Happiness has been at the centre of philosophical reflection ever since Plato and Aristotle. Epicureans thought of happiness as the satisfaction of one's minimal needs and the absence of further desires. True happiness may be the love of another, or successful and virtuous public service recognized by society, or successful engagement in a favoured activity. Youthful happiness involves intensity of feeling, engagement with the passing moment, the discovery of first love and of sexuality, and the joys of dedication to a (...) beloved. The different forms of human engagement involve different kinds of happiness. Physical normality and good health are patently preconditions of happiness inasmuch as physical abnormalities and persistent diseases are barriers to leading a healthy and normal human life. A person's social conditions are highly relevant to the possibility of happiness. Happiness can be marred or shattered by a multitude of accidents of fate and by human malice, political upheavals, and economic disasters. (shrink)

Modern utilitarianism has its roots in the eighteenth century, its philosophical blossom in the works of Bentham and the Mills, and its practical fruit in the works of nineteenth‐century radical legal and political utilitarian reformers. Utilitarians held that pleasure, and hence too happiness, are sensations. Human beings are in effect mere pleasure or happiness receptacles or desire‐satisfying mechanisms. The idea of a science of happiness appealed to some economists and social theorists who rightly felt increasingly ill at ease about measuring (...) national welfare and progress in terms of growth in gross national product. The goal of profit maximization dominated economic science. One stimulus for the development of a putative science of happiness was dissatisfaction with economists’ attempts to evaluate the success of an economic system and the progress of a society by measuring gross national product. In a happy society alienation is minimal, and freedom and dignity are respected and preserved. (shrink)

In this paper I further elucidate and defend a metaontological position that allows you to have a minimal ontology without embracing an error-theory of ordinary talk. On this view 'there are Fs' can be strictly and literally true without bringing an ontological commitment to Fs. Instead of a sentence S committing you to the things that must be amongst the values of the variables if it is true, I argue that S commits you to the things that must exist as (...) truthmakers for S if it is true. I rebut some recent objections that have been levelled against this metaontological view. (shrink)

Hybridization is a method invented by Arthur Prior for extending the expressive power of modal languages. Although developed in interesting ways by Robert Bull, and by the Sofia school , the method remains little known. In our view this has deprived temporal logic of a valuable tool.The aim of the paper is to explain why hybridization is useful in temporal logic. We make two major points, the first technical, the second conceptual. First, we show that hybridization gives rise to well-behaved (...) logics that exhibit an interesting synergy between modal and classical ideas. This synergy, obvious for hybrid languages with full first-order expressive strength, is demonstrated for a weaker local language capable of defining the Until operator; we provide a minimal axiomatization, and show that in a wide range of temporally interesting cases extended completeness results can be obtained automatically. Second, we argue that the idea of sorted atomic symbols which underpins the hybrid enterprise can be developed further. To illustrate this, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a simple hybrid language which can quantify over paths. (shrink)

Many of our concepts are introduced to us via, and seem only to be constrained by, roughand-ready explanations and some sample paradigm positive and negative applications. This happens even in informal logic and mathematics. Yet in some cases, the concepts in question – although only informally and vaguely characterized – in fact have, or appear to have, entirely determinate extensions. Here’s one familiar example. When we start learning computability theory, we are introduced to the idea of an algorithmically computable function (...) (from numbers to numbers) – i.e. one whose value for any given input can be determined by a step-by-step calculating procedure, where each step is fully determined by some antecedently given finite set of calculating rules. We are told that we are to abstract from practical considerations of how many steps will be needed and how much ink will be spilt in the process, so long as everything remains finite. We are also told that each step is to be ‘small’ and the rules governing it must be ‘simple’, available to a cognitively limited calculating agent: for we want an algorithmic procedure, step-by-minimal-step, to be idiot-proof. For a classic elucidation of this kind, see e.g. Rogers (1967, pp. 1–5). Church’s Thesis, in one form, then claims this informally explicated concept in fact has a perfectly precise extension, the set of recursive functions. Church’s Thesis can be supported in a quasi-empirical way, by the failure of our searches for counterexamples. It can be supported too in a more principled way, by the observation that different appealing ways of sharpening up the informal chararacterization of algorithmic computability end up specifying the same set of recursive functions. But such considerations fall short of a demonstration of the Thesis. So is there a different argumentative strategy we could use, one that could lead to a proof? Sometimes it is claimed that there just can’t be, because you can never really prove results involving an informal concept like algorithmic computability.. (shrink)

