Economics and psychology are both sciences of human behaviour. This paper gives a survey of their interaction. First, the changing relationship between the two sciences is discussed: while economics was once imperialistic, it has become a science inspired by psychological insights. In order to illustrate this, recent developments and evidence for three major areas are presented: bounded rationality, non-selfish behaviour, and the economics of happiness.

Die unendlichen Vermogen des menschlichen Geistes dokumentierten sich fuer den Wiederbegruender der Platonischen Akademie in Florenz, Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) vor allem in weltgestaltenden Handlungen und fuehrten ihn so zur These von der Gottlichkeit des Menschen. Anlaalich des 500. Todestages des Renaissancephilosophen werden die Grundlagen und praktischen Konsequenzen dieses bis heute nachwirkenden Menschenbildes aus den unterschiedlichsten Blickwinkeln diskutiert. Mit Beitragen von: Jorg Hardy, Udo Reinhold Jeck, Hubert Benz, Achim Wurm, Detlef Thiel, Orrin F. Summerell, Matthias Bloch, Alexander F. Lohner, (...) Burkhard Mojsisch. (shrink)

Conventional economic theory assumes that people care only about ultimate outcomes and are indifferent to the decision and allocation processes by which outcomes are brought about. Building on Sen (1997), I relax this assumption, and investigate the formal and philosophical issues that arise. I extend the formal apparatus of preference theory to analyse how processes may enter preferences, and investigate whether traditional invariance requirements like the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference are still satisfied in this new setting. I show that (...) it is, provided certain conditions of separability hold, and I discuss the plausibility of these conditions. Further, I argue that processes are often valued in a mode that diverges from the conventional modes of instrumental and intrinsic/independent valuation. I introduce the notion of dependent non-instrumental valuation, and show how processes could depend on their instrumental function for their value – making their value dependent – and yet derive their value from something else – making it non-instrumental. Dependent non-instrumental value, I argue, can be explained by symbolic and evidential relations between processes and outcomes. (Published Online July 31 2007) Footnotes1 This article is based on the third chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation (Sandbu 2003). I would like to thank Richard Tuck for many discussions over several years, which helped me develop and elaborate the ideas presented here. I am also very grateful to Amartya Sen, Nien-hê Hsieh, Luc Bovens, and Xaq Pitkow for their close readings of various versions of the paper and their incisive comments, questions, and suggestions. Further thanks go to Christopher Avery, Matthias Benz, Jerry Green, Waheed Hussain, David Laibson, Robert Sugden, Alan Strudler, Justin Wolfers, and seminar participants at Harvard University and the Wharton School of Business. Akshay Jashnani provided helpful research assistance. Most of the ideas in the present article were developed while I was the recipient of a doctoral grant from the Research Council of Norway, which I gratefully acknowledge. (shrink)

In this paper we ask whether approximation for abstract argumentation is useful in practice, and in particular whether reasoning with grounded semantics – which has polynomial runtime – is already an approximation approach sufficient for several practical purposes. While it is clear from theoretical results that reasoning with grounded semantics is different from, for example, skeptical reasoning with preferred semantics, we investigate how significant this difference is in actual argumentation frameworks. As it turns out, in many graphs models, reasoning with (...) grounded semantics actually approximates reasoning with other semantics almost perfectly. An algorithm for grounded reasoning is thus a conceptually simple approximation algorithm that not only does not need a learning phase – like recent approaches – but also approximates well – in practice – several decision problems associated to other semantics. (shrink)

Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? (...) Understood more broadly, epistemology is about issues having to do with the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry. This article will provide a systematic overview of the problems that the questions above raise and focus in some depth on issues relating to the structure and the limits of knowledge and justification. (shrink)

Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal of the concept of voluntary control. If we (...) endorse a compatibilist construal, it turns out that we enjoy voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes after all. If, on the other hand, we endorse a libertarian construal, the result is that, for our doxastic attitudes to be suitable objects of deontological evaluation, they need not be under our voluntary control. (shrink)

