Many interpretations of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion have labored under the assumption that one of the characters represents Hume's view on the Design Argument, and Philo is often selected for this role. I reject this opinion by showing that Philo is inconsistent. He offers a decisive refutation of the Design Argument, yet later endorses this very argument. I then dismiss two prominent ways of handling Philo's reversal: first, I show that Philo is not ironic either in his skepticism or (...) in his theistic reversal. Second, I reject the suggestion that the Design Argument is a natural belief, since it differs significantly from causal and external world beliefs. Finally, I argue that the control the Design Argument exerts is the product of a youthful indoctrination that prevents Philo from consistently maintaining his skeptical position. (shrink)

Many interpretations of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion have labored under the assumption that one of the characters represents Hume's view on the Design Argument, and Philo is often selected for this role. I reject this opinion by showing that Philo is inconsistent. He offers a decisive refutation of the Design Argument, yet later endorses this very argument. I then dismiss two prominent ways of handling Philo's reversal: first, I show that Philo is not ironic either in his skepticism or (...) in his theistic reversal. Second, I reject the suggestion that the Design Argument is a natural belief, since it differs significantly from causal and external world beliefs. Finally, I argue that the control the Design Argument exerts is the product of a youthful indoctrination that prevents Philo from consistently maintaining his skeptical position. (shrink)

In an effort to identify the genre of the Confessions, this essay: 1) explains the patristic notion of confession and how Augustine expands upon this already-rich concept to include that of sacrifice; 2) offers an overview of Augustine’s pervasive sacrificial imagery in the Confessions, especially with respect to himself, Monica, Alypius, and the philosophi; and 3) teases out the implications of this imagery and how Augustine’s theology of sacrifice relates to the genre of his Confessions. We conclude the Confessions (...) is best understood as a sacrifice offered to God by Augustine in his capacity as bishop on behalf of his readers so that they may join him in the transformative act of confessing. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: An Unfortunate Assumption Sosa on Knowledge and Justification The Distinctness of Justification and Knowledge.

In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief (...) as a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon from the rationality of decision or action. His approach generates promising suggestions about a wide range of issues--e.g., the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief; the question of what aspects of the Cartesian project are still worth doing; the significance of simplicity and other theoretical virtues; the relevance of skeptical hypotheses; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of knowledge; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of rational degrees of belief; and the limits of idealization in epistemology. (shrink)

Like the virtue it purports to explain, St Thomas Aquinas' treatment of modestia in the Summa Theologiae is something that can easily be overlooked. Such neglect is unfortunate, for it is liable to obscure the surprising character of Aquinas' account, departing as it does from many of his philosophical sources , to say nothing of our own contemporary assumptions. This novel treatment is especially significant given its potential value in addressing the social and political needs of the current age, for (...) rather than being the virtue least fitted for contemporary life, the modesty that emerges in Thomas' moral theology may have an enduring civic significance. This essay therefore begins with an exegesis of Aquinas' account of modestia and concludes with an analysis of its political dimensions. (shrink)

The Oregon Health Division's report on assisted suicide under the state's new legislation does not provide enough data to support its reassuring conclusions. Especially glaring is the lack of data on the palliative care offered to patients who requested assisted suicide, on their financial situation, and on their emotional state.

Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, encompassing philosophy, literature, politics and history, John Foley examines the full breadth of Camus' ideas to provide a comprehensive and rigorous study of his political and philosophical thought and a significant contribution to a range of debates current in Camus research. Foley argues that the coherence of Camus' thought can best be understood through a thorough understanding of the concepts of 'the absurd' and 'revolt' as well as the relation between them. This book includes (...) a detailed discussion of Camus' writings for the newspaper "Combat", a systematic analysis of Camus' discussion of the moral legitimacy of political violence and terrorism, a reassessment of the prevailing postcolonial critique of Camus' humanism, and a sustained analysis of Camus' most important and frequently neglected work, "L'Homme revolte". (shrink)

