According to classical physics _particles_ are basic building blocks of the world. These classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by unique combinations of physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the received view is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”) are physically indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This doctrine rests on the quantum mechanical (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the “factorist” assumption that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space of the tensor product Hilbert (...) space of a many-particle system. Even though standard in theoretical physics and the philosophy of physics, the assumption of factorism and the ensuing indistinguishability of particles are problematic. Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable with the everyday meaning of “particle”, and also with how this term is used in the practice of physics. Moreover, it is a consequence of the standard view that identical quantum particles remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, which makes a smooth transition to the classical particle concept impossible. Lubberdink (1998; 2009) and Dieks and Lubberdink (2011) have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and avoids these difficulties. We further explain and discuss this alternative framework here. One of its key consequences is that particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but _emergent_; another that once they have emerged, quantum particles are always physically distinguishable and thus possess a physically grounded identity. (shrink)

The symmetrization postulates of quantum mechanics (symmetry for bosons, antisymmetry for fermions) are usually taken to entail that quantum particles of the same kind (e.g., electrons) are all in exactly the same state and therefore indistinguishable in the strongest possible sense. These symmetrization postulates possess a general validity that survives the classical limit, and the conclusion seems therefore unavoidable that even classical particles of the same kind must all be in the same state—in clear conflict with what we know about (...) classical particles. In this article we analyze the origin of this paradox. We shall argue that in the classical limit classical particles emerge, as new entities that do not correspond to the “particle indices” defined in quantum mechanics. Put differently, we show that the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates do not pertain to particles, as we know them from classical physics, but rather to indices that have a merely formal significance. This conclusion raises the question of whether many discussions in the literature about the status of identical quantum particles have not been misguided. (shrink)

According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. These classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by unique combinations of physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the received view is that particles of the same kind are physically indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This doctrine rests on the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates together with the “factorist” assumption that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space of the tensor product Hilbert space of (...) a many-particle system. Even though standard in theoretical physics and the philosophy of physics, the assumption of factorism and the ensuing indistinguishability of particles are problematic. Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable with the everyday meaning of “particle”, and also with how this term is used in the practice of physics. Moreover, it is a consequence of the standard view that identical quantum particles remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, which makes a smooth transition to the classical particle concept impossible. Lubberdink and Dieks and Lubberdink have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and avoids these difficulties. We further explain and discuss this alternative framework here. One of its key consequences is that particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but emergent; another that once they have emerged, quantum particles are always physically distinguishable and thus possess a physically grounded identity. (shrink)

According to rule-consequentialism’s moral criterion, a given action is morally right if and only if it complies with an ideal code of rules, regardless of the consequences of that action. Rules are to be assessed by their consequences, not actions. This being so, one of the many accusations that have been made against rule-consequentialism is that it can turn suboptimal decisions into morally right decisions and optimal decisions into morally wrong decisions. After all, in certain circumstances, a rule that has (...) the best consequences overall can require an action that does less good or forbid an action that does more good. This is the core of the original rule-worship objection. However, recently, different versions of rule-consequentialism have been developed in order to address that challenge. This paper focuses on three of them, those offered by Brad Hooker, Susan Wolf, and David Copp. My claim is that their arguments, however ingenious, are unsuccessful, because they are innocuous if the charge is reformulated as it should be. (shrink)

Scholars have paid ample attention to Aristotle's works on animals. By contrast, they have paid little or no attention to Theophrastus' writings on plants. That is unfortunate because there was a shared research project in the early Peripatos which amounted to a systematic, and theoretically motivated, study of perishable living beings (animals and plants). This is the first sustained attempt to explore how Aristotle and Theophrastus envisioned this study, with attention focused primarily on its deep structure. That entails giving full (...) consideration to a few transitional passages where Aristotle and Theophrastus offer their own description of what they are trying to do. What emerges is a novel, sophisticated, and largely idiosyncratic approach to the topic of life. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

Around 1970, both Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke produced powerful arguments against description theories of proper names. They also offered sketches of positive accounts of proper name reference, highlighting the crucial role played by historical facts that might be unknown to the speaker. Building on these sketches, in the following years Michael Devitt elaborated his well-known causal theory of proper names. As I have argued elsewhere, however, contrary to what is commonly assumed, Donnellan’s and Kripke’s sketches point in two rather (...) different directions, by appealing to historical or causal facts of different sorts. In this paper, I shall discuss and criticize Devitt’s causal theory, which confuses things, I shall argue, by mixing, so to speak, Donnellan’s and Kripke’s sketches. (shrink)

