I present a critical discussion of dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making with particular attention to the nature and role of Type 2 processes. The original theory proposed...

Many critics of dual-process models have mistaken long lists of descriptive terms in the literature for a full-blown theory of necessarily co-occurring properties. These critiques have distracted attention from the cumulative progress being made in identifying the much smaller set of properties that truly do define Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Our view of the literature is that autonomous processing is the defining feature of Type 1 processing. Even more convincing is the converging (...) evidence that the key feature of Type 2 processing is the ability to sustain the decoupling of secondary representations. The latter is a foundational cognitive requirement for hypothetical thinking. (shrink)

Traditional theory of mind (ToM) accounts for social cognition have been at the basis of most studies in the social cognitive neurosciences. However, in recent years, the need to go beyond traditional ToM accounts for understanding real life social interactions has become all the more pressing. At the same time it remains unclear whether alternative accounts, such as interactionism, can yield a sufficient description and explanation of social interactions. We argue that instead of considering ToM and interactionism as mutually exclusive (...) opponents, they should be integrated into a more comprehensive account of social cognition. We draw on dual process models of social cognition that contrast two different types of social cognitive processing. The first type (labeled Type 1) refers to process es that are fast, efficient, stimulus-driven, and relatively inflexible. The second type (labeled Type 2) refers to processes that are relatively slow, cognitively laborious, flexible, and may involve conscious control. We argue that while interactionism captures aspects of social cognition mostly related to Type 1 processes, ToM is more focused on those based on Type 2 processes. We suggest that real life social interactions are rarely based on either Type 1 or Type 2 processes alone. On the contrary, we propose that in most cases both types of processes are simultaneously involved and that social behavior may be sustained by the interplay between these two types of processes. Finally, we discuss how the new integrative framework can guide experimental research on social interaction. (shrink)

This study focuses on implementing electric vehicles (EVs) in developing countries where energy production is mainly based on fossil fuels. Although for these countries the environmental short-run benefits of the EVs cannot offset the short-run costs, it may still be the best option to implement the EVs as soon as possible. Hence, it is necessary to evaluate the alternatives to introducing EVs to the market due to the environmental concerns that created an opportunity for some developing countries to catch up (...) with the international competition. Therefore, we develop a case scenario to explore the decision-making process in implementing the EVs with three alter natives and twelve criteria. We solve the decision-making problem by using Type-2 neutrosophic numbers (T2NNs) based on the RAFSI (Ranking of Alternatives through Functional mapping of criterion sub-intervals into a Single Interval) method. The proposed model combines the advantages of the RAFSI technique, and it applies T2NNs to address the uncertainties. The results show that the alternatives that may suspend the implementation of the EVs are inferior. Direct implementation of EVs is prioritized. The policy implications of the results are discussed in the study. (shrink)

Clark & Thornton are too hasty in their dismissal of uninformed learning; nonmonotonic processing units show considerable promise on type-2 tasks. I describe a simulation which succeeds on a “pure” type-2 problem. Another simulation challenges Clark & Thornton 's claims about the serendipitous nature of solutions to type-2 problems.

Type 2 diabetes mellitus is related to a variety of cognitive impairments that may even progress to dementia. Studies have found the angular gyrus is a cross-modal integration hub that is involved in a variety of cognitive processes. However, few studies have focused on the patterns of resting-state functional connections of the AG in patients with T2DM. This study explored the functional connection between the AG and the whole brain and the relationship between the FC and clinical/cognitive variables in (...) patients with T2DM. 44 patients with T2DM and 43 sex-, age-, and education-matched healthy controls underwent resting-state fMRI and received neuropsychological assessments. Compared with the control group, the T2DM group showed abnormal rsFCs between the AG and multiple brain regions. The FC between the left AG and the left medial temporal lobe in the T2DM group was positively correlated with scores on the Montreal Cognitive Assessment, after a Bonferroni correction. Collectively, patients with T2DM have abnormal FCs between the AG and extensive brain regions that may be related to various cognitive processes. (shrink)

Interval type-2 fuzzy logic systems have favorable abilities to cope with uncertainties in many applications. While the block type-reduction under the guidance of inference plays the central role in the systems, Karnik-Mendel iterative algorithms are standard algorithms to perform the type-reduction; however, the high computational cost of type-reduction process may hinder them from real applications. The comparison between the KM algorithms and other alternative algorithms is still an open problem. This paper introduces the related theory of (...) interval type-2 fuzzy sets and discusses the blocks of fuzzy reasoning, type-reduction, and defuzzification of interval type-2 fuzzy logic systems by combining the Nagar-Bardini and Nie-Tan noniterative algorithms for solving the centroids of output interval type-2 fuzzy sets. Moreover, the continuous version of NT algorithms is proved to be accurate algorithms for performing the type-reduction. Four computer simulation examples are provided to illustrate and analyze the performances of two kinds of noniterative algorithms. The NB and NT algorithms are superior to the KM algorithms on both calculation accuracy and time, which afford the potential application value for designer and adopters of type-2 fuzzy logic systems. (shrink)

