Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 45, Issue 1-2, Page 164-188, June 2022.

ABSTRACT In 1978, the evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers and Huey P. Newton, cofounder of the Black Panthers, began a collaboration exploring the evolution of self-deception. Together they published a brief paper that used their ideas about the naturalistic basis of deceit and self-deception to explain the crash of Air Florida Flight 90 in Washington, D.C. Given the continued power of the naturalistic fallacy in the modern life sciences, historical attention typically focuses on highly visible controversies with great popular traction. This (...) essay instead mobilizes the muted legacy of Trivers and Newton's publication to underscore the inherent difficulties scientists face in finding a receptive audience for their theories, even naturalistic ones. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although “naturalistic fallacy” is a term coined in the twentieth century, scholars have long voiced myriad anxieties over the mechanisms by which their contemporaries have derived moral, social, and political lessons from natural phenomena—often as gambits for advancing their own alternative explanations. The essays in this Focus section explore five episodes in the history of such concerns with naturalistic reasoning in order to shed new light on the persistence of naturalism itself.

Sex and sensibility: The role of social selection Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9464-6 Authors Erika L. Milam, Department of History, University of Maryland, 2115 Francis Scott Key Hall, College Park, MD 20742, USA Roberta L. Millstein, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616, USA Angela Potochnik, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, P.O. Box 210374, Cincinnati, OH 45221, USA Joan E. Roughgarden, Department of Biology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5020, USA Journal (...) Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)

By conceptualizing place-making as a dynamic process, this essay explores the history of two field sites that house long-term research projects in animal behavior: the Amboseli Baboon Project, cofounded by Jeanne Altmann in 1971, and Kay Holekamp’s Mara Hyena Project, which began in 1988. It highlights scientific place-making as crucial to the production of knowledge within behavioral ecology and invests our historical understanding of field sites with an appreciation for the intellectual processes that have transformed land into places for the (...) generation of scientific data. (shrink)

Sex is probably the best example of stable biological variation within the human species. Scientists have tried to account for the origin of sex differences in biological terms using evolutionary theory. Although Charles Darwin derived his theories of natural and sexual selection with no consideration for sex, he assumed that the differences he observed in male and female human and animal behavior were variations related to biology. This chapter examines the link between sex and evolution by reflecting on the various (...) resonances between cultural and social norms one the one hand, and biological theory on the other. It first considers scientific explanations of women's nature, or womanhood as a subject of science, before turning to research on female choice and the animal/woman divide in the early twentieth century. The chapter also discusses the use of human and animal models of “natural” sexual behavior after World War II, sexual selection and biological determinism in the 1970s, and efforts to bridge the gap between feminism and evolutionary theory. (shrink)

I should like to offer my greatest thanks to Paul Griffiths for providing the opportunity for this exchange, and to commentators Gillian Brown, Steven Fuller, Stefan Linquist, and Erika Milam for their generous and thought-provoking comments. I shall do my best in this space to respond to some of their concerns.

In the field of teaching English to speakers of other languages (TESOL), much empirical research has investigated learner and teacher autonomy, agency, and identity. Yet, little prior research has...

Most philosophers acknowledge ways of overcoming blame, even blame directed at a culpable offender, that are not forgiving. Sometimes continuing to blame a friend for their offensive comment just isn't worth it, so we let go instead. However, despite being a common and widely recognised experience, no one has offered a positive account of letting go. Instead, it tends to be characterised negatively and superficially, usually in order to delineate the boundaries of forgiveness. This paper gives a more complete and (...) systematic account of this important practice. We argue that the basic distinction between forgiving and letting go of blame follows from distinctions that many philosophers already accept. We then develop a positive account in terms of the reasons one has to let go rather than forgive and show that letting go is as valuable a part of our shared moral lives as forgiveness. (shrink)

When we forgive, we do so for reasons. One challenge for forgiveness theorists is to explain which reasons are reasons to forgive and which are not. This paper argues that we forgive in response to a perceived change of heart on the part of the offender. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, I show that we forgive for reasons. Second, I argue that forgiveness requires the right kind of reason. Third, I show that these two points explain a common (...) distinction between forgiving and letting go and, in doing so, solve a problem facing many accounts of forgiveness. Finally, I consider candidate reasons to forgive and argue that all of them are either the wrong kind of reason or are instances of a more general reason of the right kind, namely, a perceived change of heart. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I contend that Miranda Fricker’s ambitious new pluralist account of forgiveness is too inclusive and counts as forgiveness practices that are psychologically and normatively quite different. I raise three worries: First, her account of proleptic Gifted Forgiveness as temporally displaced Moral Justice Forgiveness seems to allow for Preemptive Forgiveness. Second, proleptic Gifted Forgiveness seems to resemble communicative blame more than forgiveness. Finally, an alternative account of forgiveness—explained in terms of reasons to forswear blame—seems capable of meeting Fricker’s desiderata for (...) an adequate theory (e.g., giftedness, pluralism, ambivalence, and genealogy), while avoiding the inclusivity worry. (shrink)

