Results for 'external proposition '

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  1.  18
    Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism.Mark Walker - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2):134-167.
    Following Wittgenstein’s lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification because of their role in our cognitive lives. Two major criticisms are raised here against the entitlement strategy when used in attempts to justify belief in the external world. First, the hinge strategy is not sufficient to thwart underdetermination skepticism, since underdetermination (...)
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  2.  2
    Is "There Are External Objects" an Empirical Proposition?Trudy Govier - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):305-321.
    Alice Ambrose once criticized Moore for treating the proposition ‘There are external objects’ as an empirical one. She said that those who denied that we could know this proposition to be true would not accept any evidence as going against their denial of it, and were not regarding the issue of its truth as empirical. She also maintained that one could not point out an external object in the way in which one could point out a (...)
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  3.  3
    Is Knowledge An Internal Or An External Relation Between A Person And A Proposition?Gerard Kuyper - 1987 - Dialectica 41 (3):209-220.
    SummaryIn this paper Russell's discovery of external relations and his refutation of the doctrine of internal relations is traced to Hume's view on “philosophical” relations. Next the concepts of internal and external relation are applied to the analysis of knowledge. The most widely received analysis, the Justified True Belief‐conception, is investigated for its resources in answering the question whether knowledge is an internal or an external relation between a person and a believed proposition. There are difficulties (...)
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  4.  20
    Propositions, Meaning, and Names.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (3):335-362.
    The object of this paper is to sketch an approach to propositions, meaning and names. The key ingredients are a Twin-Earth-inspired distinction between internal and external meaning, and a middle-Wittgenstein-inspired conception of internal meaning as role in language system. I show how the approach offers a promising solution to the problem of the meaning of proper names. This is a plea for a neglected way of thinking about these topics.
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  5.  7
    Epistemology externalized.Donald Davidson - 1991 - Dialectica 45 (2‐3):191-202.
    SummaryStarting with Descartes, epistemology has been almost entirely based on first person knowledge. We must begin, according to the usual story, with what is most certain: knowledge of our own sensations and thoughts. In one way or another we then progress, if we can, to knowledge of an objective external world. There is then the final, tenuous, step to knowledge of other minds.In this paper I argue for a total revision of this picture. All propositional thought, whether positive or (...)
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  6.  4
    Conditional Clauses: External and Internal Syntax.Liliane Haegeman - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):317-339.
    The paper focuses on the difference between event‐conditionals and premise‐conditionals. An event‐conditional contributes to event structure: it modifies the main clause event; a premise‐conditional structures the discourse: it makes manifest a proposition that is the privileged context for the processing of the associated clause. The two types of conditional clauses will be shown to differ both in terms of their ‘external syntax’ and in terms of their ‘internal syntax’. The peripheral structure of event conditionals will be shown to (...)
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  7.  9
    Hinge propositions and epistemic justification.Anthony Brueckner - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):285–287.
    Michael Williams and Crispin Wright have claimed that we are epistemically justified in believing hinge propositions, such as there is an external world. In a recent paper Allan Hazlett puts forward an argument that purports to elucidate the source of such justification. This paper reconstructs Hazlett's argument and offers a criticism of it.
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  8.  4
    What makes Hume an External World Skeptic?Graham Clay - manuscript
    What would it take for Hume to be an external world skeptic? Is Hume's position on knowledge sufficient to force him to deny that we can acquire knowledge of propositions about the external world? After all, Hume is extremely restrictive about what can be known because he requires knowledge to be immune to error. In this paper, I will argue that if Hume were a skeptic, then he must also deny a particular kind of view about what is (...)