Philosophical Logic is a clear and concise critical survey of nonclassical logics of philosophical interest written by one of the world's leading authorities on the subject. After giving an overview of classical logic, John Burgess introduces five central branches of nonclassical logic, focusing on the sometimes problematic relationship between formal apparatus and intuitive motivation. Requiring minimal background and arranged to make the more technical material optional, the book offers a choice between an overview and in-depth study, and it balances the (...) philosophical and technical aspects of the subject.The book emphasizes the relationship between models and the traditional goal of logic, the evaluation of arguments, and critically examines apparatus and assumptions that often are taken for granted. Philosophical Logic provides an unusually thorough treatment of conditional logic, unifying probabilistic and model-theoretic approaches. It underscores the variety of approaches that have been taken to relevantistic and related logics, and it stresses the problem of connecting formal systems to the motivating ideas behind intuitionistic mathematics. Each chapter ends with a brief guide to further reading.Philosophical Logic addresses students new to logic, philosophers working in other areas, and specialists in logic, providing both a sophisticated introduction and a new synthesis. (shrink)

It is no part of my purpose in this paper to advocate Minimal Foundationalism. In fact I believe there to be strong objections to any form of foundationalism, and I feel that some kind of coherence or contextualist theory will provide a more adequate general orientation in epistemology. Will and Lehrer are to be commended for providing, in their different ways, important insights into some possible ways of developing a nonfoundationalist epistemology. Nevertheless if foundationalism is to be successfully disposed of (...) it must be attacked in its most defensible, not in its most vulnerable, form. Although Will and Lehrer reveal weaknesses in historically important forms of foundationalism, it has been my aim in this paper to show that their arguments leave untouched the more modest and less vulnerable form I have called ‘Minimal Foundationalism’, a form approximated to by the most prominent contemporary versions of the position. It is to be hoped that those who are interested in clearing the decks for an epistemology without foundations will turn their critical weapons against such modest and careful foundationalists as Chisholm, Danto, and Quinton. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on what is referred to as the ‘mineness’ of experience, that is, the intimate familiarity we have with our own thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Most accounts characterize mineness in terms of an experiential dimension, the first-person givenness of experience, that is subsumed under the notion of minimal self-consciousness or a ‘minimal self’. We argue that this account faces problems and develop an alternative account of mineness in terms of the coherence of experiences with what we (...) label an ‘embodied biography’. Building on a near consensus among consciousness researchers over the function of consciousness as integrating infor- mation, we argue that the phenomenology of mineness consists in the absence of any further thought on top of the experience itself. Finally we argue that this non-phenomenological account of mineness fits well with existing data on pathologies of mineness such as delusions of thought insertion. (shrink)

We study a notion of ‘o-amorphous’ which bears the same relationship to ‘o-minimal’ as ‘amorphous’ 191–233) does to ‘strongly minimal’. A linearly ordered set is said to be o-amorphous if its only subsets are finite unions of intervals. This turns out to be a relatively straightforward case, and we can provide a complete ‘classification’, subject to the same provisos as in Truss . The reason is that since o-amorphous is an essentially second-order notion, it corresponds more accurately to 0-categorical o-minimal, (...) and our classification is thus very similar to the one given in 565–592) for that case. More interesting structures arise if we replace ‘interval’ in the definition by ‘convex set’, giving us the class of weakly o-amorphous sets. Here, in fact, there are so many examples that a complete classification seems out of the question. We illustrate some of the structures which these may exhibit, and classify them in certain instances not too far removed from the o-amorphous case. (shrink)

The temporal behaviour of the nonlinear compartmental model we have developed for rat calcium metabolism is discussed with respect to the theoretical properties of the self-oscillating autocatalytic subunit around which the model is constructed. Depending on the approximations made, this subunit is described by a minimal two-variable model, SU2, or by a three-variable one, SU3. The diversity of the theoretical dynamic behaviours possible with SU2 is greatly increased with SU3. But the identification of SU3 parameter values in three different experimental (...) situations reveals that biological constraints efficiently preserve a simple circadian rhythm for bone metabolism. This analysis indicates the significant contribution of the available bone crystal pool to the dynamic organization of this tissue, and hence to extracellular calcium homeostasis. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have drawn on tools from game theory to explore behavior in Hobbes’ state of nature. I take a similar approach and argue the Lockean state of nature is best conceived of as a conflictual coordination game. I also discuss Nozick’s famous claim regarding the emergence of the state and argue the path to the minimal state is blocked by a hitherto unnoticed free-rider problem. Finally, I argue that on my representation of the Lockean state of nature both widespread (...) conflict and lasting peace are possible. This, I contend, is in line with one popular interpretation of Locke. (shrink)

