In their searching contributions to this Symposium, Gideon Rosen, Timothy Williamson and Crispin Wright identify a set of issues crucial for assessing the principle-based treatment of modality I presented in Chapter Four of Being Known. I thank them for such focused and thoughtful discussions. This response is organized as a series of questions and proposed answers that aim to address the issues they raise. I hope their contributions will be as helpful to the reader as they have been (...) to me in understanding what is, and what is not, involved in the principle-based conception. My response will not consist only in defense and elaboration. On some issues, I will argue that the position formulated in Being Known needs supplementation. On others, especially those concerned with actualism and possibilia, it needs revision and a new positive theory. (shrink)

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) becomes more and more pervasive in our everyday life, new questions arise about its ethical and social impacts. Such issues concern all stakeholders involved in or committed to the design, implementation, deployment, and use of the technology. The present document addresses these preoccupations by introducing and discussing a set of practical obligations and recommendations for the development of applications and systems based on AI techniques. With this work we hope to contribute to spreading awareness on (...) the many social challenges posed by AI and encouraging the establishment of good practices throughout the relevant social areas. As points of novelty, the paper elaborates on an integrated view that combines both human rights and ethical concepts to reap the benefits of the two approaches. Moreover, it proposes innovative recommendations, such as those on redress and governance, which add further insight to the debate. Finally, it incorporates a specific focus on the Italian Constitution, thus offering an example of how core legislations of Member States might contribute to further specify and enrich the EU normative framework on AI. (shrink)

The article is guided by two main research questions: First, do the Equator Principles (EPs), a voluntary CSR-initiative in the project finance sector, and the recently published working paper of the Thun Group of Banks adequately address the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights or do they fall behind the ‘Ruggie framework’? Second, is the demand for human rights due diligence sufficient to classify the EPs as a positive and leverage-based concept of CSR (à la Wettstein and (...) Wood) or is this requirement still a feature of a negative and impact-based concept of CSR? In case it is a negative and impact-based concept of CSR, the question comes up which further steps should be taken by financial institutions to fulfill their positive and leverage-based responsibilities. The article argues that positive and leverage-based responsibilities for multinational companies exist – due to the moral nature of human rights and due to the political authority of multinational companies – and that the current (Ruggie-like) requirements for human rights due diligence are not adequate for a positive and leverage-based concept of CSR. Further measures should be taken by multinational companies – and especially (Equator) banks which possess a high leverage-influence over their clients – to not only ensure the respect for human rights, but also the on-the-ground protection and realization of human rights. (shrink)

In their searching contributions to this Symposium, Gideon Rosen, Timothy Williamson and Crispin Wright identify a set of issues crucial for assessing the principle-based treatment of modality I presented in Chapter Four of Being Known. I thank them for such focused and thoughtful discussions. This response is organized as a series of questions and proposed answers that aim to address the issues they raise. I hope their contributions will be as helpful to the reader as they have been (...) to me in understanding what is, and what is not, involved in the principle-based conception. My response will not consist only in defense and elaboration. On some issues, I will argue that the position formulated in Being Known needs supplementation. On others, especially those concerned with actualism and possibilia, it needs revision and a new positive theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to offer a full-fledged defense of principle-based ethics against moral particularism. My discussions not only refute particularists’ allegations against moral generalism but also provide a positive rationale for a principle-based approach in ethics. By borrowing insights from Brandom’s and Peregrin’s normative pragmatism, I describe the fundamental roles of moral principles. In my view, moral principles constitute morality, and they can function as default reasons in our moral deliberations. Moreover, I argue that (...) my principle-based conception of ethics has advantages over particularism since it explains the phenomenological experience and covers basic intuitions in the moral domain that particularists have difficulty explaining. (shrink)

The evaluation of whether an animal has a life worth living (LWL) has been suggested as a useful concept for farm animal policymaking. But there are a number of different ways in which the concept could be applied. This paper attempts to identify and evaluate candidate ethical principles based on the concept. It suggests that an appropriate principle by which to apply the concept is one that (1) is framed in terms of preventing an animal having a life (...) worth avoiding (LWA), rather than ensuring they have LWL, (2) is based on a prospective, rather than retrospective, concept of a life’s worth, and (3) relates to both the perpetuation and creation of an animal at all times during its life. The paper concludes by endorsing an overarching principle that no animal should be unreasonably caused to be, or allowed to remain, in a position of having a prospective LWA. (shrink)

