The conventional interpretation of Thomas Aquinas's concept of "moral science" casts it as a knowledge of moral rules that are the outcome of a deductive method of theoretical reason. However, there is a practical moral science that is possessed by ordinary people who are capable of a moral wisdom that is not derived from philosophy. The doctrine concerning this moral science is found in the texts of Aquinas as he takes up and (...) strengthens the philosophy of Aristotle. This book examines how moral science, then, is not a theoretical set of conclusions imposed on the will, but it is rather the grasping of a whole set of human ends that are intellectually apprehended by a compositive method. (Series: Philosophy: Science and Research / Philosophie: Forschung und Wissenschaft - Vol. 42). (shrink)

First published in 1978, this reissue presents a seminal philosophical work by professor Putnam, in which he puts forward a conception of knowledge which makes ethics, practical knowledge and non-mathematic parts of the social sciences just as much parts of 'knowledge' as the sciences themselves. He also rejects the idea that knowledge can be demarcated from non-knowledge by the fact that the former alone adheres to 'the scientific method'. The first part of the book consists of Professor Putnam's John Locke (...) lectures, delivered at the University of Oxford in 1976, offering a detailed examination of a 'physicalist' theory of reference against a background of the works of Tarski, Carnap, Popper, Hempel and Kant. The analysis then extends to notions of truth, the character of linguistic enquiry and social scientific enquiry in general, interconnecting with the great metaphysical problem of realism, the nature of language and reference, and the character of ourselves. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Before Kant almost every philosopher subscribed to the view that truth is some kind of correspondence between ideas and 'what is the case'. ...

This article responds to recent criticism regarding the application of consequentialism and rational choice theory in the social and moral sciences. It clarifies the limited scope of the presented criticism and its overly simplistic view of social scientific inquiry that, together, lead to the presentation of an argument that claims more than it warrants. Moreover, I argue that the criticism overlooks one of the most important uses of instrumentalism in moral theory that may be considered the most challenging (...) case for the application of rational choice theory. (shrink)

Ethical arguments about caregiver responsibility and the limits of client autonomy rely on best evidence about the risks and benefits of medical interventions. But when the evidence is unclear, or when the peer-reviewed literature presents conflicting accounts of the evidence, how are clinicians and their clients to recommend or decide the best course of action? Conflicting evidence about the outcomes of home and hospital birth in the peerreviewed literature offers an opportunity to explore this question. We present the contrary evidence (...) and describe the social and cultural elements that influence the production of the science of birth, including professional, publication, and critical bias. We then consider how the science of birth has been used an misused in making ethical arguments about preferred place of birth. We conclude with a number of recommendations about the responsible use of the evidence, arguing for an “ethics of information” that can be drawn on to guide caregivers and clients in the use of evidence for clinical decision making. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between economic rationality and the possibility of a moral science of business ethics. The purpose of this inquiry is to consider whether a universal and non-controversial moral science of business ethics can be defined satisfactorily, and linked to economic rationality of managers and other stakeholders of firms operating in market economies. Economic rationality connotes economic efficiency, meaning a strictly instrumental maximization of actor utility from limited resources. This rationality is a universal (...) and value free (or value neutral) axiom: actors should and generally will be rationally efficient. Utilitarianism accepting aggregation across values is the moral framework associated with market exchange. Business ethics is about normative valuation of motives, actions, and consequences. This article argues that the common foundation across relevant ethical frameworks – moral common sense, Kantianism, virtue theory, religion as a belief system, and utilitarianism – is a first or axiomatic principle of no harm without acceptable justification. A moral science of business ethics proceeds from this no harm axiom. (shrink)

