Moral injury, the experience of having acted incommensurably with one's most deeply held moral conceptions, is increasingly recognized by the mental health disciplines to be associated with postcombat traumatic stress. In this essay I argue that moral injury is an important and useful clinical construct but that the phenomenon of moral injury beckons beyond the structural constraints of contemporary psychology toward something like moral theology. This something, embodied in specific communal practices, can rescue moral injury from the medical model and (...) the means—end logic of techne and can allow for truthful, contextualized narration of and healing from morally fragmenting combat experiences. (shrink)

Although post-traumatic stress disorder is now constituted by a set of characteristic symptoms, its roots lie in Post-Vietnam Syndrome, a label generated by a Vietnam-era advocacy movement that focused not on symptoms but on war’s traumatic context. When Post-Vietnam Syndrome was subsumed into the abstract, individualistic, symptom-centered language of DSM-III and rendered as PTSD, it not only lost this focus on context but also neglected the experiences of veterans who suffer from things done or witnessed, not primarily from what was (...) done to them, in war. This agent-related trauma has been rediscovered in contemporary work on moral injury, but moral injury too is increasingly subjected to the hegemony of the symptom. Focusing on symptoms, however, unhelpfully pathologizes and individualizes trauma, neglects traumatic context, and legitimates problematic therapeutic approaches. Trauma researchers and clinicians should decenter the language of symptoms and focus instead on context and on alternative accounts of trauma. (shrink)

Suicide is a leading cause of death in the United States and in many other parts of the world. As such, suicide is frequently framed as a medical and public health problem for which solutions are best recommended by medical and public health authorities. While, medicalized suicide prevention strategies often resonate with traditional Christian commitments to preserve life and to discourage suicide, there is little evidence to date that medical approaches to suicide risk-reduction decrease population rates of suicide. Further, by (...) treating suicide as a phenomenon that can be eliminated through technical managerial control, modern suicide prevention efforts construe suffering persons as carriers of risk best managed by standardized and often dehumanizing environments of care. This emphasis on the medical management of risk also erodes the clinician–patient relationship and inappropriately centers medical (e.g., systematic health screenings) rather than non-medical (e.g., access to housing) forms of response. Although, medicalized suicide prevention efforts should not be dismantled, those working to prevent suicide would do well to prioritize a positive commitment to human dignity and worth and to engage social and political systems beyond medicine and public health, while drawing on specific contributions that clinicians can offer. (shrink)

Moral injury results from the violation of deeply held moral commitments leading to emotional and existential distress. The phenomenon was initially described by psychologists and psychiatrists associated with the US Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs but has since been applied more broadly. Although its application to healthcare preceded COVID-19, healthcare professionals have taken greater interest in moral injury since the pandemic’s advent. They have much to learn from combat veterans, who have substantial experience in identifying and addressing moral injury—particularly (...) its social dimensions. Veterans recognise that complex social factors lead to moral injury, and therefore a community approach is necessary for healing. We argue that similar attention must be given in healthcare, where a team-oriented and multidimensional approach is essential both for ameliorating the suffering faced by health professionals and for addressing the underlying causes that give rise to moral injury. (shrink)

Prudence, for Thomas Aquinas, is an intellectual virtue that requires coincident moral virtue for its sustainability. As such, prudence displays a way of living in which intellect, desire, and emotion are harmoniously integrated. This account resonates strongly with the aims of mindfulness practices within contemporary psychology and with the "interpersonal neurobiology" of Daniel Siegel, for whom health is understood as a context-responsive and narrative integration of cognition, emotion, and embodied experience that promotes and allows for stable self-identity and fulfilling interpersonal (...) relationships. Similarly, prudence for Aquinas is an integrative virtue, integrating intellect and will, theory and context, action and agent, reason and emotion, past and future, the individual and his or her community, and the proximate and ultimate ends of human life. Contemporary mindfulness practices are at their best a school for prudence, and thus they shed an interesting light on Aquinas's account. In turn, Aquinas's account of prudence offers theological parameters for Christian participation in contemporary mindfulness practices. (shrink)

Suggesting that underlying some violent behavior is an unhealthy identification of one's self with one's behavior, such that there is no reflective space between the acting self and unwanted or violent action, Alexandra Pârvan echoes many contemporary psychotherapeutic models in suggesting that a central goal of psychotherapy for perpetrators and recipients of violence should be to encourage clients to distance the acting self from the self's experience and behavior. Pârvan observes that this is already a feature of "attachment-informed psychotherapy," but (...) she argues that "the distinction between self and action can only be effectively established from outside strictly psychological perspectives" (p.... (shrink)