This paper has three main goals. Firstly – to draw attention to the phenomenon of the democratic paradigm in the study of modern state systems (especially monarchical ones), characterise it and outline its sources. Also - to question the basis of this phenomenon (by pointing out, among other things, the durability of monarchical systems and the phenomenon of partial ‘re-monarchization’ – real or apparent – of certain contemporary republican systems on the examples of: Montenegro, Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary and (...) Poland). Secondly, to present the negative consequences of the functioning of the democratic paradigm, also (paradoxically) those affecting the political practice of republics. Thirdly, to propose a way to reduce these negative consequences by changing the optics adopted in comparative studies about monarchies and republics. This change is based on the restoration, in comparative analyses of contemporary state systems (including monarchical ones), of the concepts of ‘mixed system’ and ‘monarchical principle’, which are still used in research on the history of the state and law, and should be disseminated in research on contemporary political systems and constitutional law. An explanation of the terms ‘mixed system’ and ‘monarchical principle’ as I use them here will follow in the final part of the paper. (shrink)

One of the still unsolved problems in liberal anarchism is a definition of social constituency in positive terms. Partially, this had been solved by the advancements of liberal discourse ethics. These approaches, built on praxeology as a universal framework for social formation, are detached from the need of any previous or external authority or rule for the discursive partners. However, the relationship between action, personal identity, and liberty within the process of a community becoming solely generated from the praxeological a (...) priori remains largely disputed. In order to develop a testable constitutional model, this study revises how the “ontological turn” was introduced into liberal theories and redefines the concept of liberty. Liberty is usually understood as a moral goal or measurement for just actions, as the generative principle of all social existence - individual and interpersonal. For this purpose, the function of performative contradiction within the mechanism of interpersonal “encounter”, as part of the co-generative process of the individual becoming and social formation was explored through the production of a game-based narrative historiography grounded on 19th century life writings. This narrative historiography was developed in the context of Swiss history, with a “design-based” research approach, and resulted in a prototype for networked storytelling through which the transformative learning process could be visible and the negotiation of competing individual visions of the future could be re-enacted. (shrink)

My work aims to focus on the intersections between aesthetics, intergenerational values, and climate change while exploring some core questions. How do aesthetic values interact with the construction of social and intergenerational values? Can the aesthetic experience of art have any influence on our attitudes toward the environment? These questions are related to the broader question: is the aesthetic experience of art connected to the aesthetic experience of nature? The thesis underlying this paper is that aesthetic appreciation of nature and (...) art mutually influence each other. To prove this claim, I propose a Deweyan and pluralistic approach to environmental aesthetics that interacts with the fields of neuroaesthetics and intergenerational thinking. The key concept on which my proposal rests is the Deweyan connection between aesthetics and experience. (shrink)

This volume of the Thinker’s Guide Library employs critical thinking concepts in the development of productive scientific thought. Readers will learn to reason within the logic of their scientific disciplines and will find their analytical abilities enhanced by the engaging framework of inquiry set forth by Richard Paul and Linda Elder.

Decisions in healthcare are made against the background of cultural and philosophical definitions of disease, sickness and illness. These concepts or definitions affect both health policy and research , as well as individual encounters between patients and physicians . It is therefore necessary for evidence-based medicine to consider whether any of the definitions underlying research prior to the hierarchisation of knowledge are indeed compatible with its own epistemological principles.

This handbook teaches students to read for deep understanding, properly analyze and assess what they read, and reason within the logic of an author. As part of the Thinker’s Guide Library, this guide includes activities for students to work through in developing close reading skills using the tools of critical thinking.

According to a seminal paper by Barsalou , frames are attribute-value-matrices for representing exemplars or concepts. Frames have been used as a tool for reconstructing scientific concepts as well as conceptual change within scientific revolutions . In the frame-based representations of scientific concepts developed so far the semantic content of concepts is determined by a set of attribute-specific values. This way of representing semantic content works best for prototype concepts and defined concepts of a conceptual taxonomy satisfying the no-overlap (...) principle. In addition to the semantic content of prototype concepts and defined concepts, frames can also contain empirical knowledge that is represented as constraints between the values of the frame. Beside prototype concepts and defined concepts, theoretical concepts that are multiply operationalized play an important role in science. However, so far no frame-based representation of theoretical concepts has been proposed. In this paper, it will be shown that theoretical concepts can be represented by frames and that frame-based representations of prototype concepts and defined concepts have another structure than frame-based representations of theoretical concepts. In order to explicate this difference, we will develop a frame-based method for representing all three kinds of concepts by means of mathematical graph-theory. One important consequence will be that the constraints of a frame representing a theoretical concept are entailed by the structure of the frame, as opposed to a frame representing defined or prototype concepts. (shrink)

This volume of the Thinker’s Guide Library addresses the vital role of questions in every area of life. As readers develop a questioning mind, they also come to a better understanding of the world and of themselves. This book illustrates how well developed questions lead to deeper knowledge and counteract dangerous ignorance.

In this unique study, Jean-Pierre Clero examines medical ethics from a philosophical perspective. Based on the thoughts of great philosophers, he develops a theory of medical ethics that focuses on the values of intimacy.

