Philosophy: The Big Questions occupies a unique position among introductory texts in philosophy. Designed for a single-semester introductory course in philosophy, it includes both classic readings in philosophy and newer articles. Presents, in one volume, canonical and contemporary works in ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and epistemology. Topics discussed include knowledge, religion, freedom, morality, and the meaning of life. Serves as a comprehensive and compelling introduction to philosophy. Together with traditional readings it also presents non-traditional, feminist eadings from a continental (...) perspectives. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose to defend an account of environmental justice that is not only acceptable both from an anthropocentric or human-centric perspective and from a non-anthropocentric or biocentric perspective, but also deals squarely with the problem of environmental racism.

Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

As one of the most important ethicists to emerge since the Second World War, Alan Gewirth continues to influence philosophical debates concerning morality. In this ground-breaking book, Gewirth's neo-Kantianism, and the communitarian problems discussed, form a dialogue on the foundation of moral theory. Themes of agent-centered constraints, the formal structure of theories, and the relationship between freedom and duty are examined along with such new perspectives as feminism, the Stoics, and Sartre. Gewirth offers a picture of the philosopher's theory and (...) its applications, providing a richer, more complete critical assessement than any which has occurred to date. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.2 (2002) 39-59 [Access article in PDF] Response to My Critics Karen J. Warren Introduction In the Preface to my book, Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters, 1 I describe as both "exciting and taxing" the process of writing the book over more than one decade (Warren, x). It was exciting because I was contributing to the still (...) nascent field of ecofeminist philosophy; it was taxing because I often found it difficult to know what I wanted to say about ecofeminism as a philosophical position. The book that emerged is my attempt to say, in my own voice and in a language and style amenable to a reflective lay audience, what I understand ecofeminist philosophy to be and why I think it matters.Ecofeminist Philosophy is premised on the conviction that ecofeminist philosophy has liberating potential to generate insights and recommendations for any theory, practice, or policy that is feminist, ecofeminist, or environmental. The version of ecofeminist philosophy I defend focuses on a variety of contingent interconnections—historical, empirical, socioeconomic, conceptual, linguistic, symbolic and literary, spiritual and religious, epistemological, metaphysical, political, ethical, and theoretical—among the dominations of women, other subordinated humans, nonhuman animals, and nature. It locates the commonalities of mutually reinforcing "isms of domination" (e.g., sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism, ageism, colonialism, [End Page 39] ethnocentrism, speciesism and "naturism," or the unjustified domination of nonhuman nature) in oppressive conceptual frameworks, institutions, and practices mediated and justified by a "logic of domination." Connecting these isms of domination to pressing contemporary feminist and environmental issues, I argue for a version of ecofeminist philosophy that provides both critical analyses of and creative solutions to the intersecting practices, policies, and structures of unjustified ("isms" of) domination.From my perspective, the book is bold and daring. It advocates positions (e.g., regarding spirituality) typically eschewed by feminist and ecofeminist philosophers. It takes positions (e.g., on moral vegetarianism) that are at odds with much mainstream ecofeminist literature on nonhuman animals (particularly ecofeminist animal rights literature). It defends unfamiliar or unpopular philosophical positions (e.g., on the moral considerability of nonhuman animals and nature, on the nature of social justice, on ethics as "care-sensitive," and on theory as theory-in-process). It provides an account of ecofeminist philosophy that is grounded in good science, though not in canonical ideals of objectivity and rationality. It uses cross-cultural empirical, historical, social, and cultural data to motivate and test the theoretical claims of ecofeminist philosophy. And it supports the need for and role of emotional intelligence (including the ability to care) in ethics, ethical-decision making, and the creation of life-affirming, nonviolent communities and social systems.Given the nature of the issues I address and the positions I advocate in Ecofeminist Philosophy, it is to be expected that critics will raise questions, offer criticisms, and encourage further reflection on my part about my conception and defense of ecofeminist philosophy. That is precisely what the three critics who have written commentaries on my book for this special Symposium of Ethics & the Environment—philosophers Chris Cuomo, Trish Glazebrook, and Jim Sterba—have done. It is a humbling and gratifying experience to have one's scholarship the focus of a special issue of a journal; it is even more so when the critics offer comments that are helpful and constructive. I am grateful for the time and philosophical energy all three critics have invested in writing their commentaries.In what follows, I comment on each essay separately. My hope is to provide each essay with the thoughtful attention it deserves, while offering clarifying remarks on what I attempted to do, and the version of ecofeminist philosophy I defend, in Ecofeminist Philosophy. [End Page 40] Trish Glazebrook's Essay It was a pleasure to read Professor Trish Glazebrook's essay. Glazebrook understands what I attempted to do in this book, while also providing useful, illuminating questions and suggestions for future work. I am grateful for her supportive sensitivity and scholarly attention to what I argued in Ecofeminist Philosophy and to ways I might improve my... (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Ned Block argues that the higher-order (HO) approach to explaining consciousness is ‘defunct’ because a prominent objection (the ‘misrepresentation objection’) exposes the view as ‘incoherent’. What’s more, a response to this objection that I’ve offered elsewhere (Weisberg 2010) fails because it ‘amounts to abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness’ (xxx).1 In this response, I wish to plead guilty as charged. Indeed, I will continue herein to abuse Block’s notion of what-it’s-like-ness. After doing so, I will argue that the HO approach accounts (...) for the sense of what-it’s-like-ness that matters in a theory of consciousness. I will also argue that the only incoherence present in the HO theory is that generated by embracing Block’s controversial notion of what-it’s-like-ness, something no theorist of any stripe ought to do. Block is famous for (among other things) having introduced the notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ into contemporary philosophy of mind (Block 1995). This term is widely employed in the philosophical literature and it even appears in the empirical literature. But wide-speared usage has brought about divergent interpretations of the term. We can distinguish a ‘moderate’ and a ‘zealous’ reading of ‘phenomenal consciousness’. On the moderate reading, ‘phenomenal consciousness’ just means ‘experience’. Many people have embraced this sense of the term and use it to roughly pick out conscious experience involving sensory quality (states like conscious visual experiences or conscious pains, for example).2 On the zealous reading, however, phenomenal consciousness is held to be ‘distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property’ (Block 1995: 234). That is, any explanation of phenomenal consciousness in exclusively cognitive, intentional, or functional terms will fail to capture, without remainder, what is really distinctive about phenomenal consciousness. Block, of course, is fully clear about embracing the zealous reading; indeed, his initial introduction of the notion is in those terms. The same ambiguity occurs with the much-used (and abused) idea of ‘what-it’s-like-ness’.. (shrink)

Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. In From Rationality to Equality, James P. Sterba provides just such an argument and further shows that morality, so justified, requires substantial equality and is preferable to egoism. Sterba defends his two-part argument against recent critics, and shows how it is preferable not only to alternative attempts to justify morality, but also to alternative attempts to show that morality leads to (...) a right to welfare and/or to equality. (shrink)

The only textbook devoted to these basic challenges to ethicsIntroduces some of the problems of traditional ethics and solutions to themExamines each of the challenges separatelySuggests how traditional ethics can meet the challengesThis book's author argues that traditional ethics has yet to face up to three important challenges that come from environmentalism, feminism, and multiculturalism. This failure to face up to these challenges has meant that no matter how successful traditional ethics has been at dealing with the problems it recognizes, (...) it has failed to deal with the possibility that its solutions to these problems are biased in favour of humans, biased in favour of men, and biased in favour of Western culture. Failure to deal with these challenges has clearly put the justification of traditional ethics into question. Thus those concerned with the justification of traditional ethics have no alternative but to try to determine how these challenges can be met. To meet the challenges, Sterba argues that traditional ethics must incorporate conlfict resolution principles that favour nonhumans over humans in a significant range of cases, must rule out gendered family structures and implement an ideal of androgyny, and must endorse an ethics that is secular in character and one that can survive a wide-ranging comparative evaluation of both Western and non-Western moral ideals and cultures.Readership: This text is indended for students in introductory ethics and moral problems courses and lay readers interested in evironmentalism, feminism, and multiculturalism. (shrink)

