There are three interconnected goals of this paper. The first is to articulate and motivate a view of the methodology for doing metaphysics that is broadly phenomenological in the sense of Husserl circa the Logical Investigations. The second is to articulate an argument for the importance of studying the history of philosophy when doing metaphysics that is in accordance with this methodology. The third is to confront this methodology with a series of objections and determine how well it (...) fares in light of them. (shrink)

This article addresses Franklin Gamwell's critique of Alasdair MacIntyre's account of the nature of rational justification. I argue that MacIntyreans have good reasons to take seriously Gamwell's critique, and thus to reformulate MacIntyre's position to make clear that that position does not rest on a denial of all a priori claims. The author outlines such a reformulation, drawing heavily on MacIntyre's account (in his 1990 Aquinas Lecture) of the place of a priori claims within the development of rational traditions of (...) inquiry. When thus rethought, MacIntyre's position grounds a twofold response to Gamwell's critique. (shrink)

The author states that, taking into account Collingwood's unpublished manuscripts, there is an important relation between Collingwood's doctrine of absolute presuppositions and his theory of historical understanding.

This article addresses Franklin Gamwell's critique of Alasdair MacIntyre's account of the nature of rational justification. I argue that MacIntyreans have good reasons to take seriously Gamwell's critique, and thus to reformulate MacIntyre's position to make clear that that position does not rest on a denial of all a priori claims. The author outlines such a reformulation, drawing heavily on MacIntyre's account (in his 1990 Aquinas Lecture) of the place of a priori claims within the development of rational traditions of (...) inquiry. When thus rethought, MacIntyre's position grounds a twofold response to Gamwell's critique. (shrink)

This volume introduces readers to a selected number of core issues in metaphysics that have been central in the history of philosophy and remain foundational to contemporary debates, that is: substances; properties; modality and essence; causality; determinism and free will. Anna Marmodoro and Erasmus Mayr take a neo-Aristotelian approach both in the selection and presentation of the topics. But Marmodoro and Mayr's discussion is not narrowly partisan-it consistently presents opposing sides of the debate and addresses issues from different philosophical (...) traditions, and encourages readers to draw their own conclusions about them. (shrink)

This essay examines Wolfhart Pannenberg’s defense of metaphysics’ foundational importance for philosophy and theology. Among all the modern philosophers whose claims Pannenberg challenges, Martin Heidegger’s discourse against Western metaphysics receives the major portion of criticism. The first thing one concludes from this criticism is an affirmation of a wide intellectual gap that separates Pannenberg’s thought from Heidegger’s, as if each stands at the very opposite corner of the other’s school of thought. The questions this essay tackles are: is (...) this seemingly irreconcilable difference between Pannenberg and Heidegger fully justifiable? What if there is a reading of Panneberg’s and Heidegger’s view of metaphysics that can reveal deeper similarities between the two thinkers than the first reading of Pannenberg’s criticism of Heidegger allows us to see? It then answers these questions by showing that both thinkers actually share a common emphasis on the concepts of ‘time/history’, ‘self-disclosure’ and ‘anticipation’, and their reliance on these notions reveals that Heidegger’s and Pannenberg’s approaches to the phenomenon of understanding and to metaphysical ontology are not fully contradictory but rather hold noticeable hermeneutical similarities. (shrink)

Undoubtedly, American Thomists owe a major share of their confident historical outlook to the writings of Professor Gilson whose latest work is formally concerned with the relative merits of Thomism and other important systems. This is not a new preoccupation with him, since a whole series of earlier books testify to his abiding interest in this problem. But he has now made a fresh exploration of the entire territory in the light of his revised view of the mind of St. (...) Thomas. During the war years, Gilson prepared a new edition of his pioneer study, Le Thomisme, in which the existential character of Thomistic wisdom is placed in high relief. St. Thomas regards God as the supreme and self-subsistent act of existing and the creative source of finite beings, whose highest act is also that of existing. This has a definite effect upon Thomistic metaphysics, since it involves a conception of being as something more than essence or nature. Both essence and existence are constitutive principles of being, and hence the science of being must be directed as well to the existential act. (shrink)

