The orthodox presentation of quantum theory often includes statements on state preparation and measurements without mentioning how these processes can be achieved. The often quoted projection postulate is regarded by many as problematical. This paper presents a systematic framework for state preparation and measurement. Within the existing Hilbert space formulation of quantum mechanics for spinless particles we show that it is possible (1)to prepare an arbitrary state and (2)to reduce all quantum measurements to local position measurements in (...) an asymptotic way by unitary evolution processes without recourse to the projection postulate. A generalization to spin-1/2particles is also given. The theory presented provides a general mathematical and theoretical foundation for many practical schemes for state preparation and measurement. (shrink)

This is the first of two papers responding to ‘recent’ commentary on various aspects of hyperplane dependence by several authors. In this paper I focus on the issues of the relations of HD to state reduction and unitary evolution. The authors who’s comments I address here are Maudlin and Myrvold. In the second paper of this set I focus on HD dynamical variables and localizable properties and measurements and address comments of de Koning, Halvorson, Clifton and Wallace. Each (...) paper ends with some reflections on the implications of HD for the ontology of Minkowski space-time. To set the stage for my responses, I begin this paper with some general position statements designed to correct what seem to be widespread and erroneous construals of some of my views. Two central points are argued for in this first paper. First, dynamical evolution occurs not only within foliations of Minkowski space-time. Rather the transition from the physical state of affairs on any one hyperplane to any other, whether the hyperplanes intersect or are parallel, is always an instance of dynamical evolution between them, generated by some active combination of boost-like transformations and/or time-like translations and/or state reductions and ‘reconstructions’. This point gives rise to a generalized conception of a history of dynamical evolution, allowing for the use of parameterized families of hyperplanes that multiply cover some portions of space-time. Nevertheless, and this is the second central point, for any two generalized histories, H and H’, the quantum states for a system on all the hyperplanes of H from the asymptotic past up to some hyperplane, h, determine the quantum states for the system on all the hyperplanes of H’ from the asymptotic past up to any hyperplane, h’, such that h’ lies to the past of all those state reduction regions that lie to the future of all hyperplanes of H that are ‘earlier’ than h. Consideration of these results should defuse concerns that have been voiced about the coherence and consistency of HD. A position closely related to the second point has already been argued for by Myrvold. (shrink)

This paper investigates various properties that may by possessed by quantum states, which are believed to be specifically “quantum” and their opposites. It also considers their “absolute” counterparts in the following sense: a given state has a given property absolutely if after an arbitrary unitary transformation it still possesses it. The known relations between the listed properties and between their absolute counterparts are summarized. It is proven that the only two-qubit state that has zero quantum discord absolutely (...) is the maximally mixed state. Finally, related conceptual issues concerning the terms “classical” and “quantum” are discussed. (shrink)

The Frauchiger–Renner Paradox is an extension of paradoxes based on the “Problem of Measurement,” such as Schrödinger’s Cat and Wigner’s Friend. All these paradoxes stem from assuming that quantum theory has only unitary physical dynamics, and the attendant ambiguity about what counts as a ‘measurement’—i.e., the inability to account for the observation of determinate measurement outcomes from within the theory itself. This paper discusses a basic inconsistency arising in the FR scenario at a much earlier point than the derived (...) contradiction: namely, the inconsistency inherent in treating an improper mixture as a proper, epistemic mixture. This is an illegitimate procedure that is nevertheless endemic if quantum theory is assumed to be always unitary. In contrast, under a non-unitary account of quantum state reduction yielding determinate outcomes, the use of a proper mixture for measurement results becomes legitimate, and this entire class of paradoxes cannot be mounted. The conclusion is that the real lesson of the FR paradox is that it is the unitary-only assumption that needs to be critically reassessed. (shrink)

