In this paper I will argue that an epistemology of ignorance is a denial of relationality. Knowing is a series of practices. So is ignoring. And as practices, they are strategic. I have argued that knowing is a practice, of engagement or disengagement ("Practices of Knowing"), so is ignoring (Frye, Mills). I have argued that we need to recognize rationalities not countenanced in the dominant logic ("Resisting Rationality). And I have argued for disrupting the conceptual coercion of the dominant logic (...) as well as for uncertainty as a way of emerging from the form of life enacted through the mystification of dominant discourse ("Moving Toward Uncertainty"). In this paper I want to take up the question of relationality. From postions of power and the logic of oppression, an epistemology hides engagement and as a result erases contestation and resistance. From positions of marginalization and the logic of resistance, it resists coercive consensus. In both cases there is a denial of a certain kind of relationality. (shrink)

Nursing Ethics has published several pleas for care ethics and/or relationality as the most promising ethical foundation for midwifery philosophy and practice. In this article, we stand by these calls, contributing to them with the identification of the structural form of violence that a care ethical relational approach to reproductive care is up against: that of “maternal separation”. Confronted with reproductive and obstetric violence globally, we show that a hegemonic racialized, instrumentalized, and individualized conception of pregnancy is responsible for a (...) severance of relationalities that are essential to safe reproductive care: (1) the relation between the person and their child or reproductive capabilities; and (2) the relation between the pregnant person and their community of care. We pinpoint a separation of the maternal relation in at least two discursive domains, namely, the juridical-political and the ethical-existential. Consequently, we plea for a radical re-imagination of maternal relationality, envisioning what care ethical midwifery, including abortion care, could be. (shrink)

What is the core of pedagogical practice? Which qualities are primary to the student–teacher relationship? What is a suitable language for pedagogical practice? What might be the significance of an everyday presentational pedagogical act like for example the glance of a teacher? The pedagogical relation as lived relationality experientially sensed, as well as phenomenologically described and interpreted, precedes educational methods and theories and profoundly challenges educational practice and reflection. The paper highlights the aporetic character of pedagogical practice, reflection and research (...) by suggesting that the pedagogical relation opens up for a practice that is ethically and existentially normative rather than developmentally and socially normative, and thus fundamentally shifts the meaning of education. (shrink)

This article searches for a way of theorizing the interconnectedness of processes of individuation, relationality and affect, with the aim of clearing the ground for an approach that establishes the basis of this interconnectedness by reference to mechanisms common to all living things. It establishes a number of shifts that enable us to think the categories and concepts like the individual, the subject, the group, the threshold, relationality, co-implication and so on according to a fundamental decentring, finally breaking with both (...) subject-centredness and its privilege of the individual as model or starting point; the same epistemological shift implies the rejection of the anthropocentric divide between humans and animals, while avoiding species of sociobiologism, pre-formationism, geneticism and other monocausal paradigms. What the new problematic of life enjoins us to rethink are the standpoint of singularity rather than that of the individual, coupled to the standpoint of relationality as a principle enabling us to think the self—other, human—animal, nature—culture and human—world in terms of compossibility and complex becoming. This view about the co-constitution of all life has major implications regarding responsibility for the other and responsibility for the world, grounded in the standpoint of the temporality and historicity of being as existential condition circumscribing the relation to the other. This shift at the level of ontology is explored via an engagement with the work of Simondon and his conceptual apparatus, particularly ideas of psychic and collective individuation, the pre-and transindividual, the associated milieu; this perspective is re-articulated by way of the work of Merleau-Ponty, Haraway’s notion of ‘companion species’, Ettinger’s concept of the ‘I—other plurality’, and cognate concepts that point to a new terrain for theorizing affect. (shrink)

At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence against what at face value looks correct, we are justified to consider intentionality as a relational notion.

This essay critiques feminist treatments of maternal-fetal "relationality" that unwittingly replicate features of Western individualism (for example, the Cartesian division between the asocial body and the social-cognitive person, or the conflation of social and biological birth). I argue for a more reflexive perspective on relationality that would acknowledge how we produce persons through our actions and rhetoric. Personhood and relationality can be better analyzed as dynamic, negotiated qualities realized through social practice.

