Yugoslav anti-war contention has remained an under-theorised topic almost twenty years after the end of the wars of Yugoslav succession. Rather than focusing on the?ontogenesis? of individual pacifist enterprises, this paper examines the reasons for which Yugoslav anti-war activisms have been marginalised in recent East European sociological scholarship. I argue that a thorough appreciation of these phenomena requires a Yugoslav/regional approach which has not been favoured by post-Yugoslav social science scholars. This article also offers a critical reading of the existing (...) attempts to theorise Yugoslav anti-war activisms. It criticises their failure to draw upon the rich conceptual ap?paratus of social movement theories developed within Western political sociology over the last couple of decades. In spite of the fact that the concept of?social movement? may be contested in the context of post-Yugoslav anti-war engagement on the basis of its quantitative marginality, this should not deter Yugoslav social scientists from applying and refining Anglo-Saxon social movement theories in a culturally sensitive manner. Specific dynamics of anti-war activism occurring within an armed conflict has not been sufficiently studied. This is an important knowledge lacuna where regional sociologists could offer a substantive contribution. jugoslovenski antiratni angazman je ostao nedovoljno teorijski obradjena tema i posle skoro dvadeset godina od kraja ratova za jugoslovensko nasledje. U ovom radu se ne fokusiram na?ontogenezu? individualnih mirovnih poduhvata, vec ispitujem razloge zbog kojih su jugoslovenski antiratni aktivizmi marginalizovani u skorasnjoj istocnoevropskoj socioloskoj literaturi. Tvrdim da razumevanje ovih fenomena zahteva jugoslovenski/regionalni pristup kojem do sada nije bila posvecena adekvatna paznja. Ovaj rad takodje donosi i jedno kriticko citanje postojecih napora da se teorijski pristupi jugoslovenskim antiratnim aktivizmima. Kritikujem propust istrazivaca da se posluze bogatim konceptualnim aparatom razvijenim u proteklih nekoliko decenija u okviru zapadne politicke sociologije. Iako koncept?drustvenog pokreta? moze biti diskutabilan u kontekstu jugoslovenskog antiratnog angazmana u smislu njegove kvantitativne marginalnosti, to ne bi trebalo da spreci primenu anglosaksonskih teorija drustvenih pokreta na kulturoloski senzitivan nacin. Specificna dinamika antiratnog organizovanja za vreme i na prostoru ratnog konflikta nije u dovoljnoj meri istrazena, pa bi ovdasnji istrazivaci na tom polju mogli dati bitan doprinos. (shrink)

Induction of c‐fos expression occurs following treatment of diverse cell types with agents that trigger mitogenesis, differentiation or membrane depolarization. We suggest that c‐fos may be regarded as a marker for a set of rapidly induced genes (termed cellular immediate‐early genes) whose function is to couple extracellular stimulation to long‐term responses. In the brain, these genes may contribute to the adaptive alterations involved in neuronal plasticity.

Uzimajuci u obzir razliku izmedju antickog i modernog shvatanja korupcije, zanimalo me je da istrazim vezu korupcije i seksa koja se vec na prvi pogled podrazumeva. Nije mi namera da fenomene korupcije i seksa ispitujem u kontekstu bilo koje moralne kategorije. Medjutim, pitam se sta je imao na umu Flober kada je napisao da se?Rodolf ponasao prema Emi sasvim bezobzirno. Napravio je od nje nesto podatno i korumpirano?. Sta je to sto neodoljivo privlaci korupciju i seks? Da li je moguce (...) iskoreniti korupciju i potisnuti razlicite seksualne prakse, ne bi li korupcija i seks imali samo funkcionalne strategije generacije i reprodukcije? Naznake o ovim fenomenima prate filozofska opazanja Lis Irigare koja polnu razliku, izmedju ostalog, tematizuje i u okvirima generacije i korupcije. (shrink)