We offer a new proposal for cosmic singularity resolution based upon a quantum cosmology with a unitary bounce. This proposal is illustrated via a novel quantization of a mini-superspace model in which there can be superpositions of the cosmological constant. This possibility leads to a finite, bouncing unitary cosmology. Whereas the usual Wheeler–DeWitt cosmology generically displays pathological behaviour in terms of non-finite expectation values and non-unitary dynamics, the finiteness and unitarity of our model are formally guaranteed. For (...) classically singular models with a massless scalar field and cosmological constant, we show that well-behaved quantum observables can be constructed and generic solutions to the universal Schrodinger equation are singularity-free. Key features of the solutions of our model include a cosmic bounce due to quantum gravitational effects, a well-defined FLRW limit far from the bounce, and a super-inflationary epoch in the intermediate region. Furthermore, our model displays novel features including: i) superpositions of values of the cosmological constant; ii) a non-zero scattering length around the big bounce; and iii) bound ‘Efimov universe’ states for negative cosmological constant. The last feature provides a new platform for quantum simulation of the early universe. A companion paper provides detailed interpretation and analysis of particular cosmological solutions. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to provide a philosophical conceptual framework to understand the theoretical roots and political implications of the interpretations of Plato’s work in Jaeger’s Third Humanism and Krieck’s völkisch-racist pedagogy and anthropology. This article will seek to characterize, as figures of localitas, their conceptions of the individual, community, corporeality, identity, and the State that both authors developed departing from Platonic political philosophy. My main hypothesis is that Jaeger’s and Krieck’s interpretations of Platonic paideía shared several (...) core-elements based on a modern conception of State sovereignty and human will, whose fundamental ground is the subjectivist-technical metaphysics. The “production” of a human type (spiritual and/or racial) and a unitary State political community appears in both authors mediated by a theory of political education, that I define as «State typohumanism», that sought its sustenance in Plato’s political philosophy, mainly by means of a distorted understanding of the notions of týpos and ē̂thos, and that, I argue, played a key role in the intellectual legitimization of völkisch-racism. This would be broadly translated into a programmatic and literal understanding of the Platonic Republic which assumes that the inherent function of any State is to produce subjectivities based on national identities grounded on homogeneous characteristics. In these varied characterizations similar appropriations of humanitas have been expressed both in Jaeger and in Krieck. (shrink)

A mechanism describing state reduction dynamics in relativistic quantum field theory is outlined. The mechanism involves nonlinear stochastic modifications to the standard description of unitary state evolution and the introduction of a relativistic field in which a quantized degree of freedom is associated to each point in spacetime. The purpose of this field is to mediate in the interaction between classical stochastic influences and conventional quantum fields. The equations of motion are Lorentz covariant, frame independent, and do (...) not result in divergent behavior. It is shown that the mathematical framework permits the specification of unambiguous local properties providing a connection between the model and evidence of real world phenomena. The collapse process is demonstrated for an idealized example. (shrink)

An experiment by Proietti et al. purporting to instantiate the ‘Wigner’s Friend’ thought experiment is discussed. It is pointed out that the stated implications of the experiment regarding the alleged irreconcilability of facts attributed to different observers warrant critical review. In particular, violation of a Clauser–Horne–Shimony inequality by the experimental data actually shows that the attribution of measurement outcomes to the “Friends” is erroneous. An elementary but often overlooked result regarding improper mixtures is adduced in support of this assessment, and (...) a basic logical error in the analysis leading to the authors’ ontological claims that different observers are subject to irreconcilable ‘facts’ is identified. A counterexample is provided which refutes the popular notion that quantum theory leads to ‘relative facts’ that never manifest as empirical inconsistencies. It is further noted that under an assumption of unbroken unitarity, no measurement correlation can ever yield an outcome, since all systems remain in improper mixtures, and attributing a definite but unknown outcome contradicts their composite pure state. It is pointed out that there already exists a solution to this conundrum in the form of an alternative formulation of quantum theory, which accounts for the data showing that no outcomes occurred at the interior entangled photon level and also predicts that outcomes can and do occur at the exterior “super-observer” level in this type of experiment. (shrink)

Starting from a unitary, Lorentz invariant two-particle scattering amplitude, we show how to use an identification and replacement process to construct a unique, unitary particle–antiparticle amplitude. This process differs from conventional on-shell Mandelstam s, t, u crossing in that the input and constructed amplitudes can be off-diagonal and off-energy shell. Further, amplitudes are constructed using the invariant parameters which are appropriate to use as driving terms in the multi-particle, multichannel non-perturbative, cluster decomposable, relativistic scattering equations of the Faddeev-type (...) integral equations recently presented by Alfred, Kwizera, Lindesay and Noyes. It is therefore anticipated that when so employed, the resulting multi-channel solutions will also be unitary. The process preserves the usual particle–antiparticle symmetries. To illustrate this process, we construct a J=0 scattering length model chosen for simplicity. We also exhibit a class of physical models which contain a finite quantum mass parameter and are Lorentz invariant. These are constructed to reduce in the appropriate limits, and with the proper choice of value and sign of the interaction parameter, to the asymptotic solution of the non-relativistic Coulomb problem, including the forward scattering singularity, the essential singularity in the phase, and the Bohr bound-state spectrum. (shrink)

We question whether empathy is mediated by a unitary circuit. We argue that recent neuroimaging data indicate dissociable neural responses for different facial expressions as well as for representing others' mental states (Theory of Mind, TOM). We also argue that the general empathy disorder considered characteristic of autism and psychopathy is not general but specific for each disorder.