Famously, both Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan opposed description theories and insisted on the role of history in determining the reference of a proper name token. No wonder, then, that their views on proper names have often been assimilated. By focusing on reference borrowing—an alleged phenomenon that Kripke takes to be fundamental—we argue that they should not be. In particular, we claim that according to Donnellan a proper name token never borrows its reference from preceding tokens which it is historically (...) connected to. On the contrary, its reference is always fixed anew on who or what the speaker has in mind when he or she produces it. In fact, what is important to realize is that Donnellan and Kripke took two different histories to be relevant: that of the proper name token produced by the speaker , and that of the cognitive status of the speaker when he or she produces it . We end by suggesting that this difference between Kripke’s and Donnellan’s accounts of proper names rests on a more general difference in their approach to language. (shrink)

Though researchers working on congenital aphantasia (henceforth “aphantasia”) agree that this condition involves an impairment in the ability to voluntarily generate visual imagery, disagreement looms large as to which other impairments are exhibited by aphantasic subjects. This article offers the first extensive review of studies on aphantasia, and proposes that aphantasic subjects exhibit a cluster of impairments. It puts forward a novel cognitive theory of aphantasia, building on the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis of memory and imagination. It argues that aphantasia (...) is best explained as a malfunction of processes in the episodic system, and is therefore an episodic system condition. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are quickly gaining ground in healthcare and clinical decision-making. However, it is still unclear in what way AI can or should support decision-making that is based on incapacitated patients’ values and goals of care, which often requires input from clinicians and loved ones. Although the use of algorithms to predict patients’ most likely preferred treatment has been discussed in the medical ethics literature, no example has been realised in clinical practice. This is due, arguably, to the (...) lack of a structured approach to the epistemological, ethical and pragmatic challenges arising from the design and use of such algorithms. The present paper offers a new perspective on the problem by suggesting that preference predicting AIs be viewed as sociotechnical systems with distinctive life-cycles. We explore how both known and novel challenges map onto the different stages of development, highlighting interdisciplinary strategies for their resolution. (shrink)

Certain characteristics make machine learning a powerful tool for processing large amounts of data, and also particularly unsuitable for explanatory purposes. There are worries that its increasing use in science may sideline the explanatory goals of research. We analyze the key characteristics of ML that might have implications for the future directions in scientific research: epistemic opacity and the ‘theory-agnostic’ modeling. These characteristics are further analyzed in a comparison of ML with the traditional statistical methods, in order to demonstrate what (...) it is specifically that makes ML methodology substantially unsuitable for reaching explanations. The analysis is given broader philosophical context by connecting it with the views on the role of prediction and explanation in science, their relationship, and the value of explanation. We proceed to show, first, that ML disrupts the relationship between prediction and explanation commonly understood as a functional relationship. Then we show that the value of explanation is not exhausted in purely predictive functions, but rather has a ubiquitously recognized value for both science and everyday life. We then invoke two hypothetical scenarios with different degrees of automatization of science, which help test our intuitions on the role of explanation in science. The main question we address is whether ML will reorient or otherwise impact our standard explanatory practice. We conclude with a prognosis that ML would diversify science into purely predictively oriented research based on ML-like techniques and, on the other hand, remaining faithful to anthropocentric research focused on the search for explanation. (shrink)

Human-centered explainable AI (HCXAI) advocates for the integration of social aspects into AI explanations. Central to the HCXAI discourse is the Social Transparency (ST) framework, which aims to make the socio-organizational context of AI systems accessible to their users. In this work, we suggest extending the ST framework to address the risks of social misattributions in Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly in sensitive areas like mental health. In fact LLMs, which are remarkably capable of simulating roles and personas, may lead (...) to mismatches between designers' intentions and users' perceptions of social attributes, risking to promote emotional manipulation and dangerous behaviors, cases of epistemic injustice, and unwarranted trust. To address these issues, we propose enhancing the ST framework with a fifth 'W-question' to clarify the specific social attributions assigned to LLMs by its designers and users. This addition aims to bridge the gap between LLM capabilities and user perceptions, promoting the ethically responsible development and use of LLM-based technology. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on the alleged distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. I begin by discussing Saul Kripke’s notion of speaker’s reference and the theoretical roles it is supposed to play, arguing that they do not justify the claim that reference comes in two different sorts and highlighting that Kripke’s own definition makes the notion incompatible with the nowadays widely endorsed Gricean project, which aims at explaining semantic reference in terms of speaker’s reference. I then examine an (...) alternative account of speaker’s reference offered by Michael Devitt within his causal theory and express some doubts about its suitability for explaining proper name semantic reference. From all this, I conclude that there is at least some tension between Kripke’s chain of communication picture and the attempt to explain (Griceanly, so to say) semantic properties in terms of speakers’ mental states. (shrink)