Undoubtedly, American Thomists owe a major share of their confident historical outlook to the writings of Professor Gilson whose latest work is formally concerned with the relative merits of Thomism and other important systems. This is not a new preoccupation with him, since a whole series of earlier books testify to his abiding interest in this problem. But he has now made a fresh exploration of the entire territory in the light of his revised view of the mind of St. (...) Thomas. During the war years, Gilson prepared a new edition of his pioneer study, Le Thomisme, in which the existential character of Thomistic wisdom is placed in high relief. St. Thomas regards God as the supreme and self-subsistent act of existing and the creative source of finite beings, whose highest act is also that of existing. This has a definite effect upon Thomistic metaphysics, since it involves a conception of being as something more than essence or nature. Both essence and existence are constitutive principles of being, and hence the science of being must be directed as well to the existential act. (shrink)

This selection of papers that were presented (or nearly so!) to the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science during the seventies fairly re presents some of the most disturbing issues of scientific knowledge in these years. To the distant observer, it may seem that the defense of rational standards, objective reference, methodical self-correction, even the distin guishing of the foolish from the sensible and the truth-seeking from the ideological, has nearly collapsed. In fact, the defense may be seen to (...) have shifted; the knowledge business came under scrutiny decades ago and, indeed, from the time of Francis Bacon and even far earlier, the practicality of the discovery of knowledge was either hailed or lamented. So the defense may be founded on the premise that science may yet be liberating. In that case, the analysis of philosophical issues expands to embrace issues of social interest and social function, of instrumentality and arbitrary perspective, of biological constraints (upon knowledge as well as upon the species-wide behavior of human beings in other relationships too), of distortions due to explanatory metaphors and imposed categories, and of radical comparisons among the perspectives of different civilizations. Some of our contributors are frankly programmatic, showing how problems must be formulated afresh, how evasions must be identified and omissions rectified, but they do not reach their own completion. (shrink)

I reconstruct my own journey into the history of the human sciences, which I show to have been a process of discovering the metaphysical standing of the human. I begin with Alexandre Koyré’s encounter with Edmund Husserl in the 1930s, which I use to throw light on the legacy of Kant’s ‘anthropological’ understanding of the human, which dominated and limited 19th-century science. As I show, those who broke from Kant’s strictures and set the stage for the 20th-century revolutions in science (...) - from Hegel, to John McTaggart, to Max Weber - typically were pursuing crypto-theological questions about how a finite being can comprehend an infinite universe. This journey is about the ‘common measure’ of being human, which is what links Plato to Kuhn, but has been most consistently taken up by law. I suggest that in seeking this ‘measure of man’, we may discover that to be human is not necessarily to be Homo sapiens, which would suggest a radical reorientation of the history of the human sciences. (shrink)

The volume concludes by examining a critique of Hegel's metaphysical position from the perspective of the "continental" tradition, and in particular Gilles ...

Putnam rejects "metaphysical realism," which takes "the world" to be a single complex thing, a connected causal or explanatory order into which all facts fit. he argues that such metaphysical realism is responsible for views he finds implausible; in particular, it can lead to moral relativism when one tries to locate the place of value in the world of fact. i agree that metaphysical realism will lead a thoughtful philosopher to moral relativism, but find neither of these views implausible. in (...) particular, putnam's main argument against metaphysical realism seems fallacious and his suggested alternative, to think of truth as the idea limit of rational inquiry, is clearly incorrect. (shrink)

With Hegel’s metaphysics attracting renewed attention, it is time to address a long-standing criticism: Scholars from Marx to Popper and Habermas have worried that Hegel’s metaphysics has anti-individualist and authoritarian implications, which are particularly pronounced in his Philosophy of History, since Hegel identifies historical progress with reason imposing itself on individuals. Rather than proposing an alternative non-metaphysical conception of reason, as Pippin or Brandom have done, this article argues that critics are broadly right in their metaphysical reading of (...) Hegel’s central concepts. However, they are mistaken about what Hegel’s approach entails, when one examines the specific types of states discussed by the philosopher in his Philosophy of History. Even on a traditional metaphysical reading, Hegel is not only non-authoritarian; he also makes a powerful argument concerning freedom, whereupon the freest society involves collective oversight and the shaping of social structures so as to ensure that they benefit everybody. (shrink)

"History and the Paradoxes of Metaphysics in" "Dantons Tod" is the first in-depth analysis exploring the dynamic relationship between Hegelian metaphysics and Georg Buchner's literary masterpiece. This study illuminates the fascinating paradoxes emerging from Buchner's portrayal of the collision of historical reality with the monumental concept of freedom developed in the monistic idealism of Hegel. It also brings to light much-neglected interconnections between Buchner's Hegelian reading of Spinoza and his theories on nature and history.".