The article presents an interpretation of certain aspects of John Dewey’s psychological works. The interpretation aims to show that Dewey’s framework speaks directly to certain problems that the discipline of psychology faces today. In particular the reflexive problem, the fact that psychology as an array of discursive practices has served to constitute forms of human subjectivity in Western cultures. Psychology has served to produce or transform its subject-matter. It is shown first that Dewey was aware of the reflexive problem, and (...) found that it needed to be addressed. Next, three concepts of Dewey’s psychology are drawn in: subjectivity, habit and morality. Dewey is interpreted as articulating what we today would call a practice-orientated approach to psychology, in which moral and practical reasoning is seen as a dimension of all knowledge and action. Subjectivity is understood as a function emerging with complex interaction. Finally, a Deweyan approach to how psychology and other social sciences can cope with, and make positive use of, the reflexive problem, is outlined. By acknowledging their existence in the world they study, i.e. by becoming moral sciences that realize their moral and political implications, the social sciences can become problem-solving instruments that serve to help create a democratic public, a community as an actual social idea. It is pointed out that Dewey had an attractive view both of psychology – the subject-matter and of Psychology – the discipline and its practices – and ventured on the rare attempt at explicating how they are connected in what he called Great Societies, what we today would call post- or late-modernity, and how Psychology can help to constitute Great Communities in which human beings might flourish. (shrink)

Is moral philosophy more foundational than political philosophy? In other words, is "how to live?" more fundamental than "how to live together?" We were trained to say yes, but there was never any reason to believe it. Must rigorous reflection on how to live aim to derive necessary truths from timeless axioms, ignoring ephemeral contingencies of time and place? In the 1800s, philosophy left the contingencies to emerging departments of social science. Where did that leave philosophy? Did cutting (...) ties to empirical reality checks leave philosophers with deeper questions? Better answers? Here too, our practices suggest that we assume the answer is yes, but the truth appears to be no. To recover a measure of relevance to questions that truly need answers, theorizing about how to live together might take its cue from philosophy's current renewing of ties with political economy. We can ask which principles have a history of demonstrably being organizing principles of actual thriving communities at their best. (shrink)

The book is reclaiming economics as a moral science. It argues that ethics is a relevant and inseparable aspect of all levels of economic activity, from individual and organizational to societal and global. Taking ethical considerations into account is needed in explaining and predicting the behavior of economic agents as well as in evaluating and designing economic policies and mechanisms. The unique feature of the book is that it not only analyzes ethics and economics on an abstract level, (...) but puts behavioral, institutional and systemic issues together for a robust and human view of economic functioning. It sees economic "facts" as interwoven with human intentionality and ethical content, a domain where utility calculations and moral considerations co-determine the behavior of economic agents and the outcomes of their activities. The book employs the personalist approach that sees human persons - endowed with free will and conscience - as the basic agents of economic life and defines human flourishing as the final end of economic activities. The book demonstrates that economics can gain a lot in meaning and also in analytical power by reuniting itself with ethics. (shrink)

The dissertation addresses the relationship between common sense, skepticism, and naturalistic science in Hume. It is argued that Hume's moral science uncovers numerous common illusions of visual and moral perception; it is not a defense of common-sense experience. ;Firstly, Hume views the ordinary experience of causation and external reality as illusory. The former experience is a projection of human expectation; the latter a conflation of perceptions. ;Secondly, it is argued that, according to Hume, the moral (...) judge overlooks his biases by fictively projecting himself to an impartial standpoint. Impartial sentiments are weak, however, and their weakness generates another fiction: they are mistaken for the inferences of reason. Finally, the judge falsely imagines that he can "see" the character of the persons whom he judges, when all that he actually sees are their actions. ;Thirdly, the dissertation contends that, although the practice of justice arises out of self-interest, the moral agent mistakes his personal interest for public benevolence. When his hidden selfishness fails to move him, he acts justly in the hope of re-acquiring the "lost" benevolence that he never actually had. He saves himself from disappointment by misinterpreting his actions as signs of genuine reform. In the case of promising, the agent falsely imagines that he wills its moral obligation into being with the words "I promise." ;Fourthly, it is shown how Hume denies that we can find the historical root of political obedience in enlightened self-interest and instead stresses the founding role of usurpation and conquest, erased from memory by the passage of time and the efficacy of present government. ;Finally, we see that the appearance of virtue and vice is the illusory correlate of our sentiments: we project sentiments of approval and disapproval onto others and then mistake them for objective traits. ;Contrary to what some interpreters have asserted, I conclude that, according to Hume, the philosopher is never cured of his profound skepticism. Skepticism recurs as long as the philosopher philosophizes. This is problematic, however, because at its most radical, skepticism is incompatible with moral science. (shrink)

Arguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin retain (...) an elliptical appearance even when we know it’s circular? This question has generated heated debate from Locke and Hume to the present; but whereas extant arguments rely primarily on introspection, this problem is also open to empirical test. If tilted coins bear a representational similarity to elliptical objects, then a circular coin should, when rotated, impair search for a distal ellipse. Here, nine experiments demonstrate that this is so, suggesting that perspectival shapes persist in the mind far longer than traditionally assumed. Subjects saw search arrays of three-dimensional “coins,” and simply had to locate a distally elliptical coin. Surprisingly, rotated circular coins slowed search for elliptical targets, even when subjects clearly knew the rotated coins were circular. This pattern arose with static and dynamic cues, couldn’t be explained by strategic responding or unfamiliarity, generalized across shape classes, and occurred even with sustained viewing. Finally, these effects extended beyond artificial displays to real-world objects viewed in naturalistic, full-cue conditions. We conclude that objects have a remarkably persistent dual character: their objective shape “out there,” and their perspectival shape “from here.”. (shrink)

Introspection is a fundamental part of our mental lives. Nevertheless, its reliability and its underlying cognitive architecture have been widely disputed. Here, I propose a principled way to model introspection. By using time-tested principles from signal detection theory (SDT) and extrapolating them from perception to introspection, I offer a new framework for an introspective signal detection theory (iSDT). In SDT, the reliability of perceptual judgments is a function of the strength of an internal perceptual response (signal- to-noise ratio) which is, (...) to a large extent, driven by the intensity of the stimulus. In parallel to perception, iSDT models the reliability of introspective judgments as a function of the strength of an internal introspective response (signal-to-noise ratio) which is, to a large extent, driven by the intensity of conscious experiences. Thus, by modelling introspection after perception, iSDT can calibrate introspection’s reliability across a whole range of contexts. iSDT offers a novel, illuminating way of thinking about introspection and the cognitive processes that support it. (shrink)

In the first ever commentary on the Groundwork, one of Kant’s earliest critics, Gottlob August Tittel, argues that the categorical imperative is not a new principle of morality, but merely a new formula. This objection has been unjustly neglected in the secondary literature, despite the fact that Kant explicitly responds to it in a footnote in the second Critique. In this paper I seek to offer a thorough explanation of both Tittel’s ‘new formula’ objection and Kant’s response to it, as (...) well as illustrate its significance. I argue that the objection is in fact the third step in a line of argument that Tittel presents in his commentary, and that the objection is best understood within this context. I analyze Kant’s response in the second Critique footnote line-by-line so as to show that Kant both clarifies that it was never his aim to offer a new principle, but only ‘establish’ the principle that common human reason already implicitly employs. Furthermore, I show that Kant uses the opportunity to clarify the sense in which the categorical imperative is a ‘formula [Formel]’, namely as a representation of a complicated and abstract principle, like the moral law, in a way that is easier to understand and apply. I conclude by illustrating the fourth step in Tittel’s line of argument, which makes the overall significance of the ‘new formula’ objection clear: for Tittel, the problem is not that Kant seems to be offering merely a new formula, but that the categorical imperative lacks a foundation. (shrink)

Why is it that the study of Ethics is so unpopular? It is because there are so many systems of Ethics, and they are all in such hopeless contradiction. Why are there so many systems? Because each writer starts with his theory and then attempts to get the facts to agree with it. What is the remedy? The remedy, says Professor Levy-Bruhl, is to start with the practice. And what then? Then, he says, you find that the practice is everything, (...) that you need no theory, and that every ethical writer is in harmony with every other. 'Every ethical doctrine,' says Professor Levy-Bruhl, 'jealously defends the originality of its ethical principle against the objections of others, but it formulates the guiding rules of conduct, the concrete precepts of justice and charity, in the same terms as its rivals, whether its adherent is a disciple of Kant, a critical philosopher, a pessimist, a positivist, an evolutionist, a spiritualist, or a theologian.' The way out of the chaos of theoretical Ethics, then, is to deny its existence. There is no such science. The only science of Ethics is the practical. Its object of study is the conscience of man. Its rules and obligations are what the conscience reveals to experience. It takes Professor Levy-Bruhl half his book to get rid of theoretical ethics. Then, however, he is free, and he moves more rapidly in the discussion of Natural Ethics and Ethical Feeling. He ends with a chapter of Practical Results. -The Expository Times, Vol. 17. (shrink)