This paper calls for the development of a method of ectogestation as an emancipatory intervention for women. I argue that ectogestation would have a dual social benefit: first, by providing a gestational alternative to pregnancy, it would create unique conditions to reevaluate one’s reproductive preferences—which, for women, always include gestational considerations—and to satisfy a potential preference not to gestate. Enabling the satisfaction of such a preference is particularly valuable due to the pressures women face to embrace pregnancy as central to (...) their identity, while at the same time being penalised by it. Second, ectogestation would address certain specific negative social implications of gestation and childbirth, which cannot be avoided through social measures as they are caused by the corporeal nature of these phenomena. Finally, I argue that it is unfair to hold ectogestation to a higher standard than other innovations such as modern contraceptives and non-medical egg freezing. (shrink)

The high predictive accuracy of contemporary machine learning-based AI systems has led some scholars to argue that, in certain cases, we should grant them epistemic expertise and authority over humans. This approach suggests that humans would have the epistemic obligation of relying on the predictions of a highly accurate AI system. Contrary to this view, in this work we claim that it is not possible to endow AI systems with a genuine account of epistemic expertise. In fact, relying on accounts (...) of expertise and authority from virtue epistemology, we show that epistemic expertise requires a relation with understanding that AI systems do not satisfy and intellectual abilities that these systems do not manifest. However, recent developments of large language models make us argue that in the future AI systems may endowed with a form of epistemic authority. Further, following the Distributed Cognition theory and adapting an account by Croce on the virtues of collective epistemic agents to the case of human-AI interactions we show that, if an AI system is successfully appropriated by a human agent, a hybrid epistemic agent emerges, which can become both an epistemic expert and an authority. Consequently, we claim that the aforementioned hybrid agent is the appropriate object of a discourse around trust in AI and the epistemic obligations that stem from its epistemic superiority. (shrink)

In the second lecture of "Naming and Necessity," Saul Kripke presented a new and quite convincing picture of the reference of proper names. At the same time, however, he expressed some skepticism towards the possibility of developing it into a full-blown theory by offering “more exact conditions for reference to take place.” In this paper, after discussing the reasons for his skepticism, I hint at how I think Kripke’s picture could be developed and offer an outline of a theory of (...) reference based on it. One of the key notions my ‘theory’ makes use of is that of repetition, which I take from Kaplan’s “Words.”. (shrink)

This collection of new essays examines philosophical issues at the intersection of feminism and autonomy studies. Are autonomy and independence useful goals for women and subordinate persons? Is autonomy possible in contexts of social subordination? Is the pursuit of desires that issue from patriarchal norms consistent with autonomous agency? How do emotions and caring relate to autonomous deliberation? Contributors to this collection answer these questions and others, advancing central debates in autonomy theory by examining basic components, normative commitments, and applications (...) of conceptions of autonomy. Several chapters look at the conditions necessary for autonomous agency and at the role that values and norms -- such as independence, equality, inclusivity, self-respect, care and femininity -- play in feminist theories of autonomy. Whereas some contributing authors focus on dimensions of autonomy that are internal to the mind -- such as deliberative reflection, desires, cares, emotions, self-identities and feelings of self-worth -- several authors address social conditions and practices that support or stifle autonomous agency, often answering questions of practical import. These include such questions as: What type of gender socialization best supports autonomous agency and feminist goals? When does adapting to severely oppressive circumstances, such as those in human trafficking, turn into a loss of autonomy? How are ideals of autonomy affected by capitalism? and How do conceptions of autonomy inform issues in bioethics, such as end-of-life decisions, or rights to bodily self-determination? (shrink)

L'ingegneria concettuale è una branca della filosofia caratterizzata da un approccio normativo nei confronti della rappresentazione. Assunzione fondamentale è che i nostri dispositivi rappresentazionali possano essere difettosi. Si configura dunque come l'attività che consiste nell'identificare i difetti in tali dispositivi e mettere in atto strategie di miglioramento. Verranno illustrate le questioni fondamentali a cui una teoria di ingegneria concettuale deve rispondere: in cosa consiste esattamente questa attività? Come possiamo attuarla? Quali meccanismi regolano la formazione dei dispositivi rappresentazionali? Possiamo influire su (...) tali meccanismi? Verrà inoltre presentata un'obiezione all'ingegneria concettuale e varie risposte. -/- Conceptual engineering is a branch of philosophy characterised by a normative approach towards representation. The fundamental assumption of it is that our representational devices can be defective. Conceptual engineering is then the activity consisting of identifying the defects of such devices and putting in place ameliorative strategies. This paper illustrates the fundamental issues for a theory of conceptual engineering: what does this activity consist of? How can we implement it? What mechanisms regulate the formation of representational devices? Can we have an influence over those mechanisms? Moreover, it will be presented an objection to conceptual engineering and various responses to it. (shrink)