My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution of some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of reconstruction and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, reform or transformation of the institution – is an entirely new institution possible? How do institutions die? – lies in the difficulty or even impossibility to change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can (...) they be changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What allows for the idea of the “new”? (shrink)

Scientific ideas neither arise nor develop in a vacuum. They are always nutured against a background of prior, partially conflicting ideas. Systemic hypothesistesting is the problem of testing scientific hypotheses relative to various systems of background knowledge. This paper shows how the problem of systemic hypothesis-testing (Sys HT) can be systematically expressed as a constrained maximimization problem. It is also shown how the error of the third kind (E III) is fundamental to the theory of Sys HT.The error of the (...) third kind is defined as the probability of having solved the ‘wrong’ problem when one should have solved the ‘right’ problem. This paper shows howE III can be given both a systematic as well as a systemic treatment. Sys HT gives rise to a whole host of new decision problems, puzzles, and paradoxes. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze notions of common good and of the state in late 19th century British social liberalism and their relation to collective action of the citizens. The author shows that British social liberals argued for a type of state that uses top down strategy to encourage collective action in order to transform individuals into a socially responsible groups, i.e. good citizens. The paper focuses on philosophical works of F. H. Bradley, ethics of T. H. (...) Green and political philosophy of B. Bosanquet, analyzing their efforts to reconceptualize ideas of classical liberalism and utilitarian doctrine of the individual, society and the state in light of emerging influence of leftist social movements. The author argues that the works of British social liberals are a foundation of the state and society which will dominate liberalism in the second half of 20th century, i.e. the idea of the welfare state. (shrink)

John Dewey, one of the most important thinkers of pragmatism, elaborated a specific conception of law partially and gradually in the long course of his intellectual career. This part of his broader philosophical outlook is analyzed here through one of its most important segments - application of law - and interpreted in its historical, social and cultural background. The first part of the article concentrates on the 'objective' reasons for giving emphasis to the application of law in his legal philosophy. (...) This domination of the application of law in his legal thought is derived from the needs of a rapidly changing structure of the American society in the first half of the XX century, and theoretically has its place in an all around phenomenon in American intellectual history in general that Morton White terms antiformalism. The second part of the article analyses his legal conceptions and their connection with the general philosophical position of this pragmatist. Dewey formed his conception of application of law as an integral part of his broader philosophical standpoint, and especially on the basis of his radical reinterpretation of logic and truth. Since his understanding of the legal process has roots in his experimentalist conception of logic that encompasses the apprehension of the process of experimentation as the only warrant for the validity of propositions, he regards application as conditio sine qua non of the legality of norms in general. This leads us to the last part of the article that scathes possible lines of critical approach to Dewey's work in this field. The view that the legality of norms is derived from their application is in legal theory often regarded as sociologism, inasmuch as it disregards the normative aspects of the legal process and emphasizes the social ones to the point of making it void of the normative aspects in the totality of the process itself. The proper understanding of possible lines of criticism of Dewey's standpoints in legal philosophy guides us back again to confront his conceptions with their cultural background, with which the article begins. Autor se u clanku bavi koncepcijom primjene prava u filozofiji Dzona Djuija, pragmatiste bez presedana u obuhvatnosti i temeljnosti bavljenja filozofskim problemima, cije je misljenje na ovim prostorima rijetko bilo predmet razmatranja. Zamisljen kao uvodno ispitivanje filozofsko-pravne problematike u Djuijevoj filozofiji, clanak u prvom dijelu razmatra odnos njegove filozofije prava i americkog kulturnog konteksta. U drugom dijelu je izlozeno Djuijevo shvatanje primjene prava i konfrontirano je s njegovim opstim filozofskim tezama, u prvom redu s koncepcijom logike kao 'ispitivanja ispitivanja'. Konacno, autor pokusava da ocrta osnovne smjernice kritickog pristupa Djuijevim rjesenjima filozofsko-pravnih problema. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to reflexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson?s ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in moral and political thinking. The second (...) part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum?s concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and political disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents? emotional judgments. (shrink)

