (...) basis, constituting our first and most significant encounter with the earth. Perullo has long observed people's food practices and has listened to their food experiences. He draws on years of research to explain the complex meanings behind our food choices and the thinking that accompanies our gustatory actions. He also considers our indifference toward food as a force influencing us as much as engagement. For Perullo, taste is value and wisdom. It cannot be reduced to mere chemical or cultural factors but embodies the quality and quantity of our earthly experience. (shrink)

Sometimes physicians lie to third-party payers in order to grant their patients treatment they would otherwise not receive. This strategy, commonly known as gaming the system, is generally condemned for three reasons. First, it may hurt the patient for the sake of whom gaming was intended. Second, it may hurt other patients. Third, it offends contractual and distributive justice. Hence, gaming is considered to be immoral behavior. This article is an attempt to show that, on the contrary, gaming may sometimes (...) be a physician's duty. Under specific circumstances, gaming may be necessary from the viewpoint of the internal morality of medicine. Moreover, the objections against gaming are examples of what we call the idealistic fallacy, that is, the fallacy of passing judgments in a nonideal world according to ideal standards. Hence, the objections are inconclusive. Gaming is sometimes justified, and may even be required in the name of beneficence. (shrink)

This book advances a new interpretation of Hart's penal philosophy. Positioning itself in opposition to current interpretations, the book argues that Hart does not defend a mixed theory of punishment, nor a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment, nor a liberal form of utilitarianism, nor a goal and constraint approach. Rather, it is argued, his penal philosophy is based on his moral pluralism, which comprises two aspects: value pluralism and pluralism with respect to forms of moral reason. It is held that this (...) means, on the one hand, that criminal law has an irreducible complexity due to the compromises it makes to accommodate competing values, and on the other hand, that there need not be one single justification of punishment. This original interpretation is not based only on Hart's key volume on the subject Punishment and Responsibility, but on a careful reading of his complete works. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers interested in Hart's philosophy, the philosophy of law and criminal law. (shrink)

Die Suche nach historischen Quellen für die Leibniz’sche Philosophie scheint zunächst unerschöpflich. Durch alle in diesem Band versammelten Arbeiten wird der Einfluss der Philosophie des Aristoteles auf das Leibniz’sche Denken näher umrissen. Ein wesentliches Ziel ist es hierbei, einen Beitrag zur Analyse dieser philosophischen Beziehung zu leisten und zu zeigen, dass auch Aristoteles’ Philosophie nach Ansicht unserer Autoren entscheidend zum Verständnis des Leibniz’schen Denkens beiträgt. Die Texte befassen sich mit wesentlichen Themen der Leibniz’schen Logik und Metaphysik, z. B. mit den (...) Grundbegriffen „Monade“ (und deren „Körperhaftigkeit“), „Entelechie“, „Nous“, mit dem Problem der Individuation (Individuum, Atomismus, Einheit), mit den substanziellen Formen, mit der Wissenschaft im Allgemeinen und der Technik, mit der Transformation der Logik, mit den Prinzipien (nämlich denjenigen des zureichenden Grundes, der Individuation und der Notwendigkeit), mit Zukunft und Kontingenz sowie Vergänglichkeit, mit der Theorie der syllogistischen Folgerung, usw. Diese Themen werden stets in der Gegenüberstellung von Leibniz und Aristoteles behandelt – sie zeigen daher, wie Leibniz aristotelische Thesen übernahm, veränderte oder kritisierte. The search for the historical sources of Leibniz’s philosphy initially seems to be unending. All the essays in this volume outline more clearly the influence of Aristotle’s philosophy on Leibniz’s thought. In this context a fundamental aim is to contribute to the analysis of this philosophical relationship and to demonstrate that Aristotle’s philosophy, in the opinion of our authors, plays a decisive role in the understanding of Leibniz’s thought. The texts address fundamental themes of Leibniz’s logic and metaphysics, e.g. the basic concepts of ‘monads’ (and their ‘corporality’), ‘entelechy’ and ‘nous; the problem of individuation (individual, atomism, unity); substantial forms; knowledge in general, and technology; the transformation of logic; principles (namely those of sufficient grounds, of individuation and of necesssity); future and contingency and transientness; the theory of syllogistic deduction, etc. These themes are regularly considered in the comparison between Leibniz and Aristotle – they demonstrate how Leibniz took over, treated or criticised Aristotelian theses. (shrink)

1. L'oeuvre musicale et son écoute -- 2. Le monde-musique et son solfège -- 3. Le musicien et son intellectualité musicale -- 4. Les raisonances du monde-musique ; postlude d'Alain Badiou.

Trente et un penseurs, parmi lesquels Jacques Derrida, Françoise Héritier, Edgar Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, Michel Onfray ou encore Jacques Rancière, pour comprendre les errements et les raisons d'espérer d'une planète convulsée. Dix-neuf entretiens et débats avec les intellectuels les plus engagés dans la réflexion sur le temps présent dressent un état des lieux des questions qui taraudent notre modernité. Issu du Théâtre des idées, cycle de rencontres intellectuelles du Festival d'Avignon (2004-2012), ces dialogues singuliers s'attachent à faire vivre l'esprit critique, (...) cette faculté de juger, de soumettre la réalité sociale, artistique ou politique au tamis du jugement argumenté, qu'il soit sérieux ou ironique, virulent ou tempéré. De très actuelles "résistances intellectuelles" qui esquissent ce que pourrait être un service public des idées, c'est-à-dire un accès direct, libre et partagé à l'intellectualité. (shrink)

Si, aujourd'hui, la démocratie fait, encore et toujours, question, peu d'oeuvres comparables à celles de Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997) et de Claude Lefort (1924-2010) permettent de circonscrire avec plus de profondeur et de radicalité ce questionnement. Sous les regards de la philosophie, de la sociologie, de l'histoire et de la science politique, cet ouvrage propose d'interroger le travail de réflexion entrepris par ces deux grandes figures de la philosophie politique contemporaine à la fois en commun, dans le cadre de Socialisme ou (...) Barbarie, puis de manière indépendante par la suite. Pour l'essentiel, le travail de Castoriadis et de Lefort aura principalement consisté à redonner sens à la notion de démocratie, que l'on ne doit pas entendre uniquement en tant que régime et institution politique, ou même en tant que réalité sociologique, mais bien plutôt en tant qu'expérience par laquelle les hommes s'emploient à transformer les conditions de leur existence commune. Si les convergences entre ces auteurs sont profondes, des différences se marquent aussi entre une pensée de la démocratie comme auto-institution explicite de la société et une conception de l'agir démocratique soucieuse de mettre avant tout l'accent sur le fait de la division sociale, et suggérant davantage de contester le pouvoir, en revendiquant contre lui des droits, qu'à chercher à en démocratiser l'exercice effectif Pour autant, l'un comme l'autre invitent à envisager la perspective de l'émancipation à la manière d'un processus conflictuel dont il est impossible de connaître le terme et qui n'a d'autre fondement que le désir de liberté. (shrink)