To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defence of the reliability of one's faculties, methods and opinions that does (...) not beg the question. Moreover, he shows how this account of intellectual self-trust can be used to understand the degree to which it is reasonable to rely on alternative authorities. This book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences as well as anyone looking for a unified account of the issues at the centre of intellectual trust. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Despite being generally recognised as Camus’ most important philosophical essay, L’Homme révolté is rather neglected in the scholarship and enjoys a limited readership, especially among Anglophone critics and readers – a fact brightly reflected in the questionable quality of the only English translation, by Anthony Bower, and in the decision of Hamish Hamilton and Penguin, Camus’ publishers in the UK, to cut about thirty pages of text from their edition, ‘in the interests of economy.’. This essay examines one brief (...) but crucially important section of L’Homme révolté concerned with Rousseau’s Du contrat social. It explores the centrality of Camus’ analysis of Rousseau’s essay and its influence on the French Revolution to the arguments of L’Homme révolté, especially as these pertain to political or revolutionary violence. It also examines in close detail some striking parallels between Camus’ analysis of Rousseau and that found in essays by Isaiah Berlin and Philip Pettit. (shrink)

Henri Bergson was a French professor and philosopher. Born in Paris in 1859 to a Polish composer and Yorkshire woman of Irish descent, his revelatory ideas of life as ceaseless transformation and the importance of attention, learning, humor and joy brought him incredible fame and media celebrity.Here you will find insights from his greatest works.The Life Lessons series from The School of Life takes a great thinker and highlights those ideas most relevant to ordinary everyday dilemmas. These books emphasize ways (...) in which wise voices from the past have urgently important and inspiring things to tell us. (shrink)

This article focuses on the latest developments in mainstream economic theory as of 1999. Changes in economic theory are particularly significant in a period when the Stalinist version of Marxian theory is also in disarray, and the whole question of markets and economic coordination in socialist economies is in practical and theoretical flux. The most important abstract results in the finite-commodity space general-equilibrium theory are that equilibria are locally unique, that is, prices close to but different from the equilibrium prices (...) leave an imbalance between supply and demand, and that a logical link exists between competitive equilibrium allocations and an efficient allocation of resources. A stronger theory of the productive unit can now develop to balance the so far one-sided concentration of theory on market interactions. (shrink)

In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was (...) on for a fourth condition of knowledge, one that could be added to justification, truth, and belief to produce an adequate analysis of knowledge. (shrink)

What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.

This chapter contains sections titled: Part I: Epistemology Part II: Metaphysics.

Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.

All of us get opinions from other people. And not just a few. We acquire opinions from others extensively and do so from early childhood through virtually every day of the rest our lives. Sometimes we rely on others for relatively inconsequential information. Is it raining outside? Did the Yankees win today? But we also depend on others for important or even life preserving information. Where is the nearest hospital? Do people drive on the left or the right here? We (...) acquire opinions from family and close acquaintances but also from strangers. We get directions from and heed the warnings of individuals we’ve never met, and likewise read books and articles and listen to television and radio reports authored by individuals we don’t know personally. Moreover, we undertake inquiries in groups in which the group relies on the conclusions of the individuals making up the group. In some of these collective efforts everyone knows one another, for example, a set of neighbors taking a census of birds in the neighborhood. But others, such as the effort to understand gravity, are not so nearly self-contained. Indeed, many of the most impressive human intellectual accomplishments are the collective products of individuals far removed from another in location (and sometimes even over time) who rely on each other’s conclusions without feeling the need to re-confirm them. (shrink)

The options currently available to women with uterine infertility are adoption or surrogacy. Recently the option of uterine transplantation has been explored which would allow a woman to carry her own genetically related child. Although this type of transplant raises similar ethical considerations to other types of non-life-saving organ transplantation, such as facial tissue and limb, it also raises its own very unique considerations. In this paper, some of the considerations surrounding uterine transplantation, such as informed consent and an individual's (...) rights, and potential limit to reproductive autonomy are explored. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examine (...) and criticize several seemingly plausible ways of showing that regresses of inferential justification are impossible and then propose two requirements of inferential justification which, I argue, Are sufficient to show the impossibility. (shrink)