The present study, primarily of a theoretical nature, endeavors to accomplish two distinct objectives. First and foremost, it endeavors to engage in a thoughtful examination of the metaphysical significance that Anaximander’s philosophy embodies within the context of the nascent Western philosophical tradition. Furthermore, it aims to investigate how it was contemporaneous Buddhist thought, coeval with Anaximander’s era, that more explicitly elucidated the concept of the “void” as an inherent aspect of authentic existence. This elucidation was articulated through aphoristic discourse rather (...) than being reliant on formal logical reasoning or structured arguments. (shrink)

Excerpt from Origin of History as Metaphysic The Muse Clio, carted from Pieria to the museums, can no longer be invoked without a libation to her warders, the numerous scribes, who have been busy since her fall correlating her steps, or her metamorphoses, as some say, for she has proved a difficult subject for classification: She is becoming bigger or better, nay she is growing many; she stations one foot in the beginning, but where is the other? Alas, it is (...) in Asia, and the head is a fake in need of restoration! Thus she has become Clio Tymbuchos in the professional hands of the scribes who find lively occupation exhuming and questioning her relics corked into formaldehyde and coffined into airtight compartments called historical facts. Men have speculated her into a new myth, a sepulchre of forms, and they have named the sepulchre History. But observe her resurrections! She has arisen, a mighty thing-in-herself with her own laws and growths and decays, and disembodied, dismembered, this apparition, this butterfly-concept called Clio, is expanding towards infinity. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

R. G. Collingwood’s writings do not sit neatly within any of the major approaches to metaphysics. Moore’s Evolution of Modern Metaphysics corrects the conventional exclusion of Collingwood’s thought, only to position him as contributing an ‘interlude’. I argue that this treatment does little to bring the far-reaching implications—and problems—of Collingwood’s reversible treatment of history as metaphysics and metaphysics as history to the fore. In particular, I highlight Collingwood’s not having worked through the ontological implications of historians (...) actively making meaning of the past, including potentially creating absolute presuppositions. In the end we are not sure whether this is ontologically committing or even a variety of modal fictionalism. (shrink)

AS THE subtlest part of his see-saw strategy in the Cratylus, Socrates recites several dozen comic etymologies. One of their explicit lessons is that the founders of language were Heracliteans who concealed the ontology of flux in common names. Socrates gives the etymologies, he says, to illustrate the Heraclitean Cratylus's pronouncement that names are natural. The etymologies are bait for Cratylus, of course; they are meant to lure him into a defense of his dogma. But they are more than a (...) stratagem. The Socratic etymologies raise the question whether philosophy can escape the history of its language--a history perhaps of concealed ontology or the tyranny of sense-experience or the myths of one's forefathers. Philosophy as articulate falls under forces, multiple and hardly known, which shape linguistic meaning. A question for Socrates, which I would like to make my own, is the question whether metaphysical inquiry can appropriate the history of the languages in which it must subsist. (shrink)

Like bundles of homogeneous light or particles that are scattered in physics experiments, says Goris, the homogeneous field of metaphysics was dispersed in the 14th century. He connects that dispersion to the contemporary rejection of metaphysics. His topics are the analysis of concepts, the contested primacy, scattering the homogeneous field of me.

The term metaphysics was formed at a time when physics and the physical categories constituted the whole of natural science and to describe the field of thought beyond physics. With the development of other fields of knowledge such as the biological and the historical, it has of necessity acquired a much broader meaning. It describes a field of speculative thought which lies beyond the categories of any of these sciences. In the present context the metaphysical is the meta-historical.

HEGEL EXPLICATES HIS THEORY of the history of philosophic thinking in several introductions to the various cycles of Lectures on the History of Philosophy held in Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin. Only the introductions to the first cycle of Heidelberg lectures and to the second cycle of Berlin lectures survive in Hegel's own hand. Since the earlier of these is an integral part of the latter, an analysis of the 1820 Introduction provides a reliable account of Hegel's theory.