The concept of need is often proposed as providing an additional or alternative criterion to cost-effectiveness in making allocation decisions in health care. If it is to be of practical value it must be sufficiently precisely characterized to be useful to decision makers. This will require both an account of how degree of need for an intervention is to be determined and a prioritization rule that clarifies how degree of need and the cost of the intervention interact in determining the (...) relative priority of the intervention. Three common features of health care interventions must be accommodated in a comprehensive theory of need: the probabilistic nature of prognosis (with and without the intervention); the time course of effects; and the fact that the most effective treatments often combine more than one intervention. These common features are problematic for the concept of need. We outline various approaches to prioritization on the basis of need and argue that some approaches are more promising than others. (shrink)

The non-discrimination principle is one of the essential principles in the area of European public and private law too. The importance of this principle also takes a great place in field of company law, especially in the area of “freedom of establishment of the companies” in the European Single Market. Freedom of establishment of companies is closely related to the general concept of “free movement of people, capital, goods and services,” in ESM. In fact, freedom of establishment is (...) a substantive part of the process of creation the internal market in EU. The freedom of establishment is based on the Treaty of the functioning of EU. According to article 49 from TFEU, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. This prohibition also applies to restrictions on setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State. In-depth exploration of this issue is conditioned by the interpretation of the Court of justice of European Union, which embodies the real legal regime of freedom of establishment. Freedom of establishment of companies is closely related to the principles of healthy and fair competition and equal access of the companies too. This article seeks to elaborate fundamental theoretical aspects of this issue, considering certain case - study analyze of CJEU judgements. The main focus is on the non-discrimination principle, legal effects of the CJEU judgments, free market and competitiveness, and finally, determination of the concept of primary and secondary establishment of companies in EU. (shrink)

In their book Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker, and Xiang Chen reconstruct Kuhn’s account of conceptual structure and change, based on the dynamic frame model. I argue against their reconstruction of anomalies and of the no-overlap principle and propose a competing model, based on the similarity relation. First, I introduce the concept of psychological distance between objects, and then I show that the conceptual structure of a theory consists of a set of natural (...) families, separated by a significant empty space. I argue that, in such a conceptual structure, the ES condition, according to which the distance between natural families should be greater than the distance between any two objects belonging to the same natural family, is satisfied. Anomalous objects lead to the violation of this condition. I argue that in a conceptual structure satisfying the ES condition, a similarity relation could be defined, so that natural families would be similarity classes, satisfying the no-overlap principle. In a structure not satisfying this principle, such similarity classes could not be delimited. (shrink)

Is j s mill's concept of liberty basically utilitarian? the 'utilitarian' justifies action if it promotes the ends of happiness or pleasure. But for mill liberty is neither defined nor justified by reference to any felicific calculus. Rather, His concept of liberty seems to be based on (1) natural rights theory and (2) a consideration of its social benefits.

ABSTRACTThe concept of need is often proposed as providing an additional or alternative criterion to cost‐effectiveness in making allocation decisions in health care. If it is to be of practical value it must be sufficiently precisely characterized to be useful to decision makers. This will require both an account of how degree of need for an intervention is to be determined and a prioritization rule that clarifies how degree of need and the cost of the intervention interact in determining the (...) relative priority of the intervention. Three common features of health care interventions must be accommodated in a comprehensive theory of need: the probabilistic nature of prognosis ; the time course of effects; and the fact that the most effective treatments often combine more than one intervention. These common features are problematic for the concept of need. We outline various approaches to prioritization on the basis of need and argue that some approaches are more promising than others. (shrink)

Bioethics has made a compelling case for the role of experience and empirical research in ethics. This may explain why the movement for empirical ethics has such a firm grounding in bioethics. However, the theoretical framework according to which empirical research contributes to ethics—and the specific role it can or should play—remains manifold and unclear. In this paper, we build from pragmatic theory stressing the importance of experience and outcomes in establishing the meaning of ethics concepts. We then propose three (...) methodological steps according to which the meaning of ethics concepts can be refined based on experience and empirical research: function identification, function enrichment, and function testing. These steps are explained and situated within the broader commitment of pragmatic ethics to a perspective of moral growth and human flourishing. We hope that this proposal will give specific direction to the bridging of theoretical and empirical research in ethics and thus support stronger actualization of ethics concepts. (shrink)

