These two companion volumes provide a comprehensive review and critical evaluation of the major DSM-III and DSM-III-R child disorders. Their major goal is to provide diagnostic and assessment guidelines that are based on scientific literature in specific clinical domains. Each chapter contains a discussion of the historical background of a particular diagnosis, definitional issues, a critical but selective review of the literature addressing the diagnosis in question, proposed changes in the diagnostic criteria based on the available literature, and proposed (...) assessment models and methods based on the designated criteria. Given the scientific bases for many of these discussions of diagnostic criteria, these two volumes will serve professionals and graduate students in a wide variety of fields: clinical child psychology, child psychiatry, pediatrics, pediatric and school psychology, special education, social work, and other child mental health specialties. (shrink)

These two companion volumes provide a comprehensive review and critical evaluation of the major DSM-III and DSM-III-R child disorders. Their major goal is to provide diagnostic and assessment guidelines that are based on scientific literature in specific clinical domains. Each chapter contains a discussion of the historical background of a particular diagnosis, definitional issues, a critical but selective review of the literature addressing the diagnosis in question, proposed changes in the diagnostic criteria based on the available literature, and proposed (...) assessment models and methods based on the designated criteria. Given the scientific bases for many of these discussions of diagnostic criteria, these two volumes will serve professionals and graduate students in a wide variety of fields: clinical child psychology, child psychiatry, pediatrics, pediatric and school psychology, special education, social work, and other child mental health specialties. (shrink)

This essay reads Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) alongside influential mid-century Victorian psychology studies—paying special attention to those that Carroll owned—in order to trace the divergence of Carroll’s literary representations of the “dream child” from its prevailing medical association with mental illness. The goals of this study are threefold: to trace the medico-historical links between dream-states and childhood, to investigate the medical reasons behind the pathologization of dream-states, and to understand how Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland contributed to Victorian interpretations (...) of the child’s mind. (shrink)

_Psychopathology at School_ provides a timely response to concerns about the rising numbers of children whose behaviour is recognised and understood as a medicalised condition, rather than simply as poor behaviour caused by other factors. It is the first scholarly analysis of psychopathology which draws on the philosophers Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari and Arendt to examine the processes whereby children’s behaviour is pathologised. The heightened attention to mental disorders is contrasted with education practices in the early and mid-to-late twentieth century, (...) and the emergence of a new conceptualization of childhood is explored. Taking education as a central component to the contemporary experience of growing up, the book charts the ways in which mental disorders have become commonplace in childhood and youth, from birth through to college and university, but also offers examples of where professionals have refused to pathologise children’s behaviour. The book examines the extent of the influence of psychopathology on the lives of children and young people, as well as the practices that infiltrate education and the possibilities for alternative educational responses that negate the diagnosis of mental disorder. Psychopathology at School is a must read for anyone concerned about the growing influence of psychopathology in education and will be of particular interest to educated readers and to scholars, students and professionals in education, psychiatry, psychology, child studies, youth studies, nursing, social work and sociology. (shrink)

Rabbis’ children experience unique stresses which may make them particularly susceptible to various forms of psychopathology. Fifty-three rabbis’ children completed questionnaires assessing their frequency of religious service attendance, their reactions towards being a rabbi's child, empathy levels, depressive, anxious, and disordered eating symptoms. Linear regression analyses were used for the separate outcome variables of depressive, anxiety, and disordered eating symptoms. More dissatisfaction with life as a rabbi's child was significantly associated with higher levels of depressive, Oral Control, (...) and Bulimia and Food Preoccupation symptoms. Attending services daily was associated with higher levels of anxiety and Oral Control symptoms. Higher empathy levels were associated with higher anxiety, depressive and dieting symptoms. Finally, men demonstrated higher scores for Oral Control and women for Bulimia and Food Preoccupation. Counseling may be useful to aid rabbis’ children who may be challenged with depressive, anxious and disordered eating symptoms. (shrink)

I argue that the language of some schizophrenic persons is akin to the language of Benjy in Williams Faulkner's novel The Sound and the Fury, in one crucial respect: Faulkner displays to us language that, ironically, cannot be translated or interpreted into sense... without irreducible 'loss' or 'garbling.' The same is true of famous schizophrenic writers, such as Renee and Schreber. Such 'garbling' is of an odd kind, admittedly: it is a garbling that inadvisably turns nonsense into sense.... Faulkner's language (...) is a language of paradox, of nonsense masquerading beautifully as sense. When this language works, it generates the powerful illusion that we can make sense of the 'life-world' of a young child or an 'idiot'—or a sufferer from chronic schizophrenia. But this remains, contrary to Louis Sass's claims, an illusion. Thus, drawing on the thinking of Wittgenstein (his On Certainty, especially, with its incisive critique of the very idea of being able to make claims or statements from within a sufficiently altered [non]state of mind) and of the Wittgensteinian literary critic James Guetti (who critiques the very idea of 'deranged language' being paraphrased into sense), I argue that the most impenetrable cases of schizophrenia may be cases not of a sense being made that we cannot grasp, nor of a different form of life, but, despite appearances, of no sense, no form of life, at all. This is an option that has not really been considered in the literature of/on psychopathology to date. And it can be tentatively established, not through a dubious scientism, but through a careful attention to the literature of the insane and the literature of Modernism. (shrink)