The modern editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, beginning with DSM-III in 1980, emerged in response to notable challenges to psychiatry’s practices and ways of knowing in the early 1970s. Because these challenges threatened psychiatry’s scientific self-understanding and moral authority, they exemplify what Alasdair MacIntyre has termed “epistemological crisis.” As a response to crisis, the modern DSM has been a stunning political achievement, providing the central diagnostic constructs around which psychiatric research, practice, and reimbursement has been (...) organized for four decades. Indeed, the DSM’s authority survives in the face of ongoing trenchant scientific and philosophical critique. But if psychiatry is to be healthy, it must be epistemologically humble, reckoning honestly with the limits of the DSM before a future epistemological crisis destabilizes it entirely. (shrink)

In his 1917 lecture “Science as a Vocation,” Max Weber challenged current and aspiring scholars to abandon any pretense that science bears within itself any meaning. In a disenchanted age, he argued, science could at best offer “knowledge of the techniques whereby we can control life... through calculation,” and any meaning or moral direction to scientific research—including religious meaning—must be imposed on it from without. Weber presciently anticipated that many present-day health care practitioners would struggle to find meaning for their (...) work within complex “state-capitalist” health care systems, along with predictable quasi-religious responses. But how are Christian practitioners to practice faithfully in a disenchanted age? The authors of this special issue lean deeply into the loci of Christian theology and Christian practice, some challenging the views of the body and of nature that informed Weber’s theory of disenchantment, and all offering resources and paths by which practitioners might “look the fate of the age full in the face” with courage and wisdom. (shrink)

Anastasia Philippa Scrutton renders helpful service to philosophers and mental health clinicians by highlighting strongly voluntarist approaches to depression within some present-day Christian writers and communities, particularly Pentecostal and Evangelical Christian communities in the United States and the United Kingdom. Drawing on a number of evangelical Christian books and online resources, she argues that these resources are "voluntaristic because they emphasize the role of libertarian free will and choice in the attitudes and behaviors of people with depression, such that depression (...) is seen to be a sin, or the result of sin, because depression sufferers are able to do otherwise." She counters these... (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all further (...) questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined. (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

The commentaries by Warren Kinghorn and Giuseppe Butera provide me with the welcome opportunity to reaffirm and briefly address a concern that lies at the core of my work in recent years. It regards the lack of a metaphysical perspective and consequently metaphysically informed interventions, or what I recently came to term 'metaphysical care', in psychological and medical treatments when there are identifiable metaphysical assumptions at work both in clinicians and treated persons that affect the treatment and the (...) well-being of both. In the original article, this is exemplified in the failure of both psychotherapists and people affected by violence to operate with a metaphysically grounded... (shrink)

My thanks go to Marcia Webb and Warren Kinghorn for their thoughtful and stimulating commentaries, one drawing attention to clinical studies of religion and depression and neuroscientific studies of determinism and free will, and the other making a case for a theological rather than philosophical argument against Christian voluntarism. In combination, the commentaries raise an important question about what a philosophical approach might valuably bring to the topics surrounding this paper, Kinghorn's by raising an explicit challenge to (...) this end and Webb's by pointing to the achievements of empirical studies in this field without the aid of philosophical engagement. Unfortunately, there is not space in this response... (shrink)

The prior research on different forms of what can be referred to as corporate social responsibility reporting is vast. As CSR reporting becomes more commonplace, the theoretical and empirical analysis of this type of reporting has matured and both academics and practitioners have begun to explore the possibility of having CSR disclosures assured. This paper makes an important contribution by synthesising the findings on emerging forms of CSR assurance practice. It summarises the ground covered to date and provides a comprehensive (...) review of the literature on the characterises, use and limitations of CSR assurance services. It develops a conceptual model which distinguishes between determinants of CSR assurance at the national- and firm-level and shows how the nature of assurance services, a company’s reporting infrastructure and current technologies of assurance enable or constrain the benefits of having CSR disclosures assured. Areas for future research, based on identified weaknesses in the current CSR assurance environment, are also identified. (shrink)