At every level, the study of organic life underlies the relational nature of its subject. Whether one looks at an organism as a whole and its relationship to its environment or other members of its species, or at the component parts of the organism at an organ system, cellular or even molecular level, there is an externally referential and thus relational nature to lived beings. There is perhaps no place as fruitful to illustrate this relationality than the field of immunology. (...) This paper argues that close attention to the phenomenon of relationality that is evidenced by natural scientific research provides an important occasion to demonstrate the wide-ranging validity of the sort of relational ontology defended by the tradition of phenomenological personalism. Such intersections as one discerns in interdisciplinary engagement between personalist phenomenology and immunology, moreover, can provide a basis for further clarification of the relation of person to the world of nature and vice versa in ways that call into question the dominance of reductive philosophies of nature. (shrink)

This article discusses the tension between social relationality and self-relationality central to Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein and the possible ways of reconciling this tension. Arguing that this is a tension between communicability and existential commitments, the article poses the question: How are existential commitments responsive to communication? After problematizing the quasi-Kantian and communitarian ways of settling the tension, the article uses Heidegger’s early reading of Aristotle to develop a third hermeneutic model of ethical relationality according to which existential commitments are (...) shareable in communication, since ethos – the existential posture towards the good – arises out of pathos that exposes Dasein to coexistence. The account of ethical relationality found in Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle thus takes the world to be a shared and dynamic ontological condition and emphasize that the world constitutes selfhood in a way that is constantly at stake in ethical communication. (shrink)

The proliferation of work by autistic writers continues apace, defying a long and multidisciplinary tradition of constructing autistic people as lacking the capacity for narration. To study neurodivergent literature, then, is to witness the refusal of these exclusionary narrative conventions, and to register the ideological presuppositions that underpin pathologization. In this article, I engage with recent insights from Neurodiversity Studies (especially the work of Justine Egner, Erin Manning, Julia Miele Rodas, Nick Walker, and Remi Yergeau) to explore the connections between (...) narrative neuronormativity and other discourses of oppression, especially those that have generated racialized, gendered, and colonial narratives of desubjectification. Focusing on the neuroqueer movement – an emergent practice of disidentification that refuses the interpellations of neuronormativity, ableism, heteronormativity, and cisnormativity – I discuss the concept of allism, arguing that this satirical critique of pathologization harbors a deconstructive force that denaturalizes the dialectic of recognition. Neuroqueer work on allism reveals this dialectic to be the hegemonic form of relationality that marks neurodivergence as asocial and intersubjectively non-reciprocal in order to secure a non- autistic identity. The dialectic of recognition thus instrumentalizes neurodivergence to confer normalcy and neutrality upon subjects that meet its criteria. Pursuing the discursive context and theoretical implications of this critique, I provide a short genealogy of narrative neuronormativity, connecting the operation of the dialectic in the early novel to the clinical texts of child psychology. To demonstrate the neuroqueer subversion of this tradition, I then read An Unkindness of Ghosts, by Rivers Solomon, a text that stages a disidentification with storytelling. Aster, the novel’s protagonist, is neurodivergent as well as Black, enslaved, and gender non-conforming. As she struggles against an authoritarian regime, Aster also declines to comply with the rules that would allow her to narrate her own story. Aster’s neuroqueer refusal reveals a similarity between the construction of Blackness as an ontological foil for whiteness, and the construction of autism as a standard of disordered sociality that neuronorms can be measured against. In both cases, the colonizing term articulates its supremacy via a comparison with that which it denigrates, while disavowing this dependence at all costs, dependency being inimical to free subjectivity in the liberal humanism that has shaped these procedures. My reading of Unkindness suggests that the extant techniques of literary narratorship are political instruments that, unless repurposed, will continue to disseminate these dispossessive dialectics. (shrink)

The contemporary industrialized global food system has sustained an onslaught of criticism from diverse parties—academic and popular, scientists and social justice advocates, activists and intellectuals—criticism that has only intensified in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Feminist voices have made substantial contributions to these critiques, calling attention to the cultural politics of food and health ; to the impact of the corporatization of agriculture on food quality, the environment, and the people of the Global South, especially women ; and (...) to the complicated relationship among cooking, eating, and gender, including how food.. (shrink)