Extensive research has demonstrated that rs1360780, a common single nucleotide polymorphism within the FKBP5 gene, interacts with early-life stress in predicting psychopathology. Previous results suggest that carriers of the TT genotype of rs1360780 who were exposed to child abuse show differences in structure and functional activation of emotion-processing brain areas belonging to the salience network. Extending these findings on intermediate phenotypes of psychopathology, we examined if the interaction between rs1360780 and child abuse predicts resting-state functional connectivity (...) (rsFC) between the amygdala and other areas of the salience network. We analyzed data of young European adults from the general population (N = 774; mean age = 18.76 years) who took part in the IMAGEN study. In the absence of main effects of genotype and abuse, a significant interaction effect was observed for rsFC between the right centromedial amygdala and right posterior insula (p <.025, FWE-corrected), which was driven by stronger rsFC in TT allele carriers with a history of abuse. Our results suggest that the TT genotype of rs1360780 may render individuals with a history of abuse more vulnerable to functional changes in communication between brain areas processing emotions and bodily sensations, which could underlie or increase the risk for psychopathology. (shrink)

In addition to the socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors (SRFB), we recommend integrating theoretical and empirical findings based on attachment theory. We advocate a dynamic interpretation of early caregiver–child interaction. The consequences of models from developmental psychology for the occurrence of psychopathology are demonstrated from a clinical perspective.

Psychopathology in children cannot be understood without considering developmental processes and transactional relationships, particularly the relationship with caregivers. Time-limited intersubjective child psychotherapy is a developmental and transactional approach aimed at helping children and caregivers get back on healthier developmental trajectories. Core developmental processes, such as self-other-regulation and affect integration, are considered particularly important for healthy function and transactions with caregivers and contexts. Therefore, TIC seeks to strengthen core developmental processes in the child and the caregivers’ ability to (...) scaffold the child’s development. This is achieved through parallel child therapy and parent sessions. The current study is a qualitative study of parents’ experiences of change after TIC. The study explores parents’ perception of change in their child, themselves, and their transactions, and what they experienced as helpful in therapy.Materials and MethodsNine semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with parents of nine children aged 9–12 years with internalizing difficulties after completing TIC. The data were analyzed with thematic analysis.ResultsThe parents described positive changes in the children’s ability to understand, regulate and express themselves. The parents also described positive changes in their parenting, and for all nine children the parents reported positive changes in the transactions between themselves and the child. Most parents saw the parallel child and parental sessions as particularly important, while several parents mentioned play and the therapeutic focus.DiscussionParents’ description of changes after TIC indicate that the parents perceived their children as strengthened in core developmental processes important for intersubjective exchanges such as self-regulation and affect integration. In addition, parents saw their children and their own contributions more clearly, and their transactions were described as more supportive and positive.ConclusionThe results from this study give support to TIC as a developmentally supportive approach to therapy, with potential effects on children’s core developmental processes, their parents’ ability to both see and scaffold the child’s development and positive effects on the transactions between children and parents. The positive effects likely result from the integration of the different parts of TIC and the synergies taking place between them, rather than any one component by itself. (shrink)

Termination of psychoanalysis or psychotherapy is centrally important both to the process of treatment and to the patient's experience of treatment. It is surprising, then, that there has heretofore been no comprehensive study of the subject. This book begins to bridge the gap in this area. It is the first volume devoted entirely to issues surrounding the ending of treatment in analytic and therapeutic work with children and adolescents. Organized into separate clinical and theoretical sections, framed by a preface and (...) sectional introductions, and covering a wide range of psychopathology, this book explores the different ways in which children and adolescents grapple with the experience of separation at the conclusion of treatment. Of special note is the contributors' recognition that the parents of children ending treatment face their own termination experience in relinquishing the support of their child's therapist. The presentations are enriched, as well, by frank discussions of countertransference as it enters into the termination phase of treatment. (shrink)

Parents play an integral role in the mental health service provision of children and adolescents, and they can have significant effects on the outcomes of youth. A growing body of research has linked parents’ own mental health status to numerous outcomes for their children, and recent guidelines have emerged recommending the assessment of parent psychopathology when treating child patients. However, these recommendations present a range of ethical considerations. Mental health professionals must determine if the assessment of a parent (...) is empirically supported and that an assessment procedure appropriate for parents can be feasibly implemented. They must also respect the autonomy and confidentiality of parents while ensuring that assessment findings can be translated to meaningful benefits for child patients. This article details and discusses each of these concerns within the context of the relevant principles and standards of the 2016 American Psychological Association’s Code of Ethics. Further, it provides guidelines, relevant clinical examples, and an applied model for mental health professionals to consider the ethical implications of assessing parent mental health when serving child patients. (shrink)

