A history of the pre-Socratic philosophers, with selected writings and texts.

In this paper I first list a number of areas in which recent research seems to reinforce the need to follow through on activities identified in Simonetta Magari’s article. A careful review of research in these areas would lead us into deeply mysterious psychological processes and underline the need to change the most fundamental assumptions on which modern psychology is built. Unfortunately, I am in no position to undertake this review. Accordingly, I have settled for the lesser objective of discussing (...) the problems posed by the phenomenon of emergence; the dominant role that networks of external social forces play in determining behaviour, and the emergence of a network of negative social forces which seems to have the future of mankind and the planet in its grip. I start by showing that one of the most important uses of the slippery word “intelligence” is to refer to an emergent property of a group. Groups can, to a greater or lesser extent, harness the diverse talents available to them to create cultures of intelligence or enterprise on the one hand and despondency and conflict on the other. Whereas we, as a species, currently have the highest levels of individual intelligence ever, it seems that we have the lowest levels of collective intelligence ever. But group and individual characteristics are not the only things transformed by networks of social forces. Time after time we see that well intentioned social action is transformed into its opposite by networks of social forces. A systemogram of the social forces which transform the “educational” system into its opposite is then used as a basis for a discussion of the role of social forces more generally. Two issues then stare one in the face. One is that our governance systems are ill equipped to promoting the kind of experimentation and societal learning that is needed…especially to enable us to survive as a species. The other is the dominance of the “sociological” forces pressing unrelentingly toward the societal hierarchy and division that is leading us so forcefully toward our self-destruction. Unexpectedly, therefore, it emerges that two key tasks for psychologists, qua psychologists, are to contribute to the design of a societal management system which will act more effectively in the long term public interest – that is to say, in the interests of maintaining life itself – and to map the network of social forces which are driving us so relentlessly toward our own extinction. (shrink)

By way of introduction I have to say that I know little about the Focolari movement or the Economy of Communion group. This paper is offered on the assumption that the movement is dedicated to the radical transformation of society and not just tinkering at the edges in order to keep the economy as we know it going.

This article argues that harnessing social processes for the common good depends on creating a learning society which will innovate, learn, and evolve in the long-term public interest. In essence, this involves establishing more embedded, interconnected, and interacting, “organic” feedback loops which do not depend on long and distorting chains of “accountability” to distant “representative” assemblies of “decision takers”. Several important steps toward doing this are discussed. However, all depend on undertaking a great deal of adventurous, problem-driven research. By far (...) the most important of these research programmes would be to develop a better understanding of the currently invisible network of social forces that have the future of our species and the planet in their grip … and then to find ways of intervening in that network. It is suggested that this is analogous to Newton first conceptualising physical forces and then showing how to measure, map, and harness them. Answering the question of how work like Newton’s could be funded and conducted in modern society – and especially under current research-funding arrangements – thus emerges as crucial to finding a way forward. (shrink)

"All ravens are black" is logically but not confirmationally equivalent with "all non-black things are non-ravens." But this is impossible, given that logical equivalence guarantees confirmational equivalence. In this paper, this paradox is solved.

I Want in this paper briefly to contribute two points to the elucidation of this famous passage, and apologize for the fact that my possessing the same name as one of its most illustrious interpreters may add confusion to the doxographic tradition. The first point is not an original one. It is simply to revive an interpretation given by Henry Jackson in an article which strikes me as the most profound and pellucid which I have read on the subject, and (...) which is in some danger of being forgotten. Raven, about ten years ago, insisted as a criterion of interpretation that the entire passage should be viewed ‘as a single and indivisible whole’. This is precisely what Jackson does, though he concentrates his attention, as indeed does Raven, on the line and the cave. (shrink)