Human and animal interests are often in conflict. In many situations, however, it is unclear how to evaluate and weigh competing human and animal interests, as the satisfaction of the interests of one group often inevitably occurs at the expense of those of the other group. Human-animal conflicts of this kind give rise to ethical questions. If animals count morally for their own sake, then we must ask in which cases the satisfaction or frustration of the interests of humans and (...) animals in conflict situations is justified or unjustified from an ethical perspective. In this article, we argue that limited aggregation accounts represent a promising means for resolving interspecies conflicts. The reason for this is that they can appropriately consider the qualitative relevance of interests, their relative importance to each other, and the number of individuals affected. For our argument, we start from the premise that animals count morally for their own sake, albeit to a lesser extent than humans. That is, we accept the view that animals may be used, for example, as a source of food or in animal research. However, as we will show, many basic interests of animals are sufficiently similar to human interests and can thus be compared to them. Hence, they ought to be aggregated in cases of conflict with human interests. We illustrate our account and its practical implications with the real-world example of a human-animal conflict during the outbreak of a zoonotic disease among farmed animals. We conclude that, in many cases, animal interests ought to be given more importance than they currently receive, which includes distributing the burdens and risks of farming practices more fairly. (shrink)

This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.

Der Zeuge spielt eine zentrale Rolle in den Szenarien der Wahrheitsfindung und in Kontexten der Verhandlung und Verwaltung von Erkenntnis und Wissen. Gleichzeitig gilt, dass ein mittels Zeugenschaft generiertes Wissen immer einen umstrittenen Status hatte - und hat. Das Zeugnis bedarf stets einer Akkreditierung durch den oder die Empfänger, um Geltung erlangen zu können. In diesem Band werden verschiedene Typen und Formen des testimonialen Wissens diskutiert, kulturhistorische und systematische Perspektiven zusammengeführt und in ihren Verflechtungen zwischen epistemischem Wert und ethischer, politischer, (...) sozialer, künstlerischer und religiöser Bedeutung beleuchtet. Im Fokus stehen dabei vor allem die Praktiken und Handlungsszenarien der Bezeugung, da sich in ihren Konstellationen und Dynamiken die Frage der Glaubwürdigkeit des Zeugnisses und die Optionen zur Etablierung eines Zeugenwissens entscheiden.--Backcover. (shrink)

When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that (...) a sense experience that P is a source of justification—a reason—for believing that P? Call this the Question. I will discuss various answers to the Question, and defend the one I myself favor. (shrink)

François Jacob, biologiste français et Prix Nobel, a souligné dans les années 1970 que les sciences, les technologies et leur cortège expérimental font intervenir " un jeu des possibles " et constituent pour cette raison " une machine à fabriquer de l'avenir ". Autrement dit, les activités scientifiques, médicales ou encore artistiques exigent que soient instaurés des dispositifs qui à la fois concrétisent et contrôlent la génération de connaissances nouvelles et de pratiques originales. Ce livre vise à explorer les articulations (...) multiples entre les activités créatives et leurs limites constitutives. Les articles posent la question des limites de la créativité à partir de perspectives philosophiques et sociologiques tout en se référant à des études de cas qui sont à l'interface entre sciences, arts et normes sociotechniques. Le livre est le résultat d'une recherche sur la créativité menée à l'IRIST (Institut de Recherches Interdisciplinaires sur les Sciences et la Technologie) à l'Université de Strasbourg. (shrink)

In this article, we hypothesize that leaders who display group-oriented values (i.e., values that focus on the welfare of the group rather than on the self-interest of the leader) will be evaluated more positively by their followers than leaders who do not display group-oriented values. Importantly, we expected these effects to be more pronounced for leaders who are ingroup members (i.e., stemming from the same social group as their followers) than for leaders who are outgroup members (i.e., leaders stemming from (...) a different social group than their followers). We tested our hypotheses in two studies. Results of a field study (N = 95) showed the expected relationship between leaders’ group-oriented values and followers’ identification with their leaders. A scenario study (N = 137) replicated the results and extended it to followers’ endorsement of their leaders. Overall, these findings suggest that displaying group-oriented values pays off more for ingroup than for outgroup leaders. (shrink)

