I would like to thank Barbara S. Kanner, Occidental College, for her inspiration is establishing the importance of historiographical and bibliographical essays in women's history and Mary Elizabeth Perry, University of Southern California, for comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. My students in ‘The Reformation Debate on Women’ at the Harvard Divinity School and in ‘The Renaissance’ and ‘Woman and Man in Western Thought’, at Occidental College fostered lively discussions on the ‘image’ of the Renaissance woman. In (...) particular, I would like to thank Muffy Barman, Occidental College, for an Occidental Independent Study in 1986, parallel to my research on the woman question in the Renaissance. At the Huntington Library Seminar on Women's Studies, 6 December 1986, I gave an address on 'The Renaissance Debate on Women' which will appear in the 1986–1987 Proceedings. (shrink)

Mary Anne Warren investigates a theoretical question that is at the centre of practical and professional ethics: what are the criteria for having moral status? That is: what does it take to be an entity towards which people have moral considerations? Warren argues that no single property will do as a sole criterion, and puts forward seven basic principles which establish moral status. She then applies these principles to three controversial moral issues: voluntary euthanasia, abortion, and the status (...) of non-human animals. (shrink)

Does birth make a difference to the moral rights of the fetus/infant? Should it make a difference to its legal rights? Most contemporary philosophers believe that birth cannot make a difference to moral rights. If this is true, then it becomes difficult to justify either a moral or a legal distinction between late abortion and infanticide. I argue that the view that birth is irrelevant to moral rights rests upon two highly questionable assumptions about the theoretical foundations of moral rights. (...) If we reject these assumptions, then we are free to take account of the contrasting biological and social relationships that make even relatively late abortion morally different from infanticide. (shrink)

"Readers interested in feminist studies, applied ethics, or social and political philosophy should find Gendercide especially interesting and informative. Highly recommended."-CHOICE.

By a potential person I shall mean an entity which is not now a person but which is capable of developing into a person, given certain biologically and/or technologically possible conditions. This is admittedly a narrower sense than some would attach to the term ‘potential'. After all, people of the twenty-fifth century, if such there will be, are in some sense potential people now, even though the specific biological entities from which they will develop, i.e. the particular gametes or concepti, (...) do not yet exist. For there do exist, in the reproductive capacities of people now living and in the earth's resources, conditions adequate to produce these future people eventually, provided of course that various possible catastrophes are avoided. Indeed, in some sense of ‘potential’ there have been countless billions of potential people from the beginning of time. But I am concerned not with such remote potentialities but with currently existing entities that are capable of developing into people. (shrink)

When deciding what disorders to screen newborns for, we should be guided by evidence of real effectiveness, take opportunity cost into account, distribute costs and benefits fairly, and respect human rights. Current newborn screening policy does not meet these requirements.

This chapter contains sections titled: What is Moral Status? The Moral Agency Theory The Genetic Humanity Theory The Sentience Theory The Organic Life Theory Two Relationship‐based Theories Combining these Criteria Principles of Moral Status Human Zygotes, Embryos, and Fetuses Are All Animals Equal? Machines and Artificial Life‐forms Conclusion.

This paper uses the controversy over the denial of care on futility grounds as a window into the broader issue of the role of cost in decisions about treatment near the end of life. The focus is on a topic that has not received the attention it deserves: the difference between refusing medical treatment and demanding it. The author discusses health care reform and the ethics of cost control, arguing that we cannot achieve universal access to quality care at affordable (...) care without better public understanding of the moral legitimacy of taking cost into account in health care decisions, even decisions at the end of life. (shrink)

In 1989, Helga Wanglie, 86 years old, broke her hip. This began a medical downhill course that a year later caused her health care providers to conclude that she would not benefit from continued medical treatment. It would be futile, and therefore, should not be provided. Her husband disagreed, and the conflict eventually led to a lawsuit. The Wanglie case touched off an extended debate in the medical and bioethical literature about medical futility: what it means and how useful the (...) concept is in making ethical decisions about starting or stopping treatment. (shrink)

