I reject the widely held view that Duhem's 1906 book La Théorie physique is a statement of instrumentalistic conventionalism, motivated by the scientific crisis at the end of the nineteenth century. By considering Duhem's historical context I show that his epistemological views were already formed before the crisis occured; that he consistently supported general thermodynamics against the new atomism; and that he rejected the epistemological views of the latter's philosophical supporters. In particular I show that Duhem rejected Poincaré's account of (...) scientific language, Le Roy's view that laws are definitions, and the conventionalist's use of simplicity as the criterion of theory choice. Duhem regarded most theory choices as decidable on empirical grounds, but made historical context the main determining factor in scientific change. (shrink)

The explanation of the phenomenon of Brownian motion, given by Einstein in 1905 and based on the kinetic–molecular conception of matter, is considered one of the fundamental pillars supporting atomism in its victorious struggle against phenomenological physics in the early years of this century. Despite the importance of the subject, there exists no specific study on it of sufficient depth. Generally speaking, most histories of physics repeat the following scheme: the discovery made by Robert Brown in 1827 , of the (...) continuous movement of small particles suspended in a fluid did not arouse interest for a long time. Finally, at the close of the century, Gouy's research brought it to the attention of the physicists. Gouy was convinced that Brownian motion constituted a clear demonstration of the existence of molecules in continuous movement. Nevertheless, he did not work out any mathematized theory that could be subjected to quantitative confirmation. All nineteenth-century research remained at the qualitative level and yet it was able to clarify some general characteristics of the phenomenon: the completely irregular, unceasing, motion of the particles is not produced by external causes. It does not depend on the nature of the particles but only on their size. The first significant measurements, carried out by Felix Exner in 1900, appeared to deny the possibility of reconciling the kinetic theory with Brownian motion. The discovery of the ultra-microscope then allowed Zsigmondy to perceive the presence of movements, which were completely analogous to Brown's, in the particles of the colloids; these movements were rather smaller in size than those invesigated up to then. Thus Zsigmondy aroused interest in the phenomenon. Finally, in 1905, Einstein succeeded in stating the mathematical laws governing the movements of particles on the basis of the principles of the kinetic–molecular theory. The following year Smoluchowski arrived at conclusions which corresponded to Einstein's. These laws received a first, rough confirmation in the years immediately following by the work of The Svedberg, Seddig and, for some historians, Henri. Then in 1908 Jean Perrin gave it a definitive confirmation. (shrink)

Although artificial intelligence techniques have been successfully applied to reproduce many rational features of human behaviour, a great barrier has been encountered in simulating human activities where intuition and emotion are involved. Art making and viewing are processes where typically rational and mechanical aspects interact with aesthetic and cognitive criteria. Can you make a computer understand and autonomously produce art?The main purpose of this paper is to present the most relevant approaches in the study of art perception and creation via (...) computer, focusing on the results achieved in artistic computer graphics. (shrink)

One 1120 pages volume, with 4000 entries covering - Western philosophy: authors, schools, concepts and terminology; - religions, cultural anthropology, eastern philosophies; - Psychology and psychoanalysis; - linguistics and semiotics; - sociology and political theory.

The 'Enciclopedia Filosofica' is an encyclopaedia of philosophical topics promoted by the Centre for Philosophical Studies of Gallarate and published, in its third and last edition in 2006, by the Bompiani publishing house in Milan. The first edition of the 'Enciclopedia Filosofica' was promoted by the Centre for Philosophical Studies of Gallarate in the 1950s, seeing the light in 1957-58. A second edition, published by the Sansoni publishing house in Florence, was published in 1968-69 and reprinted in 1979. The third (...) and last edition, published by Bompiani in 2006, is intended to cover the whole of philosophical knowledge and related disciplines with over ten thousand entries edited by about a thousand academics, both Italian and non-Italian, and distributed in twelve volumes for a total of 12,496 pages. (shrink)