Aristotelian ethics, Kantian ethics, and utilitarian ethics have been for some time now the main options within ethics, and the central task over the years has been to determine which of the three is right. Is this book yet another attempt to fulfill this same old task? Not at all. Sterba argues that in their ongoing attempts to put forward for general consideration the most morally defensible versions of their views, advocates of Aristotelian ethics, Kantian ethics, and utilitarian ethics (...) have jettisoned much of what had originally distinguished their theories from each other. The upshot is that, in their current most morally defensible formulations, Aristotelian ethics, Kantian ethics, and utilitarian ethics no longer differ in the practical requirements they endorse. This makes the resolution of moral problems far easier. Sterba drives home his claims by taking up some of the most challenging and important moral problems of our time--sexual harassment, affirmative action, and international terrorism and Iraqi War II. This book is an ideal supplementary text for courses in introductory ethics, history of ethics, contemporary moral problems, and various applied ethics courses. Featuring a lucid writing style and coverage of current moral issues, it is also captivating reading for general readers. (shrink)

Ethics: Classical Western Texts in Feminist and Multicultural Perspectives offers students a unique introduction to ethics by integrating the historical development of Western moral philosophy with both feminist and multicultural approaches. Engaging and accessible, it provides an introductory sampling of several of the classical works of the Western tradition in ethics and then situates these readings within feminist and multicultural perspectives so that they can be better understood and evaluated in our contemporary environment. While some of the non-Western works parallel (...) the views defended in the Western works, others question the Western perspectives. Confucius, Jorge Valadez, Ward Churchill, Moshoeshoe II, and Eagle Man present multicultural perspectives to the works of Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, Sartre, Rawls, MacIntyre, Korsgaard, and others. Noted feminists Christine de Pizan, Simone de Beauvoir, Carol Gilligan, Annette Baier, Susan Okin, and Rosemarie Radford Ruether also offer alternative views. Ideal for courses in introduction to ethics, history of ethics, and feminist ethics, Ethics: Classical Western Texts in Feminist and Multicultural Perspectives is also intriguing reading for interested general readers. (shrink)

Telling a patient that the outcome of his illness is not good, or even hopeless, requires sensitivity and the ability to communicate with him in the setting of a hospital which is an unnatural environment divorced from family and friends. It is a task which must be taught and learned by doctors and nurses.

Biocentrists are criticized (1) for being biased in favor of the human species, (2) for basing their view on an ecology that is now widely challenged, and (3) for failing to reasonably distinguish the life that they claim has intrinsic value from the animate and inanimate things that they claim lack intrinsic value. In this paper, I show how biocentrism can be defended against these three criticisms, thus permitting biocentrists to justifiably appropriate the salutation, “Let the life force (or better (...) the ethical demands of life) be with you.”. (shrink)

The existential analysis -- The death of dasein -- The timeliness of dasein -- The derivation of time -- The time of being.

So much of the work that we do as philosophers is published without much critical commentary from our colleagues. Only rarely do we have the chance to improve our work through the extensive critical analysis of our colleagues. That is why I am very grateful to have this opportunity to benefit from the valuable critical analysis that the contributors to this volume have directed at my practical reconciliation argument for making people just. While in this brief response I cannot hope (...) to discuss all the interesting points that my distinguished commentators Kurt Baier, Gerald Doppelt, James Fishkin, John Hospers, Alison Jaggar, Eric Mack, Jeffrey Reiman, Rosemarie Tong and Iris Young have raised, I will try to lay to rest at least some of their doubts concerning my practical reconciliation argument for making people just. (shrink)