I propose a version of foundationaUsm with the following distinctive features. First, it includes in the class of basic beliefs ordinary beliefs about physical objects. This makes it unrestricted. Second, it assigns the role of ultimate justifiers to A-states: states of being appeared to in various ways. Such states have propositional content, and are justifiers if they are presumptively reliable. The beliefs A-states justify are basic if they are non-inferential. In the last three sections of the paper, I defend this (...) version of foundationalism against Sellars's famous anti-foundationalist dilemma, according to which sense-experiential states can't be justifiers ifthey lack propositional content, and can't terminate the justificatory regress if they have propositional content. I argue that the latter of these two claims is false. A-states can play the role of justifiers because they have propositional content, and they can terminate the justificatory regress because they themselves are capable of neither being true or false, nor being justified or unjustified. (shrink)

Is it possible to argue that one’s memory is reliable without using one’s memory? I argue that it is not. Since it is not, it is impossible to defend the reliability of one’s memory without employing reasoning that is epistemically circular. Hence, if epistemic circularity is vicious, it is impossible to succeed in producing a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s memory. The same applies to any other one of one’s cognitive faculties. I further argue that, if epistemic circularity (...) is vicious, it is impossible to produce a cogent argument for the reliability of anything. For example, if epistemic circularity were vicious, a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s car would not be possible. The seeming viciousness of epistemic circularity even threatens, I propose, the possibility of justification and knowledge. Much, therefore, hangs one the question of whether epistemic circularity is indeed bad. I argue that epistemic circularity, or bootstrapping, need not be bad. When we use a crystal ball—a source perspicuously guilty of unreliability—to confirm its own reliability, bootstrapping is foolish. When we attribute reliability to a witness solely because the witness says he is reliable, bootstrapping is dogmatic. Foolish and dogmatic bootstrapping are bad. However, when a witness provides a rich body of testimony, using that testimony to gauge the witness’s reliability need not be a vicious form of circularity. When done critically, I argue, such reasoning exemplifies a form of bootstrapping that is benign. (shrink)

It is commonly held that the ascription of truth to a sentence is intersubstitutable with that very sentence. However, the simplest subclassical logics available to proponents of this view, namely K3 and LP, are hopelessly weak for many purposes. In this article, I argue that this is much more of a problem for proponents of LP than for proponents of K3. The strategies for recapturing classicality offered by proponents of LP are far less promising than those available to proponents of (...) K3. This undermines the ability of proponents LP to engage in public reasoning in classical domains. (shrink)

This handbook pursues an integrated communication approach. Drawing on the various fields of organizational communication and their relevance for CSR, it addresses innovative topics such as big data, social media, and the convergence of communication channels, as well as the roles they play in a successfully integrated CSR communication program. Further aspects covered include the analysis of sector-specific, cross-cultural, and ethical challenges related to the effective communication of CSR. This handbook is unique in its consistent focus on integrated communication. It (...) is of interest not only for the scientific discourse, but will also benefit those corporations that not only seek to operate in a socially responsible manner, but also to communicate their efforts to their various stakeholders. Besides its significant value for researchers and professionals, the book can also be used as a reference for undergraduate and graduate students interested in successful CSR communication. (shrink)

This open access book presents an ethical approach to utilizing personal medical data. It features essays that combine academic argument with practical application of ethical principles. The contributors are experts in ethics and law. They address the challenges in the re-use of medical data of the deceased on a voluntary basis. This pioneering study looks at the many factors involved when individuals and organizations wish to share information for research, policy-making, and humanitarian purposes. Today, it is easy to donate blood (...) or even organs, but it is virtually impossible to donate one’s own medical data. This is seen as ethically unacceptable. Yet, data donation can greatly benefit the welfare of our societies. This collection provides timely interdisciplinary research on biomedical big data. Topics include the ethics of data donation, the legal and regulatory challenges, and the current and future collaborations. Readers will learn about the ethical and regulatory challenges associated with medical data donations. They will also better understand the special nature of using deceased data for research purposes with regard to ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, and justice. In addition, the contributors identify the key governance issues of such a scheme. The essays also look at what we can learn in terms of best practice from existing medical data schemes. (shrink)

The New Testament, while rejecting any superficial connection between illness and sin, does not reject a possible connection between illness and a person's relationship with God. An example can be seen in the story of the young blind man who was healed. His blindness does not result from any fault he or his parents had committed but apparently from God's wish to reveal his own healing power. The inner blindness of the Pharisees is a different type of blindness far more (...) difficult to heal. The blind young man was actually healed, not only in body but also in soul. Such miraculous healings are rare nowadays. However, if one takes a closer look at modern genetics and psycho-neuro-immunological findings, one may come to a better understanding of how miracle healings are linked to man's inner life and therefore also to his religiousness. Many diseases have genetic backgrounds. Defective genes, however, do not necessarily lead to subsequent illness. Genes have to be switched on or off. Only activated genes trigger pathological change. The human brain and all of man's thinking and feeling are intimately connected with such activations. We may thus conclude that both inner life and religious outlook on life are relevant to the origin and development of diseases. (shrink)