The aims of this study were to measure the readability of Australian based informed consent documents and determine whether informed consent readability guidelines have been established by Australian human research ethics committees (HRECs). A total of 20 informed consent documents, 10 HIV/AIDS and 10 type 2 diabetes, were measured for readability using the Simple Measure of Gobbledygook (SMOG) and Gunning Fog Index (Fog). Published guidelines and policy statements of the two local HREC who approved the 20 clinical trials under (...) study where examined to identify whether they had any formal policies/guidelines on the readability of informed consent documents. The two HRECs were contacted via e-mail to also determine whether they utilised any informal readability standards or “rules of thumb” that may not have been mentioned in the published documents. The HIV/AIDS and type 2 diabetes informed consent documents were, on average, written at a grade 13 reading level. Formal readability standards had not been established by the two local HRECs, however, they did verify the use of informal rules for assessing readability of informed consent documents. Based on Australian literacy data, the majority of informed consent documents were written well beyond the reading ability of many Australians. Unreadable informed consent documents may result in patients rejecting trial participation altogether or conversely may result in their participating in a trial with inadequate consent. Therefore, a step toward reducing the complexity of informed consent documents may be to implement objective readability assessments into the human research ethics application and review process. (shrink)

Type 2 diabetes has been considered a public health threat due to its growing prevalence, particularly in the older population. It is important to know the effects of psychosocial stress and its potential consequences for some basic cognitive processes that are important in daily life. Currently, there is very little information about how people with T2D face acute psychosocial stressors, and even less about how their response affects working memory, which is essential for their functionality and independence. Our aim (...) was to characterize the response to an acute laboratory psychosocial stressor and its effects on WM in older people with T2D. Fifty participants with T2D from 52 to 77 years old were randomly assigned to a stress or control condition. Mood and physiological responses to tasks were measured. In addition, participants completed a WM test before and after the stress or control task. Our results showed that the TSST elicited higher negative affect and greater C and sAA responses than the control task. No significant differences in WM were observed depending on the exposure to stress or the control task. Finally, participants who showed higher C and sAA responses to the stressor had lower WM performance. Our results indicate that medically treated older adults with T2D show clear, typical mood and physiological responses to an acute psychosocial stressor. Finally, the lack of acute psychosocial stress effects on WM suggests that it could be related to aging and not to this disease, at least when T2D is adequately treated. (shrink)

Trapezoidal interval type-2 fuzzy sets are a special kind of type-2 fuzzy sets. TIT2FSs are useful in dealing with fuzziness inherent in decision data and the decision-making process. For multi-attribute group decision-making problems in which the attribute values and attribute weights are TIT2FSs, a new decision-making approach is proposed. On the basis of the concept of barycenters, a new approach to ranking TIT2FSs is given. Four kinds of geometric aggregation operators for TIT2FSs are developed, including the TIT2FS weighted (...) geometric average operator, TIT2FS ordered weighted geometric average operator, TIT2FS hybrid weighted geometric average operator, and extended TIT2FS hybrid weighted geometric average operator. The individual comprehensive values of alternatives are derived through the extended TIT2FS weighted geometric average operators. Using the TIT2FS hybrid weighted geometric average operator and the expert weights, the individual comprehensive values of alternatives are integrated into the collective ones, which are used to rank the alternatives. The practicability and effectiveness of the developed method are illustrated with a teaching quality assessment example. (shrink)

Confidence can dissociate from perceptual accuracy, suggesting distinct computational and neural processes underlie these psychological functions. Recent investigations have therefore sought to experimentally isolate metacognitive processes by creating conditions where perceptual sensitivity is matched but confidence differs (“matched-performance / different-confidence”; MPDC). Despite these endeavors’ success, much remains unknown about MPDC effects and how to best harness them in experimental settings. Here we developed a principled approach to comprehensively characterizing MPDC effects through analyzing metaperceptual (i.e., type 2 psychometric) functions relating (...) objective performance to subjective confidence across widely varying performance levels and experimental manipulations. We found that MPDC effect magnitude depends on stimulus properties, observers’ sensitivity level, and critically on trial type order (blocked or interleaved across stimulus property variations). Our findings provide the first comprehensive exploration of MPDC effects, offer a prescriptive guide to metaperceptual analysis, and suggest optimal experimental paradigms for experimentally isolating metacognition and awareness in future studies. (shrink)

Diabetes is one of the most common metabolic diseases that cause high blood sugar. Early diagnosis of such a condition is challenging due to its complex interdependence on various factors. There is a need to develop critical decision support systems to assist medical practitioners in the diagnosis process. This research proposes developing a predictive model that can achieve a high classification accuracy of type 2 diabetes. The study consisted of two fundamental parts. Firstly, the study investigated handling missing data (...) adopting data imputation, namely, median value imputation, K-nearest neighbor imputation, and iterative imputation. Consequently, the study validated the implications of these imputations using various classification algorithms, i.e., linear, tree-based, and ensemble algorithms, to see how each method affected classification accuracy. Secondly, Artificial Neural Network was employed to model the best performing imputed data, balanced with SMOTETomek ensuring each class is represented fairly. This approach provided the best accuracy of 98% on the test data, outperforming accuracies achieved in prior studies using the same dataset. The dataset used in this study is concerned with gender and population. As a prospect, the study recommends adopting a larger population sample without geographic boundaries. Additionally, as the developed Artificial Neural Network model did not undergo any specific hyperparameter tuning, it would be interesting to explore tuning on top of normalized data to optimize accuracy further. (shrink)