It is often claimed both that forgiveness is elective and that forgiveness is something that we do for reasons. However, there is a tension between these two central claims about the nature of forgiveness. If forgiving is something one does for reasons, then, at least sometimes, those reasons may generate a requirement to forgive or withhold forgiveness. While not strictly inconsistent with electivity, the idea of required forgiveness strikes some as antithetical to the spirit of the concept. They argue that (...) forgiveness is essentially elective. In this paper, I dispute these arguments. I argue that the intuitive plausibility of the position diminishes upon reflection and that the best arguments fail to explain why reasons to forgive, unlike most other reasons for action, cannot generate requirements. (shrink)

Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others’ attitudes and actions regarding her, and that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I dispute both claims and argue that (...) this objection exaggerates the role of the reactive attitudes and underestimates the importance of non-reactive moral emotions. (shrink)

Previous research has established that the success of strikes, and social movements more broadly, depends on their ability to garner support from the public. However, there is scant published research investigating the response of the public to strike action by healthcare workers. In this study, we address this gap through a study of public responses to UK nursing strikes in 2022–2023, using a data set drawn from Twitter of more than 2300 publicly available tweets. We focus on negative tweets, investigating (...) which societal discourses social media users draw on to oppose strike action by nurses. Using a combination of corpus‐based approaches and discourse analysis, we identified five categories of opposition: (i) discourse discrediting nurses; (ii) discourse discrediting strikes by nurses; (iii) discourse on the National Health System; (iv) discourse about the fairness of strikers' demands and (v) discourse about potential harmful impact. Our findings show how social media users operationalise wider societal discourses about the nursing profession (e.g., associations with care, gender, vocation and sacrifice) as well as recent crises such as the Covid‐19 pandemic to justify their opposition. The results also provide valuable insights into misconceptions about nursing, strike action and patient harm, which can inform strategies for public communication. (shrink)

Once relegated to the margins of the responsibility debate, moral influence theories have recently been rehabilitated. This paper offers a moral influence theory with two parts: a theory of responsibility as influenceability and an act-consequentialist justification of blame. I defend this account against six concerns commonly raised both by opponents and by advocates of similar views. Some concerns target act consequentialism, claiming that it 1) permits blaming innocents; 2) permits coercion, manipulation, and other objectionable forms of influence; and 3) fails (...) to capture intuitions about desert. Other concerns target responsibility as influenceability, claiming that influenceability accounts are 4) unsophisticated, 5) make ascriptions of responsibility dependent on assessments of permissible blame, and 6) have various counterintuitive implications. (shrink)

: The main contribution of this paper to current philosophical and sociological studies on modeling is to analyze modeling as an object-oriented interdisciplinary activity and thus to bring new insights into the wide, heterogeneous discourse on tools, forms and organization of interdisciplinary research. A detailed analysis of interdisciplinarity in the making of models is presented, focusing on long-standing interdisciplinary collaboration between specialists in infectious diseases, mathematicians and computer scientists. The analysis introduces a novel way of studying the elements of the (...) models as carriers of interdisciplinarity. These elements, being functionally interdependent building blocks, evolve during the modeling work and carry the disciplinary tensions in the process. This shows how the long and challenging process of defining and reformulating the object of research is crucial for understanding the dynamics of interdisciplinarity in the making. (shrink)

Abstract:Many scientists argue that the world is becoming increasingly dominated by human activity, much to the detriment of the natural world. In what scholars have dubbed the Anthropocene, the current geological epoch during which time human activity has been the dominating force over climate and the environment, many questions of environmental ethics have arisen. Who does the earth belong to? What is the relationship between humans and the environment? What is the moral standing of non-human life? Locke and Rousseau provide (...) varying answers to these questions, which are central to discussions of environmental ethics. In many ways, Locke and Rousseau's answers are opposed to each other, suggesting a differing world view when it comes to environmental ethics. Locke's understanding of environmental ethics seems to dominate, and perhaps even cause, the onset of the Anthropocene, but Rousseau's response, and a potential turn toward his understanding of environmental ethics marks an ideological shift in the way that humans understand their relationship with the world around them. This paper argues that the writings of Locke and Rousseau correspond to different stages of the Anthropocene with significant effects on both environmental ethics and environmental governance and policy. (shrink)

Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, then we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. Proponents suggest that reactive attitudes can be replaced in our emotional repertoire by non-reactive analogues. In this paper, I dispute and reject a common challenge to abolitionism according to which the reactive attitudes are necessary for protesting unfairness and maintaining social harmony. While other abolitionists dispute the empirical basis of this objection, I focus on its implications. I argue that even if non-reactive (...) analogues cannot perform the interpersonal and social functions of reactive attitudes, it does not follow that the losses of abandoning them outweigh the gains of retaining them. The force of the challenge rests on a mistake, identified by John Stuart Mill among others, that is common when evaluating entrenched social practices. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Confucian formulations of personhood and the implications they may have for bioethics and medical practice. We discuss how an appreciation of the Confucian concept of personhood can provide insights into the practice of informed consent and, in particular, the role of family members and physicians in medical decision-making in societies influenced by Confucian culture. We suggest that Western notions of informed consent appear ethically misguided when viewed from a Confucian perspective.

Current advances in assisted reproductive technologies aim to promote the health and well-being of future children. They offer the possibility to select embryos with the greatest potential of being born healthy (eg, preimplantation genetic testing) and may someday correct faulty genes responsible for heritable diseases in the embryo (eg, human germline genome modification (HGGM)). Most laws and policy statements surrounding HGGM refer to the notion of ‘serious’ as a core criterion in determining what genetic diseases should be targeted by these (...) technologies. Yet, this notion remains vague and poorly defined, rendering its application challenging and decision making subjective and arbitrary. By way of background, we begin by briefly presenting two conceptual approaches to ‘health’ and ‘disease’: objectivism (ie, based on biological facts) and constructivism (ie, based on human values). The basic challenge under both is sorting out whether and to what extent social and environmental factors have a role in helping to define what qualifies as a ‘serious’ disease beyond the medical criteria. We then focus on how a human rights framework (eg, right to science and right to the highest attainable health) could integrate the concepts of objectivism and constructivism so as to provide guidance for a more actionable consideration of ‘serious’. Ultimately, it could be argued that a human rights framework, by way of its legally binding nature and its globally accepted norms and values, provides a more universal foundation for discussions of the ethical, legal and social implications of emerging or disruptive technologies. (shrink)

The idea of self-forgiveness poses a serious challenge to any philosopher interested in giving a general account of forgiveness. On the one hand, it is an uncontroversial part of our common psychological and moral discourse. On the other, any account of self-forgiveness is inconsistent with any general account of forgiveness which implies that only the victim of an offense can forgive. To avoid this conclusion, one must either challenge the particular claims that preclude self-forgiveness or offer an independently plausible account (...) of self-forgiveness. I deploy both strategies in this article, explaining what self-forgiveness is and how it is possible. (shrink)

“Walter Benjamin, Reader of Kafka: Study, Oblivion and Justice”. In this paper we propose to explore an aspect of Franz Kafka. On the Tenth Anniversary of his Death, an essay that Walter Benjamin wrote in 1934 for the Jüdische Rundschau, and to investigate an idea that does not develop there in extenso: the “study”. Throughout the text, we find that Benjamin relates this idea with two other concepts: first, he argues that study is opposed to “oblivion”, and, on the other (...) hand, links study with the notion of justice. In this way, both characterizations seem to coexist in the essay about Kafka, without the author developing them in depth. The objective of this work is, then, to delve into each of them in order to clarify how Benjamin conceives the study so that it can be associated with both a struggle against oblivion and with justice. (shrink)

An absolute decline in US life expectancy in low education whites has alarmed policy makers and attracted media attention. Depending on which studies are correct, low education white women have lost between 3 and 5 years of lifespan; men, between 6 months and 3 years. Although absolute declines in life expectancy are relatively rare, some commentators see the public alarm as reflecting a racist concern for white lives over black ones. How ought we ethically to evaluate this lifespan contraction in (...) low education whites? Should we care, or is it racist to care? Does it constitute an injustice or reflect justice being done? I argue that the lifespan contraction in low education whites violates key normative criteria used to make determinations of health justice, and that these judgments do not vitiate concerns about racism. I conclude with reflections on US population health policy and building an inclusive health equity movement. (shrink)