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  9.  6
    Propositional Analyis [review of Graham Stevens, The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy ].David Blitz - 2009 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 29 (1):76-84.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:76 Reviews PROPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS David Blitz Philosophy Dept. and Peace Studies / Central Connecticut State U. New Britain, ct 06050, usa [email protected] Graham Stevens. The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy: Bertrand Russell and the Unity of the Proposition. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. Pp. xii, 185. isbn: 978-0-415-36044-9 (hb). £80.00. us$155.95. Graham Stevens has written a short book on a diUcult subject: the unity of the (...). While the title of the volume is The Russellian Origins of Analytic Philosophy, the underlying theme is the comparatively little discussed problem of how the elements of a proposition come together to form a unity, as indicated in the book’s subtitle: “Bertrand Russell and the Unity of the Prop­ osition”. Stevens traces this concept, as a unifying thread or “central concern”, throughout Russell’s many philosophies which constitute for Stevens a “consis­ tent and constantly evolving philosophy” (p. 2) stretching from the earliest log­ ical writings to the later works of the 1930s and 1940s. This is an important and well written volume, which Russellians should have in their personal and uni­ versity libraries. That the “unity of the proposition” is a problem at all requires the reader to return to the neo-Hegelian idealism which Russell encountered as a student at Cambridge.1 Russell, inXuenced by Peano and Frege, broke with the doctrine of internal relations, defended by Bradley and others, according to which external relations are unreal and false appearance. However, an important element of idealism remains even during the Principia period, due to Russell’s continued belief that a proposition is a non-linguistic, non-mental, abstract entity; these elements are all of the same ontological kind, which can be identiWed through analysis and recombined so that their synthesis reconstitutes the original “unity of the proposition”. This turns out to be a very tall order which will occupy Russell for nearly half a century. Consider the standard example Russell gives: “Desdemona loves Cassio”. According to Russell, this proposition (independently of its truth or falsity) actually contains its “simple constituents”z—zwith “Desdemona” and “Cassio” being things and “loves” a concept. Russell, as a founder of analytic philosophy, has to defend the legitimacy of this analysis from the claim that it has reduced 1 Chapter 1: “Russell, Frege and the Analysis of Unities”. December 2, 2009 (5:28 pm) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd Reviews 77 the structured unity of the proposition into an unstructured set of parts (or heap) where the original order of combination has been lost. The problem of is that merely listing “Desdemona”, “Cassio” and “loves” does not indicate the way in which the terms were originally combined or re­ lated. For reasons to be made clear later, this is referred to in the literature as the “narrow order problem”. In particular, the question arises as to how analysis enables us to assert that it is Desdemona who loves Cassio (supposing this to be the case), rather than the other way around (since love may not be requited). Stevens deals with logical form in a later chapter devoted to the problem of belief statements, but the notion applies here as well: analysis seems to have skip­ ped the logical form, the way in which the constituents are combined. But if the logical form is included, then there seems to be an extra constituent in the prop­ osition not given by direct inspection, and analysis would appear to have added something above and beyond what was there before the analysis. Adding linking relations to indicate how the components were originally combined does not help either. If there is some relation Lz which relates “Desdemona” and “loves” and another relation Rz which relates “loves” and “Cassio”, then there are Wve constituents, not three. Moreover, there is now room for inWnite regress, with a relation L2 linking “Desdemona” and L, R2 linking “loves” and “Cassio”, and so on. But without adding these additional items, there is an apparent failure of an­ alysis to fully provide the order of the elements present in the original... (shrink)
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  10.  6
    The Propositional Logic of Elementary Tasks.Giorgi Japaridze - 2000 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (2):171-183.
    The paper introduces a semantics for the language of propositional additive-multiplicative linear logic. It understands formulas as tasks that are to be accomplished by an agent (machine, robot) working as a slave for its master (user, environment). This semantics can claim to be a formalization of the resource philosophy associated with linear logic when resources are understood as agents accomplishing tasks. I axiomatically define a decidable logic TSKp and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to the task semantics in (...)
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  11.  9
    Propositional glue and the projection architecture of LFG.Avery D. Andrews - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (3):141-170.
    Although ‘glue semantics’ is the most extensively developed theory of semantic composition for LFG, it is not very well integrated into the LFG projection architecture, due to the absence of a simple and well-explained correspondence between glue-proofs and f-structures. In this paper I will show that we can improve this situation with two steps: (1) Replace the current quantificational formulations of glue (either Girard’s system F, or first order linear logic) with strictly propositional linear logic (the quantifier, unit and exponential (...)
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  12.  1
    Predicates: External description or neural reality?Michael A. Arbib - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):285-286.
    Hurford argues that propositions of the form PREDICATE(x) represent conceptual structures that predate language and that can be explicated in terms of neural structure. I disagree, arguing that such predicates are descriptions of limited aspects of brain function, not available as representations in the brain to be exploited in the frog or monkey brain and turned into language in the human.
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  13.  11
    Transformative Experience in Skepticism. The External Standpoint and the Finitude of the Human Condition.Rico Gutschmidt - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (4):395-417.