This paper identifies a tension between the commitment to forming rationally justified emotions and the happy life. To illustrate this tension I begin with a critical evaluation of the positive psychology technique known as ‘gratitude training’. I argue that gratitude training is at odds with the kind of critical monitoring that several philosophers have claimed is regulative of emotional rationality. More generally, critical monitoring undermines exuberance, an attitude that plays a central role in contemporary models of the happy life. Thus, (...) prominent notions of what it takes to maintain emotion rationality and what it takes to maintain happiness are in tension. To resolve this tension, I argue that some people have good reason to depreciate critical monitoring—even while maintaining the requirement of emotion rationality that we be sensitive to facts about how our concerns are faring. (shrink)

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, I ask whether there is a human right to be spared extreme poverty. The answer is ‘Not necessarily’ if a human right is a legal right, and I argue that ‘human right’ either means a right in international law and associated policy, or else the term has an unacceptably wide sense. In the second section I consider microcredit as a poverty-alleviating mechanism, distinguishing between extreme and relative poverty in developing countries. (...) I argue that credit may not be a good way of alleviating extreme poverty, and that methods of collecting debt used by microcredit providers may have moral drawbacks. In the third section I consider the fit between the class of agents currently involved in offering financial services to the poor, and the class of agents recognized as duty-bearers by human rights law and policy. Unless states become highly involved in microcredit, it is not clear that microfinance providers are or can be human rights duty bearers. (shrink)

This article considers the functionality, method and import of the critical theorist Slavoj Žižek’s engagement with theology against the wider intellectual backdrop of the relationship between an idea and its cultural context. I propose that his engagement can be better understood and interpreted with reference to how Christian theology has historically come to understand its own cultural context. When Žižek’s appropriation of theology is read alongside theology’s appropriation of classical philosophy in the patristic period, a distinctly speculative understanding of theology (...) as an idea developing through a dialectical process of determinate negation in its various contexts. (shrink)

The main idea behind this article is that in order to understand themeaning that Kant’s political philosophy is rendered to by the givensocio-historical context of a community we need to turn for help toartistic genius whose subjective “I” holds a general feeling of the worldand life. It is in this sense that authors of great novels can help us in twoways. First, their works summarise for our imagination artistic truth aboutman’s capacity for humanity, the very thing that Kant considers to (...) bethe scientifically improvable “fact of reason”. Second, works of greatwriters offer for our insight destinies of individuals who decide to pursuemoral dictate in a society, thus actualising the potential that lies hiddenin all of us, making us worthy of respect. As we lack objective scientificstandard of measurement, artist’s universal feeling of the world is impressedupon us through a narrative about a man who, in a given society and ina given moment, decides to exercise his autonomy and seek the divinein himself. Contemporary social scientists’ attempts to prove historicalprogress is characterised by the very lack of humbleness. Referring tothe great novelists’ works in this article is aimed to remind scientists ofrestraint and self-control demanded from them by the citizen of Konigsberg. (shrink)

Uporišta. O Markovićevim filozofskim rukopisima u arhivima HAZU ; O Hondlovu prigovoru Bazalinu tumačenju Spinozine filozofije -- Začetnik filozofije jezika u Hrvatskoj : uz knjigu Kruna Krstića Studije, rasprave, i članci ; Što je činjenica? O Krstićevu poimanju (znanstvene) objektivnosti ; Supek kao filozof ; Supekov odnos prema pojedinim pravcima u suvremenoj filozofiji ; Marijan Cipra : život, misao, radovi -- Hrvatska filozofija i hrvatski jezik. Rječnik hrvatskoga filozofskoga nazivlja ; Filozofija i hrvatski jezik : bibliografija ; Je li suština (...) nužna? O sustavnosti hrvatskoga filozofskoga nazivlja -- Nazivlje u Markovićevoj Etici -- Sutlićev odnos spram jezika -- László i filozofsko nazivlje. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw a distinction between two types of deepfake, and unpack the deceptive strategies that are made possible by the second. The first category, which has been the focus of existing literature on the topic, consists of those deepfakes that act as a fabricated record of events, talk, and action, where any utterances included in the footage are not addressed to the audience of the deepfake. For instance, a fake video of two politicians conversing with one another. (...) The second category consists of those deepfakes that direct an illocutionary speech act - such as a request, injunction, invitation, or promise - to an addressee who is located outside of the recording. For instance, fake footage of a company director instructing their employee to make a payment, or of a military official urging the populace to flee for safety. Whereas the former category may deceive an audience by giving rise to false beliefs, the latter can more directly manipulate an agent's actions: the speech act's addressee may be moved to accept an invitation or a summons, follow a command, or heed a warning, and in doing so further a deceiver's unethical ends. (shrink)