I Want in this paper briefly to contribute two points to the elucidation of this famous passage, and apologize for the fact that my possessing the same name as one of its most illustrious interpreters may add confusion to the doxographic tradition. The first point is not an original one. It is simply to revive an interpretation given by Henry Jackson in an article which strikes me as the most profound and pellucid which I have read on the subject, and (...) which is in some danger of being forgotten. Raven, about ten years ago, insisted as a criterion of interpretation that the entire passage should be viewed ‘as a single and indivisible whole’. This is precisely what Jackson does, though he concentrates his attention, as indeed does Raven, on the line and the cave. (shrink)

I Want in this paper briefly to contribute two points to the elucidation of this famous passage, and apologize for the fact that my possessing the same name as one of its most illustrious interpreters may add confusion to the doxographic tradition. The first point is not an original one. It is simply to revive an interpretation given by Henry Jackson in an article which strikes me as the most profound and pellucid which I have read on the subject, and (...) which is in some danger of being forgotten. Raven, about ten years ago, insisted as a criterion of interpretation that the entire passage should be viewed ‘as a single and indivisible whole’. This is precisely what Jackson does, though he concentrates his attention, as indeed does Raven, on the line and the cave. (shrink)

Metacognition, the cognition about cognition, is closely linked to intelligence and therefore understanding the metacognitive processes underlying intelligence test performance, specifically on Raven’s Progressive Matrices, could help advance the knowledge about intelligence. The measurement of metacognition, is often done using domain-general offline questionnaires or domain-specific online think-aloud protocols. This study aimed to investigate the relationship between metacognitive awareness and intelligence via the design and use of a novel Meta-Cognitive Awareness Scale – Domain Specific that encourages reflection of task strategy (...) processes. This domain-specific scale was first constructed to measure participants’ awareness of their own metacognition linked to Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Following discriminatory index and Exploratory Factor Analysis, a 15-item scale was derived. Exploratory Factor Analysis showed five factors: Awareness of Engagement in Self-Monitoring, Awareness of Own Ability, Awareness of Responding Speed/Time, Awareness of Alternative Solutions and Awareness of Requisite Problem-Solving Resources. The intelligence level of ninety-eight adults was then estimated using Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices. Participants also completed the MCAS-DS, and further items that examined their test-taking behavior and Confidence level. Metacognitive awareness was positively correlated to standardized IQ scores derived from the SPM whilst Over-Confidence derived using the Confidence level measure was negatively correlated to SPM. Despite some limitations, this study shows promise for elucidating the relationship between metacognitive awareness and intelligence using the task-specific scale. (shrink)

Projectible conditions are (roughly) those whose universal generalizations are con firmed by their positive instances. This paper proposes certain modifications to the above definition in order to capture the pre-analytic notion it is supposed to explicate. Then we investigate what logical operations, when performed on projectible conditionals, yield new projectible conditionals. A number of surprising theorems are proven, and these theorems indicate that few conditionals having complex antecedents and consequents are projectible. It is also shown that projectibility is not closed (...) under contraposition, and this is proposed as a solution to the Paradox of the Ravens. Finally, a general conjecture is made concerning just what conditionals are projectible, and it follows from this conjecture that although most conditionals are not projectible, they can still be dealt with inductively, but in ways more complex than recognized by classical confirmation theory. (shrink)

