This 1996 book defends the prospects for a science of society. It argues that behind the diverse methods of the natural sciences lies a common core of scientific rationality that the social sciences can and sometimes do achieve. It also argues that good social science must be in part about large-scale social structures and processes and thus that methodological individualism is misguided. These theses are supported by a detailed discussion of actual social research, including theories of agrarian revolution, organizational ecology, (...) social theories of depression, and supply-demand explanations in economics. Professor Kincaid provides a general picture of explanation and confirmation in the social sciences and discusses the nature of scientific rationality, functional explanation, optimality arguments, meaning and interpretation, the place of microfoundations in social explanation, the status of neo-classical economics, the role of idealizations and non-experimental evidence, and other specific controversies. (shrink)

Thats logic. LEWIS CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass 1-1. The fundamental problem of this work is the question of the nature of scientific inference.

New concepts are constantly being introduced into our thinking. Conceptual Systems explores how these new concepts are entered into our systems along with sufficient continuity with older ideas to ensure understanding. The encyclopaedic breadth of this text highlights the many different aspects and disciplines that together present an insightful view into the various theories of concepts. Harold Brown, a reputable author in the philosophy of science examines several historically influential theories of concepts as well as providing a clear view (...) on the general theory of conceptual change. Interesting case studies examine examples of conceptual change in the history of physics including the move in seventeenth century physics from Galileo to Descates to Newton; and the conceptual framework of the "standard model" in the late twentieth century high- energy physics. The key central themes in the philosophy of science that are explored in- depth in this enormous book make it an essential read for academics in this field. (shrink)

I share with all the other authors the view that conceptual metaphysics without close ties to science is of minimal value, that this holds for much of current work on social ontology, and that if there is value in social ontology, it has to be in contributing to empirical social science. I do perhaps disagree with all three authors about making any blanket statements concerning either instrumentalism or realism about the social sciences and their ontologies. I argue and try to (...) show instead that if there are fruitful questions of social ontology, they are probably mostly local empirical issues raised by specific pieces of social science. Certain kinds of pluralism and instrumentalism may well make sense in some situations. I illustrate with debates over the need for psychological realism and revealed preference theory in economics. (shrink)

There is a lively ongoing debate among philosophers and social scientists about the reality of race and among social scientists about the reality of caste and ethnicity. This paper tries to sort out what the issues are and makes some preliminary suggestions about what the evidence shows. Standard philosophical analyses try to find the necessary and sufficient conditions of our concept of race. I argue that this is not the best way to approach the issue and that the reality of (...) these concepts should be taken as a scientific realism question; that is, do our best social scientific accounts of these phenomena show that appealing to the concepts of race, caste, and ethnicity is essential to successful social science explanation? I argue that in some cases that is the case and lay out the empirical issues involved. (shrink)

A major theme of recent philosophy of science has been the rejection of the empiricist thesis that, with the exception of terms which play a purely formal role, the language of science derives its meaning from some, possibly quite indirect, correlation with experience. The alternative that has been proposed is that meaning is internal to each conceptual system, that terms derive their meaning from the role they play in a language, and that something akin to "meaning" flows from conceptual framework (...) to experience. Much contemporary debate on the nature of conceptual change is a direct outgrowth of this holistic view of concepts, and much of the inconclusiveness of that debate derives from the lack of any clear understanding of what a conceptual system is, or of how conceptual systems confer meaning on their terms. (shrink)

An attempt to reduce disability discrimination can do more harm than the ostensible discrimination itself. Such is the case with Shavelson et al.’s (2023) argument for equal access to medical aid i...

In this paper, I argue that in at least some interesting cases, the moral value of a narrative work depends on the aesthetic properties of that artwork. It does not follow that a work that is aesthetically bad will be morally bad (or that it will be morally good). The argument comprises four stages. First I describe several different features of imaginative engagement with narrative artworks. Then I show that these features depend on some of the aesthetic properties of those (...) works. Third, I argue that these same features of imaginative engagement are morally salient, by virtue of inviting more or less sophisticated and reflective moral responses. Finally, I show that the overall moral value of an artwork depends in part on whether or not the prescribed response is simple or complex, passive or reflective. (shrink)

After sorting different structuralist claims, I argue that structural realist ideas are instantiated in the social sciences, providing both clarification of social science research and support for some components of structural realism. My main focus is on three distinct ways that the social sciences can be about structural relations—exemplified by claims about social structure, reduced form structures in causal modeling, and equilibrium explanations—and on the implication of structuralist ideas for thinking about issues concerning causal explanation and nonreductive pictures of the (...) unity of the science. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, 900 13th Street South, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL 35294; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Considered ahead of its time since the first publication in 1981, Medical Choices, Medical Chances provides a telescope for viewing how developments in the fields of medical research, medical technology, and health care organization are likely to influence the doctor-patient relationship in the 21st Century. The book explores this intricate web of relationships among doctors, patients, and families and offers a new framework for mastering the emotional and intellectual challenges of uncertainty, while at the same time providing tools for all (...) concerned to regain control from managed care. It is a must-read for all those interested in medicine and where it is headed in the new millennium. (shrink)

I briefly argue that some issues in the individualism-holism debate have been fairly clearly settled and other issues still plagued by unclarity. The main argument of the paper is that there are a set of clear empirical issues around the holism-individualism debate that are central problems in current social science research. Those include questions about when we can be holist and how individualist we can be in social explanation.