The candid student of scientific method will recognize that biology is not entirely a physical science, while acknowledging that it owes its present state of development largely or mainly to physical conceptions and methods. It is clear that the constant features of vital organization and activity presuppose the physical constancies as basis. Nevertheless the living organism has proved in many ways refractory to a purely physical analysis. This is not merely because the higher organisms have their psychical side and (...) that psychological method differs from physical method; conceivably a properly unified science might apply equally to the physical and the psychical sides of nature. Nor is it entirely because vital behaviour is more individualized and less predictable than physical behaviour. It is rather that certain fundamental features of natural process, largely neglected by physics, are just those which are of chief importance in those flux-like entities which are living organisms. The traditional methods of physics, which analyze nature into combinations of invariant elements and processes, are ill-adapted to deal with the fluid, asymmetrical and largely indeterminate features of process as displayed so conspicuously in living organisms. This, put briefly, is the contention of L. L. Whyte, physicist and author of the recent remarkable book on the relations between physics and biology. In the present paper I propose first to consider especially those sections of the book which bear more particularly on the fundamental problems of biology; this part is paraphrase and commentary rather than summary, although never departing far from the subject of unitary principle as defined by Whyte. Later I shall consider some philosophical implications which seem important. For the details of Whyte's exposition the reader should refer to his book, which is notably clear, concise and critical in style and treatment, as well as comprehensive and fully realistic in its point of view. (shrink)

We pose and resolve a puzzle about spontaneous symmetry breaking in the quantum theory of infinite systems. For a symmetry to be spontaneously broken, it must not be implementable by a unitary operator in a ground state's GNS representation. But Wigner's theorem guarantees that any symmetry's action on states is given by a unitary operator. How can this unitary operator fail to implement the symmetry in the GNS representation? We show how it is possible for a (...) unitary operator of this sort to connect the folia of unitarily inequivalent representations. This result undermines interpretations of quantum theory that hold unitary equivalence to be necessary for physical equivalence. (shrink)

The basic components of James’s stream of consciousness are considered concretely and in a way that tends to be relatively neutral from a theoretical perspective. My ultimate goal is a general description of the states of consciousness, but I try here to be more “observational” than “theoretical” about them. Giving attention to James’s reports of his personal firsthand evidence, I proceed as though I were conversing with this most phenomenological and radically empirical of psychological authors. I disagree with James on (...) some points but, also, I find many of his claims acceptable and base my own view on a thesis fundamental to his perspective: A stream of consciousness consists of a succession, one at a time, of unitary states and all of the other mental occurrences that are conscious are features of such states. This is an effort to see more clearly together with James, not an exercise of correcting errors in how he treated of our topic. (shrink)

The “special state” understanding of the measurement process is presented, namely there is no “measurement process,” only unitary time evolution. However, in contrast to the many worlds interpretation, there is only one world. How this can be accomplished and how statistical mechanics is changed as a result are also discussed. The focus though is on experimental tests of this theory and the in-principle realization that this can give rise to feasible experimental tests. Those tests rely on the particular (...) feature of having only one world, so that any change in the wave function must have a proximate cause, and it is the detection of that cause that constitutes the test. In a companion article there is further exploration concerning the details of the test. In addition, in the present article, the special state theory is extended theoretically through evidence of the uniqueness of the Cauchy distribution as well as explicit recognition of the role of entanglement. (shrink)