In his new book What is a Law of Nature?, David Armstrong gives an account of functional laws on the basis of the theory, originally proposed independently by Armstrong himself, Dretske, and Tooley, and further developed in this work, which asserts that laws are relations of necessitation between properties. On the theory, properties and relations are universals, and so a law is a relation between universals and is itself a universal. There are two reasons why Armstrong's account of functional laws (...) is worth discussing. First, any theory that purports to be about laws that are investigated by science–I assume that we are only interested in such theories–must cover functional laws and not merely be adequate for generalizations about ravens or grue. Second, Armstrong claims that the main rival to his theory, the regularity theory of laws, cannot give a satisfactory account of functional laws. If this is true, and if Armstrong's theory can provide a satisfactory account of functional laws, then this may incline us towards his point of view. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:260 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and 8, although hc proposed no emendation of the text. [Raven's work is nowhere mentioned by Loenen, not even in connection with fr. 4 where he and Raven are in agreement, yet where he says "... all present-day authors assume this passage to refer to the material world," Raven believes with Loenen that the passage does not refer to the material world.] (...) With regard to Loenen's sensu stricto ~ar~, all commentators realized that Parmenides was at least some of the time using ~a~Lto denote necessity of existence and essence. Loenen does valuable work in emphasising this, but the observation is not revolutionarily original. Vlastos, following yon Fritz, argued (in Gnomon [1953]) that, for Parmenides, nothing exists but thought. Vlastos' arguments were not on as many fronts as are Loenen's, and Loenen develops the interpretation much further. Aristotle and Simplicius were the first of many who believed Parmenides to be a dualist, to have posited two worlds, fa ata~ra and ~& ~a~a, between which there was no causal relationship. Although there is much originality in Loenen's development and argument for his theses, it is nevertheless true that on the three grounds on which he lays claim to originality (introduction, pp. 3-5), his views have considerable precedents. M. C. SCHOLAR St. John's College, Cambridge Plato and the Individual. By Robert William Hall. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. 224.) Professor Hall's main thesis is that Plato's ethical thought underwent a gradual and significant development and that in the face of this fact the mature Plato is neither a halfhearted moral philosopher, nor a utilitarian, but completely committed to the substantiality and immortality of the soul. The first issue is raised so that the claim that Plato reserved the ethical ideal only for the specialists in philosophical reflection can be dismissed as groundless. The second problem is discussed in order to demonstrate beyond doubt that Plato's later moral views went beyond the limited ethics of consequences that dominates the early Socratic dialogues. But it is the third issue that constitutes the core of Hall's book, and the discussion here is undertaken in order to identify the metaphysical principle to which Plato appealed when he reconstructed his ethics from an initially quite aristocratic affair into a publicly available ideal that was rendered universal in scope and attainment. Dr. Hall argues that if knowledge of the Forms is unconditionally required for genuine morality, then only the philosophically gifted can rise to the lofty occasion. Being himself a strong advocate of a moral ideal open to all human beings, Dr. Hall does not hesitate to challenge Plato's views with this formidable problem: If we suppose Plato's views grant to the ordinary individual nothing more than a second class morality, he hardly deserves his reputation as a great ethical thinker. In line with this question the author devotes the entire first chapter to an interesting discussion on the sources of modern democratic individualism as supported by the best in the Christian tradition and then uses his findings to test the strength of Plato's moral fiber. But the author knows all along that Plato will emerge unscathed. His purpo~ then is not so much to show that Plato actually held that view as it is to take the reader through the meandering paths only the modem scholar and erudite interpreter of the dialogues know how to travel best and by which it is believed Plato himself must have been able to reach the summit of the superb answer. Since Dr. Hall discerns two different available moralities in Plato, an "aristocratic" and a "demotic," he also finds it necessary to distinguish between the morality of the excellences of the individual man and the excellence of the philosopher. When all is told, it turns out that Plato's development as an ethical philosopher moves from a high-minded kind of utilitarianism based on arete, inherited from Socrates, to a non-utilitarian conception of virtue which is Plato's own discovery and contribution. The pivotal point is found to be in the Republic where the central problem is to justify the inherent value of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:260 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and 8, although hc proposed no emendation of the text. [Raven's work is nowhere mentioned by Loenen, not even in connection with fr. 4 where he and Raven are in agreement, yet where he says "... all present-day authors assume this passage to refer to the material world," Raven believes with Loenen that the passage does not refer to the material world.] (...) With regard to Loenen's sensu stricto ~ar~, all commentators realized that Parmenides was at least some of the time using ~a~Lto denote necessity of existence and essence. Loenen does valuable work in emphasising this, but the observation is not revolutionarily original. Vlastos, following yon Fritz, argued (in Gnomon [1953]) that, for Parmenides, nothing exists but thought. Vlastos' arguments were not on as many fronts as are Loenen's, and Loenen develops the interpretation much further. Aristotle and Simplicius were the first of many who believed Parmenides to be a dualist, to have posited two worlds, fa ata~ra and ~& ~a~a, between which there was no causal relationship. Although there is much originality in Loenen's development and argument for his theses, it is nevertheless true that on the three grounds on which he lays claim to originality (introduction, pp. 3-5), his views have considerable precedents. M. C. SCHOLAR St. John's College, Cambridge Plato and the Individual. By Robert William Hall. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. 224.) Professor Hall's main thesis is that Plato's ethical thought underwent a gradual and significant development and that in the face of this fact the mature Plato is neither a halfhearted moral philosopher, nor a utilitarian, but completely committed to the substantiality and immortality of the soul. The first issue is raised so that the claim that Plato reserved the ethical ideal only for the specialists in philosophical reflection can be dismissed as groundless. The second problem is discussed in order to demonstrate beyond doubt that Plato's later moral views went beyond the limited ethics of consequences that dominates the early Socratic dialogues. But it is the third issue that constitutes the core of Hall's book, and the discussion here is undertaken in order to identify the metaphysical principle to which Plato appealed when he reconstructed his ethics from an initially quite aristocratic affair into a publicly available ideal that was rendered universal in scope and attainment. Dr. Hall argues that if knowledge of the Forms is unconditionally required for genuine morality, then only the philosophically gifted can rise to the lofty occasion. Being himself a strong advocate of a moral ideal open to all human beings, Dr. Hall does not hesitate to challenge Plato's views with this formidable problem: If we suppose Plato's views grant to the ordinary individual nothing more than a second class morality, he hardly deserves his reputation as a great ethical thinker. In line with this question the author devotes the entire first chapter to an interesting discussion on the sources of modern democratic individualism as supported by the best in the Christian tradition and then uses his findings to test the strength of Plato's moral fiber. But the author knows all along that Plato will emerge unscathed. His purpo~ then is not so much to show that Plato actually held that view as it is to take the reader through the meandering paths only the modem scholar and erudite interpreter of the dialogues know how to travel best and by which it is believed Plato himself must have been able to reach the summit of the superb answer. Since Dr. Hall discerns two different available moralities in Plato, an "aristocratic" and a "demotic," he also finds it necessary to distinguish between the morality of the excellences of the individual man and the excellence of the philosopher. When all is told, it turns out that Plato's development as an ethical philosopher moves from a high-minded kind of utilitarianism based on arete, inherited from Socrates, to a non-utilitarian conception of virtue which is Plato's own discovery and contribution. The pivotal point is found to be in the Republic where the central problem is to justify the inherent value of... (shrink)