What is the simplest and most natural axiomatic replacement for the set-theoretic definition of the minimal fixed point on the Kleene scheme in Kripke’s theory of truth? What is the simplest and most natural set of axioms and rules for truth whose adoption by a subject who had never heard the word "true" before would give that subject an understanding of truth for which the minimal fixed point on the Kleene scheme would be a good model? Several axiomatic systems, old (...) and new, are examined and evaluated as candidate answers to these questions, with results of Harvey Friedman playing a significant role in the examination. (shrink)

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls offers an idea of international public reason that governs the relationship between liberal and decent peoples. This article begins by considering the relationship between liberal peoples and the form of public reason that they would deem acceptable. It ultimately argues that there is an international public reason that is common to minimally just states that is different from what would be found in the law of peoples. The applicability and content of this version (...) of international public reason is governed by the possibility of states associating with one another in what I call an international friendship. Minimally just states would accept the importance of reasons for being attentive to how their actions can affect the just arrangements of other minimally just states. The reason of international friendship presents the possibility of competing international publics with their own form of reason. (shrink)

The primary objective of this paper, which is an addendum to the author’s [8], is to apply the general study of the latter to Łukasiewicz’s n-valued logics [4]. The paper provides an analytical expression of a 2(n−1)-place sequent calculus (in the sense of [10, 9]) with the cut-elimination property and a strong completeness with respect to the logic involved which is most compact among similar calculi in the sense of a complexity of systems of premises of introduction rules. This together (...) with a quite effective procedure of construction of an equality determinant (in the sense of [5]) for the logics involved to be extracted from the constructive proof of Proposition 6.10 of [6] yields an equally effective procedure of construction of both Gentzen-style [2] (i.e., 2-place) and Tait-style [11] (i.e., 1-place) minimal sequent calculi following the method of translations described in Subsection 4.2 of [7]. (shrink)

Let Mn♯ denote the minimal active iterable extender model which has n Woodin cardinals and contains all reals, if it exists, in which case we denote by Mn the class-sized model obtained by iterating the topmost measure of Mn class-many times. We characterize the sets of reals which are Σ1-definable from R over Mn, under the assumption that projective games on reals are determined:1. for even n, Σ1Mn=⅁RΠn+11;2. for odd n, Σ1Mn=⅁RΣn+11.This generalizes a theorem of Martin and Steel for L, (...) that is, the case n=0. As consequences of the proof, we see that determinacy of all projective games with moves in R is equivalent to the statement that Mn♯ exists for all n∈N, and that determinacy of all projective games of length ω2 with moves in N is equivalent to the statement that Mn♯ exists and satisfies AD for all n∈N. (shrink)

In our previous work, a new approach to the notorious problem of quantum measurement was proposed. Existing treatments of the problem were incorrect because they ignored the disturbance of measurement by identical particles and standard quantum mechanics had to be modified to obey the cluster separability principle. The key tool was the notion of separation status. Changes of separation status occur during preparations, registrations and scattering on macroscopic targets. Standard quantum mechanics does not provide any correct rules that would govern (...) these changes. This gives us the possibility to add new rules to quantum mechanics that would satisfy the objectification requirement. The method of the present paper is to start from the standard unitary evolution and then introduce minimal corrections. Several representative examples of registration and particle scattering on macroscopic targets are analysed case by case in order to see their common features. The resulting general Rule of Separation Status Changes is stated in the Conclusion. (shrink)

We investigate the notion of relevance as it pertains to ‘commonsense’, subjunctive conditionals. Relevance is taken here as a relation between a property (such as having a broken wing) and a conditional (such as birds typically fly). Specifically, we explore a notion of ‘causative’ relevance, distinct from ‘evidential’ relevance found, for example, in probabilistic approaches. A series of postulates characterising a minimal, parsimonious concept of relevance is developed. Along the way we argue that no purely logical account of relevance (even (...) at the metalevel) is possible. Finally, and with minimal restrictions, an explicit definition that agrees with the postulates is given. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Bioethics as “Dilemma‐motivated” The Expanding Universe of Bioethics Issues Institutional Settings of Bioethics Bioethics and Moral Reasoning Bioethics as Minimally Conventional Bioethics as Interdisciplinary The Core Theoretical Problems of Bioethics Attacks on Bioethics Can Bioethics Provide Answers? The Scope of Bioethics: From Western to Global The Future of Bioethics The Social Role of Bioethics “Uncontested Core” of Bioethics Acknowledgments.