Wrongdoing is inescapable. We all do wrong and are wronged; and in response we often blame one another. But if blame is a defining feature of our social lives, so is ceasing to blame. We might excuse, justify, or forgive an offender; or simply let the offence go. Each mode of ceasing to blame is a social practice and each has characteristic norms that influence when and how we do it, as well as how it’s received. We argue that how (...) we relinquish blame, and how effective we are, depends on many circumstances only partially within our control. Like any norm-governed practice, one can do it well or poorly, appropriately or inappropriately, successfully or unsuccessfully. To successfully participate in a practice, one’s action must be done for the right reasons and secure uptake. We argue that social and material circumstances can compromise one’s ability to effectively cease to blame in the manner one prefers. But if one can fail, then one can lack access to particular ceasing to blame practices if one is regularly prevented from effectively relinquishing blame. However, uncooperative social and material circumstances do not only arise by chance. Our central argument is that circumstances of oppression can systematically compromise one’s ability and opportunities to effectively perform a variety of ceasing to blame practices. This deprivation is an insidious facet of oppression that is neglected both in theories of oppression and of forgiveness but which has significant implications for how we understand the power and purpose of forgiveness. (shrink)

Childhood obesity may have severe long‐term consequences for health—indeed, for the overall course of a person's life. Do these harms amount to a problem of social justice? And if so, what should be done about it? Parents are usually granted considerable leeway to make decisions that affect their children's health. Social and moral theory has often overlooked the family, however, leaving us with an inadequateunderstanding of parental autonomy and of how social policy may influence it.

Existing whistle-blowing models rely on “cold” economic calculations and cost-benefit analyses to explain the judgments and actions of potential whistle-blowers. I argue that “hot” cognitions – value conflict and emotions – should be added to these models. I propose a model of the whistle-blowing decision process that highlights the reciprocal influence of “hot” and “cold” cognitions and advocate research that explores how value conflict and emotions inform reporting decisions. I draw on the cognitive appraisal approach to emotions and on the (...) social-functional value pluralism model to generate propositions. (shrink)

Intraspecific niche variation can differentially impact community processes and can represent the initial stages of adaptive radiation. Here we test for intraspecific differences in niche use in a keystone species, the alewife (Alosa pseudoharengus). To test whether feedbacks between predator foraging traits and prey communities have led to differences in niche use, we compare the diet composition and trophic position of anadromous and landlocked alewife populations. These populations differ in phenotypic traits related to foraging (gill raker spacing, gape width, and (...) prey selectivity). Trait differences appear to have resulted from eco-evolutionary feedbacks between alewives and their zooplankton prey, and suggest that these two life history forms are exploiting different niches. Direct diets show that anadromous alewives consume a greater biomass of predatory copepods than do landlocked alewives. Anadromous alewives also consume more ostracods—a littoral prey item—as the growing season progresses. These diet differences do not translate into a significant difference in trophic position, as estimated from stable isotopes. However, stable-isotope estimates of diet source show that during early fall, anadromous alewives obtain significantly more of their dietary carbon from the littoral food web. This increased reliance on littoral prey is likely a result of a diet switch that occurs in response to the alewife-driven exhaustion of large-bodied prey items available in the pelagic zone, i.e., alewife niche construction. These findings show the existence of important intraspecific niche differences in the alewife and support the role of eco-evolutionary feedbacks in shaping these niche differences. The initiation of alewife divergence is the result of dam building by humans. Therefore, alewife niche differentiation can be considered to be an eco-evolutionary byproduct of human cultural niche construction. (shrink)

Women and men are biologically and reproductively dissimilar. This sexual distinctiveness gives rise to a “sexual asymmetry”—the fundamental reality that the potential consequences of sexual intercourse are far more immediate and serious for women than for men. Advocates of contraception and abortion sought to cure sexual asymmetry by decoupling sex from procreation, relieving women from the consequences of sex, and thus equalizing the sexual experiences of men and women. But efforts to suppress or reject biological difference have not relieved women (...) of the consequences of sex and the vulnerabilities of pregnancy, even as they have further relieved men. Although secular feminist responses to biological difference have served to exacerbate sexual asymmetry, Catholic teaching on abortion, sex, and marriage—even contraception—provides an authentically pro-woman cultural response. (shrink)