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition.

Reissued here in its corrected second edition of 1864, this essay by John Stuart Mill argues for a utilitarian theory of morality. Originally printed as a series of three articles in Fraser's Magazine in 1861, the work sought to refine the 'greatest happiness' principle that had been championed by Jeremy Bentham, defending it from common criticisms, and offering a justification of its validity. Following Bentham, Mill holds that actions can be judged as right or wrong depending on whether they (...) promote happiness or 'the reverse of happiness'. Although attracted by Bentham's consequentialist framework based on empirical evidence rather than intuition, Mill separates happiness into 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures, arguing for a weighted system of measurement when making and judging decisions. Dissected and debated since its first appearance, the essay is Mill's key discussion on the topic and remains a fundamental text in the study of ethics. (shrink)

J.L. Mackie insists that ordinary evaluative thought presents itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world. And this phenomenological thesis seems correct. When one or another variety of philosophical non-cognitivism claims to capture the truth about what the experience of value is like, or (in a familiar surrogate for phenomenology) about what we mean by our evaluative language, the claim is never based on careful attention to the lived character of evaluative thought or discourse. The idea is, (...) rather, that the very concept of the cognitive or factual rules out the possibility of an undiluted representation of how things are, enjoying, nevertheless, the internal relation to 'attitudes' or the will that would be needed to count as evaluative. On this view the phenomenology of value would involve a mere incoherence, if it were as Mackie says--a possibility that then tends (naturally enough) not to be so much as entertained. But, as Mackie sees, there is no satisfactory justification for supposing that the factual is, by definition, attitudinatively and motivationally neutral. This clears away the only obstacle to accepting his phenomenological claim; and the upshot is that non-cognitivism must offer to correct the phenomenology of value, rather than give an account of it. -/- In Machie's view the correction is called for. In this paper I want to suggest that he attributes an unmerited plausibility to this thesis, by giving a false picture of what one is committed to if one resists it. (shrink)

Some believe reality is dynamic: time passes, not just in our experience of reality, but objectively, in reality itself. There are many objections to this view. I focus on the rate objection: that time passes only if it passes at the rate of 1 second per second, but that it cannot coherently pass at that rate. Existing replies to this objection do not fully engage with its motivation. My aim is to refute the rate objection. Time can coherently pass at (...) the rate of 1 second per second. This does not conclusively show that time passes, but it removes one of the main obstacles to believing that it does. (shrink)

Background: The COVID-19 crisis has had a considerable mental health impact on healthcare workers. High levels of psychological distress are expected to have a significant impact on healthcare systems, warranting the need for evidence-based psychological interventions targeting stress and fostering resilience in this population. Online cognitive behavioral therapy has proved to be effective in targeting stress and promoting resilience. However, online CBT programs targeting stress in healthcare workers are lacking.Objective: The aim of our study is to evaluate the feasibility and (...) acceptability of an internet-based CBT intervention, the My Health Too program we developed during the first COVID-19 epidemic peak in France.Methods: We recruited 10 participants among Alsace region hospital staff during the first peak of the pandemic in France. They were given 1 week to test the website and were then asked to answer an internet survey and a semi-structured phone interview.Results: We conducted a thematic analysis of the content from the phone interviews. Major themes were identified, discussed and coded: the technical aspects, the content of the website and its impact on participants’ emotions and everyday life. Overall, the participants reported finding the website easy to use and interactive. They described the resources as easy to understand, readily usable, and useful in inducing calm and in helping them practice self-compassion.Conclusion: Our results suggest that the My Health Too online CBT program is highly feasible and acceptable to healthcare workers during the highly stressful times of the pandemic peak. The feedback provided helped to improve the program whose efficacy is to be tested. (shrink)

Interest surges in a distinctively metaphysical notion of ground. But a Schism has emerged between Orthodoxy’s view of ground as inducing a strict partial order structure on reality and Heresy’s rejection of this view. What’s at stake is the structure of reality (for proponents of ground), or even ground itself (for those who think this Schism casts doubt upon its coherence). I defend Orthodoxy against Heresy.

In this philosophically sophisticated and historically significant work, John H. Zammito reconstructs Kant's composition of The Critique of Judgment and reveals that it underwent three major transformations before publication. He shows that Kant not only made his "cognitive" turn, expanding the project from a "Critique of Taste" to a Critique of Judgment but he also made an "ethical" turn. This "ethical" turn was provoked by controversies in German philosophical and religious culture, in particular the writings of Johann Herder and (...) the Sturm und Drang movement in art and science, as well as the related pantheism controversy. Such topicality made the Third Critique pivotal in creating a "Kantian" movement in the 1790s, leading directly to German Idealism and Romanticism. The austerity and grandeur of Kant's philosophical writings sometimes make it hard to recognize them as the products of a historical individual situated in the particular constellation of his time and society. Here Kant emerges as a concrete historical figure struggling to preserve the achievements of cosmopolitan Aufkl-rung against challenges in natural science, religion, and politics in the late 1780s. More specifically Zammito suggests that Kant's Third Critique was animated throughout by a fierce personal rivalry with Herder and by a strong commitment to traditional Christian ideas of God and human moral freedom. "A work of extraordinary erudition. Zammito's study is both comprehensive and novel, connecting Kant's work with the aesthetic and religious controversies of the late eighteenth century. He seems to have read everything. I know of no comparable historical study of Kant's Third Critique."-Arnulf Zweig, translator and editor of Kant's ;IPhilosophical Correspondence, 1759-1799;X "An intricate, subtle, and exciting explanation of how Kant's thinking developed and adjusted to new challenges over the decade from the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason to the appearance of the Critique of Judgment. "--John W. Burbidge, Review of Metaphysics "There has been for a long time a serious gap in English commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgment Zammito's book finally fills it. All students and scholars of Kant will want to consult it."--Frederick Beiser, Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition.