Traditionally, the manufacturer/operator of a machine is held (morally and legally) responsible for the consequences of its operation. Autonomous, learning machines, based on neural networks, genetic algorithms and agent architectures, create a new situation, where the manufacturer/operator of the machine is in principle not capable of predicting the future machine behaviour any more, and thus cannot be held morally responsible or liable for it. The society must decide between not using this kind of machine any more (which is not a (...) realistic option), or facing a responsibility gap, which cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility ascription. (shrink)

This book explores the contributions of East Asian traditions, particularly Buddhism and (Euro)Daoism, to environmental philosophy. It critically examines the conceptions of human responsibility toward nature and across time presented within these traditions as well as in European philosophy. The volume rethinks human relationships to the natural world by focusing on three main themes: Daoist and Eurodaoist perspectives on nature, human responsibility toward nature, and Buddhist perspectives on life and nature. By way of discussing East Asian traditions and European thinkers, (...) this collection reveals that the impact of humanity on the environment is shaped not only by distinctive modes of economic production, but also by cultural beliefs and practices. Representing a unique constellation of environmental and intercultural philosophy, the contributions present systematic approaches to the global need for cultivating environmental responsibility across cultures and generations to address the political, ethical, and aesthetic challenges arising from humanity’s transformative impact on the natural world. (shrink)

The primary objective of this anthology is to make intergenerational justice an issue for intercultural philosophy, and, conversely, to allow the latter to enrich the former. In times of large-scale environmental destabilization, fair- ness between generations is an urgent issue of justice across time, but it is also a global issue of justice across geographical and nation-state borders. This means that the future generations envisioned by the currently living also cross these borders. Thus, different philosophical cultures and traditions of thought (...) should converse to re ect on what is fair to future people. In the remainder of this introduction, we will detail these claims and give an overview of the volume’s chapters. (shrink)

Whoever hesitates to utter that which he thinks the highest truth, lest it should be too much m advance of the time, may reassure himself by looking at his act DEGREES from an impersonal point of view.... It is not for nothing that he has in him these sympathies with some principles and repugnance to others. He, with all his capacities, and aspirations, and beliefs, is not an accident, but a product of the time. He must remember that while he (...) is a descendant of the past he is a parent of the future; and that his thoughts are as children born to him, which he may not carelessly let die. Herbert S. (shrink)

Skeptics claim that we know radically less than we think we do. For example, skeptics might claim that we have next to no knowledge of the past, the future, or other minds. Here we will consider the skeptical claim that we have next to no knowledge of the external world: the world of physical objects that we at least seem to perceive. One well-known argument in support of this claim appeals to the possibility of being a BIV: a brain in (...) a vat. According to the BIV Hypothesis, you are a mere BIV without a normal body. This of course means, among other things, that you don't have hands. The nerve endings of your brain are stimulated in a manner so sophisticated that the perfect illusion of a normal life is generated. Let's distinguish between the.. (shrink)

Hilbert developed his famous finitist point of view in several essays in the 1920s. In this paper, we discuss various extensions of it, with particular emphasis on those suggested by Hilbert and Bernays in Grundlagen der Mathematik (vol. I 1934, vol. II 1939). The paper is in three sections. The first deals with Hilbert's introduction of a restricted ? -rule in his 1931 paper ?Die Grundlegung der elementaren Zahlenlehre?. The main question we discuss here is whether the finitist (meta-)mathematician would (...) be entitled to accept this rule as a finitary rule of inference. In the second section, we assess the strength of finitist metamathematics in Hilbert and Bernays 1934. The third and final section is devoted to the second volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik. For preparatory reasons, we first discuss Gentzen's proposal of expanding the range of what can be admitted as finitary in his esssay ?Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der reinen Zahlentheorie? (1936). As to Hilbert and Bernays 1939, we end on a ?critical? note: however considerable the impact of this work may have been on subsequent developments in metamathematics, there can be no doubt that in it the ideals of Hilbert's original finitism have fallen victim to sheer proof-theoretic pragmatism. (shrink)