It could be conceivable that society is not an organism, that it has no structure, that it functions only temporarily or seemingly. The most obvious analogies are not the best. The Human Province, p.245 True, he [man] wants to “preserve” himself, but he also simultaneously wants other things which are inseparable from this.Crowds and Power, p. 293 The planning nature of man is a very late addition that violates his essential, his transforming nature.The Secret Heart of the Clock, p. 119 (...) Man, regarding himself as the measure of all things, is almost unknown. His progress in self-knowledge is minimal, every new theory obscures more of him than it illuminates. The Conscience of Words, p. 111. (shrink)

Eric Barnes’ The Paradox of Predictivism is concerned primarily with two facts: predictivism (the fact that novel predictions play an important part in scientificconfirmation) and pluralism (the fact that scientific development is not just a matter of isolated individuals judging the truth, but at least partly a matter of trusting legitimate experts). In the middle part of the book, he peers through these two lenses at the tired realist scarecrow of the no-miracles argument. He attempts to reanimate this weatherworn realist (...) argument, contra suggestions by people like me that it should be abandoned. In this paper, I want to get clear on Barnes’ contribution to the debate. He focuses on what he calls the miraculous endorsement argument, which explains not the success of a specific theory but instead the history of successes for an entire research program. The history of successes is explained by reliable and improving methods, which are the flipside of approximately true background theories. Yet, as Barnes notes, the whole story must begin with methods that are at least minimally reliable. Barnes demands that the realist explain the origin of the minimally reliable take-off point, and he suggests a way that the realist might do so. I contend that his explanation still relies on contingent developments and so fails to completely explain the development of take-off theories. However, this line of argument digs into familiar details of the no-miracles argument and overlooks what’s new in Barnes’ approach. By calling attention to pluralism, he reminds us that we need an account of scientific expertise. This is important, I suggest, because expertise is not indefinite. We do not trust specific experts for everything, but only for things within the bounds of their expertise. Drawing these boundaries relies on our own background theories and is only likely to be reliable if our background theories are approximately true. I argue, then, that pluralism gives us reason to be realists (about some things). (shrink)

According to the author, the dichotomy between the primordialist and the instrumentalist approach to the problem od ethnicity is similar to the classical philoso_phical dichotomy of rationalism versus empiricism. Kant's solution - differentiating between the form and the content of ideas - might be animating for us in overcoming the dichotomy between primordialism and instrumentalism. In a new model of ethnicity the ethnicity is to be analogically divided into its form, i. e. the inner universal emotional structure of our mind, (...) on one hand, and its contingent content, acquired from outside in the process of socialization a enculturation on the other hand. This model is based on Tajfel's theory of the minimal group and on Lorenz's conception of imprinting. (shrink)

I argue that legitimacy discourses serve a gatekeeping function. They give practitioners telic standards for riding herd on social practices, ensuring that minimally acceptable versions of the practice are implemented. Such a function is a necessary part of implementing formalized social practices, especially including law. This gatekeeping account shows that political philosophers have misunderstood legitimacy; it is not secondary to justice and only necessary because we cannot agree about justice. Instead, it is a necessary feature of actual human social practices, (...) which must be implemented via practitioners' discretion in changing contexts. (shrink)

The education of students and professionals in business ethics is an increasingly important goal on the agenda of business schools and corporations. The present study provides a meta-analysis of 25 previously conducted business ethics instructional programs. The role of criteria, study design, participant characteristics, quality of instruction, instructional content, instructional program characteristics, and characteristics of instructional methods as moderators of the effectiveness of business ethics instruction were examined. Overall, results indicate that business ethics instructional programs have a minimal␣impact on increasing (...) outcomes related to ethical perceptions, behavior, or awareness. However, specific criteria, content, and methodological moderators of effectiveness shed light on potential recommendations for␣improving business ethics instruction. Implications for␣future research and practice in business ethics are discussed. (shrink)

One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal (...) fashion to assimilate exactly the new information. In this form of belief change, when the reasoner revises by new information p ∨ q their belief corpus is modified so that p∨q is believed but stronger propositions like p∧q are not, no matter what beliefs are in the reasoner's initial corpus. We term this conservative belief change since the revised belief corpus is a conservative extension of the original belief corpus given the new information. (shrink)