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant develops a rigorous formulation of aesthetic judgments, in which he makes a sharp distinction between judgments of taste and judgments of the agreeable if only to dismiss judgments of the agreeable as worthy objects of study. Kant is primarily concerned with judgments of taste, the main example of which is judging something to be beautiful. He asserts that such judgments are subjective, universal, necessary, disinterested, and do not presuppose a purpose. The (...) other type of aesthetic judgment are judgments of the agreeable, “which are the kind of judgment expressed by saying simply that one likes something or finds it pleasing.” These are judgments of what, in Kant’s words, please “the senses in sensation” as opposed to pleasing ourcognition in reflection. (shrink)

This essay focuses on a recently prominent notion of ground which is distinctive for how it links metaphysics to explanation. Ground is supposed to serve both as the common factor in diverse in virtue of questions as well as the structuring relation in the project of explaining how some phenomena are “built” from more fundamental phenomena. My aim is to provide an opinionated synopsis of this notion of ground without engaging with others. Ground, so understood, generally resists illumination by appeal (...) to more familiar models of explanation. Nevertheless, its distinctive explanatory and metaphysical aspects guide us on characterizing its explanatory logic and its metaphysical features. Some issues concerning the meta-question of what grounds ground are explored, as well as some recent skeptical challenges to ground. (shrink)

Knowledge and Lotteries is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know a certain class of propositions, while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things that entail that its holder will not suddenly acquire a (...) large fortune. After providing a number of specific and general characterizations of the puzzle, Hawthorne carefully examines the competing merits of candidate solutions. In so doing, he explores a number of central questions concerning the nature and importance of knowledge, including the relationship of knowledge to assertion and practical reasoning, the status of epistemic closure principles, the merits of various brands of scepticism, the prospects for a contextualist account of knowledge, and the potential for other sorts of salience-sensitive accounts. Along the way, he offers a careful treatment of pertinent issues at the foundations of semantics. His book will be of interest to anyone working in the field of epistemology, as well as to philosophers of language. (shrink)

A collection of 37 essays surveying the state of the art on metaphysical ground. -/- Essay authors are: Fatema Amijee, Ricki Bliss, Amanda Bryant, Margaret Cameron, Phil Corkum, Fabrice Correia, Louis deRosset, Scott Dixon, Tom Donaldson, Nina Emery, Kit Fine, Martin Glazier, Kathrin Koslicki, David Mark Kovacs, Stephan Krämer, Stephanie Leary, Stephan Leuenberger, Jon Litland, Marko Malink, Michaela McSweeney, Kevin Mulligan, Alyssa Ney, Asya Passinsky, Francesca Poggiolesi, Kevin Richardson, Stefan Roski, Noel Saenz, Benjamin Schnieder, Erica Shumener, Alexander Skiles, Olla Solomyak, (...) Tuomas Tahko, Naomi Thompson, Kelly Trogdon, Jennifer Wang, Tobias Wilsch, and Justin Zylstra. (shrink)