    According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ‘absolute objectivity’ is confused. The dissolution of this confusion is supposed to lead us to acquiesce in our finite and plain everyday life without being bothered anymore about the supposed need for objective knowledge. In contrast, I want to propose a transformative reading of skepticism according to which the philosophical practice of skepticism can be ‘epistemically transformative’. To this end, I will transpose L.A. Paul's notion (...)
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  14.  86
    Singular propositions and modes of presentation.João Branquinho - 1996 - Disputatio (1):05-21.
    The aim of this paper is to survey a number of features which are constitutive of the Millian account of attitude-ascription and which I take to be irremediably defective. The features in question, some of which have not been fully appreciated, relate mainly to the failure of that account to accommodate certain fundamental aspects of our ordinary practise of attitude attribution. I take it that one’s definitive method of assessment of a given semantical theory consists in checking out whether or (...)
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  15.  2
    Internal and External Logic.V. A. Smirnov - 1988 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 17 (3/4):170-181.
    In an essential way I make use of Frege’s and Vasilev’s ideas. N. A. Vasilev distinguished two levels in a logic. The abstract logic depends on gnoeologic assumptions while the empirical part of logic depends on ontological ones. Vasilev did not change the external logic but he did change the internal one. His system can be viewed as a non-standard syllogistics based on classical propositional logic . Vasilev’s ideas become plain if we discern cleary acts of predication and acts (...)
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  16.  12
    On meta complexity of propositional formulas and propositional proofs.Pavel Naumov - 2008 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 47 (1):35-52.
    A new approach to defining complexity of propositional formulas and proofs is suggested. Instead of measuring the size of these syntactical structures in the propositional language, the article suggests to define the complexity by the size of external descriptions of such constructions. The main result is a lower bound on proof complexity with respect to this new definition of complexity.
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  17. Transformative Experience in Skepticism. The External Standpoint and the Finitude of the Human Condition.Rico Gutschmidt - 2020 - Philosophy 4 (95):395 - 417.
    According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ‘absolute objectivity’ is confused. The dissolution of this confusion is supposed to lead us to acquiesce in our finite and plain everyday life without being bothered anymore about the supposed need for objective knowledge. In contrast, I want to propose a transformative reading of skepticism according to which the philosophical practice of skepticism can be ‘epistemically transformative’. To this end, I will transpose L.A. Paul's notion (...)
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  18.  8
    How to defeat belief in the external world.Allan Hazlett - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):198–212.
    I defend the view that there is a privileged class of propositions – that there is an external world, among other such 'hinge propositions'– that possess a special epistemic status: justified belief in these propositions is not defeated unless one has sufficient reason to believe their negation. Two arguments are given for this conclusion. Finally, three proposals are offered as morals of the preceding story: first, our justification for hinge propositions must be understood as defeatable, second, antiskeptics must explain (...)
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  19. Reasoning One's Way out of Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - forthcoming - In Brill Studies in Skepticism.
    Many have thought that it is impossible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic that we have knowledge of the external world. This paper aims to show how this could be done. I argue, while appealing only to premises that a skeptic could accept, that it is not rational to believe external world skepticism, because doing so commits one to more extreme forms of skepticism in a way that is self-undermining. In particular, the external world skeptic (...)
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  20.  71
    Do Imaginings have a Goal?Marcus Hunt - 2023 - Axiomathes: Global Philosophy 33 (1):1-17.
    The paper investigates whether imaginative states about propositions can be assessed in terms of fittingness (also known as correctness, appropriateness, aptness). After characterizing propositional imaginings and explaining the idea of fittingness, I present some considerations in favour of the no conditions view: imagining seems to be the sort of action that cannot be done unfittingly, and imaginings have no external cognitive nor conative goals in light of which they could be unfitting. I then examine the local conditions view, that (...)
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  21. Gödel Mathematics Versus Hilbert Mathematics. II Logicism and Hilbert Mathematics, the Identification of Logic and Set Theory, and Gödel’s 'Completeness Paper' (1930).Vasil Penchev - 2023 - Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 15 (1):1-61.
    The previous Part I of the paper discusses the option of the Gödel incompleteness statement (1931: whether “Satz VI” or “Satz X”) to be an axiom due to the pair of the axiom of induction in arithmetic and the axiom of infinity in set theory after interpreting them as logical negations to each other. The present Part II considers the previous Gödel’s paper (1930) (and more precisely, the negation of “Satz VII”, or “the completeness theorem”) as a necessary condition for (...)