The prior research on different forms of what can be referred to as corporate social responsibility reporting is vast. As CSR reporting becomes more commonplace, the theoretical and empirical analysis of this type of reporting has matured and both academics and practitioners have begun to explore the possibility of having CSR disclosures assured. This paper makes an important contribution by synthesising the findings on emerging forms of CSR assurance practice. It summarises the ground covered to date and provides a comprehensive (...) review of the literature on the characterises, use and limitations of CSR assurance services. It develops a conceptual model which distinguishes between determinants of CSR assurance at the national- and firm-level and shows how the nature of assurance services, a company’s reporting infrastructure and current technologies of assurance enable or constrain the benefits of having CSR disclosures assured. Areas for future research, based on identified weaknesses in the current CSR assurance environment, are also identified. (shrink)

The Covid-19 crisis has clarified the demand for an ultra-brief single-session, online, theory-led, empirically supported, psychological intervention for managing stress and improving well-being, especially for people within organizational settings. We designed and delivered “4Ds for Dealing with Distress” during the crisis to address this need. 4Ds unifies a spectrum of familiar emotion regulation strategies, resilience exercises, and problem-solving approaches using perceptual control theory and distils them into a simple four-component rubric. In essence, the aim is to reduce distress and restore (...) wellbeing, both in the present moment through current actions, and through expressing longer-term goal conflicts to discover new perspectives that arise spontaneously after sufficient time and consideration. The intervention is user-led in that it draws on users’ own idiosyncratic and pre-existing experiences, knowledge, skills and resources to help them apply an approach, or combination of approaches, that are proportionate and timed to the nature and context of the stress they are experiencing. In this article we review the empirical basis of the approach within experimental, social, biological and clinical psychology, illustrate the novel and time-efficient delivery format, describe its relevance to sports and exercise, summarise feedback from the recipients of the intervention to date, and describe the directions for future evaluation. (shrink)

Warren and Dresang comment on the contributions from a psycholinguistic perspective, highlighting close relations between the respective research on events and proposing that, for example, verbs may indeed directly pre‐activate templates of the typically involved event participants.

_The Other Adam Smith_ represents the next wave of critical thinking about the still under-examined work of this paradigmatic Enlightenment thinker. Not simply another book about Adam Smith, it allows and even necessitates his inclusion in the realm of theory in the broadest sense. Moving beyond his usual economic and moral philosophical texts, Mike Hill and Warren Montag take seriously Smith's entire corpus, his writing on knowledge, affect, sociability and government, and political economy, as constituting a comprehensive—though highly contestable—system (...) of thought. We meet not just Smith the economist, but Smith the philosopher, Smith the literary critic, Smith the historian, and Smith the anthropologist. Placed in relation to key thinkers such as Hume, Lord Kames, Fielding, Hayek, Von Mises, and Agamben, this other Adam Smith, far from being localized in the history of eighteenth-century economic thought or ideas, stands at the center of the most vibrant and contentious debates of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. (shrink)

“It is the creation of the paternalistic but secretive company which produces moral indifference towards its employees”. This Turner & Newall case‐study highlights the significance of how a corporate morality or a thought world can affect the ethical conduct of the individuals in the organization. Geoffrey Tweedale is Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for Business History, and Richard C. Warren is Principal Lecturer in the Department of Business Studies, at The Manchester Metropolitan University, Aytoun Building, Aytoun Street, Manchester. (...) M1 3GH. Acknowledgments. This study draws partly on a study funded by the Wellcome Trust. Also to be thanked are David Jeremy and Andrew Lock. Michael O’Connor of Chase Manhattan Bank kindly provided court transcripts and other records from the Bank’s collection of non‐confidential T&N materials. (shrink)

Critically engages the work of American philosopher Richard J. Bernstein.