I defend (metaphysical) ground against recent, unanswered objections aiming to dismiss it from serious philosophical inquiry. Interest in ground stems from its role in the venerable metaphysical project of identifying which facts hold in virtue of others. Recent work on ground focuses on regimenting it. But many reject ground itself, seeing regimentation as yet another misguided attempt to regiment a bad idea (like phlogiston or astrology). I defend ground directly against objections that it is confused, incoherent, or fruitless. This vindicates (...) the very attempt to regiment ground. It also refocuses our attention on the genuine open questions about ground and away from the distracting, unpersuasive reasons for dismissing them. (shrink)

A commonly held view is that a central aim of metaphysics is to give a fundamental account of reality which refers only to the fundamental entities. But a puzzle arises. It is at least a working hypothesis for those pursuing the aim that, first, there must be fundamental entities. But, second, it also seems possible that the world has no foundation, with each entity depending on others. These two claims are inconsistent with the widely held third claim that the fundamental (...) just is the foundational. It is tempting to resolve the puzzle by rejecting the first or second claim, perhaps because it is obscure how the third claim might plausibly be challenged. But I develop a new analysis of fundamentality which challenges the third claim by allowing for an entity to be fundamental without being foundational. The analysis, roughly, is that an entity is fundamental just in case not all facts about it are grounded in facts about other entities. The possibility of fundamentality without foundations not only provides for a novel resolution to the puzzle, but has applications to some live debates: for example, it undermines Jonathan Schaffer's modal argument for priority monism. (shrink)

Foreword I. Critical rationalism is a genuinely new philosophical perspective. It is not, however, one systematic view. The development of it by Popper and ...

What does reality encompass? Is it exclusively physical, or does it include mental and 'abstract' aspects? What are the elements of being, reality's raw materials? John Heil offers stimulating answers to these questions framed in terms of a comprehensive metaphysics of substances and properties inspired by Descartes, Locke, and their successors.

Everyone loves something or somebody, and most people are concerned with loving another person like themselves, all equal. This book is based on the belief that getting clear about the concept and meaning of love between equals is essential for success in our practical lives. For how can we love properly unless we have a fairly clear idea of what love is? The book is written in ordinary language and for the ordinary person, without jargon or philosophical technicalities. It aims (...) to show that love between equals involves a single basic disposition, though that disposition expresses itself in various ways. Thus, after an introduction explaining the need for analysis and clarification, the author then deals in order with love as desire or need; with intrinsic friendship and sharing the self; with basic difficulties concerning power, dependence, altruism and paranoia; with sex and erotic love; and finally with the value in human life of love between equals. The work as a whole gives clear, coherent and practical guidance for all who wish to grasp what such love is really like. (shrink)

The conception of “prospective potency” was defined by its author H.Driesch as “the sum of the possible modes of development of a given part of the embryo”. However, in the language of science the word “potency” usually means “power”, not “possibility”. Therefore this conception from the beginning possessed a certain ambiguity, that it retained up to the present. The distinction of “active” and “passive” potency, introduced by Roux, has found no general acceptance. It appeared necessary to submit the conception of (...) “potency” to a profound analysis. In the first place it is shown, that the ambiguity of this conception vanishes, if we understand by the word “potency” those fundamental properties of the embryonic material, that are responsible for its various developmental possibilities. We can distinguish among these properties the “reactive powers”, by which the embryonic material reacts to inductive stimulations, and its own “developmental tendencies”. These faculties only differ by their strength; a “reactive power” may change into a “tendency”, when its intensity increases during development; conversely, a “tendency” may change into a mere “reactive power” by a decrease of its strength. The determination of the material results from the conflict of its tendencies. The inductive actions interfere by strengthening or weakening different tendencies, and by activating new tendencies by reinforcement of the “reactive powers” of the embryonic material. (shrink)