In this chapter I systematically distinguish a variety of ways to relationalize economics, and focus on a certain approach to relationalizing normative economics in the light of communal values salient in the African philosophical tradition. I start by distinguishing four major ways to relationalize empirical economics, viz., in terms of its ontologies, methods, explanations, and predictions, and also three major ways to relationalize normative economics, in regards to means taken towards ends, decision-procedures used to specify ends, and ends themselves. Then, (...) in the rest of the chapter I address what would be involved in relationalizing the ends of economic choices, given certain ideals of communal relationship characteristically prized by sub-Saharan philosophers, particularly southern African adherents to ubuntu. I advance communal answers to the two large questions of what an economy should distribute and how to engage with stakeholders, and suggest that the implications will be found plausible by many open-minded enquirers around the world. Although this chapter is a work of ethical philosophy, it is meant to be of broad interest to scholars in economics. (shrink)

This first book-length study into the influence of Emmanuel Levinas on the thought and philosophy of Giorgio Agamben, Law, Relationality and the Ethical Life demonstrates how Agamben's immanent thought can be read as presenting a compelling, albeit flawed, alternative to Levinas's ethics of the Other. The publication of the English translation of The Use of Bodies in 2016 ended Giorgio Agamben's 20-year multi-volume Homo Sacer study. Over this time, Agamben's thought has greatly influenced scholarship in law, the wider humanities, and (...) social sciences. This book places Agamben's figure of form-of-life in relation to Levinasian understandings of alterity, relationality, and the law. Considering how Agamben and Levinas craft their respective forms of embodied existence - that is, a fully formed human which can live an ethical life - the book considers Agamben's attempt to move beyond Levinasian ethics through the liminal figures of the foetus and the patient in a persistent vegetative state. These figures, which Agamben uses as examples of bare life, call into question the limits of Agamben's non-relational use and form of existence. As such, it is argued, they reveal the limitations of Agamben's own ethics, whilst suggesting that his 'abandoned' project can and must be taken further. This book will be of interest to scholars, researchers, graduate students and anyone with an interest in the thought of Giorgio Agamben and Emmanuel Levinas in the fields of law, philosophy, the humanities and the social sciences. (shrink)

This study deals with the concept of relationality, which has become one of the central themes of contemporary theological literature. The value of the concept in terms of philosophy of religion and related disciplines such as ecotheology and comparative theology is questioned within the framework of Jürgen Moltmann’s ecotheological anthropology. This study claims that the applications of relationality in theology have the potential to make significant contributions to the enrichment and deepening of the perspectives of the philosophy of religion and (...) related disciplines and that especially philosophy of religion can make conceptual and methodological contributions to relational theology. Relationality, in general, is the approach that puts the claim that everything exists in relation to everything else at the centre and is widely applied in many disciplines such as psychology, sociology, ecology, political science, education, philosophy, and theology. Relationality, which has become one of the most current issues in contemporary philosophy and metaphysics, is a method widely used in contemporary theology, especially in Christian theology, to define different dimensions of the relationship between God, the human being, and nature. Relationality in theology is a theological approach that emphasizes the importance of relationships and interdependence in understanding the nature of God, the world, and human beings. Moltmann, one of the most influential names in contemporary Christian theology, presents his theological anthropological views around the Biblical verses expressing that the human being was created in the image of God, as an alternative to traditional anthropology, on the basis of the theological dimensions of the ecological crisis and through a relational approach. In this respect, Molt-mann's anthropology is a remarkable option in dealing with the relational approach in theology with the current dimensions of the concept and within the framework of different philosophical and theological disciplines. In the context of this background, the study consists of four parts. In the first chapter, an introduction to the relational approach in theology is made to clarify the conceptual framework of the study. The function and role of relationality as an approach in contemporary theological anthropology are discussed in the second part, which presents the claim that the discussions on the current ecological crisis cause changes in the scope and focus of contemporary theological anthropological studies. This section is followed by an examination of Moltmann’s relational anthropology with reference to his approach to the doctrine of imago Dei. In the fourth and last part, in the context of Moltmann’s arguments and also beyond them, the problems that may occur as a result of the application of relationality in theology in terms of the aforementioned contemporary theological disciplines, especially the philosophy of religion, and its possible contributions to those fields are evaluated. (shrink)