In this article, Spain’s system of autonomous communities as a model of regionalisation in terms of subnational integration is analysed regarding its historical background, legal framework, and political context. Regionalism is examined with special emphasis on Bask nationalism and is also discussed with reference to the recent independence movement taking place in Catalonia. The contribution of the European Union’s encouragement of regional self-government to the development of regional democracy in Spain is stated in the mentioned as well. Regionalisation in Spain (...) is important as the discussion on 2017 independence referendum in Catalonia continues to be relevant. Being within unitary state level the regionalised state model strengthened the integration of the historical nationalities/regions with Spain and soothed the influence of the separatist movements; however, with the recent rally of Catalan nationalism this model became a controversial topic. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Frederick Engels’s The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State remains a fundamental resource for anyone wanting to understand the oppression of women as a capitalist form. By re-examining the strengths and weaknesses of Engels’s historicisation of women’s oppression through the lens of the debates opened by second wave feminism, I argue that, once properly understood, we can overcome the limitations of Engels’s book to point to the kind of unitary (...) theory of women’s oppression essential to a strategy adequate to the needs of the struggle for women’s liberation. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Frederick Engels’s The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State remains a fundamental resource for anyone wanting to understand the oppression of women as a capitalist form. By re-examining the strengths and weaknesses of Engels’s historicisation of women’s oppression through the lens of the debates opened by second wave feminism, I argue that, once properly understood, we can overcome the limitations of Engels’s book to point to the kind of unitary (...) theory of women’s oppression essential to a strategy adequate to the needs of the struggle for women’s liberation. (shrink)

In this essay we explain some of the problems of the Venezuelan criminal justice sub-system and, in general, the criminal law enforcement. That is to say, that which is expressed in the persecutory actions of the investigating authorities and the criminal courts, after having established in Venezuela a Carl Schmitt concept of Dual State with the purpose of eliminating “bourgeois” democracy and implanting the model of so-called Socialism of the XXI Century. In this sense, it is a question of (...) identifying the flagrant persecution and violation of human rights of those who do not have the capacity to resist the attacks emanating from the State in the abusive use of coercion and legal violence. With the Dual State want to impose an utopia by force, which leads to dystopia, due to the division and polarization of society with the dichotomous politics of friend-enemy, In a process of etiquette and "demonization" of the enemy. (shrink)

This article looks at the relationship between logistical power and the assemblages of sites that constitute modern states. Rather than treating states as centralizing institutions and singular sites of power, we treat them as multi-sited. They gain power by using logistical methods of problem solving, using infrastructures to enforce and depersonalize relations of domination and limit the autonomy of elites. But states necessarily solve diverse problems by different means in multiple locations. So, educating children is not continuous with governing colonies (...) even though both are necessary to nineteenth-century states. For this reason, states use logistical means of coordination to link sites, and they make the power of the state seem unitary even though the exercise of state power is not. (shrink)

This essay examines the grammatical structure underlying the use of the word "conscious". Despite the existence of this grammatical structure, I reject the assumption that actual consciousness has a similar structure. Specifically, I reject the claim that consciousness consists of three subtypes: state consciousness, transitive consciousness, and creature consciousness. I offer an inductive argument and a deductive argument that no such psychological entities exist. The inductive argument: given the lack of evidence or arguments for the entities and given that (...) a tripartite consciousness structure evolved from a tripartite grammatical habit, it would be far too coincidental if the grammatical distinction mirrored a psychological distinction. The deductive argument shows that absurd conclusions follow from assuming the existence of three distinct psychological entities. Furthermore, the verbal habits that motivate the distinction are rendered more intelligible under a "Unitary Thesis", the idea that verbal distinctions involving use of the word "conscious" are unified in their reliance on a single ontological unit, that of conscious experience. (shrink)

Among the newly enchristianed "extreme sports" category, ultrarunners and the sport of ultrarunning is on the fringe edge. What makes ultrarunners and their "sport" interesting is that ultrarunners regularly report experiences that can be equated to various types of mystical experiences during their "sporting" events. This paper briefly discusses ultrarunners, a hypothetical mystical (mythical) state of consciousness called Absolute Unitary Being, and the psychoneurophysiological aspects of ultrarunning. Through this process, a link is established that connects ultrarunners and their (...) "sport" with many traditional indigenous practices. It is suggested that many of the traditional indigenous practices may have produced experiences similar to those of ultrarunners, and thus we can look to ultrarunners to begin to understand some of the physiological, psychological, neurological, as well as humanistic, phenomenological, and transpersonal experiences and reasons behind many now lost traditional indigenous practices. (shrink)