According to a leading view, emotions such as admiration, contempt, pride, and shame are important vehicles of agential development. Through admiration and contempt, we establish models and countermodels against which to shape our character; through pride and shame, we get a sense of how we measure up to them. Critics of this view object that these emotions always deliver uncompromising evaluations: admiration casts people in a completely positive light, while contempt casts aspersion on them. Therefore, insofar as they lack the (...) capacity for nuance, these emotions are systematically unfitting and misleading. This paper discusses this objection as originally formulated by John Doris as well as Macalester Bell’s response. Drawing from research on emotional intentionality, it will be argued that Doris’ and Bell’s accounts are respectively misguided criticisms and inadequate defences of these emotions. Their mistake lies in an invalid transition from the claim that these emotions are intentionally directed towards persons to the claim that they deliver global evaluations of those towards whom they are directed. By rejecting this inference, it will be shown that these emotions can deliver nuanced and fitting evaluations in a way Doris’ objection overlooks and Bell’s response precludes us from articulating. (shrink)

A critical survey of the main philosophical theories about events and event talk, organized in three main sections: (i) Events and Other Categories (Events vs. Objects; Events vs. Facts; Events vs. Properties; Events vs. Times); (ii) Types of Events (Activities, Accomplishments, Achievements, and States; Static and Dynamic Events; Actions and Bodily Movements; Mental and Physical Events; Negative Events); (iii) Existence, Identity, and Indeterminacy.

Roberto Esposito is one of the most prolific and important exponents of contemporary Italian political theory.

This book by Roberto Esposito - a leading Italian political philosopher - is a highly original exploration of the relationship between human bodies and societies. The original function of law, even before it was codified, was to preserve peaceful cohabitation between people who were exposed to the risk of destructive conflict. Just as the human body's immune system protects the organism from deadly incursions by viruses and other threats, law also ensures the survival of the community in a life-threatening (...) situation. It protects and prolongs life. But the function of law as a form of immunization points to a more disturbing consideration. Like the individual body, the collective body can be immunized from the perceived danger only by allowing a little of what threatens it to enter its protective boundaries. This means that in order to escape the clutches of death, life is forced to incorporate within itself the lethal principle. Starting from this reflection on the nature of immunization, Esposito offers a wide-ranging analysis of contemporary biopolitics. Never more than at present has the demand for immunization come to characterize all aspects of our existence. The more we feel at risk of being infiltrated and infected by foreign elements, the more the life of the individual and society closes off within its protective boundaries, forcing us to choose between a self-destructive outcome and a more radical alternative based on a new conception of community. (shrink)

A wide family of many-valued logics—for instance, those based on the weak Kleene algebra—includes a non-classical truth-value that is ‘contaminating’ in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula φ⁠, any complex formula in which φ appears is assigned that value as well. In such systems, the contaminating value enjoys a wide range of interpretations, suggesting scenarios in which more than one of these interpretations are called for. This calls for an evaluation of systems with multiple contaminating (...) values. In this paper, we consider the countably infinite family of multiple-conclusion consequence relations in which classical logic is enriched with one or more contaminating values whose behavior is determined by a linear ordering between them. We consider some motivations and applications for such systems and provide general characterizations for all consequence relations in this family. Finally, we provide sequent calculi for a pair of four-valued logics including two linearly ordered contaminating values before defining two-sided sequent calculi corresponding to each of the infinite family of many-valued logics studied in this paper. (shrink)

The relationships between art and cognition constitute a very wide set of largely unexplored and at times undefined or much too speculative problems. The field is narrowed down by imposing some constraints. It is proposed that the depiction of cast shadows, in its early history, could provide an ideal case study which conforms to the constraints. This paper addresses some methodological problems of the study of this case. A sample of relevant Renaissance images is discussed. A typology of depicted cast (...) shadows is proposed upon which further empirical research could be built. (shrink)

This paper discusses three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent calculi (...) for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fdeand the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues. (shrink)

This unique textbook states and proves all the major theorems of many-valued propositional logic and provides the reader with the most recent developments and trends, including applications to adaptive error-correcting binary search. The book is suitable for self-study, making the basic tools of many-valued logic accessible to students and scientists with a basic mathematical knowledge who are interested in the mathematical treatment of uncertain information. Stressing the interplay between algebra and logic, the book contains material never before published, such as (...) a simple proof of the completeness theorem and of the equivalence between Chang's MV algebras and Abelian lattice-ordered groups with unit - a necessary prerequisite for the incorporation of a genuine addition operation into fuzzy logic. Readers interested in fuzzy control are provided with a rich deductive system in which one can define fuzzy partitions, just as Boolean partitions can be defined and computed in classical logic. Detailed bibliographic remarks at the end of each chapter and an extensive bibliography lead the reader on to further specialised topics. (shrink)

"A pleasure to read. Gracefully written by a scholar well grounded in the relevant philosophical, historical, and technical background.... a helpfully clarifying review and analysis of some issues of importance to recent philosophy of science and a source of some illuminating insights."—Burke Townsend, Philosophy of Science.

Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page 37-39.

Se intentan poner de manifiesto isomorfismos estructurales en las teorías de Heidegger y Husserl sobre tiempo e historia. En relación con Ser y tiempo, la atención está puesta en la tesis compartida de que la historiografía está arraigada en la historicidad y esta en la temporeidad. Con referencia al curso de 1934 se pone de relieve la convergencia heideggeriana de misión, encargo y trabajo, que remiten al futuro, al pasado y al presente. Se muestran nociones equivalentes en los niveles que (...) Husserl distingue en la historia: protohistoria, historia efectiva e historia racional. Finalmente, en lo que atañe al viraje, se trazan paralelos entre el Ereignis y el presente viviente como instancias últimas de una indagación restrospectiva, entre la temporeidad del Dasein y al tiempo inmanente como resonancias de una dimensión profunda, y en torno de una conexión mutua en el análisis de la historia en términos de desviación, reposición, incorporación y superación, esto es, los momentos que componen la noción de Gewind. (shrink)

Roberto Esposito is one of leading figures in a new generation of Italian philosophers. This book criticizes the notion of the person and develops an original account of the concept of the impersonal - what he calls the third person.

This paper is concerned with certain ontological issues in the foundations of geographic representation. It sets out what these basic issues are, describes the tools needed to deal with them, and draws some implications for a general theory of spatial representation. Our approach has ramifications in the domains of mereology, topology, and the theory of location, and the question of the interaction of these three domains within a unified spatial representation theory is addressed. In the final part we also consider (...) the idea of non-standard geographies, which may be associated with geography under a classical conception in the same sense in which non-standard logics are associated with classical logic. (shrink)

For each integer n ≥ 2, MVn denotes the variety of MV-algebras generated by the MV-chain with n elements. Algebras in MVn are represented as continuous functions from a Boolean space into a n-element chain equipped with the discrete topology. Using these representations, maximal subalgebras of algebras in MVn are characterized, and it is shown that proper subalgebras are intersection of maximal subalgebras. When A ∈ MV3, the mentioned characterization of maximal subalgebras of A can be given in terms of (...) prime filters of the underlying lattice of A, in the form that was conjectured by A. Monteiro. (shrink)

For each integer n ≥ 2, MVn denotes the variety of MV-algebras generated by the MV-chain with n elements. Algebras in MVn are represented as continuous functions from a Boolean space into a n-element chain equipped with the discrete topology. Using these representations, maximal subalgebras of algebras in MVn are characterized, and it is shown that proper subalgebras are intersection of maximal subalgebras. When A ∈ MV3, the mentioned characterization of maximal subalgebras of A can be given in terms of (...) prime filters of the underlying lattice of A, in the form that was conjectured by A. Monteiro. (shrink)

Giovanni Merlo has argued that a currently popular way to interpret Kit Fine's fragmentalism about tensed facts (which he calls ‘unstructured fragmentalism’) is threatened by the problem of ‘tensed belief explosion’. I argue that such an explosion of belief poses no problem to unstructured fragmentalists.

This article addresses some useful coordinates for the analysis of the relationship between philosophy and taxation. My argument aims to show the relevance of a philosophy of taxation and thus draw attention to civic education required to shape a democratic public reason, truthful, critical and attentive. I emphasize the character of “donation” that is the rule of law within a democratic constitutional regime, which depends on tax payments for the purposes proposed, and particularly those of a social distributive justice. I (...) distinguish between charity and justice and political obligation to maintain that by implementing an effective "rule of law" citizens “donate” ourselves mechanisms and procedures for advancing a system of justice as fairness. This grant does not pertain to the field of natural duties, charity or sacrifice of supererogatory acts, but is expressed in institutional programs whose implementation and maintenance required from us pay taxes, but always based on personal commitment. Thus, close to John Rawls I emphasize the value of freedom. (shrink)

That emotions are especially valuable for our well-being has become a widely agreed upon claim. In this article, we argue that many of the ways in which the emotions are commonly considered to be prudentially valuable – hedonically, experientially, and adaptively – are not specific to the emotions: they are in fact shared by other affective reactions such as drives and sensory affects. This may suggest that emotions are not prudentially valuable in any distinctive manner. We challenge this suggestion by (...) arguing that, unlike other affective reactions, emotions provide unique contexts in which to refine our general sensibility to a wide variety of evaluative properties – and that in this sense they are prudentially valuable in a distinctive way. (shrink)