We explore contested meanings around care and relationality through the under-explored case of caring after death, throwing the relational significance of ‘bodies’ into sharp relief. While the dominant social imaginary and forms of knowledge production in many affluent western societies take death to signify an absolute loss of the other in the demise of their physical body, important implications follow from recognising that embodied relational experience can continue after death. Drawing on a model of embodied relational care encompassing a ‘me’, (...) a ‘you’ and an ‘us’, we argue that after death ‘me’ and ‘us’ remain (though changed) while crucial dimensions of ‘you’ persist too. In unravelling the binary divide between living and dead bodies, other related dichotomies of mind/body, self/other, internal/external, and nature/social are also called into question, extending debates concerning relationality and openness between living bodies. Through an exploration of autobiographical accounts and empirical research, we argue that embodied relationality expresses how connectedness is lived out after death in material practices and felt experiences. (shrink)

This article interrogates the challenge artificial general intelligence (AGI) poses to religion and human societies, in general. More specifically, it seeks to respond to “Singularity”—when machines reach a level of intelligence that would put into question the privileged position humanity enjoys as imago Dei . Employing the Bemba notion of mystico‐relationality in dialogue with the concepts of the “created co‐creator” and Christ the Key, it argues for the possibility of AI participating in imago Dei . The findings show that imaging (...) is a fluid, participatory activity that aims at likeness, but also social harmony. It also argues that God is the only original creator, humans are created creators, and that every aspect of visible existence, including AI, is inherently divine imaging. However, strong imaging is only attainable based on the only One and True Image—Christ, whose union of the material and the divine means that all creation can image, excluding nothing, even AI. (shrink)

This article considers the conceptual significance of relationality in Sappho. It argues that Sappho's poetry reconstitutes systems of relation by making evident exceptions to their explanatory capacity. These exceptions can be profitably understood through the rubric of the “event.” Drawing in particular on the relational function of prepositions and Alain Badiou's philosophical work on the event, the article examines how “thinking prepositionally” alongside Sappho reveals both the relations that make up the situational world of her poetry as well as those (...) evental moments of non-relation through which that world is impossibly transformed. The article concludes with considerations of Sapphic fidelity—that is, how Sappho's poetry realizes the transformative potential of the event—and the poet's articulation of the event through figures of preeminence and comparison. (shrink)

I identify my priority in teaching Christian ethics as fostering relationality, both in individual and collective contexts. I argue that focusing on the idea of relationality enables us to explore connections that exist or should exist between individuals and groups. For me, fostering relationality involves building an intellectual understanding of moral relationality and embodying this understanding in practical situations. In order to contain the theme of this study, I focus on a specific aspect of relationality, namely the idea of attunement. (...) I propose attentive listening, openness to innovation and fostering the spirit of tranquillity as key components of the ethics of attunement. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 33, Issue 3, Page 535-546, July 2024.

Some reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational theories of morality.

Just as Michael Porter's five forces provided a practical analytical tool for describing the forces that shape competitive strategy, so business ethicists ought to provide business leaders with a workable framework for understanding the sources of ethical obligations. The forces that shape competitive strategy vary according to time and industry, but are anchored in an ultimate criteria of profitability. Similarily, ethics can use a set of analytical categories that identify the relevant forces to business ethics on the basis of (...) class='Hi'>relationality.This paper first argues that relationality based on naturalism is the primary, plausible value for ethics. Second, it adapts a tripartite dialectic from scholars William Frederick and Michael Novak to describe the relational categories with which business must contend. Third, it uses these forces in a way similar to Porter's competitive forces to offer an analytical language familiar to managers in order to characterize business ethics. (shrink)

A vision of law and justice that is rooted in relationality stands at the heart of this paper. To tribal people, such as the Lakota and Dakota, what sustains the lives of people are bonds of kinship relations that bind human and nonhuman life together with a sense of mutual responsibility and caring that is most aptly captured by the Lakota phrase Mitakuye Oysain, "all are relatives." What are important to tribal communities are collective rights and obligations as embodied in (...) Indian law and justice. Indian societies, thereby, have established their own tribal courts and legal systems that are markedly different from mainstream society. Indian people, it is argued, have much to teach about the limitations of the dominant legal culture and ways in which relationality serves a far better basis for law and justice than an adversarial system that demands winners and losers. (shrink)

This paper develops a political ontology of relationality that can account for the dramatic impact that photographs of the plight of others can have on the course of the political. The aim...

