The question of whether AI systems such as robots can or should be afforded moral agency or patiency is not one amenable either to discovery or simple reasoning, because we as societies constantly reconstruct our artefacts, including our ethical systems. Consequently, the place of AI systems in society is a matter of normative, not descriptive ethics. Here I start from a functionalist assumption, that ethics is the set of behaviour that maintains a society. This assumption allows me to exploit the (...) theoretical biology of sociality and autonomy to explain our moral intuitions. From this grounding I extend to consider possible ethics for maintaining either human- or of artefact-centred societies. I conclude that while constructing AI systems as either moral agents or patients is possible, neither is desirable. In particular, I argue that we are unlikely to construct a coherent ethics in which it it is ethical to afford AI moral subjectivity. We are therefore obliged not to build AI we are obliged to. (shrink)

Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We (...) conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect. (shrink)

One of the interesting and occasionally controversial aspects of Dennett’s career is his direct involvement in the scientific process. This article describes some of Dennett’s participation on one particular project conducted at MIT, the building of the humanoid robot named Cog. One of the intentions of this project, not to date fully realized, was to test Dennett’s multiple drafts theory of consciousness. I describe Dennett’s involvement and impact on Cog from the perspective of a graduate student. I also describe the (...) problem of coordinating distributed intelligent systems, drawing examples from robot intelligence, human intelligence, and the Cog project itself. (shrink)

Ballard et al. show how control structures using minimal state can be made flexible enough for complex cognitive tasks by using deictic pointers, but they do so within a specific computational framework. We discuss broader implications in cognition and memory and provide biological evidence for their theory. We also suggest an alternative account of pointer binding, which may better explain their limited number.

That perception and action share abstract representations is a key insight into the organization of intelligence. However, organizing behavior requires additional representations and processes which are not “early” sensing or “late” motion: structures for sequencing actions and arbitrating between behavior subsystems. These systems are described as a supplement to the Theory of Event Coding (TEC).

The term embodiment identifies a theory that meaning and semantics cannot be captured by abstract, logical systems, but are dependent on an agent’s experience derived from being situated in an environment. This theory has recently received a great deal of support in the cognitive science literature and is having significant impact in artificial intelligence. Memetics refers to the theory that knowledge and ideas can evolve more or less independently of their human-agent substrates. While humans provide the medium for this evolution, (...) memetics holds that ideas can be developed without human comprehension or deliberate interference. Both theories have profound implications for the study of language—its potential use by machines, its acquisition by children and of particular relevance to this special issue, its evolution. This article links the theory of memetics to the established literature on semantic space, then examines the extent to which these memetic mechanisms might account for language independently of embodiment. It then seeks to explain the evolution of language through uniquely human cognitive capacities which facilitate memetic evolution. (shrink)

Social learning is a source of behaviour for many species, but few use it as extensively as they seemingly could. In this article, I attempt to clarify our understanding of why this might be. I discuss the potential computational properties of social learning, then examine the phenomenon in nature through creating a taxonomy of the representations that might underly it. This is achieved by first producing a simplified taxonomy of the established forms of social learning, then describing the primitive capacities (...) necessary to support them, and finally considering which of these capacities we actually have evidence for. I then discuss theoretical limits on cultural evolution, which include having sufficient information transmitted to support robust representations capable of supporting variation for evolution, and the need for limiting the extent of social conformity to avoid ecological fragility. Finally, I show how these arguments can inform several key scientific questions, including the uniqueness of human culture, the long lifespans of cultural species, and the propensity of animals to seemingly have knowledge about a phenomenon well before they will act upon it. (shrink)

One of the interesting and occasionally controversial aspects of Dennett’s career is his direct involvement in the scientific process. This article describes some of Dennett’s participation on one particular project conducted at MIT, the building of the humanoid robot named Cog. One of the intentions of this project, not to date fully realized, was to test Dennett’s multiple drafts theory of consciousness. I describe Dennett’s involvement and impact on Cog from the perspective of a graduate student. I also describe the (...) problem of coordinating distributed intelligent systems, drawing examples from robot intelligence, human intelligence, and the Cog project itself. (shrink)