Freges Kontextprinzip "Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas" hat auch nach der von ihm vollzogenen Angleichung von Behauptungssätzen an Eigennamen Gültigkeit für die formale Sprache der "Grundgesetze". Der Bedeutungsvollständigkcitsbeweis, den er für sein Logiksystem anstrebt, schließt eine unmittelbare Anwendung dieses Prinzips nicht nur auf die unvollständigen Funktionsausdrücke, sondern auch auf die leerstellenfreien Wertverlaufsnamen ein. Wahrheitsnamen (Sätze) zeichnen sich vor anderen symbolsprachlichen Eigennamen in mehrfacher Hinsicht, insbesondere durch ihre semantische Selbständigkeit aus. Wertverlaufsnamen haben nur im Zusammenhang eines Wahrheitswertnamens (...) eine Bedeutung. Ihre Bedeutung besteht in ihrem Beitrag zur Bestimmung der Bedeutung von Wahrheitswertnamen, in denen sie vorkommen. (shrink)

Once the post-modern account of individual and cultural identity as creative openness to change is re-construed in terms of a constructivist rendering of the semiotic theory of culture, and once inter-denominational and inter-faith hospital chaplaincy is interpreted on a model of cross-cultural communication which agrees with this theory, chaplains can conceive of their ability to fulfill their mission in offering understanding and help to the client from other faith communities only by explicitly invoking the intervention of the Holy Spirit. The (...) commentary argues that Schneider-Harpprecht’s all too generalized account of that intervention leaves chaplains with no spiritual substance for distinguishing between truely and only apparent pastoral helpfulness. (shrink)

One of the major political problems the world faces at the moment of its so-called globalization concerns the possibilities of maintaining, transforming, and expanding democracy. Globalization, as the extension of neo-liberal markets, the formation of multi-national, non-democratic economic powers, and the ubiquitous use of teletechnologies, threatens the modus vivendi of older democracies in ways that call for the reinvention of an old idea. Inasmuch as teletechnical globalization transforms space and time so as to put into question their very presence, and (...) inasmuch as deconstruction has always sought to rethink the constitution as well as deconstitution of the metaphysics of presence, I will here examine the concept of democracy that Jacques Derrida developed over the last few years of his life. (shrink)

Ryles Concept of Mind gilt als ebenso überholt wie logischer Behaviorismus und sprachanalytische Philosophie, denen er zugerechnet wird. Ryle betreibt jedoch keinen logischen Behaviorismus, da er das mentale Vokabular nicht zu beseitigen versucht. Für die sprachanalytische Philosophie bilden sich die Begriffe der Umgangssprache in der Auseinandersetzung mit der Welt, spiegeln daher auch die Weh wider. In den von Putnam gegen diese These konstruierten Situationen mit veränderten Wortverwendungsweisen sind auch die Referenten verändert. Putnam hat in der philosophy of mind eine ähnliche (...) Position wie Ryle. Hauptunterschiede sind seine unhaltbare Stilisierung der Turing-Maschinen-Analogie zum Funktionalismus und die Ablehnung des Common-Sense zugunsten der Wissenschaft. Diese läuft leer, da v.a. Begriffe, die sich auf unser Erleben der Welt beziehen, ihren Ursprung in der Grundbefindlichkeit des Menschen haben. Ryle hat gezeigt, daß auch diese öffentlich, d.h. rationaler Argumentation zugänglich sind. (shrink)

While in the Netherlands there are complaints about the „emptiness of a culture of tolerance“ we can find attempts to „surmount“ the concept of integration in France, because immigrants feel culturally neglected by the French tradition of republicanism with its „enforced cultural equalization“. A conceptual analysis of the central terms may help to see why from different points of view there seems to be a „lack of difference“. The paper entails a plea for tolerance seen as acceptance of individuals within (...) their original culture but argues that group rights for minorities should be conceded only in special and rare cases. (shrink)