The main idea behind this article is that in order to understand the meaning that Kant?s political philosophy is rendered to by the given socio-historical context of a community we need to turn for help to artistic genius whose subjective?I? holds a general feeling of the world and life. It is in this sense that authors of great novels can help us in two ways. First, their works summarise for our imagination artistic truth about man?s capacity for humanity, the very (...) thing that Kant considers to be the scientifically improvable?fact of reason?. Second, works of great writers offer for our insight destinies of individuals who decide to pursue moral dictate in a society, thus actualising the potential that lies hidden in all of us, making us worthy of respect. As we lack objective scientific standard of measurement, artist?s universal feeling of the world is impressed upon us through a narrative about a man who, in a given society and in a given moment, decides to exercise his autonomy and seek the divine in himself. Contemporary social scientists? attempts to prove historical progress is characterised by the very lack of humbleness. Referring to the great novelists? works in this article is aimed to remind scientists of restraint and self-control demanded from them by the citizen of Konigsberg. nema. (shrink)

Članak se bavi etičkim značajem prihvaćanja transcendencije svake osobe. Autor zagovara sljedeće teze: transcendentna antropologija je pozitivan čimbenik personalizma; povreda solidarnosti je fundamentalno zlo; apofatička antropologija je realistički nazor; trebamo izbjegavati ekstremne pozicije po pitanju identiteta: nihilističke ili neutralističke s jedne, te nekritičko prihvaćanje i njihovo okoštavanje s druge strane; ispravan pristup identitetima je kritički realizam i dijaloški univerzalizam; princip dubljeg identiteta je duh; transcendentna antropologija je pozitivan čimbenik solidarnog stava. Autor zaključuje da stav transcendentne antropologije nudi dobru pozadinu za (...) otvorenost prema drugome, za odnosni i solidarni stav, kao i za živuće tradicije. Nadalje, nudi također i dobre temelje za kulturnu i intelektualnu razmjenu, za odgovornu toleranciju radikalno drukčijeg i za osjećaj potrebe za bivanjem izloženim utjecaju drugih. (shrink)

Can the theory that reality is a simulation be tested? We investigate this question based on the assumption that if the system performing the simulation is nite (i.e. has limited resources), then to achieve low computational complexity, such a system would, as in a video game, render content (reality) only at the moment that information becomes available for observation by a player and not at the moment of detection by a machine (that would be part of the simulation and whose (...) detection would also be part of the internal computation performed by the Virtual Reality server before rendering content to the player). Guided by this principle we describe conceptual wave/particle duality experiments aimed at testing the simulation theory. (shrink)

As the expansion of the Internet and the digital formatting of all kinds of creative works move us further into the information age, intellectual property issues have become paramount. Computer programs costing thousands of research dollars are now copied in an instant. People who would recoil at the thought of stealing cars, computers, or VCRs regularly steal software or copy their favorite music from a friend's CD. Since the Web has no national boundaries, these issues are international concerns. The contributors-philosophers, (...) legal theorists, and business scholars, among others-address questions such as: Can abstract ideas be owned? How does the violation of intellectual property rights compare to the violation of physical property rights? Can computer software and other digital information be protected? And how should legal systems accommodate the ownership of intellectual property in an information age? Intellectual Property is a lively examination of these and other issues, and an invaluable resource for librarians, lawyers, businesspeople, and scholars. (shrink)