This study documents how people who inject drugs in rural Puerto Rico perceive payments for participating in HIV epidemiological studies. In-depth interviews were conducted among a subset of active PWID older than 18 years of age who had been previously enrolled in a much larger study. Findings suggest that financial compensation was the main motivation for initially enrolling in the parent study. Then, as trust in the researchers developed, participants came to perceive compensation as part of a reciprocal exchange in (...) which they assisted researchers by providing a trustful account of their experiences and researchers reciprocated with financial support. (shrink)

Não é pensando que criamos mundos. É compreendendo o mundo que aprendemos a pensar. Cosmovisão é um termo que deve significar um conjunto de fundamentos dos quais emerge uma compreensão sistêmica do Universo, seus componentes como a vida, o mundo em que vivemos, a natureza, o fenômeno humano e suas relações. Trata-se, portanto, de um campo da filosofia analítica alimentado pelas ciências, cujo objetivo é esse conhecimento agregado e epistemologicamente sustentável sobre tudo o que somos e contemos, que nos cerca (...) e que nos relaciona de alguma forma. É algo tão antigo quanto o pensamento humano e, além de utilizar elementos da cosmologia científica, engloba tudo na filosofia e na ciência que se refere ao universo e à vida. Uma cosmovisão não é um conjunto de ideias, hipóteses e suposições, mas um sistema baseado em observação, análise, evidência e demonstração. Nenhuma cosmovisão pretende definir, estabelecer, propor, mas apenas compreender, analisar e interpretar. Cada um de nós constrói e transporta sua cosmovisão ao longo da vida, sem estabelecer formas, como pano de fundo para nosso pensamento e comportamento. Linguisticamente, o termo “cosmovisão” derivaria do alemão, equivalente ao conceito de “ Weltanschauung”, usado por vários filósofos. No entanto, essa relação linguística não é aplicável porque contraria o que propomos como cosmovisão. Esta palavra alemã refere-se a uma visão pré-lógica ou proto-experimental da realidade, com um contexto intuitivo e longe de um conhecimento crítico ainda inexistente no momento da sua formulação. Sem dúvida, as cosmovisões , no sentido em que as entendemos, abrigam e utilizam esses elementos protoexperimentais ou pré-lógicos que incluem a história, o inconsciente coletivo e todos os arquétipos que carregamos. No entanto, no conceito que aqui aplicamos, a cosmovisão vai muito além desse conteúdo, primeiro por submetê-lo constantemente ao pensamento crítico presente e, finalmente, por tornar a experiência analítica (e não o próprio pensamento ou intuição) seu universo real. António Lopes expõe a amplitude deste conteúdo: -/- “Cosmovisões não são o produto do pensamento. Não nascem do simples desejo de saber. A apreensão da realidade é um momento importante em sua configuração, mas, no entanto, é apenas um. Vem da conduta vital, da experiência da vida, da estrutura de nossa totalidade psíquica. A elevação da vida à consciência no conhecimento da realidade, na valorização da vida e na realidade volitiva é o trabalho lento e árduo que a humanidade tem feito no desenvolvimento das concepções de vida. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)” Neste trabalho, buscamos traçar uma cosmovisão baseada nas realidades que a ciência oferece hoje. Não nos propomos, em nenhum momento, a fazer ciência ou teorizar a filosofia, mas sempre buscaremos ser apoiados por elas ou, pelo menos, protegidos por elas das distorções cognitivas que costumamos carregar. (shrink)