It is argued that there is no agreed definition of disease. Purely biological definitions are inadequate and combined biological and social definitions are not yet satisfactory. One approach has been to say that what doctors treat is disease. We are uncomfortable with that because we feel it releases people from obligations on a basis of convenience. In practice the weight given to the idea of disease varies according to what it will imply about obligations and privileges. It is suggested that (...) what doctors treat can be accepted as disease provided that we recognize that the significance of disease must vary with circumstances. Those circumstances include the agreement, more or less, of all persons affected when someone is considered to be a patient. The individual must also be competent and not constrained except by his own biological or psychological characteristics. Keywords: disease, patient-physician relationship, obligation CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Every discipline has its foundational terms, those words that practitioners use to name what they study, or how they study, or why that study is valid. These terms often go unscrutinized when a discipline is up and running, but in the formative stages of a discipline and in periods of contention or crisis they often become subject to intensive criticism and attempts at redefinition. Challenging foundational terms is no simple task. Because they are foundational, they are difficult to do without, (...) even by those who would reject them. They are often used or assumed by those who question them, and after intensive questioning is done they often simply recur, even in their most unquestioned, naive form. The “foundational” nature of foundational terms, one begins to see, is not just a matter of a basic organizing concept or a description of some natural process, but of a term that is invested with aspirations of different sorts. The term also offers authorization to interpret, enacts a wish, suggests a cultural utopia, or puts in place a political program. The density of functions found in foundational terms guarantees that even the most questioned term will return. (shrink)

Most of the work produced by these scholars together and in collaboration with their students represent applications of their basic theory to a wide assortment ...

The origins of research projects, the duties of supervisors and research workers, the subjective elements in research and the difficulties of publication are reviewed, as a guide to the complexities of executing an honest research project. It is assumed that research carried out with maximal intellectual integrity will result in real advances.

In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) Adam Smith draws on the Stoic idea of a Providence that uses everything for the good of the whole. The process is often painful, so the Stoic ethic insisted on conscious cooperation. Stoic ideas contributed to the rise of science and enjoyed wide popularity in Smith's England. Smith was more influenced by the Stoicism of his professors than by the Epicureanism of Hume. In TMS, Marcus Aurelius's "helmsman" becomes the "impartial spectator," who judges (...) actions in terms of the way they are seen by others. This is the key to justice, without which society collapses. Business school students should be taught that Smith's "invisible hand" is best understood as a universal rationality that uses just actions for the benefit of the whole. (shrink)

In this resource for educators, Harold F. Burks offers a comprehensive guide to the evaluation techniques and intervention strategies that have worked with many school children experiencing problems. Thus, Diagnosis and Remediation Practices for Troubled School Children attempts to: clarify the understanding of observed, unwanted child behavior symptoms ; investigate with educators and parents—and sometimes children—the possible causal factors that antedate these behavior manifestations; create in cooperation with parents and school personnel, innovative intervention techniques to help children learn accepted (...) behavior patterns. (shrink)

Functionalism is a dominant but widely criticized perspective in social theory; my goal in this paper is to help clarify what functionalists claim, identify what would count as evidence for those claims and evaluate some standard criticisms. Functionalism relies essentially on functional explanations of the form "A exists in order to B." I point out problems with previous accounts of such explanations, offer an improved account, and discuss in detail evidence that might confirm such explanations and its difficulties. I argue (...) that some functionalist accounts can be confirmed and that, contra the critics, functionalism's problems are not inherent errors, "only" practical ones. (shrink)

Change happens to us. It's measured in gains or losses: you find a spouse or lose a loved one; you receive a promotion or lose a job. Change happens around us. It's marked by natural and social factors: a good harvest, a natural disaster; an economic boom, a stock market plunge. Change is initiated by us. It's weighed by its outcome: you make a decision that improves your life; you make a choice that shatters your dreams. Transitional tides-whether personal or (...) cultural-can bring on stress, confusion, and even panic. Only a small percentage of people respond to change in truly effective ways. Yet how we deal with change determines whether it will ultimately be a positive or negative force in our lives. Best-selling author Dr. Myles Munroe explains how we can tap into the positive power of change-no matter what the source of that change-enabling us to thrive while fulfilling our God-given purposes in life. (shrink)

A belief must have justification if it is to count as knowledge. And it is a commonplace thought that in certain circumstances experiences can serve as justifications for beliefs. Moreover, many have thought that there is something distinctive about the wayin which experiences justify beliefs, and that there is something distinctive about experiences which accounts for the distinctive way in which they justify beliefs. In this paper, I seek to elucidate views about experience and justification that can make sense of (...) these thoughts and that can show us why so many have been attracted to them.I think it is important to try to make sense of these thoughts concerning the justificatory role of experiences, for I suspect that we are losing the ability to see why philosophers have traditionally been attracted to such thoughts. Coherentism and reliabilism, perhaps the two most currently popular theories of epistemic justification, appear simply to reject the idea that experiences can justify beliefs. (shrink)