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  22.  14
    In Defense of Piecemeal Skepticism.Philip Atkins - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):53-56.
    Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul suggest a version of skepticism according to which the skeptic posits a distinct skeptical hypothesis for each external world proposition that a person claims to know. In a recent issue of this journal, Eric Yang argues against this piecemeal approach. In this note, I show that Yang’s argument against piecemeal skepticism is fallacious.
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  23.  23
    The Skeptical Challenges of Hume and Berkeley: Can They Be Answered?Michael Tooley - 2011 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 85 (2):27-46.
    My topic is the skeptical challenges that are posed by Hume and Berkeley. Can one show, contrary to what Hume claimed, that one is justified in projecting regularities that have held in the past into the future? Can one show that induction is justified? Or can one show, contrary to what Berkeley claimed, not only that the hypothesis that there is an external, physical world expresses a coherent proposition, but also one that is extremely likely to be true? (...)
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  24.  6
    A dynamic logic of action.Brigitte Penther - 1994 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (3):169-210.
    The paper presents a logical treatment of actions based on dynamic logic. This approach makes it possible to reflect clearly the differences between static and dynamic elements of the world, a distinction which seems crucial to us for a representation of actions.Starting from propositional dynamic logic a formal system (DLA) is developed, the programs of which are used to model action types. Some special features of this system are: Basic aspects of time are incorporated in DLA as far as they (...)
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  25.  19
    On Moore’s Notion of Proof.Michael De - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):313-321.
    Much has been said about Moore’s proof of the external world, but the notion of proof that Moore employs has been largely overlooked. I suspect that most have either found nothing wrong with it, or they have thought it somehow irrelevant to whether the proof serves its antiskeptical purpose. I show, however, that Moore’s notion of proof is highly problematic. For instance, it trivializes in the sense that any known proposition is provable. This undermines Moore’s proof as he (...)
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  26.  63
    Why Wittgenstein Doesn’t Refute Skepticism.Raquel Albieri Krempel - 2019 - Discurso 49 (2).
    In On Certainty, Wittgenstein formulates several criticisms against skepticism about our knowledge of the external world. My goal is to show that Wittgenstein does not here offer a convincing answer to the skeptical problem. First, I will present a strong version of the problem, understanding it as a paradoxical argument. In the second part, I will introduce and raise problems for two pragmatic responses against skepticism that appear in On Certainty. Finally, I will present some of Wittgenstein’s logical criticisms (...)
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  27.  3
    Grammar and necessity.G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker - 1980 - In Gordon P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker (eds.), Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity. New York, NY, USA: Blackwell. pp. 241–370.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Setting the stage Leitmotifs External guidelines Necessary propositions and norms of representation Concerning the truth and falsehood of necessary propositions What necessary truths are about Illusions of correspondence: ideal objects, kinds of reality and ultra‐physics The psychology and epistemology of the a priori Propositions of logic and laws of thought Alternative forms of representation The arbitrariness of grammar A kinship to the non‐arbitrary Proof in mathematics Conventionalism.
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  28.  5
    Knowledge by Acquaintance Reconsidered.Augustin Riska - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 11 (1):129-140.
    A propositional interpretation of knowledge by acquaintance seems more promising than the nonpropositional one, endorsed by Russell. According to the propositional interpretation, to be acquainted with an object means to attend (pay attention) to individuating features of the object. For the actual, direct acquaintance with an object, a subject's perception of the object and his attending to the individuating features of it (just as the fact that these features do belonge to the object in question) are the essential factors. Proper (...)
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  29.  2
    Knowledge by Acquaintance Reconsidered.Augustin Riska - 1980 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 11 (1):129-140.
    A propositional interpretation of knowledge by acquaintance seems more promising than the nonpropositional one, endorsed by Russell. According to the propositional interpretation, to be acquainted with an object means to attend (pay attention) to individuating features of the object. For the actual, direct acquaintance with an object, a subject's perception of the object and his attending to the individuating features of it (just as the fact that these features do belonge to the object in question) are the essential factors. Proper (...)
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  30.  11
    Semantic Externalism and Knowing Our Own Minds: Ignoring Twin‐Earth and Doing Naturalistic Philosophy.Richard Boyd - 2013 - Theoria 79 (3):204-228.