Giorgio Agamben’s development of a messianic politics-to-come seeks to counter the law which is in force without significance, a law which creates bare life. Embodying this messianic politics, and a call for the law’s fulfilment, is the figure of whatever-being, a form-of-life. This article contends that there is an important conceptual problem in respect of Agamben’s construction of such a form-of-life, namely the issue of relationality. The problem of relationality in Agamben is explored here through the comparative lens of relationality (...) in Levinas’s thought. It is contended that Agamben’s messianic subject, his form-of-life, has a negative relation to its other, in contrast to Levinas’s positive, subject forming view of relationality. (shrink)

Setting the stage -- Relationality in contemporary theology -- Separateness in classical physics -- Entanglement in quantum physics -- Philosophical perspectives -- Entanglement, theologically speaking.

My main argument will be that Plotinus’ notion of The One is best understood as “pure relation”. I will argue that Aristotle’s understanding of relation as being determined by relata has been the dominant understanding and that this is wrong-headed, that relata are actually determined by relationality. Thus, relation is actually ontologically prior to the relata. This entails that the First Principle of Being is pure relation.

K. Lüscher, M. Sánchez, A. Klimczuk, Generations, intergenerational relationships, generational policy: A multilingual compendium, 12 languages, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 2016, 300pp.

While care ethics has frequently been criticized for lacking an account of autonomy, this paper argues that care ethics' relational model of moral agency provides the basis for criticizing the philosophical tradition's model of autonomy and for rethinking autonomy in relational terms. Using Diana Meyers's account of autonomy competency as a basis, a dialogical model of autonomy is developed that can respond to internal and external critiques of care ethics.

This paper examines the Japanese notion of relationality, that is, the idea that the individual is defined primarily within a web of relationships. Furthermore, it proposes that this relationality provides an ontological basis for morality, particularly the critical need for achieving consensus. This need for consensus is evident in the dispute over brain death. It was also conspicuous in the long-standing debate regarding heart transplantation. By reviewing key features of relationality, the study also demonstrates that the Japanese approach toward consensus (...) reflects certain cultural values such as the importance of nemawashi. This inquiry thereby evokes the brain death and heart transplantation controversy in order to illustrate the critical need for consensus in the decision-making process. (shrink)

Recent studies have investigated connections between Adam Smith’s economic and philosophical ideas and Catholic Social Teaching (CST). Scholars argue that their common background lies in their respective anthropologies, both endorsing a relational view of human beings. I raise one main concern regarding these analyses. I suggest that the relationality endorsed by Smith lacks a central element present in CST—the other-oriented perspective which is the intentional concern for promoting the good of others. Some key elements of CST, such as love, gift, (...) gratuitousness, and fraternity, find a very different space in Smith’s social view and very little space in his economic view. Moreover, I show how CST relationality is more in accordance with a civil economy view of the market as a place of fraternity and mutual assistance. (shrink)

For over 40 years, Mary Midgley has been celebrated for the sensibility with which she approached some of the most challenging and pressing issues in philosophy. Her expansive corpus addresses such diverse topics as human nature, morality, animals and the environment, gender, science, and religion. While there are many threads that tie together this impressive plurality of topics, the thread of relationality unites much of Midgley's thought on human nature and morality. This paper explores Midgley's pursuit of a relational notion (...) of the self and our connections to others, including animals and the natural world. (shrink)

Some well-known metaphysical arguments against relativism rest on the claim that relativity somehow must be accompanied by relationality. I argue otherwise, and trace the consequences for some prominent disputes between relativists and absolutists.