현대 가톨릭교회의 평화 사상과 국제사회의 ‘평화권’ 운동은 모 두 ‘보편적 인권’에 기반하는 평화체제’를 강조한다. 가톨릭 평화사 상과 국제사회의 평화운동이 같은 노선 위에서 변화를 가져올 수 있었던 배경은 제2차 세계대전 이후의 사회변화에 있다. 전쟁의 참 상, 빈곤의 고통, 국가 간 갈등을 발생시키는 구조적 폭력의 문제 들은 인권의 문제를 직시하게 만들었다. ‘평화권’에 대한 구상은 더 는 물리적 폭력이 없는 소극적 평화에 만족하지 않고, 경제 사회 문화적인 구조적 폭력을 없애는 적극적 평화개념에 이르렀다. 평 화 만들기를 위한 제안들은 ‘평화롭게 살 권리’와 ‘연대권’으로 개 념화되고 (...) 있다. 이 권리들은 ‘전쟁을 거부할 권리’, ‘군사외교안보 정책을 민주적으로 통제할 권리’, ‘발전과 환경에 대한 권리’ 등을 포괄하며, 평화권이 개인과 집단의 권리이며 의무라는 점을 확인 한다. 난민을 포함한 이주민의 문제도 국가 간 불평등을 제거해야 하는 평화의 문제에 속한다. ‘평화권’ 개념은 가톨릭의 평화사상과 공통된 지향을 가질 뿐 아 니라, 아래로부터 요구되는 평화운동으로 이해할 수 있다. 한국사 회에서 ‘평화권’은 특별히 1919년 ‘거리의 평화운동’을 계승한다는 역사적 의의도 지닌다. 여전히 냉전시대를 살고 있는 비동시적 상 황에서, 한국사회는 ‘평화권’에 기초한 새로운 평화주의 원리를 발 전시켜야 할 과제를 지닌다. 그 원리는 한국사회의 민주주의를 발 전시키고, 한반도의 문제를 안정적이고 지속적으로 풀어 나가는 방안이어야 하며, ‘동아시아 평화 공동체’를 만들어 나가는 동력이 되어야 한다. (shrink)

This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely (...) tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so-called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them. (shrink)

Principle-based formulations of bioethical theory have recently come under increasing scrutiny, particularly insofar as they give prominence to personal autonomy. This essay critiques the dominant conceptualization of autonomy and urges an alternative formulation freed from the individualistic assumptions that pervade the prevailing framework. Drawing on feminist perspectives, I discuss the need for a vision of patient autonomy that joins relational experiences to individuality and acknowledges the influence of patterns of power and authority on the exercise of patient agency. (...) Deficiencies in the current models of science and social relations guiding medical practice are analyzed, particularly (1) the tendency to disregard the patients self-knowledge and (2) failure to recognize limitations on the generalizability of medical knowledge. Models of social relations such as mothering and friendship are explored to advance a conception of autonomy better suited to the practical activities of medicine. In conclusion, I consider how acknowledgement of the specificity and complexity of social relations can contribute to reconfiguration of other principles comprising the standard framework of bioethics, particularly beneficence, justice, and equality. (shrink)

One of Etchemendy's arguments against the Tarskian and model‐theoretic notion of logical truth is based on a reduction principle according to which a universally quantified sentence is true if, and only if, all of its instances are logically true. The reduction of logical truth to mere truth reveals that the concept of validity at play in Tarski and in model‐theory relies upon extra‐logical assumptions. A similar reduction had already been put forward by Prawitz, although not with focus on (...) extra‐logical assumptions. Prawitz's reduction concerns rather the possibility of understanding the Tarskian and model‐theoretic approach as implying any epistemic modality. We take into account a possible strategy that an advocate of Tarski and model‐theory may use against Etchemendy's objection, and argue that this strategy fails with respect to Prawitz's criticism. This permits us to shed light upon a difference between Prawitz's and Etchemendy's standpoints: while Etchemendy's reduction shows that the Tarskian and model‐theoretic notion of logical truth cannot be understood as an adequate formal counterpart of truth‐preservation solely by virtue of logical form, Prawitz's reduction insists on the fact that truth‐preservation solely by virtue of logical form is insufficient for epistemic modality to obtain. (shrink)

Theories of interpersonal conflict analysis and resolution originate from sociology, social psychology and political science. These theories took shape during twentieth century after World War I and World War II. Some of the prominent conflict resolution theories are Burton’s ‘human needs theory’, Roger Fisher’s ‘principled-negotiation’ and Lederach’s ‘Conflict transformation’. Conflict is an inevitable part of living because it is related to situations of scarce resources, division of functions, power relations and role-differentiation. In the organizational environment, awareness of each employee’s nature (...) is critical to success. When such employees are self-aware, workplace conflict can be minimized and can become productive to the organization. This study develops a new three energy framework of personality for conflict analysis and resolution. This framework is based on the ‘ guna’ concept of Bhagavad Gita, an ancient Hindu scripture. The term ‘ guna’ indicates the ‘inherent energy’ with which the human mind functions. These three energies are: Positive Energy ( sattva), Dynamic Energy ( rajas) and Potential Energy ( tamas). People work under influence of these three energies all the time and go through various physical, emotional and intellectual experiences. The quality and quantity of these experiences determines their personality, pattern of behaviours and conduct. (shrink)

John Rawls based his theory of justice, in the work of that name, on a ‘Kantian interpretation’ of the status of human beings as ‘free and equal’ persons. In his subsequent, ‘political rather than metaphysical’ expositions of his theory, the conception of citizens of democracies as ‘free and equal’ persons retained its foundational role. But Rawls appealed only to Kant’s moral philosophy, never to Kant’s own political philosophy as expounded in his 1797 Doctrine of Right in theMetaphysics of (...) Morals. I argue here that the structure of Kant’s political philosophy, with its categories of the innate right to freedom, private acquired right and public right, can clarify the relationship between Rawls’s two principles of justice and his scheme of basic liberties and primary goods. (shrink)