There are marked differences between countries with regard to reimbursement decision-making, yet few studies have tried to understand this process and its consequences by a detailed analysis of the local context and decision-making structure. This article describes reimbursement decision-making and subsequent prescribing patterns of new pharmaceuticals by means of a case study on glitazones in treatment of type 2 diabetes mellitus patients in Denmark. The study shows that institutional arrangements, providing the context in which evidence is used, are highly (...) important for understanding the reimbursement decision-making process. In particular the Danish Medicines Agency (DMA) has shaped the decision to reimburse glitazones on the basis of physician-mediated requests of individual patients. Relatively few patients have been prescribed glitazones since their introduction in 2000, suggesting that individual reimbursement may be an effective instrument in controlling overall expenditure of selected pharmaceuticals, although in the case of glitazones this has likely been achieved at the expense of equality in access to the products. The discussion focuses on the generalizability of the findings to both other pharmaceuticals in the individual reimbursement scheme in Denmark, and to other countries that are trying to balance the need to control overall pharmaceutical care expenditure with the need to secure equality in access to new drugs with therapeutic added value. (shrink)

Clothes laundering are necessary during their cycle life, and the mechanical forces exposed to fabrics during laundering were caused to wrinkle. Therefore, in this paper, the wrinkle of the cotton fabric after home laundering was evaluated based on their characteristic. The washing process was done without any softener as toxic material. For this purpose, experimental and theoretical evaluations were conducted. In experiments, the cotton fabrics in various characteristics were washed by washing machine without any softener in special adjustments. The wrinkle (...) of the samples was rated based on the light line method. Theoretical evaluations were studied by the development of a new type-2 fuzzy neural network. In this model the thickness, weight, warp and weft density per inch, warp and weft Tex as linear density, and cover factor of the fabric in warp and weft directions were considered as input parameters and the wrinkle grade of the washed fabric was output. Analysis of the modeling and experimental results illustrates that when eight mentioned parameters were selected as inputs, the mean square error, root mean square error, and mean absolute error of the model were decreased in comparison of the models with two, four, and six inputs. According to this fact, all of the input parameters have an effect on the wrinkle of the cotton fabric after the washing process. (shrink)

A step towards a theory of consciousness would be to characterise the effect of consciousness on information processing. One set of results suggests that the effect of consciousness is to interfere with computations that are optimally performed non-consciously. Another set of results suggests that conscious, system 2 processing is the home of norm-compliant computation. This is contrasted with system 1 processing, thought to be typically unconscious, which operates with useful but error-prone heuristics. -/- These results can be (...) reconciled by separating out two different distinctions: between conscious and non-conscious representations, on the one hand, and between automatic and deliberate processes, on the other. This pair of distinctions is used to illuminate some existing experimental results and to resolve the puzzle about whether consciousness helps or hinders accurate information processing. This way of resolving the puzzle shows the importance of another category, which we label ‘type 0 cognition’, characterised by automatic computational processes operating on non-conscious representations. (shrink)

Dual process theory proposes clusters of features that form two dichotomous groups in cognition. One standing internal issue is defining what the reference of these two dichotomous groups could be in the mind or brain. Does dual process theory speak of two systems, types, minds, modes, kinds or just metaphors? A particular common answer is that differences in clusters of features are evidence of different underlying systems, often called system 1 and system 2. However, the suggestion to abandon the ‘system’ (...) terminology is now common in the literature, but the consequences of doing so need to be addressed. This work reviews and critically discusses previous suggestions. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between moral heuristics and two types of information processing. To achieve this goal, moral heuristics will be considered in the context of a dual-process theory. Type 1 processes (deliberate) are being defined as consciously controlled and Type 2 processes (intuitive) as those that occur without conscious control. Heuristics are not one of the types of information processing, but a methodor procedure that simplifies information processing for (...) decision-makers. This simplification can be achieved both in deliberate and intuitive ways. Therefore, heuristics can operate at the different levels of the information processing. The level at which heuristics work depends on the heuristic itself, the person (their experience, cognitive qualities, etc.), environment, and problem that needs to be solved. (shrink)

Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual- (...) class='Hi'>processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes. What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory. (shrink)

My aim is to relate Søren A. Kierkegaard’s early theory of stages as described basically in “Either-Or” to the theory of interest underlying the two process model of cognition of the Canadian psychologist Keith E. Stanovich with regard to the question of the highest formal goal we can pursue in our life. On the basis of Stanovich’s distinction between type 1 and type 2 processing and Kierkegaard’s distinction between an esthetical and an ethical stage of life, I (...) argue for an extension of Stanovich’s understanding of the goal structure of type 2 processing, for Kierkegaard’s ethical stage of life being a natural expression of our cognitive faculties and for a critical approach to Kierkegaard's idea of a religious stage as hinted at in “Fear and Trembling”. (shrink)

Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual‐process virtue, consisting of imagination1 (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination2 (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual‐process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology, providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General (...) Reliability (GR) and Functional System Reliability (FSR), for example in relation to Kengo Miyazono and Uko Tooming's (2023) argument for epistemic generativity. Furthermore, the paper claims that the dual‐process virtue account enables us to integrate a wide range of findings from the literature on epistemology and imagination. Moreover, it suggests a novel way to distinguish the virtues of creativity and imagination and presents a case for viewing imagination as a virtue rather than a skill. (shrink)