In this article I examine what happens to the “I” when the other disappears. I elucidate the relationship between ontic – relational ties to specific others – and ontological relationality – the fundamental relationality that facilitates the very existence of the “I.” The loss of an ontic relationality, I contend, ensures that the “I” can never be the same as it was prior to the loss. But the disappearance of an ontic relationality also accentuates that the “I” cannot disavow its (...) ontological relationality, despite the pain and suffering brought about by the loss of a specific other. I argue that exposure to this ontological relationality, through the deprivation of an ontic one, offers us the opportunity to re-think habituated and potentially damaging forms of relationality, particularly in an age when neoliberal rationality encourages us to turn away from the other and to seek shelter in the self. To explicate the chiastic relationship between ontic and ontological relationality, I draw on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the “hinge,” Judith Butler’s work on grief and mourning, and Emmanuel Levinas’s notion of the “face.” By looking specifically at remembrance campaigns for victims of forced disappearance – particularly in Guatemala and Argentina – I show how faces of the disappeared continue to haunt the political present in ways that refuse the fantasy of a return to a former order. In doing so, these campaigns keep exposing us to the ontological relationality that underpins all human life, encouraging us to find new ways of relating that transcend our habituated and repetitive relational behaviours. This exposure, I argue, illustrates that no amount of self-sufficiency allows us to escape the ontological necessity of relationality. The disappearance of the other, any other, discloses the fraudulent anti-relationality of the neoliberal era by revealing the ties that connect beings together. This disclosure, I conclude, constitutes the importance of the relationality of disappearance. -/- . (shrink)

In this article I examine what happens to the “I” when the other disappears. I elucidate the relationship between ontic – relational ties to specific others – and ontological relationality – the fundamental relationality that facilitates the very existence of the “I.” The loss of an ontic relationality, I contend, ensures that the “I” can never be the same as it was prior to the loss. But the disappearance of an ontic relationality also accentuates that the “I” cannot disavow its (...) ontological relationality, despite the pain and suffering brought about by the loss of a specific other. I argue that exposure to this ontological relationality, through the deprivation of an ontic one, offers us the opportunity to re-think habituated and potentially damaging forms of relationality, particularly in an age when neoliberal rationality encourages us to turn away from the other and to seek shelter in the self. To explicate the chiastic relationship between ontic and ontological relationality, I draw on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the “hinge,” Judith Butler’s work on grief and mourning, and Emmanuel Levinas’s notion of the “face.” By looking specifically at remembrance campaigns for victims of forced disappearance – particularly in Guatemala and Argentina – I show how faces of the disappeared continue to haunt the political present in ways that refuse the fantasy of a return to a former order. In doing so, these campaigns keep exposing us to the ontological relationality that underpins all human life, encouraging us to find new ways of relating that transcend our habituated and repetitive relational behaviours. This exposure, I argue, illustrates that no amount of self-sufficiency allows us to escape the ontological necessity of relationality. The disappearance of the other, any other, discloses the fraudulent anti-relationality of the neoliberal era by revealing the ties that connect beings together. This disclosure, I conclude, constitutes the importance of the relationality of disappearance. (shrink)

The “relational turn” in social research raises many issues that might loosely be collected together under the heading of “reflexivity.” This can have a variety of meanings, but here, follo...

This article uses the perichoretic nature of the Trinity to evaluate the reliance on anointed objects as instruments of connecting with God amongst African neo-Pentecostal Christians. The article answers the question: from a perspective of the relationality of God, how can we evaluate the African neo-Pentecostal reliance on anointed objects to connect with God? The aim is to show that the perichoretic nature of the Trinity demands that a direct relationship with the Godhead be possible without the intermediary and impersonalising (...) use of anointed objects. The use of anointed objects to connect with God impersonalises him and undermines his relationality, as depicted in his perichoretic triune nature. The significance of the article lies in calling for African neo-Pentecostals to inform their quest for an intimate connection with God by a critical understanding of his perichoretic trinitarian communal ontology. (shrink)

The material anthropological proposals of Wolfhart Pannenberg are best interpreted in light of the methodological reciprocity that lies across and holds together his treatments of theology and science. In the context of a response to a recent book on Pannenberg by Jacqui Stewart, this article outlines a new interpretation of his theological engagement with the human sciences. I provide a model of the relationality that links these disciplines in Pannenberg's work and commend its general contours as a resource for the (...) ongoing reconstruction of the interdisciplinary dialogue vis‐à‐vis the concerns of late modernity. (shrink)