Tom Beauchamp and James Childress‘s revolutionary textbook, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, shaped the field of bioethics in America and around the world. Midway through the Principle’s eight editions, however, the authors jettisoned their attempt to justify the four principles of bioethics —autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice—in terms of ethical theory, replacing it with the idea that these principles are part of a common morality shared by all rational persons committed to morality, at all times, and in all places. Other commentators (...) contend that their theory has never been empirically confirmed and is unfalsifiable, since counterexamples can be deemed irrational, or as held by those living lives not committed to morality. The thesis of this paper is that common morality theory is the artifact of a category mistake—conflating common areas regulated by moral norms with common norms regulating moral conduct—that accords mid-twentieth century American liberal morality the status of transcultural, transtemporal, eternal moral truths. Such a conception offers bioethicists no tools for analyzing moral change—moral progress, regress, reform, evolution, devolution, or revolution—no theoretical basis for deconstructing structural classicism, racism, and sexism, or for facilitating international cooperation on ethical issues in the context of culturally based moral differences. (shrink)

Summary Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy, in the broader sense of the term, has developed in various forms on both sides of the Atlantic since the 1920s. Gestalt Theoretical Psychotherapy, in the narrower sense of the term, came into being in the second half of the 1970s in German-speaking countries. In Austria, it is a state-approved, independent scientific psychotherapy method since 1995, and an integrative psychotherapeutic approach based on the Gestalt theory of the Berlin School. With reference to this comprehensive, consistent, (...) scientific theory, this article presents the basic concepts of therapeutic practice in the field of Gestalt psychotherapy. Starting from the overarching whole to the parts, the paper first examines the concept of therapeutic relationship and therapeutic attitude, and then describes the basic principles of the practical design of the therapeutic process. (shrink)

We discuss the principles for a primitive, object-linguistic notion of consequence proposed by ) that yield a version of Curry’s paradox. We propose and study several strategies to weaken these principles and overcome paradox: all these strategies are based on the intuition that the object-linguistic consequence predicate internalizes whichever meta-linguistic notion of consequence we accept in the first place. To these solutions will correspond different conceptions of consequence. In one possible reading of these principles, they give rise to a (...) notion of logical consequence: we study the corresponding theory of validity by showing that it is conservative over a wide range of base theories: this result is achieved via a well-behaved form of local reduction. The theory of logical consequence is based on a restriction of the introduction rule for the consequence predicate. To unrestrictedly maintain this principle, we develop a conception of object-linguistic consequence, which we call grounded consequence, that displays a restriction of the structural rule of reflexivity. This construction is obtained by generalizing Saul Kripke’s inductive theory of truth. Grounded validity will be shown to satisfy several desirable principles for a naïve, self-applicable notion of consequence. (shrink)

Neuroethics applies cognitive neuroscience for prescribing alterations to conceptions of self and society, and for prescriptively judging the ethical applications of neurotechnologies. Plentiful normative premises are available to ground such prescriptivity, however prescriptive neuroethics may remain fragmented by social conventions, cultural ideologies, and ethical theories. Herein we offer that an objectively principled neuroethics for international relevance requires a new meta-ethics: understanding how morality works, and how humans manage and improve morality, as objectively based on the brain and social sciences. (...) This new meta-ethics will simultaneously equip neuroethics for evaluating and revising older cultural ideologies and ethical theories, and direct neuroethics towards scientifically valid views of encultured humans intelligently managing moralities. Bypassing absolutism, cultural essentialisms, and unrealistic ethical philosophies, neuroethics arrives at a small set of principles about proper human flourishing that are more culturally inclusive and cosmopolitan in spirit. This cosmopolitanism in turn suggests augmentations to traditional medical ethics in the form of four principled guidelines for international consideration: empowerment, non-obsolescence, self-creativity, and citizenship. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes based his natural philosophy on definitions and general principles of matter in motion, which he refrained from calling “laws of nature.” Across the channel, René Descartes had presented his own account of matter in motion in such a way that laws of nature play a central causal-explanatory role. Despite some notable differences in the two systems of natural philosophy, the content of the three Cartesian laws of nature is shared by Hobbesian principles of motion. Why is it (...) the case that Hobbes never ‘transferred’ the concept of law of nature from the sphere of civil society to the realm of nature? What is the status of the Hobbesian principles of motion if they are not laws? Answering these questions is the main aim of this article. It is shown that Hobbes made available an importantly different and genuinely original way to do natural philosophy, which renders it free of metaphysics and eschews the need to ground it in anything other than ‘natural reason’. Briefly put, Hobbes took the category of ‘laws of nature’ to involve commitments that cannot be met in the natural world, unless natural philosophy loses its autonomy from theology and metaphysics. (shrink)