    In this article I offer a naturalistic defence of semantic externalism. I argue against the following: (1) arguments for externalism rest mainly on conceptual analysis; (2) the community conceptual norms relevant to individuation of propositional attitudes are quasi-analytic; (3) externalism raises serious questions about knowledge of propositional attitudes; and (4) externalism might be OK for “folk psychology” but not for cognitive science. The naturalist alternatives are as follows. (1) Community norms are not anything like a priori; sometimes they are incoherent. (...)
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  31.  79
    Conhece-te a ti Mesmo: Externalismo e Auto-conhecimento de Atitudes Passadas.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2010 - Kinesis 2 (3):157 – 174.
    There is a thesis that assure the computability between externalize about mental content and self-knowledge (BURGE, 1988). However, this theses, that explore the auto-verification property of claims of the type “I think that p”, works only for assertive claims that are express in the simple present tense. Among the problematic cases are the claims in the past tense and claims about specific propositional attitude. This fails about the thesis of the compatibility is pointed by Boghossian (1992) as a prove of (...)
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  32.  16
    Signification, intention, projection.Kenneth P. Winkler - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):477-501.
    Locke is what present-day aestheticians, critics, and historians call an intentionalist. He believes that when we interpret speech and writing, we aim—in large part and perhaps even for the most part—to recover the intentions, or intended meanings, of the speaker or writer. Berkeley and Hume shared Locke’s commitment to intentionalism, but it is a theme that recent philosophical interpreters of all three writers have left largely unexplored. In this paper I discuss the bearing of intentionalism on more familiar themes in (...)
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  33. The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging.Thomas Grundmann - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (2):208-218.
    Typically, nudging is a technique for steering the choices of people without giving reasons or using enforcement. In benevolent cases, it is used when people are insufficiently responsive to reason. The nudger triggers automatic cognitive mechanisms – sometimes even biases – in smart ways in order to push irrational people in the right direction. Interestingly, this technique can also be applied to doxastic attitudes. Someone who is doxastically unresponsive to evidence can be nudged into forming true beliefs or doxastic attitudes (...)
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  34.  72
    Southeast Asian Studies and the Nationalist Tradition: Evaluating the Historiographical Contribution of Zeus A. Salazar in Building Pan-Malayan Identity.Mark Joseph Santos - 2019 - Regional Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 4 (1):77-78.
    One of the early propositions on the nature of Southeast Asia comes from George Coedes’ 1968 The Indianized states of Southeast Asia, which assumes that Southeast Asia and its identity construction resulted from the region’s passive acceptance of culture from India and China. Such is the case that that the cultural landscape of the region becomes a mere accumulation of external influences. Robert Redfield’s notion of “great and little traditions” that Southeast Asian historians used in examining and understanding Southeast (...)
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  35. Kierkegaard on belief and credence.Z. Quanbeck - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):394-412.
    Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus famously defines faith as a risky “venture” that requires “holding fast” to “objective uncertainty.” Yet puzzlingly, he emphasizes that faith requires resolute conviction and certainty. Moreover, Climacus claims that all beliefs about contingent propositions about the external world “exclude doubt” and “nullify uncertainty,” but also that uncertainty is “continually present” in these very same beliefs. This paper argues that these apparent contradictions can be resolved by interpreting Climacus as a belief‐credence dualist. That is, Climacus holds (...)
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  36.  2
    Imagery and Imagination Sensory Images and Fictional Characters.Ernest Sosa - 1985 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 25-26 (1):485-499.
    1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the question answered. 10. (...)
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  37. Self‐Knowledge and Intentional Content.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - In Being known. New York: Oxford University Press.
    A conscious occurrent propositional attitude contributes to the content of consciousness by occupying attention, rather than by being its object. Externally individuated concepts contribute to the nature of this conscious occupation of attention. Those same externally individuated concepts are redeployed when the occurrence of these conscious states gives a subject a reason for self‐ascribing a propositional attitude. This account, involving both conscious states and conceptual redeployment, steers a middle course between accounts of self‐ascription that involve introspection and those accounts under (...)
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  38.  80
    Sellars and Pretense on "Truth & 'Correspondence'".Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2012 - Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21):33-63.
    In this paper, we show how an internal tension in Wilfrid Sellars’s understanding of truth, as well as an external tension in his account of meaning attribution, can be resolved while adhering to a Sellarsian spirit, by appealing to the particular fictionalist accounts of truth-talk and proposition-talk that we have developed elsewhere.
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  39. The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.
    In this article, I cast doubt on an apparent truism, namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it’s always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this ‘value of information’ (VOI). I show that VOI conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view that (...)