Dual-process theories hold that there are two distinct processing modes available for many cognitive tasks: one that is fast, automatic and non-conscious, and another that is slow, controlled and conscious. Typically, cognitive biases are attributed to type 1 processes, which are held to be heuristic or associative, and logical responses to type 2 processes, which are characterised as rule-based or analytical. Dual-system theories go further and assign these two types of process to two separate reasoning systems, System (...) 1 and System 2 – a view sometimes described as ‘the two minds hypothesis’. It is often claimed that System 2 is uniquely human and the source of our capacity for abstract and hypothetical thinking. This study is an introduction to dual-process and dual-system theories. It looks at some precursors, surveys key work in the fields of learning, reasoning, social cognition and decision making, and identifies some recent trends and philosophical applications. (shrink)

The recent in vitro derivation of gamete‐like cells from mouse embryonic stem (mES) cells is a major breakthrough and lays down several challenges, both for the further scientific investigation and for the bioethical and biolegal discourse. We refer here to these cells as gamete‐like (sperm‐like or oocyte‐like, respectively), because at present there is still no evidence that these cells behave fully like bona fide sperm or oocytes, lacking the fundamental proof, i.e. combination with a normally derived gamete of the opposite (...) sex to yield a normal individual. However, the results published so far do show that these cells share some defining features of gametes. We discuss these results in the light of the bioethical and legal questions that are likely to arise would the same process become possible with human embryonic stem (hES) cells. (shrink)

In response to the claim that the properties typically used to distinguish System 1 from System 2 crosscut one another, Carruthers, Evans, and Stanovich have abandoned the System 1/System 2 distinction. Evans and Stanovich both opt for a dual-process theory, according to which Type-1 processes are autonomous and Type-2 processes use working memory and involve cognitive decoupling. Carruthers maintains a two-system account, according to which there is an intuitive system and a reflective system. I argue that these defenses (...) of dual-process theory face two problems. First, as pointed out by Sloman, these new dual-process theories cast the net of “reasoning” too wide. Second, and more importantly, this singular distinction cannot accomplish the explanatory work needed to support dual-process theory. These theorists must fall back on using various properties from the Standard Menu in explanations, thereby committing these accounts to a “Standard View” that they had hoped to avoid. Thus, these theorists face a.. (shrink)

Aristotle's De Anima discusses the psychological causes of what he calls locomotion – i.e, roughly, purpose-driven behavior. One cause is desire. The other is cognition, which falls into two kinds: thought (nous) and imagination (phantasia). Aristotle’s discussion is dense and confusing, but I argue that we can extract from it an account that is coherent, compelling, and that in many ways closely anticipates modern psychological theories, in particular Dual Processing theory. Animals and humans are driven to pursue objects that (...) attract us. Objects take on that power when we cognize them as valuable. If we rely on imagistic, automatic, uncontrolled processing mechanisms – Aristotle’s phantasia, which closely anticipates the modern notion of Type 1 processing – our resulting desires and actions will be impulsive. If we rely instead on rational, critical, deliberative capacities – Aristotle’s thought, which closely anticipates the modern notion of Type 2 processing – our resulting desires and actions will be reflective. Animals are capable only of the first kind of behavior; the human psyche is constituted of an animal psyche united with an intellectual one, so we are capable of both. (shrink)

Dual-process models of cognition suggest that there are two types of thought: autonomous Type 1 processes and working memory dependent Type 2 processes that support hypothetical thinking. Models of creative thinking also distinguish between two sets of thinking processes: those involved in the generation of ideas and those involved with their refinement, evaluation, and/or selection. Here we review dual-process models in both these literatures and delineate the similarities and differences. Both generative creative processing and evaluative creative (...) class='Hi'>processing involve elements that have been attributed to each of the dual processes of cognition. We explore the notion that creative thinking may rest upon the nature of a shifting process between Type 1 and Type 2 dual processes. We suggest that a synthesis of the evidence bases on dual-process models of cognition and of creative thinking, together with developing time-based approaches to explore the shifting process, could better inform the development of i.. (shrink)

I argue that virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism are complementary. They do not give competing accounts of epistemic virtue. Rather they explain the excellent functioning of different parts of our cognitive apparatus. Reliabilist virtue designates the excellent functioning of fast and context-specific Type 1 cognitive processes, while responsibilist virtue means an excellent functioning of effortful and reflective Type 2 cognitive processes. This account unifies reliabilist and responsibilist virtue theory. But the virtues are not unified by designating some epistemic (...) norm that both aim at. Instead, I unify them through their cognitive foundations. Because Type 1 and Type 2 cognition are complementary, reliabilist and responsibilist virtues are complementary. Thereby, this dual-process theory of epistemic virtue gives a naturalised account of virtues as well as an explanation of how reliabilism and responsibilism relate. This approach offers a solution for both the generality problem and the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology; additionally it preserves the epistemological autonomy of each virtue type. (shrink)

Dual Process Theory is currently a popular theory for explaining why we show bounded rationality in reasoning and decision-making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process, while the other describes a slow and reflective one. A problem for this theory is identifying a common principle that binds these features together, explaining why they form a unity, the unity problem. To solve (...) it, a hypothesis is developed combining embodied predictive processing with symbolic classical approaches. The hypothesis, simplified, states that Type 1 processes are bound together because they rely on embodied predictive processing whereas Type 2 processes form a unity because they are accomplished by symbolic classical cognition. To show that this is likely the case, the features of Dual Process Theory are discussed in relation to these frameworks. (shrink)