The study of belief is expanding and involves a growing set of disciplines and research areas. These research programs attempt to shed light on the process of believing, understood as a central human cognitive function. Computational systems and, in particular, what we commonly understand as Artificial Intelligence (AI), can provide some insights on how beliefs work as either a linear process or as a complex system. However, the computational approach has undergone some scrutiny, in particular about the differences between what (...) is distinctively human and what can be inferred from AI systems. The present article investigates to what extent recent developments in AI provide new elements to the debate and clarify the process of belief acquisition, consolidation, and recalibration. The article analyses and debates current issues and topics of investigation such as: different models to understand belief, the exploration of belief in an automated reasoning environment, the case of religious beliefs, and future directions of research. (shrink)

This book celebrates the many important contributions to philosophy by one of the leading philosophers in the analytic field, Michael Devitt. It collects seventeen original essays by renowned philosophers from all over the world. They all develop themes from Devitt’s work, thus discussing many fundamental issues in philosophy of linguistics, theory of reference, theory of meaning, methodology, and metaphysics. In a long final chapter, Devitt himself replies to the contributors. In so doing, he further elaborates his views on various of (...) these issues, for example defending his claim (in opposition to Chomskyan orthodoxy) that languages are external rather than internal; his well-known causal theory of reference; his “shocking” idea that meanings can be causal, non-descriptive, modes of presentation; his methodological naturalism; his commitment to scientific realism; and his version of biological essentialism. The volume will appeal to all scholars and students interested in contemporary theoretical analytic philosophy, and will be a must-read for any serious researcher in philosophy of language. It provides a deep insight into the work of one of the most important living philosophers, and will help readers to better understand language and reality from a naturalistic perspective. (shrink)

In their article ‘Who is afraid of black box algorithms? On the epistemological and ethical basis of trust in medical AI’, Durán and Jongsma discuss the epistemic and ethical challenges raised by black box algorithms in medical practice. The opacity of black box algorithms is an obstacle to the trustworthiness of their outcomes. Moreover, the use of opaque algorithms is not normatively justified in medical practice. The authors introduce a formalism, called computational reliabilism, which allows generating justified beliefs on the (...) algorithm reliability and trustworthy outcomes of artificial intelligence systems by means of epistemic warrants, called reliability indicators. However, they remark the need for reliability indicators specific to black box algorithms and that justified knowledge is not sufficient to justify normatively the actions of the physicians using medical AI systems. Therefore, Durán and Jongsma advocate for a more transparent design and implementation of black box algorithms, providing a series of recommendations to mitigate the epistemic and ethical challenges behind their use in medical practice. In this response, I argue that a peculiar form of black box algorithm transparency, called design publicity, may efficiently implement these recommendations. Design publicity encodes epistemic, that is, reliability indicators, and ethical recommendations for black box algorithms by means of four subtypes of transparency. These target the values and goals, their translation into design requirements, the performance and consistency of the algorithm altogether. I discuss design publicity applying it to a use case focused on the automated classification of skin lesions from medical images. (shrink)

In his recent article ‘Limits of trust in medical AI,’ Hatherley argues that, if we believe that the motivations that are usually recognised as relevant for interpersonal trust have to be applied to interactions between humans and medical artificial intelligence, then these systems do not appear to be the appropriate objects of trust. In this response, we argue that it is possible to discuss trust in medical artificial intelligence, if one refrains from simply assuming that trust describes human–human interactions. To (...) do so, we consider an account of trust that distinguishes trust from reliance in a way that is compatible with trusting non-human agents. In this account, to trust a medical AI is to rely on it with little monitoring and control of the elements that make it trustworthy. This attitude does not imply specific properties in the AI system that in fact only humans can have. This account of trust is applicable, in particular, to all cases where a physician relies on the medical AI predictions to support his or her decision making. (shrink)

Most of the times we open our mouth to communicate, we talk about things. This can happen because the linguistic expressions we use have semantic properties that connect them to extra-linguistic entities. Thanks to these properties, they may be used by us to refer to things. Or, as we may also say, they themselves refer to things, though in certain cases they do so only relative to a context of use. But how can we characterize the semantic properties in question? (...) What exactly is reference? Philosophers have been trying to answer these questions for centuries, but only in the last century has it become really pressing. Following Frege's account of reference, and Kripke's rebuttal of it, many philosophers began to look at reference from a new perspective, which highlighted the crucial role played in its determination by mundane aspects that are not under the direct control of the speaker. This semantic revolution, however, left us with a number of open problems. The eighteen original essays collected in this volume deal with many of these problems, thus contributing to our understanding of the nature of reference, its role in cognition, and the place it should be given in semantic theory. (shrink)

This introduction to the thematic section of Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science on “Artificial Intelligence and Religion: Recent Advances and Future Directions” outlines the five articles by dividing them into two groups: the three that analyze the impact of recent advances in subsymbolic artificial intelligence (AI) on religion and theology, and the two that explore theological concepts in symbolic AI environments. These five articles are five steps toward a strong, deep, and interdisciplinary dialogue between the research in religion and (...) the research in AI. (shrink)