At a time when firms signal their commitment to CSR through online communication, news sources may convey conflicting information, causing stakeholders to perceive firm hypocrisy. Here, we test the effects of conflicting CSR information that conveys inconsistent outcomes (results-based hypocrisy) and ulterior motives (motive-based hypocrisy) on hypocrisy perceptions expressed in social media posts, which we conceptualize as countersignals that reach a broad audience of stakeholders. Across six studies, we find that (1) conflicting CSR information from internal (firm) and external (news) (...) sources elicits hypocrisy perceptions regardless of whether the CSR information reflects inconsistencies in results or motives, (2) individuals respond to conflicting CSR information with countersignals accusing firms of hypocrisy expressed in social media posts, (3) hypocrisy perceptions are linked to other damaging stakeholder consequences, including behavior (divestment, boycotting, lower employment interest), affect (moral outrage), and cognition (moral condemnation), and (4) firms with higher credibility are more likely to experience adverse effects of conflicting CSR information. These findings advance theory regarding the effects of conflicting CSR information as it relates to the role of credibility and different forms of hypocrisy. Importantly, damaging social media posts and stakeholder backlash can arise from hypocrisy perceptions associated with inconsistent CSR results as well as inconsistent motives, and strong firm credibility only makes a firm more vulnerable to this backlash. (shrink)

This paper evaluates the ethical consequences of the use of marketing techniques in the child adoption process within England and Wales. Since 1995 the political climate in the UK has seen a reassessment of the manner in which the state organises care for children who are within its legal guardianship. Successive UK governments have acknowledged the under‐utilisation of child adoption as a moral and efficient means of child‐care. However, the presentation of child adoption in a more active fashion involves concerns (...) about the manner in which child adoption has been organised. Increasingly child adoption organisations and social work professionals are being made accountable through the language of customer service and performance measurements. The use of commercial techniques such as marketing is justified on utilitarian grounds. However, any utilisation of marketing within the child adoption process is forced to ensure that the child is not de‐centred. Legislation requires that the needs and welfare of the child are the first consideration for the adoption agency. Here we begin to see tensions between the humanitarian project that is child adoption, and the unease produced by viewing the child as human ‘product’. This invites analysis via critical theory. The use of marketing in child adoption raises issues related to the objectification and commodification of the child and prospective adopters. Within child adoption it is assumed that we must engage with the child as ‘face’ (Bauman, 1995). But will these assumptions stand the encroachment of marketing techniques into this very sensitive area? (shrink)

Is the Internet an appropriate medium to use when attempting to resolve conflicts over ethical issues in business? The research reported on in this paper focuses on internet versus face-to-face negotiations as a component of applied discourse ethics. Although internet negotiation has serious restrictions, it also has specific qualities. It enhances reflection and plays down emotion. Important qualities when handling complex and delicate ethical issues.

If we want to retain classical logic and standard syntax in light of the liar, we are forced to restrict the T-schema. The traditional philosophical justification for this is sentential – liar sentences somehow malfunction. But the standard formal way of implementing this is conditional, our T-sentences tell us that if “p” does not malfunction, then “p” is true if and only if p. Recently Bacon and others have pointed out that conditional T-restrictions like this flirt with incoherence. If we (...) want to keep the “malfunction” motivation, our only other option is to non-conditionally restrict the T-schema, but Field and others have given powerful philosophical and technical arguments against this kind of approach. Here I argue that if we really take the philosophical motivation for restricting T-sentences seriously, we can explain why conditional restrictions fail, answer Field's argument, and reason in a coherent way about truth using a non-conditional restriction strategy. This cracks the door open for a fully classical response to the liar and related paradoxes. In closing, I argue that, when properly understood, this kind of “restriction” is not really a restriction at all. If this is right, then the holy grail of liar studies (classical logic, naïve truth, and standard syntax) may yet be attainable. (Note for readers: when this paper was first put online, the typesetters had changed some instances of corners to brackets, leading to confusion. The paper has now been corrected online by PPR, so please make sure you have the corrected version before reading or citing.). (shrink)

The Epicurean philosophical system has enjoyed much recent scrutiny, but the question of its philosophical ancestry remains largely neglected. It has often been thought that Epicurus owed only his physical theory of atomism to the fifth-century BC philosopher Democritus, but this study finds that there is much in his ethical thought which can be traced to Democritus. It also finds important influences on Epicurus in Democritus' fourth-century followers such as Anaxarchus and Pyrrho, and in Epicurus' disagreements with his own Democritean (...) teacher Nausiphanes. The result is not only a fascinating reconstruction of a lost tradition, but also an important contribution to the philosophical interpretation of Epicureanism, bearing especially on its ideal of tranquillity and on the relation of ethics to physics. (shrink)

In his arguments that science itself can answer moral questions, Sam Harris often appeals to our intuitions about the badness of suffering. If we share these intuitions, Harris argues, we’ve taken a significant step in conceding to a basically utilitarian worldview. In this chapter, I critically assess Harris’ arguments and find them deeply wanting.