For a number of years now I have argued for a reconciliation of contemporary conceptions of justice. I have argued that a libertarian conception of justice with its ideal of liberty, a welfare liberal conception of justice with its ideal of fairness, a socialist conception of justice with its ideal of equality, a communitarian conception of justice with its ideal of the common good, and a feminist conception of justice with its ideal of androgyny can all be seen to support (...) the same practical requirements, specifically the practical requirements that are usually associated with a welfare liberal conception of justice, namely, a right to welfare and a right to equal opportunity. Since most people endorse one or another of these conceptions of justice, to reach agreement in practice it should suffice to show them that all these conceptions support the same practical requirements of a right to welfare and a right to equal opportunity. (shrink)

The achievements of the textile industry in Roman Britain are often underestimated as a result of the meagreness of our available evidence. The Edict on maximum prices issued by Diocletian in A.D. 301 shows that British capes commanded high prices on the markets of the Empire, and that in the late third century A.D. British rugs were the best in the world. In view of the competition from the traditional centres of rug manufacture in the East, this is an astonishing (...) achievement. (shrink)

The received translation and interpretation of many of the technical terms current in the textile industry of the Roman Empire are inaccurate, because lexicographers have either fought shy of being precise, or have thought that they recognized in the ancient world technical processes which originated at a much later date. The evidence is often equivocal or insufficient, but may still yield details that have been overlooked. The textile expression scutulatus, to take an example, deserves more attention than Blümner has devoted (...) to it. When it refers to the appearance of a garment, Lewis and Short, s.v. scutulatus, translate ‘diamond or lozenge-shaped, checkered’. It seems worth while to attempt a more precise translation, and, if possible, to estimate the significance in context of the goods so designated. (shrink)

Living out of silence, out of a fully functioning, lovingly attentive mind, and not just out of thought, out of a partially functioning mind, is requisite for depth or profundity in living or relating. A fully attentive, truly silent or meditative mind sees that there is real dualism of time and the timeless and that time and the timeless each has its own unique value. The timeless, or real silence, that which alone can make for depth in one's living and (...) relating, can be there only when, in one's awareness, time and all that is related to time, have come to an end. An examination of a wide variety of statements made by writers, both past and present, shows that these understandings are seldom there in contemporary writings, just as they were not there in writings that have come down to us from the past. 'Living beyond the One and the Many' invites readers to consider the possibility that what is presented in it can bring deep meaning to one's way of living in the world"--Publisher's description, back cover. (shrink)

If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 167-169, June 2011.

Jeffrey Collins’ new book aims to presents Locke’s views on religious toleration in the light of Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy. At first blush, Hobbes seems an unusual choice as a point of co...

Biocentrists are criticized for being biased in favor of the human species, for basing their view on an ecology that is now widely challenged, and for failing to reasonably distinguish the life that they claim has intrinsic value from the animate and inanimate things that they claim lack intrinsic value. In this paper, I show how biocentrism can be defended against these three criticisms, thus permitting biocentrists to justifiably appropriate the salutation, “Let the life force be with you.”.

Marxist social contract theory gives rise to an unwelcome dilemma for would-Be contractarians. For either the state of nature choice situation confronting the parties to the social contract will be defined to include or to exclude the knowledge of the general facts of class conflict. But if, On the one hand, The state of nature choice situation is defined to include such knowledge (particularly the knowledge of the fundamental conflict between the proletariat and capitalist classes), Then it could be argued (...) that no agreement would be reached, And hence, No conception of justice would be chosen at all. And if, On the other hand, The state of nature choice situation is defined to exclude such knowledge, Then it could be argued that only an inadequate conception of justice tailored to the interests of the most advantaged classes would be chosen. What the author shows in this paper is that whatever the effectiveness of this dilemma when employed against various classical social contract theories, It cannot be employed with similar effect against a social contract theory that utilizes a rawlsian veil of ignorance. (shrink)