The present paper analyses discursive representations and standpoint-arguments pairs, realized in articles of four mainstream Italian newspapers that report on migrants’ and refugees’ mobilization at the perceived peak of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. We draw on the scholarly agenda of Critical Discourse Studies, employing tools from corpus linguistic perspectives, which allow us to generalize over the way in which the relevant minorities are represented in our corpus. Then, focusing on a smaller sample of negative representations, we outline a methodological synthesis (...) in order to scrutinize instances of representational meaning in newspapers articles and trace what is argumentatively inferred in discursive representations. To that end we exploit tools from systemic functional and cognitive linguistics as well as the Argumentum Model of Topics for the analysis of inference. In this sense, we demonstrate how discriminatory representations do not only portray migrants and refugees in a negative light but also justify discrimination through the argumentative dynamic they develop. (shrink)

Real engines of the artificial intelligence revolution, machine learning models, and algorithms are embedded nowadays in many services and products around us. As a society, we argue it is now necessary to transition into a phronetic paradigm focused on the ethical dilemmas stemming from the conception and application of AIs to define actionable recommendations as well as normative solutions. However, both academic research and society-driven initiatives are still quite far from clearly defining a solid program of study and intervention. In (...) this contribution, we will focus on selected ethical investigations around AI by proposing an incremental model of trust that can be applied to both human-human and human-AI interactions. Starting with a quick overview of the existing accounts of trust, with special attention to Taddeo’s concept of “e-trust,” we will discuss all the components of the proposed model and the reasons to trust in human-AI interactions in an example of relevance for business organizations. We end this contribution with an analysis of the epistemic and pragmatic reasons of trust in human-AI interactions and with a discussion of kinds of normativity in trustworthiness of AIs. (shrink)

Background Gerontechnologies are increasingly used in the care for older people. Many studies on their acceptability and ethical implications are conducted, but mainly from the perspective of principlism. This narrows our ethical gaze on the implications the use of these technologies have. Research question How do participants speak about the impact that gerontechnologies have on the different phases of care, and care as a process? What are the moral implications from an ethic of care perspective? Research design Secondary analysis of (...) semi-structure interviews, whose segments on specific technologies were analysed through reflexive thematic analysis. Participants and research context Sixty-seven Swiss stakeholders involved in the use of gerontechnologies, including professional caregivers, informal caregivers, and older persons themselves. Ethical considerations The research study was evaluated by the Ethics Commission of Northwest and Central Switzerland (EKNZ). All participants received an information document before the interview date detailing the purpose, procedure, and anonymization measures. After explaining the study during the agreed upon interview time and upon receiving their written informed consent, the interview process began. Findings/results Four themes are identified: Identifying care needs, Taking responsibility, Hands-on work, Responding to care. As part of these themes, many codes highlighting the ambivalent impact of gerontechnologies are created, ranging from ‘Expanded capacity for…identifying care needs’ to ‘Create new & (un)necessary…hands-on work’. The moral implications of these results from the care ethics perspective are discussed, through the ethical elements of: attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness. Conclusions The moral implications of gerontechnologies on care phases from the care ethics perspective open up several questions on whether they actually help give care a central role in social life and provide more competent care. (shrink)

In recent works, Kind has argued that imagination is a skill, since it possesses the two hallmarks of skill: improvability by practice, and control. I agree with Kind that and are indeed hallmarks of skill, and I also endorse her claim that imagination is a skill in virtue of possessing these two features. However, in this paper, I argue that Kind’s case for imagination’s being a skill is unsatisfactory, since it lacks robust empirical evidence. Here, I will provide evidence for (...) by considering data from mental rotation experiments and for by considering data from developmental experiments. I conclude that imagination is a skill, but there is a further pressing question of how the cognitive architecture of imagination has to be structured to make this possible. I begin by considering how can be implemented sub-personally. I argue that this can be accounted for by positing a selection mechanism which selects content from memory representations to be recombined into imaginings, using Bayesian generation. I then show that such an account can also explain. On this basis, I hold that not only is imagination a skill, but that it is also plausibly implemented sub-personally by a Bayesian selection mechanism. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the _ethics of how_ to approach the introduction of MAiD as an organizational ethics challenge, a focus that diverges from the traditional focus in healthcare ethics on the _ethics of why_ MAiD is right or wrong. It describes a method co-designed and implemented by ethics and medical leadership at a tertiary hospital to develop a values-based, grassroots response to the decriminalization of assisted dying in Canada. This organizational ethics engagement method embodied core tenants that drew inspiration (...) from a variety of sources, including poetic ones. These tenants are: make the problem bigger; focus on values; cultivate open moral spaces; and trust emergence. The paper describes how these tenants were put into practice in order to create a rigorous and sustainable MAiD program that delivers high-quality care to patients and families while honoring the moral diversity of the hospital workforce. One of the goals in sharing this method is to provide a roadmap for healthcare organizations in Canada and other jurisdictions around the world that are facing the challenge of responding to patient requests for MAiD following the decriminalization of this care option. (shrink)