This article probes the philosophical and political significance of the relationships between wheelchair activists and their wheelchairs. Analyzing disability memoirs and the work of a professional wheelchair dancer, I argue that wheelers frequently experience complex relationality and queer kinships with their wheels. By bringing the artistry of disabled writers and dancers into conversation with the notions of human–material relations in the work of Donna Haraway, Jane Bennett, Stacy Alaimo, and Mel Chen, I show how alternative animacies shape wheelers’ conceptions of (...) interdependence and movement. The sensuous pleasure they take in their wheels queers conventional conceptions of how humans should relate to things. New materialist philosophy has increasingly drawn attention to the porous boundaries between the human and material world. But where posthumanist philosophers have largely aimed to dethrone the sovereignty of the human, disability activists use alternative animacies to raise up a devalued and discounted portion of humanity: to emphasize the agency and capacity of those whose lives are often cast as pitiable and powerless, to express a queer feminist disability culture and politics, and to claim the transgressive vitality and vibrant artistry of life with disability. (shrink)

Building a coherent discourse on professionalism is a challenge for corporate social responsibility practitioners, as there is not yet an established knowledge basis for CSR, and CSR is a contested notion that covers a wide variety of issues and moral foundations. Relying on insights from the literature on micro-CSR, new professionalism, and Boltanski and Thévenot’s economies of worth framework, we examine the discourses of 56 CSR practitioners in South Korea on their claimed professionalism. Our analysis delineates four distinct discourses of (...) CSR professionalism—strategic corporate giving, social innovation, risk management, and sustainability transition—that are derived from a plurality of more or less compatible moral foundations whose partial overlaps and tensions we document in a systematic manner. Our results portray these practitioners as compromise makers who selectively combine morally distant justifications to build their own specific professionalism discourse, with the aim to advance CSR within and across organizations. By uncovering the moral relationality connecting these discourses, our findings show that moral pluralism is a double-edged sword that can not only bolster the justification of CSR professionalism but also threaten collective professionalism at the field level. Overall, our study suggests paying more attention to the moral relationality and tensions that underlie professional fields. (shrink)

In this essay, I analyze pregnancy loss from a feminist phenomenological perspective. I draw upon relational accounts of personhood wherein a person's status and identity are formed through a lived history and the activity of “calling into personhood” a being a woman may seek to know or become. I draw upon the work of Simone de Beauvoir, who advances a feminist phenomenology that grounds the status and identity of women within embodied situations. Her important work sheds light on the varied (...) perceptions and processes that inform experiences of pregnancy and pregnancy loss. (shrink)

For more than four decades, George Atwood and I have been absorbed in rethinking psychoanalysis as a form of phenomenological inquiry. In the course of this work, I repeatedly made the claim that phenomenology led us inexorably to relationality, but until now I did not offer an explanation of this inexorability. In this article, I show that emotional phenomenology and relationality always already form an indissoluble unity, because relationality is constitutive of emotional experience.

Insufficient attention has been paid to the ways in which Newtonian conceptualizations of time encourage the view in contemporary psychology that only efficient causal explanations are viable, explanations that ultimately render meaningful, purposive, morally rich human actions and relationships illusory. In short, psychology’s pervasive adoption of Newtonian assumptions about time and causation renders the discipline incapable of understanding human behavior, its primary focus of study, in any but fundamentally inhuman ways. This paper aims (1) to provide a critique of the (...) Newtonian conception of time and its commitment to efficient causality, particularly as commonly present in contemporary psychological theory and practice, and (2) to examine the phenomenological account of time provided in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Specifically, we will explore some of the ways in which Levinas’ account of time as fundamentally intersubjective provides an alternative conceptual grounding for understanding the therapeutic relationship as one of infinite ethical responsibility. (shrink)

This article argues that the concept of personhood is intrinsically relational and that a relational understanding of created personhood can be derived from divine personhood and understood systematically in relation to itself, the pre-personal world and to other persons. Insofar as this set of three relationships is understood to be dislocated by sinful self-enclosedness in the penultimate reality and standing in contradiction to the ultimate reality retrospectively constituting it, the article suggests that all created personhood at present could be called (...) ‘potential’ personhood. The article then examines the concept of personhood maintained by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva in their recent paper on ‘after-birth abortion’ in comparison to Johannes Fischer’s discussion of embryonic stem cell research and personhood. In response to both, the article concludes that it is not possible at present for humans to make a concrete external identification of the divine relation that internally constitutes created personhood. As a result, the article proposes adopting a veil of ignorance with reference to the status of embryonic personhood, as it would be worse to deny the status of personhood to an actual person than to attribute personhood to a non-person. (shrink)