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  40.  21
    The justification of a priori intuitions.Paul Tidman - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):161-171.
    There are propositions that upon understanding them it seems that one can “just see” that they are necessary or impossible. A commonly discussed example is the claim that it is not possible for an object to be red and green all over at the same time. My purpose in this paper is to account for how it is that such beliefs are justified. I begin by criticizing a suggestion defended lately by Laurence BonJour and others. BonJour argues that because these (...)
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  41.  6
    Semantics modulo satisfiability with applications: function representation, probabilities and game theory.Sandro Márcio da Silva Preto - 2022 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):264-265.
    In the context of propositional logics, we apply semantics modulo satisfiability—a restricted semantics which comprehends only valuations that satisfy some specific set of formulas—with the aim to efficiently solve some computational tasks. Three possible such applications are developed.We begin by studying the possibility of implicitly representing rational McNaughton functions in Łukasiewicz Infinitely-valued Logic through semantics modulo satisfiability. We theoretically investigate some approaches to such representation concept, called representation modulo satisfiability, and describe a polynomial algorithm that builds representations in the newly (...)
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  42.  2
    The Justification of a Priori Intuitions.Paul Tidman - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):161-171.
    There are propositions that upon understanding them it seems that one can “just see” that they are necessary or impossible. A commonly discussed example is the claim that it is not possible for an object to be red and green all over at the same time. My purpose in this paper is to account for how it is that such beliefs are justified. I begin by criticizing a suggestion defended lately by Laurence BonJour and others. BonJour argues that because these (...)
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  43.  10
    Truth and the World: An Explanationist Theory.Jonathan Tallant - 2017 - London: Routledge.
    How do we explain the truth of true propositions? Truthmaker theory is the branch of metaphysics that explores the relationships between what is true and what exists. It plays an important role in contemporary debates about the nature of metaphysics and metaphysical enquiry. -/- In this book Jonathan Tallant argues, controversially, that we should reject truthmaker theory. In its place he argues for an 'explanationist' approach. Drawing on a deflationary theory of truth he shows that it allows us to explain (...)
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  44. Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):114-133.
    I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.
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  45.  43
    Reflective equilibrium and understanding.Christoph Baumberger & Georg Brun - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7923-7947.
    Elgin has presented an extensive defence of reflective equilibrium embedded in an epistemology which focuses on objectual understanding rather than ordinary propositional knowledge. This paper has two goals: to suggest an account of reflective equilibrium which is sympathetic to Elgin’s but includes a range of further developments, and to analyse its role in an account of understanding. We first address the structure of reflective equilibrium as a target state and argue that reflective equilibrium requires more than an equilibrium in the (...)
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  46.  15
    What Kind of an Idealist (If Any) Is Hegel?Markus Gabriel - 2016 - Hegel Bulletin 37 (2):181-208.
    In this paper, I first explore Hegel’s own distinctions between various types of idealism, most of which he explicitly rejects. I discuss his notions of subjective, transcendental and absolute idealism and present the outlines of his criticisms of the first two as well as the motivation behind his commitment to a version of absolute idealism. In particular, I argue that the latter does not share the defining features of what is now commonly called ‘idealism’, as Hegel neither denies the existence (...)
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  47. Moorean Arguments Against the Error Theory: A Defense.Eric Sampson - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Moorean arguments are a popular and powerful way to engage highly revisionary philosophical views, such as nihilism about motion, time, truth, consciousness, causation, and various kinds of skepticism (e.g., external world, other minds, inductive, global). They take, as a premise, a highly plausible first-order claim (e.g., cars move, I ate breakfast before lunch, it’s true that some fish have gills) and conclude from it the falsity of the highly revisionary philosophical thesis. Moorean arguments can be used against nihilists in (...)
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  48.  19
    Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.
    According to Bayesian orthodoxy, an agent should update---or at least should plan to update---her credences by conditionalization. Some have defended this claim by means of a diachronic Dutch book argument. They say: an agent who does not plan to update her credences by conditionalization is vulnerable (by her own lights) to a diachronic Dutch book, i.e., a sequence of bets which, when accepted, guarantee loss of utility. Here, I show that this argument is in tension with evidence externalism, i.e., the (...)
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  49.  6
    Imagery and Imagination.Ernest Sosa - 1985 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1):485-499.
    1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the question answered. 10. (...)
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  50. Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of (...)
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