This book defends Aestheticism- the claim that everything is aesthetically valuable and that a life lived in pursuit of aesthetic value can be a particularly good one. Furthermore, in distilling aesthetic qualities, artists have a special role to play in teaching us to recognize values; a critical component of virtue. I ground my account upon an analysis of aesthetic value as ‘objectified final value’, which is underwritten by an original psychological claim that all aesthetic values are distal versions of practical (...) values. This is followed by systematic accounts of beauty, sublimity, comedy, drama, and tragedy, as well as appendix entries on the cute, the cool, the kitsch, the uncanny, the horrific, the erotic, and the furious. (shrink)

The book Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity is a contribution not only to the phenomenological tradition of thought and Hannah Arendt studies, but also political science and, most importantly, political philosophy. Sophie Loidolt advances an intervention that stands in contrast to contemporary phenomenological research which in certain times have had the tendency to perform depoliticized examination of the self and sociality, actually revealing the intention of Phenomenology of Plurality to articulate the numerous elements that comprise the methodological (...) novelty with which Arendt changes the theory of the political. (shrink)

It is an important feature of creatures like us that our various motivations compete for control over our behaviour, including mental behaviour such as imagining and attending. In large part, this competition is adjudicated by the stimulation of affect — the intrinsically pleasant or unpleasant aspects of experience. In this paper I argue that the motivation-affect system controls a sub-type of attention called 'alerting attention' to bring various goals and stimuli to consciousness and thereby prioritize those contents for action. This (...) view allows me to flesh out the global workspace theory of consciousness, as well as some of the phenomenal characteristics of conscious experience. (shrink)

I am interested in the epistemological status of «project(ion)», that is, the «act» or «strategy» of project(ion) in relation to various didactic protocols usually associated with an «author» and her intention or production. What is a plan, program, plot, platform, concept, conception, or even «meta-project»? Is a project or projection necessarily an «architectural matter»? Is it a prototypically Western or European procedure of specific use of time and space (literally, throwing forth into space/time)? I will attempt to explain some passages (...) from Eisenman, Cacciari, as well as a theory recently put forth by Armando and Durbiano (Teoria del progetto architettonico). (shrink)

In Section 1, I outline the history of natural law theory, covering Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Aquinas. In Section 2, I explore two alternative traditions of natural law, and explain why these constitute rivals to the Aristotelian tradition. In Section 3, I go on to elaborate a via negativa along which natural law norms can be discovered. On this basis, I unpack what I call three 'experiments in being', each of which illustrates the cogency of this method. In Section (...) 4, I investigate and rebut two seminal challenges to natural law methodology, namely, the fact/value distinction in metaethics and Darwinian evolutionary biology. In Section 5, I then outline and criticise the 'new' natural law theory, which is an attempt to revise natural law thought in light of the two challenges above. I conclude, in Section 6, with a summary and some reflections on the prospects for natural law theory. (shrink)

Im Text dieses Projekt wird das Wort "Geheimnis" ausschließlich in Zusammenhang mit dem Staat und der "Ragion di Stato" /Staatsräson/ gedacht. Die unterschiedlichen Formen und Transformationen des Geheimnisses und des Verbergens bilden eine der grundlegenden Quellen und Bedingungen für die Souveränität. Die berühmte Fiktion von der Schwierigkeit, das "mystery in the soul of state", die Shakespeare, Bacon, Thomasius, Kant und Heidegger verwenden, zu erklären, könnte der Beginn eines anderen Verständnisses der Souveränität und der Figur des Souveräns sein. Ist der Souverän (...) ein Teil einer Einheit, der mystifizieren und ein Geheimnis produzieren kann? Was bedeutet "geheim" oder für den Staat bzw. für die geheime Souveränität eines Staates zu dienen? Was ist das Staatsgeheimnis? Und ist es das Geheimnis der Verteidigung einer Einheit, die ihren Souverän etabliert und den "Terror der Souveränität" erklärt? (shrink)