This collection of articles by scholars from several disciplines is concerned for the most part, in one way or another, with the relation of science and values. Alasdair MacIntyre, in "Objectivity in Morality and Objectivity in Science," maintains that science is a social practice whose aim is given by the ideal of realism. Objectivity in science, according to MacIntyre, is the acceptance of certain features of the practice, including realism as its aim. Recent discussions of subjectivism (...) and relativism in philosophy of science, MacIntyre says, recapitulate the history of ethics, because the scientific community is a moral community and objectivity a moral notion. In "The Moral Psychology of Science," Stephen Toulmin discusses the aims and motives of scientists in order to refute the view that the only respectable motive for doing science is the disinterested pursuit of value-free truth. Toulmin argues that this view is a barrier to understanding that science is not value-free. (shrink)

This article presents a summary of the key aspects of the Biocentric theory of psychology proposed and developed by Nathaniel Branden. The themes of the conscious and nonconscious aspects of the mind and their interplay in healthy and psychopathological human functioning are highlighted, with the development and maintenance of self-esteem as the centerpiece of this schema. Branden's cogent, in-depth analysis and synthesis of these issues, presented for the first time over fifty years ago, is discussed in relation to issues that (...) are being actively researched today. (shrink)

Scientists have long counseled against interpreting animal behavior in terms of human emotions, warning that such anthropomorphizing limits our ability to understand animals as they really are. Yet what are we to make of a female gorilla in a German zoo who spent days mourning the death of her baby? Or a wild female elephant who cared for a younger one after she was injured by a rambunctious teenage male? Or a rat who refused to push a lever for food (...) when he saw that doing so caused another rat to be shocked? Aren’t these clear signs that animals have recognizable emotions and moral intelligence? With _Wild Justice_ Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce unequivocally answer yes. Marrying years of behavioral and cognitive research with compelling and moving anecdotes, Bekoff and Pierce reveal that animals exhibit a broad repertoire of moral behaviors, including fairness, empathy, trust, and reciprocity. Underlying these behaviors is a complex and nuanced range of emotions, backed by a high degree of intelligence and surprising behavioral flexibility. Animals, in short, are incredibly adept social beings, relying on rules of conduct to navigate intricate social networks that are essential to their survival. Ultimately, Bekoff and Pierce draw the astonishing conclusion that there is no moral gap between humans and other species: morality is an evolved trait that we unquestionably share with other social mammals. Sure to be controversial, _Wild Justice_ offers not just cutting-edge science, but a provocative call to rethink our relationship with—and our responsibilities toward—our fellow animals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:276 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Elements of Moral Science. By Francis Wayland. Edited by Joseph L. B1au. (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. 1 + 413. $7.50.) We are indebted to Professor Blau of Columbia University and to the series of John tIarvard Books of the Harvard University Press for this attractive edition of a genuine American antique. Of this college text 100,000 copies were sold. (...) Editions were published in 1835, 1837, and 1865; also an abridged edition for secondary schools and translations into several languages. The present edition reproduces the 1837 text and gives the variations of 1835 and 1865 in the form of appendices. Especially noteworthy are Appendix (H), in which the author's denunciation of slavery is expanded in 1865 into a vigorous abolition appeal, and Appendix (N) against the supposed right of rebellion against "civil society." The Editor's fine, fifty-page Introduction gives us both a sketch of Wayland's distinguished career and an account of the writing, revising, and use of this book. The textbook is a product of Wayland's teaching of Ethics during his Presidency of Brown University. It was quickly adopted by many colleges and remained for two generations a favorite exposition of "Christian ethics" both for colleges throughout the United States and for the mission fields abroad. Among Baptists it was especially popular, but it was not sectarian either by intention or by influence. Wayland began his instruction in moral science by using as a text William Paley's Principles o[ Moral and Political Philosophy (1785). Finding himself in disagreement with Paley on many points, he introduced his own lectures increasingly until finally Paley was completely displaced by Wayland's own lectures and textbook. Both Paley and Wayland agreed in teaching that "the will of God" is the ultimate and absolute ground of moral obligation, but both also agreed with Dr. Johnson, when he said that "religion will appear to be the voice of reason and morality the will of God." There could be no conflict between the principles of eternal happiness and the obligation to obey a benevolent God. What turned Wayland against Paley's text was the preference shown to "natural theology" over "the moral sense" or conscience, and in Bishop Joseph Butler's Sermons he found a justification for the reliability of conscience as an innate, instinctive faculty of correct moral judgment. This confession on Wayland's part seems to indicate that he repudiated "theological utilitarianism," as Paley's system was called, along with Paley's Natural Theology and Evidences of Christianity, and embraced the Scottish "moral sense" philosophy. However, anyone who reads both Paley's and Wayland's texts will be struck by the ways in which Wayland's "moral science" shows the influence of Paley's philosophy and Principles. In the interest of the history of philosophy it may be appropriate to devote the remainder of the review to pointing out how Wayland followed Paley more than Butler. What seems to have annoyed Wayland in Paley's text was not so much the theoretical philosophy and theology as the practical application of obligations to British society. Wayland was a conservative Jeffersonian Republican in his political ideas, whereas Paley was a latitudinarian Anglican, critical of the society in which he lived. One illustration of this difference is striking: Paley begins his treatment of Practical Ethics (which is by far the larger part in each text) as follows: If you should see a flock of pigeons in a field of corn; and if (instead of each picking where and what it liked, taking just as much as it wanted, and no more) you should see ninety-nineof them gathering all they got into a heap; reserving nothing for themselves but the chaff and the refuse; keeping this heap for one, and that the weakest perhaps, the worst pigeon of the flock; sitting around and looking on all the winter, whilst this one was devouring, throwing about, and wasting it; and if a pigeon, more hardy or hungry than the rest, touched the grain of the hoard, all the others instantly flying about it, and tearing it to pieces: If you should see this, you would see... (shrink)