A divide exists in the creativity literature as to whether relatively more or less executive processing is beneficial to creative thinking. To explore this issue, we employ an individual differences perspective informed by dual-process theories in which it is assumed that people vary in the extent to which they rely on autonomous or controlled processing . We find that those more willing and/or able to engage Type 2 processing are more likely to successfully make creative connections (...) in tasks requiring the unification of disparate elements and the novelty of generated items, but not in some other indices of creativity, namely, cognitive flexibility and fluency. Implications for the role of executive processing in creative thinking are discussed in the context of DPTs. We situate the ability to make remote connections alongside other advanced higher order thinking capabilities that are unique to humans. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an upsurge of research aimed at removing the mystery from insight and creative problem solving. The present special issue reflects this expanding field. Overall the papers gathered here converge on a nuanced view of insight and creative thinking as arising from multiple processes that can yield surprising solutions through a mixture of “special” Type 1 processes and “routine” Type 2 processes.

Implicit cognition is cognition that happens automatically and (typically) non-consciously. In moral psychology, implicit cognition is almost always understood in terms of dual process models of moral judgment. In this chapter, we address the question whether implicit moral judgment is usefully cashed out in terms of automatic (“type 1”) processes, and what the limitations of this approach are. Our chapter has six sections. In (1), we provide a brief overview of dual process models of domain-general (moral and non-moral) cognition. (...) (2) reviews a recent debate regarding the soundness of dual process models to begin with. Section (3) is about dual process accounts of moral judgment specifically. The last three sections then survey attempts to go beyond a simplistic automatic/controlled (“type 2”) distinction in conceptualizing implicit moral cognition. Recently, three main theoretical approaches have emerged, which all revolve around the questions whether type 2 processing can successfully penetrate implicit moral cognition. First, rational learning approaches highlight how episodes of moral learning can feed back into and shape our moral intuitions (4). Second, so-called triple process models suggest that automatic cognitive outputs can under certain circumstances be reined in by reflective cognition (5). Finally, recent evidence shows that moral reasoning is not as impotent as earlier developments in empirical moral psychology claimed to demonstrate (6). (shrink)

This paper reflects on Dietrich Dörner's observation that participants in complex dynamic control tasks exhibit a "tendency to economize", that is, they tend to minimize cognitive effort. I interpret this observation in terms of a dual processing approach and explore if the reluctance to adopt Type 2 processing could be rooted in biological energy saving. There is evidence that the energy available for the cortex at any point in time is quite limited. Therefore, effortful thinking comes at (...) the cost of neglecting other cortical functions. The proposed dual processing approach to complex problem solving is explored in an experiment where we varied cognitive load by means of a secondary task in order to make Type 1 or Type 2 processing more likely. Results show that cognitive load had no effect on target achievement. Even in the single task condition, many participants prefer Type 1 processing, confirming Dörner's observation. (shrink)

Thanks to advances in machine learning in recent years the ability of AI agents to act independently of human oversight, respond to their environment, and interact with other machines has significantly increased, and is one step closer to human-like performance. For this reason, we can observe contemporary researchers’ efforts towards modeling agency in artificial systems. In this light, the aim of this paper is to develop a dual-process approach to the problem of AI agency perception, and to discuss possible triggers (...) of various agency perceptions. The article discusses the agency attribution phenomenon, based on which the argument for the dual-process nature of agency perception is developed. Two distinct types of thinking involved in human reasoning on AI agency are suggested: Type 1 and Type 2. The first one is fast, automatic, routine, and often unconscious; the second is a slower, controlled, more conscious one. These two distinct types of processing can yield differing and sometimes conflicting results for human cognition and interaction. The preliminary philosophical findings may contribute to further investigations in philosophy of mind or cognitive psychology and could also be empirically tested in HCI and UX studies. (shrink)

Thanks to advances in machine learning in recent years the ability of AI agents to act independently of human oversight, respond to their environment, and interact with other machines has significantly increased, and is one step closer to human-like performance. For this reason, we can observe contemporary researchers’ efforts towards modeling agency in artificial systems. In this light, the aim of this paper is to develop a dual-process approach to the problem of AI agency perception, and to discuss possible triggers (...) of various agency perceptions. The article discusses the agency attribution phenomenon, based on which the argument for the dual-process nature of agency perception is developed. Two distinct types of thinking involved in human reasoning on AI agency are suggested: Type 1 and Type 2. The first one is fast, automatic, routine, and often unconscious; the second is a slower, controlled, more conscious one. These two distinct types of processing can yield differing and sometimes conflicting results for human cognition and interaction. The preliminary philosophical findings may contribute to further investigations in philosophy of mind or cognitive psychology and could also be empirically tested in HCI and UX studies. (shrink)