The (re)building of the post-communist states offers new perspectives both on the state and on the multiple transitions that followed communism. Specifically, it shifts our analytical focus from states as consolidated outcomes and unitary actors to the process by which states come into being and into action in the modern era. This process consists of elite competition over policy-making authority, which is shaped and constrained by existing institutional resources, the pacing of transformation, and the international context. The four (...) ideal types of state-building that result are exemplified by the post-communist experience: democratic, autocratic, fractious, and personalistic. (shrink)

The building of the post-communist states offers new perspectives both on the state and on the multiple transitions that followed communism. Specifically, it shifts our analytical focus from states as consolidated outcomes and unitary actors to the process by which states come into being and into action in the modern era. This process consists of elite competition over policy-making authority, which is shaped and constrained by existing institutional resources, the pacing of transformation, and the international context. The four (...) ideal types of state-building that result are exemplified by the post-communist experience: democratic, autocratic, fractious, and personalistic. (shrink)

Despite waves of privatization around the world, state ownership of enterprise remains significant. The focus of scholars and policymakers has accordingly shifted from the defense and promotion of privatization to the design and improvement of corporate governance practices in state-owned enterprises. A broad consensus has emerged suggesting that state-owned firms should be corporatized, publicly traded and subject to the greatest extent possible to the same legal regime applicable to private firms. However, by focusing exclusively on what corporate (...) and securities laws can do to increase the efficiency of state enterprise, this view ignores the other side of the problem: How does the presence of SOEs affect the efficiency of corporate and securities laws as they apply to private firms? Brazil’s long historical experience with SOEs suggests that state ownership of listed firms can have unintended consequences that go beyond the potential firm mismanagement if the state pursues political goals inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization. The state’s financial interest as the controlling shareholder of listed firms can lead it to disfavor legal reforms that improve minority shareholder rights, thus impairing the ability of private firms to raise outside financing. In ignoring the conflicts of interest inherent in the state’s dual role as shareholder and regulator, the conventional wisdom has likely overestimated the aggregate benefits of a unitary corporate law regime for both state-owned and private firms. (shrink)

The Author presents the theoretical framework of this «Governare lapaura»’ issue on the Fear of Secession. Starting from the recent cases of the Brexit and the Catalonian referendum, the main goal of this issue is reflecting on the relationship between the political crisis of unitary State and the revival of secession.

The Jamesian streams of consciousness are each made up of states of consciousness one at a time in tight temporal succession except when a stream stops flowing momentarily or for a longer time. These pulses of mentality are typically complex in the sense of their possessing, each of them, many ingredients or features. But, also, every state of consciousness is, in a different sense, simple: a unitary awareness, a single mental act. Although unitary, a state of (...) consciousness often has many objects, which have some kind of existence, past, present, or future, or which are nonexistent, merely apparent, only imaginary. The problem concerning the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness is what they are themselves, not what they are about or what they may seem to be about, but what are their own intrinsic properties. For example, in my view, conscious states are, literally, certain occurrent states of the brain. In James’s different view, conscious states are mental in the sense of nonphysical yet directly produced by the total brain process or by a substantial part of it. In our attempts to determine the intrinsic properties of states of consciousness, we are well advised to attend to our inner awareness of them. Any true statement about a state of consciousness that we may succeed in formulating from the first-person perspective is, in my view, a fact concerning a brain state and may help us to learn which among the occurrent brain states are actually the states of consciousness. Their being unitary awarenesses is among the facts we know firsthand about the states of consciousness. I can think of no instance of such a state that is missing the property of intentionality, the property of its being at least as though about something. Also, although we may distinguish various ingredients belonging to a state of consciousness — a state can be, for example, an auditory, a visual, a sexual, a memorial, and an anticipatory experience, all at the same time — these ingredients are not apprehended side by side, but as integrated together in a unitary state. It will be argued that how we find firsthand a state of consciousness to be is illusory, that any such state is actually made up of separate processes. But this claim has its own problems, including having to explain the difference between two simultaneous states of consciousness belonging each of them to a different stream and an integral state that includes several different kinds of experience. (shrink)

Are the conclusions reached by mature sciences merely “likely stories” or are they “really true”? Questions of this sort have been live issues from Étienne Tempier’s March 1277 condemnation of theses of the Radical Aristotelians of Paris to the May 2005 Kansas State Board of Education deliberations on Darwinism. One major difficulty with the view that scientific findings are “really true” is that, from the historical record, all such statements are recognized as being revisable, even replaceable. Several attempts to (...) formalize a notion of “approximate truth” have addressed this difficulty—without notable success. This book proposes a new solution to the problem—a resolution that stands in the tradition of the American Pragmatists: Peirce, James, and Dewey. (shrink)

In this work a calculation of the cluster decomposable formalism for relativistic scattering as developed by Lindesay, Markevich, Noyes, and Pastrana (LMNP) is made for an ultra-light quantum model. After highlighting areas of the theory vital for calculation, a description is made of the process to go from the general theory to an eigen-integral equation for bound state problems, and calculability is demonstrated. An ultra-light quantum exchange model is then developed to examine calculability.