Hans-Johann Glock develops a capacity-based alternative to the currently widespread view that concepts and experiences are mental representations. He claims that experiences must be explained by way of perceptual and sensory capacities and that concepts must be explained by way of intellectual ones, in particular, by way of capacities for classification and reasoning. Glock does not, however, identify concepts with intellectual capacities. He rather conceives of them as rules that guide the application of capacities. He defines the relationship between (...) perceptions and concepts by coupling rationalistic, Aristotelian, and Kantian motifs: perceptions are to be strictly distinguished from concepts; perceptual capacities genetically, causally, and conceptually precede conceptual ones; and conceptual capacities must, in principle, be applicable to objects of experience. Glock's “capacity approach” can accordingly be understood as a variant of non-conceptualism. (shrink)

This review article offers a European perspective on the pluralistic, principles-based model of intellectual property (IP) advanced by Robert Merges in his book Justifying Intellectual Property. After introducing Merges’s model and theory of IP with reference to IP theories generally, other pluralistic legal models, and patterns of judicial reasoning in the patent and copyright fields, the article argues that European jurisprudence offers broad support for Merges’s operational model of IP, while also challenging certain aspects of his wider analysis. They (...) include his ‘one size fits all’ foundational theory of IP, his account of key IP rules and practices, and his choice and conception of IP’s midlevel principles. Through this critique the article draws attention to the utilitarian bias of Merges’s model; a bias which undermines its pluralistic claims, in part by undermining Merges’s own foundational theory of IP. The result is to underline the limits of a regime unconcerned with its own normative basis, and the need for more rather than less discussion of IP theory, including more work of the type that Merges’s book undertakes. (shrink)

The disciplinary enterprises engaged in the study of consciousness now extend beyond their original paradigms providing additional knowledge toward an overall understanding of the fundamental meaning and scope of consciousness. A new transdisciplinary domain has resulted from the syncretism of several approaches bringing about a new paradigm. The background for this overarching enterprise draws from a variety of traditions. In this paper however elaboration is restricted to the quantum-mechanical account in David Bohm’s theoretical work in relation to his ideas about (...) “active information”, “protointelligence”, and “non-locality”. This leads to an adapted version of Bohm’s thesis concerning the implicate order and explicate order of the Universe - the Impression Order and the Expression Order, respectively. On this view, the Universe is formed on an actual-material level, the apparent properties of things, and a potential-material level, a constant process of becoming that exerts an attractive force on the present. The central thesis emerges from a radical reformulation of certain core concepts that transforms many ontological assumptions about the material basis of consciousness. That is, the above platform inclusively connects to a hypothesis that the concepts of ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘event’, and ‘motion’ can be unified to capture the notion of simultaneous activity at reducing levels to the Impression order. This notion coheres with a physical-theoretical model of Signature-Energy-Frequency which has been well demonstrated in the atomic, chemical, and information fields. This study embraces a holistic and creative worldview based on a triadic model wherein consciousness itself is postulated as the most basic, primordial stratum. Importantly, both orders are constantly conjoined since the Impression Order exists as potential energy of the quantum vacuum. The physical realm is formed by the proposed Triangulate-Three conditions as a principle of animation and ‘being’: Consciousness, Body-of-Experience and Intellect-Reflective in the Expression Order, one aspect of which emerge as lifelike properties. This Triangulate-Three principle inheres in every particle and organism to which it guides its development, adaptation, and survival. The conscious being thus possesses all three conditions in Expression Order through STEM-interactions via SEF transmissions, as a self-organising organism. (shrink)

The concept of sustainable development is here revised in the light of a brief historical analysis, followed by a semantic analysis of the expressions development and sustainability. The authors criticize the common use of this concept in a loose way or in wide generalizations, to conclude, based on the principles of human ecology, that it is only possible to make it operational in limited spans of time and in limited spatial units.

A bounded ultrasheaf is a nonstandard universe constructed from a superstructure in a Boolean valued model of set theory. We consider the bounded elementary embeddings between bounded ultrasheaves. Then the standardization principle is true if and only if the ultrafilters are comparable by the Rudin-Frolik order. The base concept is that the bounded elementary embeddings correspond to the complete Boolean homomorphisms. We represent this by the Rudin-Keisler order of ultrafilters of Boolean algebras.