This paper presents a minimal formulation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, by which is meant a formulation which describes the theory in a succinct, self-contained, clear, unambiguous and of course correct manner. The bulk of the presentation is the so-called “microscopic theory”, applicable to any closed system S of arbitrary size N, using concepts referring to S alone, without resort to external apparatus or external agents. An example of a similar minimal microscopic theory is the standard formulation of classical mechanics, which (...) serves as the template for a minimal quantum theory. The only substantive assumption required is the replacement of the classical Euclidean phase space by Hilbert space in the quantum case, with the attendant all-important phenomenon of quantum incompatibility. Two fundamental theorems of Hilbert space, the Kochen–Specker–Bell theorem and Gleason’s theorem, then lead inevitably to the well-known Born probability rule. For both classical and quantum mechanics, questions of physical implementation and experimental verification of the predictions of the theories are the domain of the macroscopic theory, which is argued to be a special case or application of the more general microscopic theory. (shrink)

Even though integrity is widely considered to be an essential aspect of research, there is an ongoing debate on what actually constitutes research integrity. The understanding of integrity ranges from the minimal, only considering falsification, fabrication and plagiarism, to the maximum, blending into science ethics. Underneath these obvious contrasts, there are more subtle differences that are not as immediately evident. The debate about integrity is usually presented as a single, universal discussion, with shared concerns for researchers, policymakers and ‘the public’. (...) In this article, we show that it is not. There are substantial differences between the language of research integrity in the scientific arena and in the public domain. Notably, scientists and policymakers adopt different approaches to research integrity. Scientists tend to present integrity as a virtue that must be kindled, while policy documents and newspapers stress norm enforcement. Rather than performing a conceptual analysis through philosophical reasoning and discussion, we aimed to clarify the discourse of ‘scientific integrity’ by studying its usage in written documents. To this end, large numbers of scientific publications, policy documents and newspaper articles were analysed by means of scientometric and content analysis techniques. The texts were analysed on their usage of the term ‘integrity’ and of frequently co-occurring terms and concepts. A comparison was made between the usage in the various media, as well as between different periods in which they were published through co-word analysis, mapping co-occurrence networks of significant terms and themes. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the power and limitations of computing effectively generic sequences using effectively random oracles. Previously, it was known that every 2-random sequence computes a 1-generic sequence and every 2-random sequence forms a minimal pair in the Turing degrees with every 2-generic sequence. We strengthen these results by showing that every Demuth random sequence computes a 1-generic sequence and that every Demuth random sequence forms a minimal pair with every pb-generic sequence. Moreover, we prove that for every (...) comeager${\cal G} \subseteq {2^\omega }$, there is some weakly 2-random sequenceXthat computes some$Y \in {\cal G}$, a result that allows us to provide a fairly complete classification as to how various notions of effective randomness interact in the Turing degrees with various notions of effective genericity. (shrink)

In this paper we show that the prime ideal space of an MV-algebra is the disjoint union of prime ideal spaces of suitable local MV-algebras. Some special classes of algebras are defined and their spaces are investigated. The space of minimal prime ideals is studied as well.

Michael Williams has frequently considered and rejected approaches to "our knowledge of the external world" that see it as the best explanation for certain features of experience. This paper examines the salience of his position to approaches such as Mackie’s that do not deny the presentational directness of ordinary experience but do permit a gap between how things appear and how they are that allows for sceptical doubts. Williams’ main argument is that, to do justice to its place in a (...) foundationalist strategy, the external world as hypothesis must offer an explicandum that does not invoke concepts of objects but is rather purely experiential. He next claims that no coherent regularities are available at such a level so there is nothing to be explained. Coherence only comes with objects, not as something objects could explain. Confronting this with Mackie’s Lockean theory of perception, we find that Mackie decisively rejects the first claim about the nature of the explicandum, since he sees ordinary perception as involving intentional objects which are distinct from the persisting objects they present. He is also committed to rejecting Williams’ line on purely experiential regularities, though this plays a subordinate role in his general position. The crucial issue then becomes the tenability of Mackie’s intentional object analysis and the extent to which it might yet tilt the argument in favour of realism against a global sceptic. In formulating his own epistemological strategies Williams might appear to countenance a version of Mackie’s view divorced from foundationalism. But while Williams’ contextualism in its minimal version might do so, in practice it retains the lessons derived from his skirmishes with scepticism and thus disallows certain types of enquiry. I conclude by contrasting Mackie’s response to scepticism with that of Williams in his diagnostic vein. (shrink)