The last twenty-five years of published literature and curriculum development in bioethics suggest that the field enjoys a successful and stable marriage to philosophical ethical theory. However, the next twenty-five years could be very different. I believe the marriage is troubled. Divorce is conceivable and perhaps likely. The most philosophical parts of bioethics may retreat to philosophy departments, while bioethics continues on its current course toward a more interdisciplinary and practical field.I make no presumption that bioethics is integrally linked to (...) philosophical ethical theory. Indeed, I assume that the connection is contingent and fragile. Many individuals in law, theological ethics, political theory, the social and behavioral sciences, and the health professions carefully address mainstream issues of bioethics without finding ethical theory essential or breathtakingly attractive. This is not surprising. Moral philosophers have traditionally formulated theories of the right, the good, and the virtuous in the most general terms. (shrink)

Our successful engagement with the world is plausibly underwritten by our sensitivity to affordances in our immediate environment. The considerable literature on affordances focuses almost exclusively on affordances for bodily actions such as gripping, walking or eating. I propose that we are also sensitive to affordances for mental actions such as attending, imagining and counting. My case for this ‘Mental Affordance Hypothesis’ is motivated by a series of examples in which our sensitivity to mental affordances mirrors our sensitivity to bodily (...) affordances. Specifically, subjects perceive opportunities to perform a mental action and their doing so leads, under the right conditions, to the automatic preparation of that action. I conclude by sketching a mental affordance research program that would reinforce my case for the Mental Affordance Hypothesis and establish its ramifications for a number of debates across philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

According to a standard view, the physical boundary of the person—the skin-and-skull boundary—matters morally because this boundary delineates between where the person begins and the world ends. On the basis of this view we make a distinction between invasive interventions that penetrate this boundary and non-invasive interventions that do not. The development of neuroprosthetics, however, raises questions about the significance of this boundary and the relationship between person and body. In particular it has been argued by appeal to the Extended (...) Mind thesis that mind and person can extend beyond the body, and hence the skin-and-skull boundary is of questionable significance. In this paper I argue that the Extended Mind thesis is consistent with the ethical relevance of the skin-and-skull barrier. Although it can be argued that cognitive processes and aspect of mind can extend beyond the skin-and-skull boundary as EM claims, it does not follow that the person is also extended beyond this boundary. The moral sense of person is closely related to the notion of person as a subject of experiences and this, in turn, is related to the sensory and somatosensory aspects of the body. The development of neuroprosthetics provides us with reason to see that persons can be variously embodied, but this is consistent with the functional and ethical significance of the skin-and-skull boundary. (shrink)

Nearly everyone prefers pain to be in the past rather than the future. This seems like a rationally permissible preference. But I argue that appearances are misleading, and that future-biased preferences are in fact irrational. My argument appeals to trade-offs between hedonic experiences and other goods. I argue that we are rationally required to adopt an exchange rate between a hedonic experience and another type of good that stays fixed, regardless of whether the hedonic experience is in the past or (...) future. (shrink)

The fear of death resists philosophical attempts at reconciliation. Building on theories of emotion, I argue that we can understand our fear as triggered by a de se mode of thinking about death which comes into conflict with our will to live. The discursive mode of philosophy may help us to avoid the de se mode of thinking about death, but it does not satisfactorily address the problem. I focus instead on the voluntary diminishment of one’s will to live. I (...) argue that we can encourage a natural tendency for the will to live to decline as we approach death. I then consider two objections: Is not the will to live too fundamental for us to control? And even if we can control it, would not a declining will to live result in a general despair that it is better to resist? I argue that both of these objections can be overcome. (shrink)