In recent years, several political theorists have argued that reasonable principles of justice are practice-dependent. In this paper it is suggested that we can distinguish between at least two main models for doing practice-dependent theorizing about justice, interpretivism and constructivism, and that they can be understood as based in two different conceptions of practices. It is then argued that the reliance on the notion of participants that characterizes interpretivism disables this approach from adequately addressing certain matters of justice and (...) that a better way of developing the idea of practice-dependence can be found in a constructivism that starts from the Rawlsian idea of overlapping consensus, but which shifts the focus of that approach from societies to a more open-ended category of domains, and which understands the parties to a possible overlapping consensus as stakeholders in a certain set of interconnected practices. (shrink)

Does respect for autonomy imply respect for precedent autonomy? The principle of respect for autonomy requires us to respect a competent patient’s treatment preference, but not everyone agrees that it requires us to respect preferences formed earlier by a now‐incapacitated patient, such as those expressed in an advance directive. The concept of precedent autonomy, which concerns just such preferences, is problematic because it is not clear that we can still attribute to a now‐incapacitated patient a preference which that patient (...) never disaffirmed but can no longer understand. If we cannot make that attribution, then perhaps we should not respect precedent autonomy – after all, how can you respect patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer want, even if they never disaffirmed those wants? I argue that whether an earlier preference can still be attributed to a now‐incapacitated patient depends on the reasons behind the preference, for a preference includes (and is not merely supported by) the reasons behind it. When the considerations that served as reasons no longer exist, neither does the preference which included those reasons. In particular, if the considerations that served as reasons for the patient exist only under conditions where the patient retains full mental capacity, then once that capacity is lost, so are those reasons and the preference based upon them. I use this analysis of precedent autonomy to ascertain the merits of various approaches to advance medical decisionmaking, including Nancy Rhoden’s approach, approaches based on a Parfitian personal identity analysis, approaches based on soft paternalism, and approaches based on the stability and longevity of preferences. Despite the apparent absurdity of respecting patient autonomy by giving patients what they no longer prefer but have never disaffirmed, I conclude with some programmatic remarks on when and why respect for (precedent) autonomy nonetheless requires us to respect former preferences. (shrink)

A principle, according to which any scientific theory can be mathematized, is investigated. Social science, liberal arts, history, and philosophy are meant first of all. That kind of theory is presupposed to be a consistent text, which can be exhaustedly represented by a certain mathematical structure constructively. In thus used, the term “theory” includes all hypotheses as yet unconfirmed as already rejected. The investigation of the sketch of a possible proof of the principle demonstrates that it should be (...) accepted rather a metamathematical axiom about the relation of mathematics and reality. The main statement is formulated as follows: Any scientific theory admits isomorphism to some mathematical structure in a way constructive. Its investigation needs philosophical means. Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of “bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction. The sketch of the proof is organized in five steps: a generalization of epoché; involving transfinite induction in the transition between Peano arithmetic and set theory; discussing the finiteness of Peano arithmetic; applying transfinite induction to Peano arithmetic; discussing an arithmetical model of reality. Accepting or rejecting the principle, two kinds of mathematics appear differing from each other by its relation to reality. Accepting the principle, mathematics has to include reality within itself in a kind of Pythagoreanism. These two kinds are called in paper correspondingly Hilbert mathematics and Gödel mathematics. The sketch of the proof of the principle demonstrates that the generalization of Peano arithmetic as above can be interpreted as a model of Hilbert mathematics into Gödel mathematics therefore showing that the former is not less consistent than the latter, and the principle is an independent axiom. The present paper follows a pathway grounded on Husserl’s phenomenology and “bracketing reality” to achieve the generalized arithmetic necessary for the principle to be founded in alternative ontology, in which there is no reality external to mathematics: reality is included within mathematics. That latter mathematics is able to self-found itself and can be called Hilbert mathematics in honour of Hilbert’s program for self-founding mathematics on the base of arithmetic. The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent to Hilbert mathematics, but not to Gödel mathematics. Consequently, its validity or rejection would resolve the problem which mathematics refers to our being; and vice versa: the choice between them for different reasons would confirm or refuse the principle as to the being. An information interpretation of Hilbert mathematics is involved. It is a kind of ontology of information. The Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics is involved to illustrate that ontology. Thus the problem which of the two mathematics is more relevant to our being is discussed again in a new way A few directions for future work can be: a rigorous formal proof of the principle as an independent axiom; the further development of information ontology consistent to both kinds of mathematics, but much more natural for Hilbert mathematics; the development of the information interpretation of quantum mechanics as a mathematical one for information ontology and thus Hilbert mathematics; the description of consciousness in terms of information ontology. (shrink)

The concept of sustainable development is here revised in the light of a brief historical analysis, followed by a semantic analysis of the expressions development and sustainability. The authors criticize the common use of this concept in a loose way or in wide generalizations, to conclude, based on the principles of human ecology, that it is only possible to make it operational in limited spans of time and in limited spatial units.