HEGEL EXPLICATES HIS THEORY of the history of philosophic thinking in several introductions to the various cycles of Lectures on the History of Philosophy held in Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin. Only the introductions to the first cycle of Heidelberg lectures and to the second cycle of Berlin lectures survive in Hegel's own hand. Since the earlier of these is an integral part of the latter, an analysis of the 1820 Introduction provides a reliable account of Hegel's theory.

In The Metaphysics of Margaret Cavendish and Anne Conway, Marcy P. Lascano holds up the metaphysical views of two early modern women philosophers alongside one another in order to demonstrate that...

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Historiography in a metaphysical mode Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-17 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9524-6 Authors Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, CETCOPRA/Université Paris 1-Panthéon-Sorbonne, 17 Rue de la Sorbonne, 75231 Paris Cedex05, France Jan Golinski, Department of History, University of New Hampshire, 20 Academic Way, Durham, NH 03824, USA Lissa L. Roberts, Department of Science, Technology and Policy Studies (STePS), University of Twente, Postbox 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands John McEvoy, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN (...) 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)

Develops a theory of culture based on a metaphysics that elaborates on the Platonic and Confucian traditions. In Metaphysics of Goodness, Robert Cummings Neville extends Alfred North Whitehead’s project of cultural studies, which was based on a new metaphysics that Whitehead developed in Adventures of Ideas. Neville’s focus is value or goodness in many modes. The metaphysics treated in this book derive from the Platonic and Confucian traditions, with significant modifications of Whitehead, Peirce, Dewey, Confucius, Xunzi, (...) and Zhou Dunyi. Part one develops a theory of form based on a metaphysics of harmony. Part two elaborates a theory of art based on a metaphysics of beauty. Part three sketches a theory of personhood based on a metaphysics of obligation. Part four discusses civilization in a systematic way based on a metaphysics of flourishing. Throughout the book, Neville elaborates a theory of interpretation that is inspired by Peirce, Dewey, and Xunzi but is not limited to their ideas. While the reasoning of the book is concise, it employs methodologies from many kinds of philosophy, art criticism, ethics, and cultural studies, and sees philosophy as needing to learn from all these disciplines. “Neville’s work is informed by a lifelong engagement with the most important philosophers in history, including Plato, Aristotle, Whitehead, and Dewey. Here, he offers an important argument that there is beauty not only in how people see the world, but also in the world itself.” — Kevin Schilbrack, Appalachian State University. (shrink)

Could an "ideal theory" be false? metaphysical realism requires an affirmative answer. The question has usually been discussed in terms of physical theory. I argue that if we shift ground to historical narrative, We can be virtually certain that some "ideal stories" not only "can" be false, But "will" be false. If this argument is correct, Metaphysical realism is almost certainly true.

Professor Zenkovsky's work is a history in the grand manner --and a grand history it is. We are much indebted to Dr. George Kline for his lucid, readable translation. Our historian takes the basic theme of Russian thought to have been the relations of Christianity and secularism. This does not mean that there has been a dearth of studies in logic, philosophy of science, and so on; or that Zenkovsky neglects these or treats them unfairly or unintelligently. But his belief (...) is that "the genuinely vital creative problems of philosophic reflection derive from the Christian gospel and hence cannot be resolved apart from it." In the West, however, it has, he thinks, been difficult to see this because freedom of investigation has there become identified with opposition to the Church, while in Russia it has been possible to defend such freedom "from the religious point of view, taking the ecclesiastical tradition as point of departure, and giving oneself up fully to the 'free spontaneous force of theological investigation,' in Karsavin's familiar expression." The Russian view of the Church, as set forth by Khomyakov and Kireyevski, a hundred years ago, is not that of an "authority" wielded by officials or even councils, but of a community of members forming a spiritual organism in which they reach a level of life involving integral experience of the nature of reality. Ecclesiastical coercion, as in the West, is viewed as a heresy. Faith calls us to a life of freedom, rather than of "obedience." Zenkovsky regards as "romantic" the notion of a generally diffused spiritual insight which would make all important truths perfectly evident, but he seems to agree with the rejection of coercion. (shrink)