One of the most enigmatic and inevitably most suggestive words that Hölderlin’s philosophical work delivers to us is the neologism introduced in the summer of 1799: aorgisch, aorgic. A principle that is both ontological and mimetic, the aorgic undoubtedly represents the presence of the sublime in Hölderlin, albeit concealed terminologically, but also a particular declination that makes it not always easy to assimilate to the theories of the eighteenth-century and romantic sublime. This paper attempts to probe the role played by (...) the aorgic in the configuration of an aesthetics of the tragic by considering two precise moments: the writing, Grund zum Empedokles, which seeks to give speculative legitimacy to the unfinished tragedy on Empedocles, and the notes that accompanied the translations of Sophocles that Hölderlin published in 1804. Interpreted as the dimension of the formless, but also of the possible, the aorgic is necessarily thought by Hölderlin always next to its opposite pole, the organic, that is the dimension of the human in the broad sense (art, culture, history). The relationship between these two poles is not only dialectical, along the lines of Fichte’s Wechselwirkung, but also analogical, recovering that relationship between physis and techne that Aristotle had already indicated in the second book of Physics. The aorgic therefore represents the necessary alienation to which nature is subjected in order to become culture (or art), a passage that, from the point of view of traditional aesthetic categories, could be read as the transition from the (natural) unrepresentability of the sublime to the (cultural) configuration of the beautiful: from chaos to form. (shrink)

How do teenage girls articulate sexism in an era where gender injustice has been constructed as a thing of the past? Our article addresses this question by qualitatively exploring Canadian girls’ experiences of being caught between the postfeminist belief that gender equality has been achieved and the realities of their lives in school, which include incidents of sexism in their classrooms, their social worlds, and their projected futures. This analysis takes place in relation to two celebratory postfeminist narratives: Girl Power, (...) where girls are told they can do, be, and have anything they want, and Successful Girls, where girls are told they are surpassing boys in schools and workplaces. We argue that these postfeminist narratives have made naming sexism in schools difficult for girls because they are now seen to “have it all.” Utilizing Foucault’s law of the tactical polyvalence of discourse, this article analyzes girls’ contradictory engagement with postfeminism in order to both show its importance in girls’ lives, and its instability as a narrative that can adequately explain gender injustice. (shrink)

John Schlitpacher (†1482), who was prior of Melk in the 15th century, encouraged both the circulation of manuscripts at his Abbey and their transcription, even in abbreviated form to the benefit of the Abbey School students. This article looks at the sources and diffusion of texts to and from Melk Abbey in that period, examining the case of a codex purchased by Nicholas of Cusa, registered in his Library as no. 58, and subsequently loaned to the monks in Melk to (...) be copied. It contained the Scala Paradisi by John Climacus and the De spiritualibus deliciis by John of Dambach. In the article, I underline that both of these works, copied in codex 58, were in accordance with John Gerson’s theological approach, which was prevalent in Melk at that time. Moreover, I confirm that there are doctrinal similarities between the two works mentioned above and two, hitherto, unedited writings by Schlitpacher from the same period – the treatise De ascensionibus cordis, which is a summary of the De spiritualibus ascensionibus by Gerard Zerbolt of Zutphen, and another entitled De felicitate beatorum (or De gaudiis electorum). (shrink)

This study assessed the attitudes and needs of physicians and health professional staff at a tertiary care hospital in Canada regarding the introduction of physician assisted dying (PAD) during 2015–16. This research aimed to develop an understanding of the wishes, concerns and hopes of stakeholders related to handling requests for PAD; to determine what supports/structures/resources health care professionals (HCP) require in order to ensure high quality and compassionate care for patients requesting PAD, and a supportive environment for all healthcare providers (...) across the moral spectrum. This study constituted a mixed methods design with a qualitative descriptive approach for the study’s qualitative component. A total of 303 HCPs working in a tertiary care hospital completed an online survey and 64 HCPs working in hospital units with high mortality rates participated in 8 focus group discussions. Both focus group and survey data coalesced around several themes to support the implementation of PAD following the decriminalization of this practice: the importance of high quality care; honoring moral diversity; supporting values (such as autonomy, privacy, beneficence); and developing resources, including collaboration with palliative care, education, policies and a specialized team. This study provided the foundational evidence to support the development of the PAD program described in other papers in this collection, and can be a model for gathering evidence from stakeholders to inform the implementation of PAD in any healthcare organization. (shrink)