Social learning is a source of behaviour for many species, but few use it as extensively as they seemingly could. In this article, I attempt to clarify our understanding of why this might be. I discuss the potential computational properties of social learning, then examine the phenomenon in nature through creating a taxonomy of the representations that might underly it. This is achieved by first producing a simplified taxonomy of the established forms of social learning, then describing the primitive capacities (...) necessary to support them, and finally considering which of these capacities we actually have evidence for. I then discuss theoretical limits on cultural evolution, which include having sufficient information transmitted to support robust representations capable of supporting variation for evolution, and the need for limiting the extent of social conformity to avoid ecological fragility. Finally, I show how these arguments can inform several key scientific questions, including the uniqueness of human culture, the long lifespans of cultural species, and the propensity of animals to seemingly have knowledge about a phenomenon well before they will act upon it. (shrink)

Language isn't the only way to cross modules, nor is it the only module with access to both input and output. Minds don't generally work across modules because this leads to combinatorial explosion in search and planning. Language is special in being a good vector for mimetics, so it becomes associated with useful cross-module concepts we acquire culturally. Further, language is indexical, so it facilitates computationally expensive operations.

When individuals learn from what others tell them, the information is subject to transmission error that does not arise in learning from direct experience. Yet evidence shows that humans consistently prefer this apparently more unreliable source of information. We examine the effect this preference has in cases where the information concerns a judgment on others’ behaviour and is used to establish cooperation in a society. We present a spatial model confirming that cooperation can be sustained by gossip containing a high (...) degree of uncertainty. Accuracy alone does not predict the value of information in evolutionary terms; relevance, the impact of information on behavioural outcomes, must also be considered. We then show that once relevance is incorporated as a criterion, second-hand information can no longer be discounted on the basis of its poor fidelity alone. Finally we show that the relative importance of accuracy and relevance depends on factors of life history and demography. (shrink)

One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is deserving of ethical consideration. This special issue of Philosophy and Technology investigates whether and to what extent machines, of various designs and configurations, can or should be considered moral subjects, defined here as either a moral agent, a moral patient, or both. The articles that comprise the issue were competitively selected from papers initially prepared for and presented at a symposium on this subject matter convened during (...) the AISB/IACAP 2012 World Congress, held in at the University of Birmingham in Birmingham, UK. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to offer some critical remarks on the so-called pragmatist approach to the regulation of robotics. To this end, the article mainly reviews the work of Jack Balkin and Joanna Bryson, who have taken up such ap- proach with interestingly similar outcomes. Moreover, special attention will be paid to the discussion concerning the legal fiction of ‘electronic personality’. This will help shed light on the opposition between essentialist and pragmatist methodologies. After a brief (...) introduction (1.), in 2. I introduce the main points of the methodological debate which opposes pragmatism and essentialism in the regulation of robotics and I examine how legal fictions are framed from a pragmatist, functional perspective. Since this approach entails a neat separation of ontological analysis and legal rea- soning, in 3. I discuss whether considerations on robots’ essence are actually put into brackets when the pragmatist approach is endorsed. Finally, in 4. I address the problem of the social valence of legal fictions in order to suggest a possible limit of the pragmatist approach. My conclusion (5.) is that in the specific case of regulating robotics it may be very difficult to separate ontological considerations from legal reasoning—and vice versa—both on an epistemological and social level. This calls for great caution in the recourse to anthropomorphic legal fictions. (shrink)

The amount allocated to publicly funded health care for 2005/06 in New Zealand, a small country of some four million people, is $NZ 9.68 billion, or 6.2% of GDP, an increase from the 5.7% of GDP in 2000/01. The Minister of Finance has recently signalled that spending in health and education has outpaced economic growth, and that the present rate of growth in health spending, which has grown at about 7% a year over the last decade, is unsustainable. Despite these (...) big funding increases in recent years, the perception of New Zealanders is that the extra spending has made little difference, at least to hospital services and to people’s ability to access treatment. In surveys, health emerges as a leading concern for New Zealanders. Their concern is apparently less about the quality of services, than about their ability to access treatment - whether they will be able to access timely health care when they or their family members need it. (shrink)

Libertarian paternalism is a concept derived from cognitive psychology and behavioural science. It is behind policies that frame information in such a way as to encourage individuals to make choices which are in their best interests, while maintaining their freedom of choice. Clinicians may view their clinical consultations as far removed from the realms of cognitive psychology but on closer examination there are a number of striking similarities.