I provide a novel argument in favour of majority rule. In particular, I consider the distribution of voter satisfaction in response to the outcome of a vote and prove that under certain conditions majority rule minimizes the level of inequality present in the distribution of voter satisfaction. This finding is reinforced by a computer simulation as well as an analysis of over four decades of polling data. Results complement existing procedural justifications of majority rule, demonstrating that majority rule ensures equality (...) at the level of both procedure and outcome. (shrink)

The deliberative ethics guidelines elaborated and implemented by members of the IFOM-IEO Campus (Firc Institute of Molecular Oncology (IFOM) and the European Institute of Oncology (IEO)). These should serve the dual purpose of establishing a minimal set of standard rules for bioethical debate and any ensuing decision-making process, especially for the perspective of providing real instruments to foster public engagement and public awareness on the ethical issues involved in biomedical research. It is shown that these guidelines instantiate the scheme of (...) one of the correct ways of debating formalised by the western thought. (shrink)

In ‘belief revision’ a theory\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document} is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}\ast\varphi$$\end{document}. Typically, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\neg\varphi$$\end{document} is in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document}, one has to give up belief in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\neg\varphi$$\end{document} by a process (...) of retraction, and φ is in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}\ast\varphi$$\end{document}. We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document} wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$B\neg\varphi$$\end{document} is true. The revision with φ is a program *φ that transforms this information state into a new information state. The transformation is described by a dynamic modal operator [*φ], that is interpreted as a binary relation [ [*φ] ] between information states. The next information state is computed from the current information state and the belief revision formula. If the revision is successful, the agent believes φ in the resulting state, i.e., Bφ is then true. To make this work, as information states we propose ‘doxastic epistemic models’ that represent both knowledge and degrees of belief. These are multi-modal and multi-agent Kripke models. They are constructed from preference relations for agents, and they satisfy various characterizable multi-agent frame properties. Iterated, revocable, and higher-order belief revision are all quite natural in this setting. We present, for an example, five different ways of such dynamic belief revision. One can also see that as a non-deterministic epistemic action with two alternatives, where one is preferred over the other, and there is a natural generalization to general epistemic actions with preferences. (shrink)

James P. Sterba offers something that philosophers have long sought: an argument showing that morality is rationally required. Furthermore he argues that morality requires substantial equality. Even libertarian perspectives, which would seem to require minimal enforcement of morality, are shown to lead to a requirement of equality.

NATURALLY. DEVELOPED. THOUGHT. Figure i these two construcrs to define a sprctrum of modes of thought, ranging ftom analytical (inrensive checking and nattow focus) to intuitive (minimal checking and btoad focus). He develops the ...

The target article “Thinking Through Other Minds” (TTOM) offered an account of the distinctively human capacity to acquire cultural knowledge, norms, and practices. To this end, we leveraged recent ideas from theoretical neurobiology to understand the human mind in social and cultural contexts. Our aim was bothsynthetic– building an integrative model adequate to account for key features of cultural learning and adaptation; andprescriptive– showing how the tools developed to explain brain dynamics can be applied to the emergence of social and (...) cultural ecologies of mind. In this reply to commentators, we address key issues, including: (1) refining the concept of culture to show how TTOM and the free-energy principle (FEP) can capture essential elements of human adaptation and functioning; (2) addressing cognition as an embodied, enactive, affective process involving cultural affordances; (3) clarifying the significance of the FEP formalism related to entropy minimization, Bayesian inference, Markov blankets, and enactivist views; (4) developing empirical tests and applications of the TTOM model; (5) incorporating cultural diversity and context at the level of intra-cultural variation, individual differences, and the transition to digital niches; and (6) considering some implications for psychiatry. The commentators’ critiques and suggestions point to useful refinements and applications of the model. In ongoing collaborations, we are exploring how to augment the theory with affective valence, take into account individual differences and historicity, and apply the model to specific domains including epistemic bias. (shrink)

Two logics L1 and L2 are negatively equivalent if for any set of formulas X and any negated formula ¬, ¬ can be deduced from the set of hypotheses X in L1 if and only if it can be done in L2. This article is devoted to the investigation of negative equivalence relation in the class of extensions of minimal logic.