How are the states of consciousness intrinsically so that they all qualify as ?feelings? in William James?s generic sense? Only a small, propaedeutic part of what is required to address the intrinsic nature of such states can be accomplished here. I restrict my topic mainly to a certain characteristic that belongs to each of those pulses of mentality that successively make up James?s stream of consciousness. Certain statements of James?s are intended to pick out the variable ?width? belonging to a (...) stream of consciousness as it flows. Attention to this proposed property brings me to a discussion of (a) the unitary character of each of the states of consciousness however complex they may frequently be and (b) how to conceive of their complexity without recourse to a misleading spatial metaphor. (shrink)

Anesthetic gas molecules are recognized to act by van der Waals (London dispersion) forces in hydrophobic pockets of select brain proteins to ablate consciousness. Enigmatic features of consciousness have defied conventional neurophysiological exp lanations and prompted suggestions for supplemental occurrence of macroscopic quantum coherent states and quantum computation in the brain. Are these feasible? During conscious (non-anesthetic) conditions, endogenous Van der Waals London dispersion forces occur among non-polar amino acid groups in hydrophobic pockets of neural proteins and help regulate their (...) conformation/function. London forces are weak instantaneous couplings between pairs of electron induced dipoles (e.g. between adjacent non-polar amino acid groups), and are quantum mechanical effects capable of supporting quantum superposition/computation and macroscopic quantum coherence. Quantum effects mediated by endogenous London forces in hydrophobic pockets of select neural proteins may be necessary for consciousness. The mechanism of anesthetics may be to inhibit (by exogenous London forces) the necessary quantum states. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to ascribe to Chrysippus two ‘compatibilist’ theories and to explain their differences through the fact that our sources depend on different parts of the philosopher’s corpus. This can be confirmed by a passage in Eusebius and by Chrysippus’ wordy style of writing. In my opinion, Alexander and Nemesius report the more general theory, stating that fate rules everything but employs the nature of each being as a means to accomplish its plans. Cicero and Gellius report (...) a theory more connected with human responsibility. Their accounts are similar, but the fact that they are not drawing upon the same source becomes clear once we analyse in detail the objections to which the philosopher was responding: Cicero seems to report a criticism levelled by Arcesilaus against Zeno, Gellius one levelled against Chrysippus by his contemporaries. (shrink)

What are the states of consciousness in themselves, those pulses of mentality that follow one upon another in tight succession and constitute the stream of consciousness? William James conceives of each of them as being, typically, a complex unitary awareness that instantiates many features and takes a multiplicity of objects. In contrast, Brian O?Shaughnessy claims that the basic durational component of the stream of consciousness is the attention, which he understands to be something like a psychic space that is (...) simultaneously occupied by several experiences. Whereas, according to the first conception, emotion is a feature of a temporal segment of the stream of consciousness and colors through and through each consciousness state that instantiates it, the second conception considers an emotion to be a distinct one of a system of simultaneous experiences that interact with each other, for example, limiting each other?s number and intensity. Among other matters discussed is the two theorists? mutually contrasting conception of how the non-inferential awareness which we have of our states of consciousness is accomplished. (shrink)

Shelly Kagan and Leonard Katz have offered versions of hedonism that aspire to occupy a middle position between the view that pleasure is a unitary sensation and the view that pleasure is, as Sidgwick put it, desirable consciousness. Thus they hope to offer a hedonistic account of well-being that does not mistakenly suppose that pleasure is a special kind of tingle, yet to offer a sharp alternative to desire-based accounts. I argue that they have not identified a coherent middle (...) position. (shrink)

In Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant speaks of an ethical state of nature and of an ethico-civil condition, with explicit reference to the juridical state of nature and the juridico-civil condition he discusses at length in his legal-political writings. Given that the Religion is the only work where Kant introduces a parallel between these concepts, one might think that this is only a loose analogy, serving a merely illustrative function. The paper provides a first outline (...) of the similarities and the differences between the state of nature and the civil condition in Right and in ethics. The comparison points to a deeper, structural relation between the two pairs of concepts. By doing so, it makes room for developing a unitary conception of the state of nature and of the civil condition, which would underlie both the ethical and the juridical version. (shrink)

This essay examines the administrative state as a ubiquitous phenomenon that results in part from the mismatch of incentives. Using two dramatic episodes in the history of economics, the essay considers two types of mismatch. It then examines how economists increasingly endorsed the “general good” as a unitary goal for society, even at the expense of private hopes and desires. More than this, their procedures and models gave them warrant to design mechanisms and advocate for legislation and regulations (...) to “fix” the supposedly suboptimal choices of individuals in service to the overarching goal. The rise of New Welfare Economics dealt an additional blow to the sovereignty of individual motivations, notwithstanding that Hayek and Buchanan warned that this engineering approach allowed social goals to override individual preferences. Throughout, the argument is that it is important to recognize that people within or advising the administrative state are influenced by the same sorts of motivations as actors throughout the economy. (shrink)

Rather than assume a unitary cybernetics, I ask how its disunity mattered to the history of the human sciences in the United States from about 1940 to 1980. I compare the work of four prominent social scientists – Herbert Simon, George Miller, Karl Deutsch, and Talcott Parsons – who created cybernetic models in psychology, economics, political science, and sociology with the work of anthropologist Gregory Bateson, and relate their interpretations of cybernetics to those of such well-known cyberneticians as Norbert (...) Wiener, Warren McCulloch, W. Ross Ashby, and Heinz von Foerster. I argue that viewing cybernetics through the lens of disunity – asking what was at stake in choosing a specific cybernetic model – shows the complexity of the relationship between first-order cybernetics and the postwar human sciences, and helps us rethink the history of second-order cybernetics. (shrink)

Like Hobbes and unlike Locke, Kant denied the possibility of a right to rebellion. But unlike Hobbes, Kant did not argue for a unitary head of state in whom legislative, judicial, and executive powers are inseparable, and thus did not believe that the executive power in a state to whom must be conceded a monopoly of coercion also defines all rights in the state. Instead, Kant insisted upon the necessary division of authority in a state (...) into a separate legislature, executive, and judiciary, and thus, while rejecting the idea that a people could ever rightfully overthrow their entire constitution or government, he could and did hold that a people represented by a parliament have genuine rights against the executive power within their state even though that executive power properly has a monopoly on the coercive enforcement of the parliament's laws. (shrink)

The paper presents a novel take on the character of South Africa’s governance structure. It argues that, insofar as it constitutionally recognises traditional authorities, figures who rule in accordance with idiosyncratic and localised customary laws, as well as instigate a cheek-by-jowl existence of an asymmetrical property law (where in the urban setting land is nominally bought or transferred for sale, but in traditional rural areas granted by the chief), manifest in the differentiated land laws brought about by the Communal Land (...) Rights Act of 2003, is more akin to, and necessitates a definitional alignment with, the federal system of government than a unitary one – or at least a weak “federalism with South African characteristics.”. (shrink)

Law's Community offers a distinctive analysis of law, identifying political and moral problems that are fundamental to contemporary legal theory. It portrays contemporary law as institutionalized doctrine, emphasizing ways in which legal modes of thought influence wider currents of understanding and belief in contemporary Western societies. Exploring relationships between law and sociology as contrasting and competing fields of knowledge, Law's Community develops ideas from social theory to identify key problems for legal development; in particular, those of restoring moral authority to (...) law and of elaborating a concept of community that can guide legal regulation. The analysis leads to radical conclusions: among them, that law's functions need reconsideration at the most general level, that a unitary state legal system as portrayed in traditional kinds of legal theory may no longer be adequate in complex contemporary societies, and that law should be reconceptualized as a diverse but co-ordinated plurality of systems, sites, and forms of regulation. (shrink)

This paper provides an argument in favour of federal institutional design on the basis that it is more congenial to the preservation and promotion of normatively desirable societal diversity than its unitary alternative. Seeking inspiration in the work of three of the most influential liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century: John Stuart Mill; Alexis de Tocqueville; and Lord Acton, I construct a novel case for federalism that focuses on the inherent benefits of a dual/multi-layered governmental structure. Section one argues (...) for the value of diversity, stating that it can both improve the authenticity of individually exercised autonomy, and improve the quality of individually espoused moral views. Section two considers the potential dangers posed by the unitary state to the flourishing of diversity through the centralisation of key institutions. Section three shows how the federal model sidesteps these pitfalls, and offers a more auspicious environment for the cultivation and enjoyment of diversity. (shrink)