This rich and diverse collection offers a range of perspectives and practices of Philosophy for Children (P4C). P4C has become a significant educational and philosophical movement with growing impact on schools and educational policy. Its community of inquiry pedagogy has been taken up in community, adult, higher, further and informal educational settings around the world. The internationally sourced chapters offer research findings as well as insights into debates provoked by bringing children’s voices into moral and political arenas and to philosophy (...) and the broader educational issues this raises, for example: historical perspectives on the field; democratic participation and epistemic, pedagogical and political relationships; philosophy as a subject and philosophy as a practice; philosophical teaching across the curriculum; embodied enquiry, emotions and space; knowledge, truth and philosophical progress; resources and texts for philosophical inquiry; ethos and values of P4C practice and research. The Routledge International Handbook of Philosophy for Children will spark new discussions and identify emerging questions and themes in this diverse and controversial field. It is an accessible, engaging and provocative read for all students, researchers, academics and educators who have an interest in Philosophy for Children, its educational philosophy and its pedagogy. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim to enhance our understanding about the processing of implicit and explicit temporal chronological relations by investigating the roles of temporal connectives and verbal tenses, separately and in interaction. In particular, we investigate how two temporal connectives (ensuiteandpuis, both meaning ‘then’) and two verbal tenses expressing past time (the simple and compound past) act as processing instructions for chronological relations in French. Theoretical studies have suggested that the simple past encodes the instruction to relate events sequentially, (...) unlike the more flexible compound past, which does not. Using an online experiment with a self-paced reading task, we show that these temporal connectives facilitate the processing of chronological relations when they are expressed with both verbal tenses, and that no significant difference is found between the two verbal tenses, nor between the two connectives. By means of an offline experiment with an evaluation task, we find, contrary to previous studies, that comprehenders prefer chronological relations to be overtly marked rather than implicitly expressed, and prefer to use the connectivepuisin particular. Furthermore, comprehenders prefer it when these relations are expressed using the compound past, rather than the simple past. Instead of using thecontinuityhypothesis (Segal et al. 1991,Murray 1997) to explain the processing of temporal relations, we conclude that a more accurate explanation considers a cluster of factors including linguistic knowledge (connectives, tenses, grammatical and lexical aspect) and world knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically examine the major philosophical standpoints regarding subsentential speech acts such as “Nice dress”, “Under the table”, or “Where?”. The opponents of this category argue either that apparent subsentential speech acts are ellipses or that they are not full-fledged speech acts. The defenders of subsentential speech acts argue that even though they are not sentences in the syntactic or the semantic sense, they can be used to perform a speech act. I argue in defence of subsentential (...) speech acts and propose to analyze them using Recanati’s moderate relativism. (shrink)

This paper proposes that global peace should be a professional concern because the issues are complex and require critical and creative thinking, and because professionals have status enabling them to convey information to empower others. Professionals must examine priorities in society's needs for application of their particular knowledge areas, and must each make their own unique contribution towards a more peaceful, less threatened planet.

Our contributors invite new ways of thinking Hegels ideas through contemporary art and theories that arise from current perspectives; and of thinking through such art and perspectives via Hegelianism.

In this issue, our contributors demonstrate how art in the city, art “about” the city, art compared to the city, can bring to attention the insidious forces underlying every city’s gleaming, wide-awake veneer.

In this issue, our contributors demonstrate how art in the city, art “about” the city, art compared to the city, can bring to attention the insidious forces underlying every city’s gleaming, wide-awake veneer.

This introduction highlights the themes that arise from The Missed: the productivity and negativity of unrealized potential and missed opportunity.

This introduction highlights the themes that arise from The Missed: the productivity and negativity of unrealized potential and missed opportunity.