Mary Anne Perkins re-examines Coleridge's claim to have developed a "logosophic" system which attempted "to reduce all knowledges into harmony." She pays particular attention to his later writings, some of which are still unpublished. She suggests that the accusations of plagiarism and of muddled, abstruse metaphysics which have been levelled at him may be challenged by a thorough reading of his work in which its unifying principle is revealed. She explores the various meanings of the term "logos," a (...) recurrent theme in every area of Coleridge's thought--philosophy, religion, natural science, history, political and social criticism, literary theory, and psychology. Coleridge was responding to the concerns of his own time, a revolutionary age in which increasing intellectual and moral fragmentation and confusion seemed to him to threaten both individuals and society. Drawing on the whole of Western intellectual history, he offered a ground for philosophy which was relational rather than mechanistic. He is one of those few thinkers whose work appears to become more interesting and his perceptions more acute as the historical gulf widens. This book is a contribution to the reassessment that he deserves. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the struggle for women’s suffrage in Kuwait to determine how and why it was successful. The research highlights two paradoxical findings: first, democratic progress occurred despite the pacifying and hindering effects of modernization; second, it was supported more strongly and effectively by Kuwait's autocratic executive than the democratically elected Kuwaiti parliament. We delineate two psychological factors that were connected to the climax of the struggle as they were experienced and acted upon by a relatively small number of (...) Kuwaiti middle- and upper-class women: transformative events and the tying of struggle goals to self-esteem. We examine these factors in the context of interaction between chaotic political circumstances and the new strategy and tactics that suffragists employed in the last phase of their struggle. The analytic approach involves process tracing, field research, interviews, and longitudinal analysis of primary and secondary sources. (shrink)

The Commission on the Accreditation of Law Enforcement employs rigorous evaluation techniques. Objective accreditation, such as made possible by CALEA, is important from the public’s perspective and in the national community of law enforcement.To counteract a general distrust of law enforcement agencies, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration developed a grant to develop standards by which the quality and performance of law enforcement could be measured. LEAA developed 107 standards and, though well received by the law enforcement community, no single group (...) or agency took the initiative to begin a program to evaluate and implement the standards. In 1979, the Department of Justice established an additional grant that effectively organized the four major law enforcement groups: the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriff’s Association, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, and the Police Executive Research Forum. (shrink)

The Forum and the Tower tackles a fascinating and perennial topic: the relationship between the academy and the world of politics. The accomplished Harvard law professor Mary Ann Glendon traces this crucial relationship from Classical Greece taking readers through the Roman Empire, Renaissance Italy, the English revolution, the Federalist era in the US, the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, the Concert of Europe, the progressive era, and the New Deal/World War II era.

The past 25 years have seen an upsurge of interest in the figure of Mary Magdalene, whose image has been transformed through feminist scholarship from penitent prostitute to prominent disciple of Jesus. This article documents another, non-academic, interpretation of Mary Magdalene – the image of Mary as goddess or embodiment of the female divine. The most influential proponent of this view is Margaret Starbird, who hypothesizes that Mary was both Jesus’ wife and his divine feminine counterpart. (...) The author suggests that feminist theologians/thealogians should be aware of this popular understanding of Mary; and consider what it is about Mary Magdalene as the sacred feminine/bride of Jesus/sophia that captures the public imagination in a way that other feminist christologies do not. (shrink)

I examine a problem or dilemma of legitimation faced by the critical theorist who takes as the object of his or her critique a totality of which she or he is a part. The dilemma is that the theorist must either illegitimately exempt her critical theory from the determining influences of the totality or lose normative authority. The critics I examine in detail are: Adorno and Horkheimer; Kant; Hegel; feminist standpoint epistemologists, in particular, Sandra Harding; Irigaray; Foucault; and Arendt. ;I (...) conclude that a purely theoretical or epistemic ground for the legitimacy of totalizing critique is impossible; philosophical critique must involve an extra-rational faith or a political commitment. However, I also argue that the project of theoretical grounding should not be abandoned. I continue this project by drawing out of the critical theorists I examined some preliminary concepts and strategies that may, after further development, serve to provide a theory of the legitimacy of critical philosophy. (shrink)