The 1970 amended Belgian Constitution is at the cross-roads of two currents of history, on one hand, once more the traditional values of the Occidental society ; on the other hand a double communal pressure contests an unitary state : from underneath affirmation of three Belgiannational communities, from above, apparition of a «supra-national party».The authors make a critical examination of the cropping up of bonding institutions in a «pré-fédéral» state, then they clearly state the principles of (...) a really federal Constitution based upon the acknowledgement of the 2 large communities and the 3 regions and the principles of a democratic organization of an economic politic. (shrink)

The strengths and weaknesses of federalism have been debated for centuries. But one major possible advantage of building decentralization and limited government into a constitution has been largely ignored in the debate so far: its potential for reducing the costs of widespread political ignorance. The argument of this paper is simple, but has potentially important implications: Constitutional federalism enables citizens to “vote with their feet,” and foot voters have much stronger incentives to make well-informed decisions than more conventional ballot box (...) voters. The informational advantage of foot voting over ballot box voting suggests that decentralized federalism can increase citizen welfare and democratic accountability relative to policymaking in a centralized unitary state.Ballot box voters have strong incentives to be “rationally ignorant” about the candidates and policies they vote on because the chance that any one vote will have a decisive impact on an electoral outcome is vanishingly small. For the same reason, they also have little or no incentive to make good use of the information they do possess. By contrast, “foot voters” choosing a jurisdiction in which to reside have much stronger incentives to acquire information and use it rationally; the decisions they make are individually decisive. (shrink)

When philosophers and psychologists think about consciousness, they generally focus on one or more of three features: phenomenality , intentionality , and introspectibility . Using examples from empirical psychology and neuroscience, I argue that consciousness is not a unitary state, that, instead, these three features characterize different and dissociable states, which often happen to occur together. Understanding these three features as dissociable from each other will resolve philosophical disputes and facilitate scientific investigation.

This article proposes the political organisation of interstate integration – characterised by functional differentiation and unbundled multi-level territoriality – as a political ideal type. The theoretical foundations and empirical conditions of this new form of political organisation are explored focussing on basic security threats, such as nuclear armament, transnational terrorism, and organised crime. The empirical conditions of multilateral democratic integration are not essentially different from the conditions of democratic state-building and not limited to Europe. The political reality of multilateral (...) integration is often misperceived in political theory. This is due, either to the uncritical presupposition of a traditional political ontology, defined by an essentialist understanding of the unitary state; or by an apolitical discourse on flows and scapes that loses sight of the specific features of political authority in the postnational realm. (shrink)

This study investigates the determinants of the ratification of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). To do so, it proposes an explanation that postulates that states employ treaty ratification as a device to signal their resolve to implement polices required by the treaty at issue in order to appease demanding domestic constituencies, predicting that states with lower compliance capacity tend to commit faster than states with higher compliance capacity. Applying this explanation to the ICESCR leads to two (...) expectations. First, the larger government spending a proxy of high compliance capacity is hypothesized to delay the ratification process. Second, states with the unitary system are expected to ratify the ICESCR more promptly because the centralized power structure in unitary states significantly restricts the pursuit of the policy autonomy by minorities at local level that the right to self-determination entails. The Cox proportional hazard analysis lends support to both hypotheses. (shrink)

Political philosophers often formulate the problem of distributive justice as the problem of how the government ought to distribute different types of goods—for example, income or health care—to its citizens. They therefore presuppose that the government is a unitary agent that governs its citizens directly. However, although a number of governments are unitary in this way, many are federations, exhibiting a division of sovereignty between two or more levels of government having independent grounds of authority. In contrast to (...) unitary states, therefore, within a federation, two or more levels of government directly govern their citizens and are directly accountable to them. Because of the way in which different levels of government in a federation can separately affect the distribution of goods in society, federations face resource allocation problems that are far more complex than those of unitary states. In addition to determining what a just distribution of goods is, federations must also determine (1) whether distributive justice is a shared responsibility amongst different levels of government, and, if so, (2) how this shared responsibility should be allocated between them. (shrink)