The existence of different types of semiosis has been recognized, so far, in two ways. It has been pointed out that different semiotic features exist in different taxa and this has led to the distinction between zoosemiosis, phytosemiosis, mycosemiosis, bacterial semiosis and the like. Another type of diversity is due to the existence of different types of signs and has led to the distinction between iconic, indexical and symbolic semiosis. In all these cases, however, semiosis has been defined by (...) the Peirce model, i.e., by the idea that the basic structure is a triad of ‘sign, object and interpretant’, and that interpretation is an essential component of semiosis. This model is undoubtedly applicable to animals, since it was precisely the discovery that animals are capable of interpretation that allowed Thomas Sebeok to conclude that they are also capable of semiosis. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear how far the Peirce model can be extended beyond the animal kingdom, and we already know that we cannot apply it to the cell. The rules of the genetic code have been virtually the same in all living systems and in all environments ever since the origin of life, which clearly shows that they do not depend on interpretation. Luckily, it has been pointed out that semiosis is not necessarily based on interpretation and can be defined exclusively in terms of coding. According to the ‘code model’, a semiotic system is made of signs, meanings and coding rules, all produced by the same codemaker, and in this form it is immediately applicable to the cell. The code model, furthermore, allows us to recognize the existence of many organic codes in living systems, and to divide them into two main types that here are referred to as manufacturing semiosis and signalling semiosis. The genetic code and the splicing codes, for example, take part in processes that actually manufacture biological objects, whereas signal transduction codes and compartment codes organize existing objects into functioning supramolecular structures. The organic codes of single cells appeared in the first three billion years of the history of life and were involved either in manufacturing semiosis or in signalling semiosis. With the origin of animals, however, a third type of semiosis came into being, a type that can be referred to as interpretive semiosis because it became closely involved with interpretation. We realize in this way that the contribution of semiosis to life was far greater than that predicted by the Peirce model, where semiosis is always a means of interpreting the world. Life is essentially about three things: (1) it is about manufacturing objects, (2) it is about organizing objects into functioning systems, and (3) it is about interpreting the world. The idea that these are all semiotic processes, tells us that life depends on semiosis much more deeply and extensively than we thought. We realize in this way that there are three distinct types of semiosis in Nature, and that they gave very different contributions to the origin and the evolution of life. (shrink)

In [3] John S. Bell proposed how to associate particle trajectories with a lattice quantum field theory, yielding what can be regarded as a |Ψ|2-distributed Markov process on the appropriate configuration space. A similar process can be defined in the continuum, for more or less any regularized quantum field theory; such processes we call Bell-type quantum field theories. We describe methods for explicitly constructing these processes. These concern, in addition to the definition of the Markov processes, the efficient calculation (...) of jump rates, how to obtain the process from the processes corresponding to the free and interaction Hamiltonian alone, and how to obtain the free process from the free Hamiltonian or, alternatively, from the one-particle process by a construction analogous to “second quantization.” As an example, we consider the process for a second quantized Dirac field in an external electromagnetic field. (shrink)

Dual-Process Theories (D-PTs) claim there are two qualitatively different types of processes in the human brain-mind. Despite forming the basis for several areas of cognitive science, they are still shrouded in ambiguity: critics erroneously attack D-PTs as a whole (e.g., Evans and Stanovich Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 2013), the qualitative/quantitative distinction is not clear enough (De Neys Perspectives on Psychological Science 16 (6): 1412–1427, 2021; Dewey 2022) and, given this criterion, deciding between qualitative or quantitative differences may even be (...) scientifically irrelevant (De Neys 2021). As a way of disambiguating the discussion and clarifying what exactly means to claim the existence of a second type of process, I define two possible categories of D-PT: The substantial and the instrumental. In the substantial case, Type 2 processes are subpersonal level ones. In the instrumental case, Type 2 processing is a personal level phenomenon that does not necessarily imply subpersonal level Type 2 processes. Discussing the different implications of each of the categories, I use as a main example to illustrate the ambiguity – and the exercise of disambiguation – the model proposed by Evans and Stanovich (2013), making clear its substantial character, and contrast it with Frankish’ (2009) – a clear case of instrumental D-PT. Finally, I discuss the contributions this distinction can make. By making the discussion clearer, it can provide a relatively unanimous framework for dual- and single-process theorists (the instrumental version) and clearer desiderata for those wishing to defend the substantive one. (shrink)

The interactivist approach to development generates a framework of types of constraints on what can be constructed. The four constraint types are based on: (1) what the constructed systems are about; (2) the representational relationship itself; (3) the nature of the systems being constructed; and (4) the process of construction itself. We give illustrations of each constraint type. Any developmental theory needs to acknowledge all four types of constraint; however, some current theories conflate different types of constraint, or rely (...) on a single constraint type to explicate development. Such theories will be inherently unable to explain important aspects of development. (shrink)

Recent work in cognitive modelling has found that most of the data that has been cited as evidence for the dual-process theory (DPT) of reasoning is best explained by non-linear, “monotonic” one-process models (Stephens et al., 2018, 2019). In this paper, I consider an important caveat of this research: it uses models that are committed to unrealistic assumptions about how effectively task conditions can isolate Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning. To avoid this caveat, I develop a coordinated theoretical, experimental, (...) and modelling strategy to better test DPT. First, I propose that Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning are defined as reasoning that precedes and follows metacognitive control, respectively. Second, I argue that reasoning that precedes and follows metacognitive control can be effectively isolated using debiasing paradigms that manipulate metacognitive heuristics (e.g., processing fluency) to prevent or trigger metacognitive control, respectively. Third, I argue that monotonic modelling can allow us to decisively test DPT only when we use them to analyse data from this particular kind of debiasing paradigm. (shrink)