The conception of “prospective potency” was defined by its author H.Driesch as “the sum of the possible modes of development of a given part of the embryo”. However, in the language of science the word “potency” usually means “power”, not “possibility”. Therefore this conception from the beginning possessed a certain ambiguity, that it retained up to the present. The distinction of “active” and “passive” potency, introduced by Roux, has found no general acceptance. It appeared necessary to submit the conception of (...) “potency” to a profound analysis. In the first place it is shown, that the ambiguity of this conception vanishes, if we understand by the word “potency” those fundamental properties of the embryonic material, that are responsible for its various developmental possibilities. We can distinguish among these properties the “reactive powers”, by which the embryonic material reacts to inductive stimulations, and its own “developmental tendencies”. These faculties only differ by their strength; a “reactive power” may change into a “tendency”, when its intensity increases during development; conversely, a “tendency” may change into a mere “reactive power” by a decrease of its strength. The determination of the material results from the conflict of its tendencies. The inductive actions interfere by strengthening or weakening different tendencies, and by activating new tendencies by reinforcement of the “reactive powers” of the embryonic material.La conception de „prospektive Potenz” fut définie par son auteur H.Driesch comme „l'ensemble des modes de développement possibles d'une certaine partie de l'embryon”. Cependant, le, mot „Potenz” dans le langage de la science répond plutôt à la „puissance” qu'à la „possibilité”. De là résulte, que cette conception dès son origine avait une certaine ambiguïté, qui se fait sentir jusqu'à présent. La distinction entre „potentialité active” et „potentialité passive”, proposée par Roux, n'est pas acceptée généralement. Il se trouvait nécessaire, que la conception de „Potenz” fût soumise à une. analyse profonde. D'abord il est démontré, que l'ambiguïté de cette conception disparaît, si on entend par le mot „Potenz” les propriétés fondamentales du matériel embryonnaire, qui sont à la base de ses diverses possibilités de développement. On peut distinguer parmi ces propriétés les „pouvoirs réactifs”, en vertu desquels le matériel embryonnaire répond à des inductions morphogénétiques, et les „tendances propres” du matériel. Ils ne diffèrent que par leur intensité; un „pouvoir réactif” peut se changer en „tendance” par suite d'un renforcement au cours du développement, une „tendance” peut se changer en „pouvoir réactif” par une diminution d'intensité. La détermination du matériel se réalise par une „lutte” entre les tendances. Les actions inductives influent sur cette lutte en renforçant ou en diminuant l'intensité des diverses tendances, et en activant de nouvelles tendances par le renforcement de „pouvoirs réactifs”. (shrink)

In his preface Mr Wilson writes 'I feel that a great many adults … would do better to spend less time in simply accepting the concepts of others uncritically, and more time in learning how to analyse concepts in general'. Mr Wilson starts by describing the techniques of conceptual analysis. He then gives examples of them in action by composing answers to specific questions and by criticism of quoted passages of argument. Chapter 3 sums up the importance of this kind (...) of mental activity. Chapter 4 presents selections for the reader to analyse, followed by questions of university entrance/scholarship type. This is a book to be worked through, in a sense a text-book. (shrink)

This paper concerns a distinction between circumstantial truths that hold because of the circumstances and acircumstantial truths that hold regardless of, or transcend, the circumstances. Previous discussions of the distinction tended to focus on its applications, such as to modality, logical truth, and essence. This paper focuses on developing the distinction largely, but not entirely, in abstraction from its potential applications. As such, the paper’s main contribution is to further clarify the distinction itself. An indirect contribution is to help guide (...) its future applications. (shrink)

There has been much recent interest in a distinctively metaphysical kind of determinative explanation: ground. This paper concerns various skeptical challenges to ground’s relevance to metaphysics, such as that it is an empty posit, that the work it is supposed to do is appropriated by other notions, and that it is inapt for specific issues it should serve. I argue against these challenges. My strategy is both critical and constructive. Critical because I argue that versions of these challenges raised by (...) Elizabeth Barnes, Kathrin Koslicki, Mari Mikkola, and Jessica Wilson are not persuasive. Constructive because we may nevertheless learn from them new work for ground. (shrink)