A focused review of the literature on reasoning suggests that mechanisms based upon contraries are of fundamental importance in various abilities. At the same time, the importance of contraries in the human perceptual experience of space has been recently demonstrated in experimental studies. Solving geometry problems represents an interesting case as both reasoning abilities and the manipulation of perceptual–figural aspects are involved.In this study we focus on perceptual changes in geometrical problem solving processes in order to understand whether a mental (...) manipulation in terms of opposites might help. Four conditions were studied, two of which concerned the search for contraries as an implicit or explicit strategy.Results demonstrated that contraries, when used explicitly in solution processes, constitute an effective heuristic: The number of correct solutions increased, less time was needed to find a solution and participants were oriented towards the use of perception-based solutions—not only wer.. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo nos proponemos analizar un pasaje de El caso Wagner, en el que Nietzsche condensa una serie de problemáticas referidas al vínculo entre Wagner, la decadencia y la psicología. El carácter condensado de las afirmaciones que allí se presentan, suscitan una serie de interrogantes que intentamos responder a lo largo de nuestro escrito. En primer lugar, indagamos las razones por las cuales Nietzsche afirma que los alemanes malentendieron a Wagner y cómo se relaciona esto con el hecho (...) de que nunca hayan sido psicólogos. En segundo lugar, rastreamos por qué Nietzsche sostiene que existe una “afinidad” entre Wagner y la décadence francesa. A los fines de dilucidar estas cuestiones, recurrimos como estrategia interpretativa a una fuente central de la que se nutrió Nietzsche: los Essais de psychologie contemporaine de Paul Bourget. Finalmente, planteamos una tensión que encontramos entre el diagnóstico crítico de la decadencia y la práctica psicológica que Nietzsche reivindica. (shrink)

El presente trabajo busca reconstruir una tensión entre el pensamiento de Marx y Benjamin en relación al valor que cada uno le otorga a la memoria. En principio, podría afirmarse que estos autores asumen puntos de vista contrapuestos: mientras en El Dieciocho Brumario Marx sostiene que toda apelación al pasado es superstición, por lo que la revolución no puede sacar de allí su lírica; para Benjamin, el cambio revolucionario cita al pasado. Lo que llama la atención, sin embargo, es que (...) Benjamin en la Tesis XIV afirma que el salto al pasado que él reivindica es “la revolución tal y como la entendió Marx”. Nuestro objetivo aquí será indagar los motivos por los que Benjamin incluye esta referencia a Marx, considerando que él conocía su negativa a que la revolución se nutriera del pasado. (shrink)

Despite apparent political concern and action—often fuelled by high-profile cases and campaigns—legislative and institutional responses to image-based sexual abuse in the UK have been ad hoc, piecemeal and inconsistent. In practice, victim-survivors are being consistently failed: by the law, by the police and criminal justice system, by traditional and social media, website operators, and by their employers, universities and schools. Drawing on data from the first multi-jurisdictional study of the nature and harms of, and legal/policy responses to, image-based sexual abuse, (...) this article argues for a new joined-up approach that supports victim-survivors of image-based sexual abuse to ‘reclaim control’. It argues for a comprehensive, multi-layered, multi-institutional and multi-agency response, led by a government- and industry-funded online or e-safety organisation, which not only recognises the diversity of victim-survivor experiences and the intersection of image-based sexual abuse with other forms of sexual and gender-based violence and discrimination, but which also enables victim-survivors to reclaim control within and beyond the criminal justice system. (shrink)

Consequentialism is a moral philosophy that maintains that the moral worth of an action is determined by the consequences it has for the welfare of a society. Consequences of model design are a part of the model lifecycle that is often neglected. This paper investigates the issue using system dynamics modeling as an example. Since a system dynamics model is a product of the modeler’s design decisions, the modeler should consider the life cycle consequences of using the model. Seen from (...) a consequentialist perspective, the consequences of policies developed from system dynamics models determine the model’s moral value. This concept is explored by discussing model uncertainty from an engineering perspective. In this perspective, the ethical considerations shift from the behavior of the modeler to the model itself and the model’s inherent uncertainty. When the ethical considerations are taken away from the modeler and directed to what the model does, the ethical boundaries extend beyond the proximity of the model. This discussion renews the ethics conversation in system dynamics by considering this shift in philosophical perspective, and investigates how consequentialist moral philosophy applies to the modeling process and in communicating with decision-makers. A model of social assistance in Norway in the context of immigration pressures illustrates some possibilities for addressing these ethical concerns. This paper argues for an ethical framework, or at the very least, an ethical conversation within the field of system dynamics.Article first published online: 25 FEB 2017. (shrink)