Is graffiti writing creative activism? In this paper, I challenge commonly held beliefs that graffiti writing is politically inert. On the contrary, I argue that graffiti writing is an example of creative activism. Rather than being a narcissistic form of vandalism, primarily directed at increasing one’s fame in front of an esoteric group, that is, fellow writers, writing is a form of everyday resistance allowing its practitioners to challenge authoritarian power. In questioning dominant hierarchies, graffiti is a powerful tool to (...) help correct a specific instance of spatial injustice: the unequal distribution of access to urban surfaces for self-expression in the city, where corporations and political elites hold an unjustified monopoly over visual communication. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) have now entered the realm of medical ethics. In a recent study, Balaset alexamined the performance of GPT-4, a commercially available LLM, assessing its performance in generating responses to diverse medical ethics cases. Their findings reveal that GPT-4 demonstrates an ability to identify and articulate complex medical ethical issues, although its proficiency in encoding the depth of real-world ethical dilemmas remains an avenue for improvement. Investigating the integration of LLMs into medical ethics decision-making appears to be (...) an interesting avenue of research. However, despite the promising trajectory of LLM technology in medicine, it is crucial to exercise caution and refrain from attributing their expertise to medical ethics. Our thesis follows an examination of the nature of expertise and the epistemic limitations that affect LLM technology. As a result, we propose two more fitting applications of LLMs in medical ethics: first, as tools for mining electronic health records or scientific literature, thereby supplementing evidence for resolving medical ethics cases, and second, as educational platforms to foster ethical reflection and critical thinking skills among students and residents. The integration of LLMs in medical ethics, while promising, requires careful consideration of their epistemic limitations. Consequently, a well-considered definition of their role in ethically sensitive decision-making is crucial. (shrink)

We characterize Hegel’s stance on biological purposiveness as consisting in a twofold move, which conceives organisms as intrinsically purposive natural systems and focuses on their behavioral and cognitive abilities. We submit that a Hegelian stance is at play in enactivism, the branch of the contemporary theory of biological autonomy devoted to the study of cognition and the mind. What is at stake in the Hegelian stance is the elaboration of a naturalized, although non-reductive, understanding of natural purposiveness.

This paper depicts a case study of an organizational strategy for the promotion of ethical practice when introducing a new, high-risk, ethically-charged medical practice like Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD). We describe the development of an interprofessional program that enables the delivery of high-quality, whole-person MAiD care that is values-based and sustainable. A “care ecology” strategy recognizes the interconnected web of relationships and structures necessary to support a quality experience of MAiD for patients, families, and clinicians. This program exemplifies a (...) care ecology approach that addresses common barriers to entry to MAiD practice, and also meets the needs of a variety of stakeholders through the creation of patient and family resources, team supports, standards of practice, professional development opportunities, organizational infrastructure, and community partnerships. We also describe how a thriving care ecology evolves to remain resilient, and to enable integration as the needs of the organization, team and program change over time. The design and development of this program may be adapted to other jurisdictions and organizations where MAiD is introduced, or where new patient populations become eligible for MAiD. This care ecology model may also be applicable to the creation of sustainable programs that provide other morally controversial or novel clinical services. (shrink)

Following an initial study of the needs of healthcare providers (HCP) regarding the introduction of Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD), and the subsequent development of an assisted dying program, this study sought to determine the efficacy and impact of MAiD services following the first two years of implementation. The first of three aims of this research was to understand if the needs, concerns and hopes of stakeholders related to patient requests for MAiD were addressed appropriately. Assessing how HCPs and families (...) perceived the quality of MAiD services, and determining if the program successfully accommodated the diverse needs and perspectives of HCPs, rounded out this quality evaluation. This research implemented a mixed-methods design incorporative of an online survey with Likert scale and open-ended questions, as well as focus groups and interviews with staff and physicians, and interviews with MAiD-involved family members. There were 356 online surveys, as well as 39 participants in six focus groups with HCP, as well as fourteen interviews with MAiD-involved family members. Participants indicated that high-quality MAiD care could only be provided with enabling resources such as policies and guidelines to ensure safe, evidence-based, standardized care, as well as a specialized, trained MAiD team. Both focus group and survey data from HCPs suggest the infrastructure developed by the hospital was effective in delivering high-quality MAiD care that supports the diverse needs of various stakeholders. This study may serve as a model for evaluating the impact and quality of services when novel and ethically-contentious clinical practices are introduced to healthcare organizations. (shrink)

This book addresses two related questions that have first arisen in Toulmin’s seminal book on the uses of argument. The first question is the one of the relationship between the semantic analysis of modality and the structure of arguments. The second question is the one of the distinctive place, or role, of modality in the fundamental structure of arguments. These two questions concern how modality, as a semantic category, relates to the fundamental structure of arguments. The book addresses modality and (...) argumentation also according to another perspective by looking at how different linguistic modal expressions may be taken as argumentative indicators. It explores the role of modal expressions as argumentative indicators by using the Italian modal system as a case study. At the same time, it uses predictions/forecasts in the business-financial daily press to investigate the relation between modality and the context of argumentation. (shrink)