We investigated the influence of stimulus base rates on the Implicit Association Test . Using an East/West-German attitude-IAT, we demonstrated that both overall response speed and differential response speed underlying IAT effects depend on the relative frequencies of the stimulus categories. First, when those stimuli that are more common in reality also occurred more frequently in the stimulus list, response speed generally increased. Second, IAT effects increased when congruent blocks profited from the compatibility of frequency-based response biases , whereas IAT (...) effects decreased when incongruent trial blocks profited from response compatibility. These findings demonstrate that the stimulus context moderates the magnitude of the IAT effect. Simultaneously, they highlight the need to explore the extent to which implicit measures reflect properties of the task or the environment rather than attributes of test-takers. (shrink)

The exhaustion particles of the Yi languages are sentence-end morphemes with a surprising wealth of possible interpretations. With gradeable states they convey the meaning of superlative, with accomplishments they function as completive particle, and in ungradeable states, activities or achievements they act as all particles, i.e. as universal non-distributive quantifiers, on the first argument. A unified account of the all -, completive - and superlative -meanings is proposed. It is argued that all three notions basically divide their respective domain into (...) three types: a singular domain type, a quantized domain type and a homogeneous domain type. For events there is also a fourth domain type, the bounded domain type, which does not have an analogy with objects and states. Object-denotations Event-denotations State-denotations Singular Individual OD Punctual ED Ungradeable SD Quantized Quantized OD Quantized ED State with quantized comparison class Bounded — Bounded ED — Homogeneous Homogeneous OD Homogeneous ED State with homogeneous comparison class The all -, the completive - and the superlative -meanings of the exhaustion particles have in common that they are incompatible with entities from the singular domain type, pragmatically implausible with entities from the homogeneous domain type, and compatible with entities from the quantized domain type. (shrink)

P. Churchland argued for the nomological character of action explanation by presenting an alleged law - I call it below L2 - which, according to Churchland, we make use ofimplicitly when explaining rational actions. I shall argue that Churchland 'sargumentation is not complete because he does not exclude an alternative interpretation of L2. According to this alternative interpretation, L2 is not a law, but, it indicates the general form of complete action explanations. I shall argue that this alternative interpretation is (...) more acceptable than Churchland 's interpretation of L2 as a law. Moreover, if the alleged law is interpreted as the general form of action explanations, then Churchland 's article even transforms itself into a confirmation ofthe non-nomological character of action explanation. I conclude my article with some short remarks about action explanation as a kind of non-nomological explanation. (shrink)

How can we understand the intensifying interactions of science and society? The answers are found in part in the interdisciplinary field called science studies. This field provides us with a rich inventory of analytical approaches. It helps us explore science as a practice, a subsystem, a culture, and an institution. Its observation is that science today is part and parcel of what has come to be known as "knowledge society." Nine exemplary studies that inquire into, or are themselves examples of (...) the dynamics of scientific knowledge are included in this book. They cover issues as diverse as eugenics, climate research, and the role of historiography, and make use of different tools such as evolutionary reasoning, metaphor, and bibliometrics. Finally, they ponder the need for science to go public as well as for society to regulate knowledge and restructure universities as the building blocks of our science system. The message is that science studies can and should assume an active role in observing, reflecting, and communicating the intricate encounters of science and society today. Sabine Maasen teaches sociology at Basel University, Switzerland. Matthias Winterhager is senior researcher and coordinator of bibliometric studies at the Institute for Science and Technology Studies, University of Bielefeld, Germany. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Kerry McKenzie identifies theory change in science as a source for doubts about the value of engaging in metaphysics of science before a final theory is at hand. According to McKenzie, the basic problem is that naturalized metaphysics lacks a concept of progress. More specifically, naturalized metaphysics lacks a concept of progress as approximation that can easily be taken to correspond to the scientific sources of naturalized metaphysical inquiry. In this paper, we criticise the proposed concept (...) of progress as approximation as too narrow a concept, notably, even in science, and propose an alternative notion of scientific progress that metaphysical investigations can and do latch on to, namely progress understood as exploring and constraining theory space. First, we motivate this notion of progress via an examination of progress in particle physics and propose that it can be applied to metaphysics as well. Second, we argue that this notion of progress leads to a convincing reply to McKenzie's argument. Third, we discuss how this notion of progress relates to the program of naturalized metaphysics and argue that it speaks in favor of a more lenient version of naturalistically-inclined metaphysics, namely inductive metaphysics. (shrink)