This paper is a response to the opening of new lines of research on CSR and SMEs (Thompson & Smith, 1991; Spence, 1999; Moore & Smith, 2006; Spence, 2007). It seeks to explore the business case for CSR in this corporate segment. The paper, which is based on four case studies of medium-sized firms in the automotive sector, took the distinctive approach of trying to understand the nature of CSR-like activities developed not by best-in-class CSR-driven companies but by purely competitiveness-driven (...) firms. The case studies provide explicit evidence that the CSR activities of SMEs and the notion of social capital are interrelated, turning social capital into a powerful instrument to better explain what academic literature has called silent CSR practices . The analysis that follows questions some of the basic tenets that underpin the branch of business ethics that deals with the nature of SMEs' approach to CSR. Four basic concerns, which take the form of propositions for further research, serve as the basis for this analysis: a) A definition of CSR that includes most of the actions taken by all companies in the territory contributes no academic value to the discipline b) Any study of the motivation behind these CSR actions must reflect their essentially pragmatic nature. Actions are linked to social values but also, more importantly, to the nature of the competitive environment c) Business ethics must seek common ground with other more sociological disciplines if it is to explain the reasons behind this type of action d) Any study of this kind of practice requires a dual approach: a) normative when using tools developed by CSR; and b) descriptive and instrumental using the notion of social capital. (shrink)

Previous research suggested a role of gaze in preference formation, not merely as an expression of preference, but also as a causal influence. According to the gaze cascade hypothesis, the longer subjects look at an item, the more likely they are to develop a preference for it. However, to date the connection between viewing and liking has been investigated predominately with self-paced viewing conditions in which the subjects were required to select certain items from simultaneously presented stimuli on the basis (...) of perceived visual attractiveness. Such conditions might promote a default, but non-mandatory connection between viewing and liking. To explore whether the connection is separable, we examined the evaluative processing of single naturalistic food images in a 2 x 2 design, conducted completely within subjects, in which we varied both the type of exposure (self-paced versus time-controlled) and the type of evaluation (non-exclusive versus exclusive). In the self-paced exclusive evaluation, longer viewing was associated with a higher likelihood of a positive evaluation. However, in the self-paced non-exclusive evaluation, the trend reversed such that longer viewing durations were associated with lesser ratings. Furthermore, in the time-controlled tasks, both with non-exclusive and exclusive evaluation, there was no significant relationship between the viewing duration and the evaluation. The overall pattern of results was consistent for viewing times measured in terms of exposure duration (i.e., the duration of stimulus presentation on the screen) and in terms of actual gaze duration (i.e., the amount of time the subject effectively gazed at the stimulus on the screen). The data indicated that viewing does not intrinsically lead to a higher evaluation when evaluating single food images; instead, the relationship between viewing duration and evaluation depends on the type of task. We suggest that self-determination of exposure duration may be a prerequisite for any influence from viewing time on evaluative processing, regardless of whether the influence is facilitative. Moreover, the purported facilitative link between viewing and liking appears to be limited to exclusive evaluation, when only a restricted number of items can be included in a chosen set. (shrink)

The confluence of creativity in music performance finds itself in performance practices and cultural motifs, the communication of the human body along with the instrument it interacts with, and individual performers’ perceptual, motor, and cognitive abilities that contribute to varied musical interpretations of the same piece or melodic line. The musical and artistic execution of a player, as well as the product of this phenomena can become determinant causes in a creative mental state. With advances in neurocognitive measures, the state (...) of one’s artistic intuition and execution has been a growing interest in understanding the creative thought process of human behavior, particularly in improvising artists. This article discusses the implementation on the concurrence of spontaneous (Type-1) and controlled (Type-2) processing modes that may be apparent in the perception of non-improvising artists on how melodic lines are perceived in music performance. Elucidating the cortical-subcortical activity in the dual-process model may extend to non-improvising musicians explored in the paradigm of neural correlates. These interactions may open new possibilities for expanding the repertoire of executive functions, creativity, and the coordinated activity of cortical-subcortical regions that regulate the free flow of artistic ideas and expressive spontaneity in future neuromusical research. (shrink)

The interactivist approach to development generates a framework of types of constraints on what can be constructed. The four constraint types are based on: (1) what the constructed systems are about; (2) the representational relationship itself; (3) the nature of the systems being constructed; and (4) the process of construction itself. We give illustrations of each constraint type. Any developmental theory needs to acknowledge all four types of constraint; however, some current theories conflate different types of constraint, or rely (...) on a single constraint type to explicate development. Such theories will be inherently unable to explain important aspects of development. (shrink)

The bcl‐2 gene product, a 25 kDa membrane protein residing at mitochondrial, microsomal and nuclear membrane sites within many cell types, is a broad and potent inhibitor of cell death by apoptosis. A family of bcl‐2‐related genes with death‐inhibiting or ‐promoting activities has recently been described, indicating a potentially quite complex cell death regulatory network at the level of gene expression and protein‐protein interactions. The function of bcl‐2 may be to regulate a final common pathway in apoptosis. Current hypotheses suggest (...) that oxidative stress, specific proteolytic activity or cell cycle control may be common elements in apoptosis through which bcl‐2 exerts its survival function. Based on the extent to which elements of apoptotic pathways overlap with non‐apoptotic cellular functions, the physiological role of bcl‐2 may also extend to other cellular processes such as differentiation and proliferation. (shrink)

We examined a large set of conditional inference data compiled from several previous studies and asked three questions: How is normative performance related to intelligence? Does negative conclusion bias stem from Type 1 or Type 2 processing? Does implicit negation bias stem from Type 1 or Type 2 processing? Our analysis demonstrated that rejecting denial of the antecedent and affirmation of the consequent inferences was positively correlated with intelligence, while endorsing modus tollens inferences was (...) not; that the occurrence of negative conclusion bias was related to the extent of Type 2 processing; and that the occurrence of implicit negation bias was not related to the extent of Type 2 processing. We conclude that negative conclusion bias is, at least in part, a product of Type 2 processing, while implicit negation bias is not. (shrink)