One of the most widely applied techniques used to examine associative memory errors is the Deese-Roediger- McDermott paradigm. The aim of the present studies was to demonstrate a Polish version of the DRM paradigm and to test the characteristics of memory illusions evoked by this procedure for both recall and recognition. A normative study was conducted to prepare Polish stimuli material sharing similar characteristics as the lists in the English language version. Subsequently, the lists were applied to examine the effect (...) of prior recall on recognition, as well as the influence of retention interval on recall. The results revealed that the Polish version of the DRM paradigm induced a robust effect of false recall and recognition. Moreover, it was revealed that immediate recall of a single list led to a higher rate of both correct and false recall and that prior recall positively influenced recognition, leading to a higher rate of hits. (shrink)

BackgroundIn this study, we analyze the association of social isolation in the first phase of the pandemic with perceived stress among residents of Poland and Italy with a look at how these populations adjust to and comply with implemented regulations, guidelines, and restrictions.Materials and MethodsInternet survey with Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10) and questions regarding mobility patterns, attitude, and propensity to adjust toward the implemented measures and current health condition was made among Polish and Italian residents (Cronbach’s alpha 0.86 and 0.79, (...) respectively). The sample size was 7,108 (6,169 completed questionnaires in Poland and 939 in Italy).ResultsThe Polish group had a higher stress level than the Italian group (mean PSS-10 total score 22,14 vs 17,01, respectively;p< 0.01). There was a greater prevalence of chronic diseases among Polish respondents. Italian subjects expressed more concern about their health, as well as about their future employment. Italian subjects did not comply with suggested restrictions as much as Polish subjects and were less eager to restrain from their usual activities (social, physical, and religious), which were more often perceived as “most needed matters” in Italian than in Polish residents.ConclusionHigher activity level was found to be correlated with lower perceived stress, but the causality is unclear. Difference in adherence to restrictions between Polish and Italian residents suggests that introducing similar lockdown policies worldwide may not be as beneficial as expected. However, due to the applied method of convenience sampling and uneven study groups, one should be careful with generalizing these results. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric Jahrgang: 45 Heft: 1 Seiten: 277-287.

In the paper I describe John MacFarlane’s version of relativism about truth. I begin by discussing Twardowski’s (1900) and Kokoszynska’s (1948; 1951) arguments against relativism. They think — just as Haack does (see 2011) — that sentences may be relatively true, if they are incomplete, but once they are completed they become true (or false) absolutely. MacFarlane distinguishes between nonindexical contextualism (which was anticipated by Kokoszynska (sic!)) and relativism which requires the introduction of the context of assessment. According to him (...) only the view which postulates double-indexed (to contexts of utterance and to contexts of assessments) truth is able to explain disagreement in subjective domains and contradicting intuitions about the truth-value of future-contingents. (shrink)

Semantic contextualism claims that sentences ascribing knowledge or lack thereof (sentences like "S knows that p" and "S doesn't know that p") are context dependent: they express different propositions in different contexts of utterance. "Knows that" is either indexical or elliptical and refers to different relations in different circumstances. Invariantism argues in turn that the knowing relation is just one and the proposition expressed by a given knowledge ascription does not depend on context. A special case of invariantism is interest-relative (...) invariantism proposed recently by Jason Stanley. According to |R| knowledge is conceptually linked to practical interests. Whether or not true beliefs count as knowledge depends on the costs of being wrong; on the stakes in a given situation (I may know that the bank will be open on Saturday if I have no important business to be done in the bank; if however I have an impending bill coming due I will not count as knowing that the bank will be open on Saturday even though my evidence as regard bank opening hours has not changed). It is argued in the paper that the difference between various contexts in which knowledge ascriptions are made is not a difference in stakes. Moreover knowledge has to be distinguished from willingness to be sure. One may know something but not be sure about it and may be sure about something but not to know it. The higher the stakes the more sure one usually wants to be, but the height of the stakes does not have such an impact on knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper one of the popular conceptions of rigidity of general names is presented and discussed. According to this view general terms\' rigidity consists in the fact that they have the same abstract designatum (namely a kind or a property) in all possible words. It is argued that the view which says that all general names are in fact abstract names is no good, because (i) in postulating the existence of abstract designatum, it \'multiplies entities beyond necessity\', (ii) it (...) either trivialises the notion of rigidity or else entangles us in an unresolvable discussion as to the nature of universals, (iii) is ad hoc, and (iv) rigidity defined in this conception cannot play any of the roles that Kripke wanted the notion of rigidity for general terms to play. (shrink)