Because of the “all-or-none” character of nervous activity, neural events and the relations among them can be treated by means of propositional logic. It is found that the behavior of every net can be described in these terms, with the addition of more complicated logical means for nets containing circles; and that for any logical expression satisfying certain conditions, one can find a net behaving in the fashion it describes. It is shown that many particular choices among possible neurophysiological assumptions (...) are equivalent, in the sense that for every net behaving under one assumption, there exists another net which behaves under the other and gives the same results, although perhaps not in the same time. Various applications of the calculus are discussed. (shrink)

Writings by a thinker—a psychiatrist, a philosopher, a cybernetician, and a poet—whose ideas about mind and brain were far ahead of his time. Warren S. McCulloch was an original thinker, in many respects far ahead of his time. McCulloch, who was a psychiatrist, a philosopher, a teacher, a mathematician, and a poet, termed his work “experimental epistemology.” He said, “There is one answer, only one, toward which I've groped for thirty years: to find out how brains work.” Embodiments of (...) Mind, first published more than fifty years ago, teems with intriguing concepts about the mind/brain that are highly relevant to recent developments in neuroscience and neural networks. It includes two classic papers coauthored with Walter Pitts, one of which applies Boolean algebra to neurons considered as gates, and the other of which shows the kind of nervous circuitry that could be used in perceiving universals. These first models are part of the basis of artificial intelligence. Chapters range from “What Is a Number, that a Man May Know It, and a Man, that He May Know a Number,” and “Why the Mind Is in the Head,” to “What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain” (with Jerome Lettvin, Humberto Maturana, and Walter Pitts), “Machines that Think and Want,” and “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity” (with Walter Pitts). Embodiments of Mind concludes with a selection of McCulloch's poems and sonnets. This reissued edition offers a new foreword and a biographical essay by McCulloch's one-time research assistant, the neuroscientist and computer scientist Michael Arbib. (shrink)

Once upon a time, logical conventionalism was the most popular philosophical theory of logic. It was heavily favored by empiricists, logical positivists, and naturalists. According to logical conventionalism, linguistic conventions explain logical truth, validity, and modality. And conventions themselves are merely syntactic rules of language use, including inference rules. Logical conventionalism promised to eliminate mystery from the philosophy of logic by showing that both the metaphysics and epistemology of logic fit into a scientific picture of reality. For naturalists of all (...) stripes, this was paradise. Alas, paradise was lost. By the end of the twentieth century, logical conventionalism had been almost universally abandoned. But more recently, it has been revitalized. This chapter provides an overview of logical conventionalism and its history, clears away misunderstandings, and briefly responds to both the canonical objections to conventionalism (from Quine, Dummett, Boghossian, and many others) as well as new objections (from Field and Golan). From paradise lost, to paradise regained: logical conventionalism is back. (shrink)

Why another book on Berkeley? For one thing, because he is so curiously modern. He was one of the pioneers of the empiricism and nominalism so popular today. He discussed with great clearness many of the issues with which present-day philosophers are concerned--the status of sense-data, the nature of causation, the relation of primary to secondary qualities, the problems of universals, the importance of language, the existence of other selves, and how we communicate with them.

We face reality presented with the data of conscious experience and nothing else. The project of early modern philosophy was to build a complete theory of the world from this starting point, with no cheating. Crucial to this starting point is the data of conscious sensory experience – sense data. Attempts to avoid this project often argue that the very idea of sense data is confused. But the sense-data way of talking, the sense-data language, can be freed from every blemish (...) using ideas from contemporary metaontology. We can adopt a sense-data framework that vindicates the traditional claims of sense-data theories and leads to plausible theories of perception and color. We can, we should, and in a sense, we must. Yet when we do, we face the traditional problem of external world skepticism, head-on. The real challenge of skepticism is forced upon us; it cannot honestly be avoided using externalist tricks, burden of proof shifting, or other razzle dazzle. But the challenge can be met: we are rational to posit the external world as the best explanation of the many synchronic and diachronic patterns over our sense-data. This paper argues for all of these points and ends with a plea for analytic empiricism – a traditional sense-data version of empiricism that uses all of the tools of analytic philosophy while avoiding the more questionable doctrines of the Vienna Circle (phenomenalism, verificationism). Analytic empiricism is our last best hope for completing the great philosophical project of early modern philosophy. (shrink)