Online social networks (OSNs) have gained enormous popularity in recent years. Hundreds of millions of social network users reveal great amounts of personal information in the Web 2.0 environment that is largely devoid of security standards and practices. The central question in this article is why so many social network users are being so trusting. The focus is on theory-building on trust as a critical issue in OSNs. A theoretical framework is developed, which facilitates a multi-level and multi-dimensional analysis of (...) research problems related to trust in OSNs. First, the structural and relational underpinnings of trust in OSNs are investigated from a governance perspective that integrates concepts of social network theory, social capital and the role of value in relational exchanges. Subsequently, the focus moves to the individual's decision to trust and to processes through which trust actually emerges. Different types and sources of trust from the trust literature and their importance for trust-related decisions and behaviours in OSNs are discussed. Several research propositions are presented, which contribute to a better understanding of the role of trust and the relevance of facets of trust and social capital in OSNs. (shrink)

Results from two self-paced reading experiments in English are reported in which subject- and object-extracted relative clauses (SRCs and ORCs, respectively) were presented in contexts that support both types of relative clauses (RCs). Object-extracted versions were read more slowly than subject-extracted versions across both experiments. These results are not consistent with a decay-based working memory account of dependency formation where the amount of decay is a function of the number of new discourse referents that intervene between the dependents (Gibson, 1998; (...) Warren & Gibson, 2002). Rather, these results support interference-based accounts and decay-based accounts where the amount of decay depends on the number of words or on the type of noun phrases that intervene between the dependents. In Experiment 2, presentation in supportive contexts was directly contrasted with presentation in null contexts. Whereas in the null context the extraction effect was only observed during the RC region, in a supportive context the extraction effect was numerically larger and persisted into the following region, thus showing that extraction effects are enhanced in supportive contexts. A sentence completion study demonstrated that the rate of SRCs versus ORCs was similar across null and supportive contexts (with most completions being subject-extractions), ruling out the possibility that an enhanced extraction effect in supportive contexts is due to ORCs being less expected in such contexts. However, the content of the RCs differed between contexts in the completions, such that the RCs produced in supportive contexts were more constrained, reflecting the lexical and semantic content of the preceding context. This effect, which we discuss in terms of expectations/lexico-syntactic priming, suggests that the enhancement of the extraction effect in supportive contexts is due to the facilitation of the subject-extracted condition. (shrink)

The direct social perception thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ (...) class='Hi'>Type 1 mindreading serves as a rival to DSP or whether some Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill’s dual process account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief. This account posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges and has significant advantages over DSP’s phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state. (shrink)

Service-dominant logic established that for the success of service industries, it is vital to acknowledge the customer as an active agent in the commercial ecosystem. To carry it out, the consumer must participate in value creation. The resource integration theory exposes the importance of recognizing the customer as an agent capable of improving the company’s competitive advantage. It is only necessary for the participants to perceive benefits to make their resources available and integrate them into the co-creation process. This study (...) aims to find the key customer-based factors that influence the brand value co-creation process in the banking sector, analyzing the dynamics in different customers across national cultures and idiosyncrasies. In this paper, we analyze the potential heterogeneous idiosyncrasy of customers and how it leads to becoming more engaged in the co-creation process. Quantitative research was performed in five countries, obtaining a total of 2,029 valid questionnaires where latent profile analyses and ANOVAs were performed to identify and describe the latent profiles of consumer co-creators of brand value. Afterward, a PLS-SEM was performed to test the research model in each segment. The results show four different profiles of customer co-creators of brand value, from non-co-creators, skeptical and neutral, to customers committed to co-creating brand value with their banks. The results indicate that detractor customers lack the motivations and resources to carry out co-creation behaviors. On the other hand, creativity and connectedness were crucial for customers co-creators of value. To the authors’ understanding, no studies have used latent segmentation to find the profiles of customer co-creators of brand value. (shrink)

This study examined health professionals’ (HPs) experience, beliefs and attitudes towards brain death (BD) and two types of donation after circulatory death (DCD)—controlled and uncontrolled DCD. Five hundred and eighty-seven HPs likely to be involved in the process of organ procurement were interviewed in 14 hospitals with transplant programs in France, Spain and the US. Three potential donation scenarios—BD, uncontrolled DCD and controlled DCD—were presented to study subjects during individual face-to-face interviews. Our study has two main findings: (1) In the (...) context of organ procurement, HPs believe that BD is a more reliable standard for determining death than circulatory death, and (2) While the vast majority of HPs consider it morally acceptable to retrieve organs from brain-dead donors, retrieving organs from DCD patients is much more controversial. We offer the following possible explanations. DCD introduces new conditions that deviate from standard medical practice, allow procurement of organs when donors’ loss of circulatory function could be reversed, and raises questions about “death” as a unified concept. Our results suggest that, for many HPs, these concerns seem related in part to the fact that a rigorous brain examination is neither clinically performed nor legally required in DCD. Their discomfort could also come from a belief that irreversible loss of circulatory function has not been adequately demonstrated. If DCD protocols are to achieve their full potential for increasing organ supply, the sources of HPs’ discomfort must be further identified and addressed. (shrink)