This essay attempts to interrogate the distinct character of Peter Sloterdijk’s declaration of the absolute imperative that concludes his work, You Must Change Your Life, by contextualizing it within the development of his notion of anthropotechnics. In particular, the essays examine the claim that his is a new and unprecedented form of the absolute imperative that is alone able to address, in an effective way, the contemporary global crises that are confronting us now. The first sections trace out the ways (...) in which this new imperative differs from previous forms of the imperative, including the categorical, the aesthetic, and the existential-ontological. The latter sections then discuss how the new form of the imperative is connected to Sloterdijk’s radical attempt at a rethinking of the essence of the human as always already technological, which is the very project of anthropotechnics. This leads finally to a discussion of Sloterdijk’s polemical engagement with Heidegger’s question concerning technology, in which I trace out his attempt at a sweeping translation of Heidegger’s notion of enframing [Gestell] into enhousing [Gehäuse] and the consequences thereof. (shrink)

In this article, I provide a historical and bibliographical exploration of the handwritten, dictated commentaries (dictata) of Johannes de Raey (1620/1622–1702) on the texts of René Descartes (1596–1650), shedding light on their structure, development, and on their relations with the academic commentaries of Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665) and Christoph Wittich (1625–1687). The study of these commentaries, which are extant as class notes, is important because they conveyed one of the first systematic teachings of Descartes’s ideas and constituted a vehicle for their (...) further dissemination across northern Europe. (shrink)

As Dieter Lohmar (Citation2002; Citation2012) has shown, in the Logical Investigation Husserl sketches a peculiar type of reduction, the so-called “Reduktion auf den reellen Bestand.” Husserl does not explicitly put this kind of reduction forward, though, and he does definitely not clarify how it works, and what its elements properly are. Lohmar proposes to understand it as a kind of empiricist reduction to mere sense-data. On the contrary, I believe that it should be considered as entailing also the apprehensional forms (...) of sense-data, though not the so-called apprehensional senses. In this article, I will offer some arguments and textual evidence in favour of this claim, and I will conclude by proposing that, despite Husserl’s unclarity on the issue, the reduction to the real components of experience, rather than being simply an ancestor of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, should be seen as the regulative model of all later forms of reduction. (shrink)

This paper aims to problematize pregnancy and support the development of a safe alternative method of gestation. Our arguments engage with the health risks of gestation and childbirth, the value assigned to pregnancy, as well as social and medical attitudes toward women’s pain, especially in labor. We claim that the harm caused by pregnancy and childbirth provides a prima facie case in favor of prioritizing research on a method of extra corporeal gestation.

The problem of intentional inexistence arises because the following (alleged) intuitions are mutually conflicting: it seems that sometimes we think about things that do not exist; it seems that intentionality is a relation between a thinker and what such a thinker thinks about; it seems that relations entail the existence of what they relate. In this paper, I argue for what I call a radical relationist solution. First, I contend that the extant arguments for the view that relations entail the (...) existence of their relata are wanting. In this regard, I defend a kind of pluralism about relations according to which more than one kind of relation involves non-existents. Second, I contend that there are reasons to maintain that all thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things they are about. More accurately, I contend that the radical relationist solution is to be preferred to both the intentional content solution (as developed by Crane) and the adverbial property solution (as developed by Kriegel). Finally, I argue that once the distinction between thinking “X” and thinking about X has been drawn, the radical relationist solution can handle issues like ontological commitment, substitutivity failure, scrutability, and non-specificity. (shrink)

Collective impact cases are situations where people collectively bring about a morally significant outcome by each acting in a certain way, and yet each individual action seems to make no, or almost no difference to the outcome. Intuitively, the beneficial or harmful outcomes give individuals moral reason to act (or refrain from acting) in collective impact situations. However, if the individual action does not make a difference to the outcome, it is not clear what those moral reasons are. The problem (...) of collective impact is the challenge of identifying such moral reasons. Julia Nefsky has presented an account of how an individual action can help without making a difference – call it the Helping Account – that claims to provide a general solution to the problem of collective impact while avoiding problems faced by previously suggested solutions. I present an internal critique of Nefsky’s work. First, I argue that, based on the problems that Nefsky has raised against previously suggested solutions, three success conditions for a general solution to the problem of collective impact can be formulated: The Weightiness condition, the Generalizability condition, and the Connectedness condition. Second, I argue that the Helping Account fails to satisfy the three success conditions, thereby failing, by Nefsky’s own standards, to provide a general solution to the problem. (shrink)