n the John Locke Lectures, included in Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Hilary Putnam argues that "the 'softness' of social facts may affect the 'hard' notions of truth and reference" Without fully endorsing Putnam's argument, I hope to show that a similar argument could be constructed for a slightly different conclusion: that the 'softness' of ethics may affect the 'hard' notions of truth and reference.

The COVID-19 global health emergency has greatly impacted the educational field. Faced with unprecedented stress situations, professors, students, and families have employed various coping and resilience strategies throughout the confinement period. High and persistent stress levels are associated with other pathologies; hence, their detection and prevention are needed. Consequently, this study aimed to design a predictive model of stress in the educational field based on artificial intelligence that included certain sociodemographic variables, coping strategies, and resilience capacity, and to study the (...) relationship between them. The non-probabilistic snowball sampling method was used, involving 337 people from the university education community in south-eastern Spain. The Perceived Stress Scale, Stress Management Questionnaire, and Brief Resilience Scale were administered. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used to design the architecture of artificial neural networks. The results found that stress levels could be predicted by the synaptic weights of coping strategies and timing of the epidemic, with a predictive capacity of over 80% found in the neural network model. Additionally, direct and significant associations were identified between the use of certain coping strategies, stress levels, and resilience. The conclusions of this research are essential for effective stress detection, and therefore, early intervention in the field of educational psychology, by discussing the influence of resilience or lack thereof on the prediction of stress levels. Identifying the variables that maintain a greater predictive power in stress levels is an effective strategy to design more adjusted prevention programs and to anticipate the needs of the community. (shrink)

A systematic survey of the topics of moral science in the tradition of the "Aristotle via Aquinas" school. It is written in the form of a textbook with review questions, discussion topics, and suggested readings following each chapter. Little notice is taken of the standard criticisms of Aristotle and no attempt is made at originality in presentation.--C. L.

In this paper, I sketch a new model for the format of the content of understanding states, Compressible Graph Maximalism (CGM). In this model, the format of the content of understanding is graphical, and compressible. It thus combines ideas from approaches that stress the link between understanding and holistic structure (like as reported by Grimm (in: Ammon SGCBS (ed) Explaining Understanding: New Essays in Epistemollogy and the Philosophy of Science, Routledge, New York, 2016)), and approaches that emphasize the connection (...) between understanding and compression (like Wilkenfeld (Synthese 190(6):997–1016, 2018)). I argue that the combination of these ideas has several attractive features, and I defend the idea against some challenges. (shrink)