The key assumption behind evolutionary epistemology is that animals are active learners or ‘knowers’. In the present study, I updated the concept of natural learning, developed by Henry Plotkin and John Odling-Smee, by expanding it from the animal-only territory to the biosphere-as-a-whole territory. In the new interpretation of natural learning the concept of biological information, guided by Peter Corning’s concept of “control information”, becomes the ‘glue’ holding the organism–environment interactions together. The control information guides biological systems, from bacteria to ecosystems, (...) in the process of natural learning executed by the universal algorithm. This algorithm, summarized by the acronym IGPT (information-gain-process-translate) incorporates natural cognitive methods including sensing/perception, memory, communication, and decision-making. Finally, the biosphere becomes the distributed network of communicative interactions between biological systems termed the interactome. The concept of interactome is based on Gregory Bateson’s natural epistemology known as the “ecology of mind”. Mimicking Bateson’s approach, the interactome may also be designated “physiology of mind”—the principle behind regulating the biosphere homeostasis. (shrink)

Can concepts be acquired by testing hypotheses about these concepts? Fodor famously argued that this is not possible. Testing the correct hypothesis would require already possessing the concept. I argue that this does not generally hold for mathematical concepts. I discuss specific, empirically motivated, hypotheses for number concepts that can be tested without needing to possess the relevant number concepts. I also argue that one can test hypotheses about the identity conditions of other mathematical concepts, and then fix the application (...) conditions based on those hypotheses—under the assumption that the neo‐logicist view on abstraction principles is correct. (shrink)

This volume of the Thinker’s Guide Library offers a framework for ethical reasoning, illuminating powerful, universal tools for thinking through ethical questions. Linda Elder and Richard Paul discuss the main impediments to ethics and present ethical concepts and principles as guides for people of different backgrounds to find common ground.

The present paper investigates why logical empiricists remained silent about one of the most philosophy-laden matters of theoretical physics of their day, the principle of least action (PLA). In the two decades around 1900, the PLA enjoyed a remarkable renaissance as a formal unification of mechanics, electrodynamics, thermodynamics, and relativity theory. Taking Ernst Mach's historico-critical stance, it could be liberated from much of its physico-theological dross. Variational calculus, the mathematical discipline on which the PLA was based, obtained a (...) new rigorous basis. These three developments prompted Max Planck to consider the PLA as formal embodiment of his convergent realist methodology. Typically rejecting ontological reductionism, David Hilbert took the PLA as the key concept in his axiomatizations of physical theories. It served one of the main goals of the axiomatic method: ''deepening the foundations.'' Although Moritz Schlick was a student of Planck's, and Hans Hahn and Philipp Frank enjoyed close ties to Gottingen, the PLA became a veritable Shibboleth to them. Rather than being worried by its historical connections with teleology and determinism, they erroneously identified Hilbert's axiomatic method tout court with Planck's metaphysical realism. Logical empiricists' strict containment policy against metaphysics required so strict a separation between physics and mathematics to exclude even those features of the PLA and the axiomatic method not tainted with metaphysics. (shrink)

Wittgenstein on philosophical problems : from one fundamental problem to particular problems -- The Tractatus on philosophical problems -- Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophical problems -- Examples of philosophical problems as based on misunderstandings -- Tendencies and inclinations of thinking : philosophy as therapy -- Wittgenstein's notion of peace in philosophy : the contrast with the Tractatus -- Two conceptions of clarification -- The Tractatus's conception of philosophy as logical analysis -- Wittgenstein's later critique of the Tractatus's (...) notion of logical analysis -- Clarification in Wittgenstein's later philosophy -- From metaphysics and philosophical theses to grammar : Wittgenstein's turn -- Philosophical theses, metaphysical philosophy, and the Tractatus -- Metaphysics and conceptual investigation : the problem with metaphysics -- Conceptual investigation and the problem of dogmatism -- Wittgenstein's turn -- The turn and the role of rules -- Rules as objects of comparison -- Rules, metaphysical projection, and the logic of language -- Grammar, meaning, and language -- Grammar, use, and meaning : the problem of the status of Wittgenstein's remarks -- Wittgenstein's formulation of his conception of meaning -- The concept of language : comparisons with instruments and games -- Wittgenstein's development and the advantages of his mature view -- Examples as centers of variation and the conception of language as a family -- Avoiding dogmatism about meaning -- Wittgenstein's methodological shift and analyses in terms of necessary conditions -- The concepts of essence and necessity -- Constructivist readings and the arbitrariness/nonarbitrariness of grammar -- Problems with constructivism -- The methodological dimension of Wittgenstein's conception of essence -- The nontemporality of grammatical statements -- Explanations of necessity in terms of factual regularities -- Wittgenstein's account of essence and necessity -- Beyond theses about the source of necessity -- Philosophical hierarchies and the status of clarificatory statements -- Philosophical hierarchies and Wittgenstein's "leading principle" -- The concept of perspicuous presentation -- The (alleged) necessity of accepting philosophical statements -- The concept of agreement and the problem of injustice -- The criteria of the correctness of grammatical remarks -- Multidimensional descriptions and the new use of old dogmatic claims -- Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, everyday language, and ethics -- Metaphysics disguised as methodology -- The historicity of philosophy -- Philosophy and the everyday. (shrink)