In this paper I would like to reflect on discipline as a category, and explain the quotation marks in the title, as they can always follow and amend the word discipline. my intention is to reconstruct a decades-long resistance to discipline, and to uncover the origin of praise for self-discipline, un-discipline or interdisciplinarity. Further, I would like to offer a few arguments in favor of discipline as one of the most important protocols of social ontology, and the unconditioned condition of (...) cooperation, life and group work. Discipline is joint learning, as well as production and a nurturing of knowledge that constitutes and sustains an institution. the question is whether individuals’ discipline indeed makes an institution necessarily better or more just. (shrink)

In this text, I analyze the most important topics of one of the most complex portions of Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption. The chapter “The Fire or the Eternal Life” deals with the community and communal life of the eternal people, and it reconstructs the basic elements and conditions of communal living. A presentation of all key protocols of life and work of a group of people ought to show the plurality of heterogeneous practices that have helped maintain a people scattered (...) and always on the verge of extinction. (shrink)

Referring to Ferraris’ “Fenomenologia dell’istituzionale (Phenomenology of the Institutional)” is very appropriate to insist on some difficulties with the notion of “institution”. My intent is twofold: on the one hand, I would like to claim, against Ferraris and with Searle, that a theory (or phenomenology) of the institution is always the most important task in the construction of social ontology. Along the way, I would like to point to the importance of violence (and power) and violent strategies in the creation (...) and maintaining of institutions. By answering the question in the sub-heading of this paper, my intention is to understand Ferraris’ project, firstly, as a necessary addition to the ontology of John Searle. But, also, I would like to argue that this project could “incorporate” this same theoretical attempt that precedes it. The future of Ferraris’ project is in political and legal theory, in the understanding of the great and truly “ultimate institutional structures”. Ferraris, as inheritor of and contributor to the great project of Paul Otlet (Mundaneum), surpasses “the government as ultimate institutional structure”, and puts it in the place of the State-Europe and la Cité mondiale. (shrink)

Gli autori intendono proporre le premesse necessarie al chiarimento del rapporto, incerto e da sempre dibattuto, che lega architettura e filosofia attraverso il riferimento al concetto di “Filosofia architettonica” proposto da Peter Eisenman. Una prima premessa riguarda le varie tipologie di approccio alla filosofia riscontrabili nel campo dell’architettura, fino a delineare una forma di consapevolezza filosofica nell’architettura contemporanea. La seconda premessa riguarda la possibilità di spiegare il rapporto tra filosofia e architettura attraverso i casi di collaborazione concreta tra architetti e (...) filosofi. (shrink)

Paraphrased within the title of this text is a note Hannah Arendt made in August 1952. After reading Carl Schmitt?s Nomos der Erde, Arendt tries to confront Schmitt?s idea of a just war. In the text I attempt to reconstruct Arendt?s readings of differing political philosophy texts within the context of her thinking concerning the relationship between violence and power, force and law. Arendt?s refusal to accept the existence of violence which can "conquer" freedom and "create" right and democracy, brings (...) contradiction to the great tradition of the followers of Marx, to whom Arendt undoubtedly belongs: how is and is revolutionary violence even possible and does violence as resistance to injustice bring justice?. Naslov ovoga teksta je parafraza jedne beleske Hannah Arendt koja je napisana avgusta 1952. godine. Posle citanja Schmittove knjige Nomos der Erde, Arendt pokusava da se suprotstavi njegovom razumevanju pravednog rata. U tekstu rekonstruisem njena razlicita citanja mnostva tekstova politicke filozofije, u kontekstu Arendtovog razlikovanja izmedju nasilja i vlasti, snage i zakona. Arendtovo odbijanje da prihvati postojanje nasilja koje moze "osvojiti" slobodu i "stvoriti" pravo i demokratiju, suprotstavlja je velikoj tradiciji sledbenika Marxa, kojoj ona nesumnjivo pripada: da li je i na koji nacin moguce revolucionarno nasilje i da li nasilje kao otpor nepravdi donosi pravdu?. (shrink)