Ce n'est pas en pensant que nous créons des mondes. C'est en comprenant le monde que nous apprenons à penser. La cosmovision est un terme qui devrait désigner un ensemble de fondements d'où émerge une compréhension systémique de l'Univers, de ses composantes comme la vie, le monde dans lequel nous vivons, la nature, le phénomène humain et leurs relations. C'est donc un champ de la philosophie analytique nourri par les sciences, dont l'objectif est cette connaissance agrégée et épistémologiquement soutenable de (...) tout ce que nous sommes et contenons, qui nous entoure, et qui nous concerne de quelques manières que ce soit. C'est quelque chose d'aussi vieux que la pensée humaine et, en plus d'utiliser des éléments de la cosmologie scientifique, il englobe tout ce qui, dans la philosophie et la science, se réfère à l'univers et à la vie. Une cosmovision n'est pas un ensemble d'idées, d'hypothèses et de suppositions, mais un système établi sur l'observation, l'analyse, la preuve et la démonstration. Aucune cosmovision n'entend définir, établir ou proposer, mais seulement comprendre, analyser et interpréter. Chacun de nous construit et transporte sa cosmovision tout au long de sa vie, sans établir de forme, comme toile de fond de nos pensées et de nos comportements. Linguistiquement, le terme « cosmovision » dériverait de l'allemand, équivalent au concept de « Weltanschauung », tel qu'il a été utilisé par plusieurs philosophes. Cependant, cette relation linguistique n'est pas applicable, car elle contredit ce que nous proposons comme cosmovision. Ce mot allemand fait référence à une vision prélogique ou proto-expérimentale de la réalité, avec un contexte intuitif et loin des connaissances critiques encore inexistantes au moment de sa formulation. Sans aucun doute, les cosmovisions, au sens où nous les entendons, abritent et utilisent ces éléments proto-expérimentaux ou prélogiques qui incluent l'histoire, l'inconscient collectif et tous les archétypes que nous portons. Or, dans le concept que nous appliquons ici, la cosmovision va bien au-delà de ce contenu, d'abord en le soumettant constamment à la pensée critique actuelle et enfin en faisant de l'expérience analytique (et non de la pensée elle-même ou de l'intuition) son univers réel. António Lopes expose l'étendue de ce contenu : [ ] « Les cosmovisions ne sont pas le produit de la pensée. Ils ne naissent pas du simple désir de savoir. L'appréhension de la réalité est un moment important dans sa configuration, mais, néanmoins, ce n'en est qu'un. Elle vient de la conduite vitale, de l'expérience de la vie, de la structure de notre totalité psychique. L'élévation de la vie à la conscience dans la connaissance de la réalité, dans l'évaluation de la vie et dans la réalité volitive est le travail lent et ardu que l'humanité a fait dans le développement des conceptions de la vie. (W.Dilthey, 1992 [1911] : 120). Dans cet ouvrage, nous cherchons à esquisser une cosmovision fondée sur les réalités que la science offre aujourd'hui. Nous ne proposons, à aucun moment, de faire de la science ; ou théoriser la philosophie, mais nous chercherons toujours à être soutenus par eux ou, du moins, protégés par eux des distorsions cognitives que nous portons habituellement. -/- . (shrink)

Nicht durch das Denken erschaffen wir Welten. Indem wir die Welt verstehen, lernen wir zu denken. Kosmovision ist ein Begriff, der eine Reihe von Grundlagen bedeuten sollte, aus denen ein systemisches Verständnis des Universums, seiner Bestandteile als Leben, der Welt, in der wir leben, der Natur, des menschlichen Phänomens und ihrer Beziehungen hervorgehen sollte. Es handelt sich also um ein von den Wissenschaften gespeistes Feld der analytischen Philosophie, deren Ziel dieses aggregierte und erkenntnistheoretisch nachhaltige Wissen über alles ist, was wir (...) sind und beinhalten, was uns umgibt und was uns in einer Weise betrifft. Sie ist so alt wie das menschliche Denken und umfasst neben der Verwendung von Elementen der wissenschaftlichen Kosmologie alles in Philosophie und Wissenschaft, was sich auf das Universum und das Leben bezieht. Eine Kosmovision ist keine Sammlung von Ideen, Hypothesen und Annahmen, sondern ein System, das auf Beobachtung, Analyse, Beweisen und Demonstrationen basiert. Keine Kosmovision will definieren, etablieren oder vorschlagen, sondern nur verstehen, analysieren und interpretieren. Jeder von uns baut und transportiert sein ganzes Leben lang seine Kosmovision, ohne Formen zu etablieren, als Hintergrund für unser Denken und Handeln. In dieser Arbeit versuchen wir, eine Kosmovision zu skizzieren, die auf den Realitäten basiert, die die Wissenschaft heute bietet. Wir schlagen zu keinem Zeitpunkt vor, Wissenschaft zu betreiben; oder Philosophie zu theoretisieren, aber wir werden immer versuchen, von ihnen unterstützt oder zumindest vor den kognitiven Verzerrungen geschützt zu werden, die wir normalerweise mit uns herumtragen. (shrink)