Child poly-victimization is a risk factor for psychopathology in adulthood, such as anxiety and depression. Despite that, there is minus investment regarding psychotic symptoms and the mechanisms explaining the relationship between poly-victimization and psychoticism. The purpose of this study is to investigate these variables and explain how they might be associated. A sample of 246 adults participated in this study, aged between 18 and 68 years (M = 37.5, SD = 12.5) and mostly females (76.8%). The results revealed (...) a significant mediating effect of anxiety and depression in the relationship between childhood victimization and psychoticism (b =.12, p =.011), but not a significant moderating effect of gender, Δχ2(5) = 3.87, p =.568. The affective pathway was supported by our findings. These results suggest the need of additional efforts on prevention of child victimization, as well as of intervention programs aiming to prevent its cumulative effect. (shrink)

How exactly do mental disorders affect one’s agency? How might therapeutic interventions help patients regain or improve their autonomy? Do only some disorders excuse morally inappropriate behavior, such as theft or child neglect? Or is there nothing about having a disorder, as such, that affects whether we ought to praise or blame someone for their moral success or failure? Our volume gathers together empirically-informed philosophers who are well equipped to tackle such questions. Contributors specialize in free will, agency, and (...) responsibility, but they are informed by current scientific and clinical approaches to a wide range of psychopathologies, including autism, addiction, Tourette syndrome, personality disorders, depression, dementia, phobias, schizophrenia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. These conditions exhibit a diverse array of symptoms that can contribute quite differently to being blameworthy or praiseworthy. (shrink)

The first line of Merleau-Ponty 's 1951-52 lecture "The Question of Method in Child Psychology" readt, "In child psychology (as in psychopathology, the psychology of primitives, and the psychology ofwomen), the situation ofthe object of study is so different from that ofthe observer that it cannot be grasped on its own terms." Is there any hope for a feminist reading of Merleau-Ponty's psychology with such a statement, or are women relegated in Merleau-Ponty's corpus alongside the childlike, the (...) insane, and the primitive? This paper endeavors to demonstrate that Merleau-Ponty 's understanding of the psychology of women is not a false or bigoted placing of women in an infant-like position. Rather, he demonstrates that it is precisely this relationship of man to woman that must be the starting point of analysis for both a philosophy and psychology of sex. (shrink)

Developmental psychopathology holds promise for elucidating the structure of self-awareness. Here we studied social emotions in matched groups of children and adolescents with and without autism. Our aims were to determine whether there are potentially dissociable aspects of self-awareness, and to reconsider how the qualities of young children's engagement with other persons influences the development of their sense of self.

Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely (...) expressing our emotions. Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it. In the second half of the book, he turns to a defense of moral relativism. Moral facts depend on emotional responses, and emotional responses vary from culture to culture. Prinz surveys the anthropological record to establish moral variation, and he draws on cultural history to show how attitudes toward practices such as cannibalism and marriage change over time. He also criticizes evidence from animal behavior and child development that has been taken to support the claim that moral attitudes are hard-wired by natural selection. Prinz concludes that there is no single true morality, but he also argues that some moral values are better than others; moral progress is possible. Throughout the book, Prinz relates his views to contemporary and historical work in philosophical ethics. His views echo themes in the writings of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche, but Prinz supports, extends, and revises these classic theories using the resources of cutting-edge cognitive science. The Emotional Construction of Morals will stimulate and challenge anyone who is curious about the nature and origin of moral values. (shrink)

The first line of Merleau-Ponty’s 1951-52 lecture “The Question of Method in Child Psychology” reads, “In child psychology (as in psychopathology, the psychology of primitives, and the psychology of women), the situation of the object of study is so different from that of the observer that it cannot be grasped on its own terms.” [F, 465] Is there any hope for a feminist reading of Merleau-Ponty’s psychology with such a statement, or are women relegated in Merleau-Ponty’s corpus (...) alongside the childlike, the insane, and the primitive? This paper endeavors to demonstrate that Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the psychology of women is not a false or bigoted placing of women in an infant-like position. Rather, he demonstrates that it is precisely this relationship of man to woman that must be the starting point of analysis for both a philosophy and psychology of sex.À la première ligne du cours de Merleau-Ponty intitulé “Methode en psychologie de I’enfant,” on peut lire: “En psychologie de I’enfant, comme en psychpathologie, en psychologie des primitifs et en psychologie de la femme, I’objet à connaître est dans une situation si differente de celle de I’observateur qu’il est difficile de le saisir tel qu’il est. “À la lumière de cette citation, peut-on espérer faire une lecture féministe de la psychologie de Merleau-Ponty, ou les femmes sont-elles reléguées, dans le corpus merleau-pontien, à I’infantile, I’insensé et le primitif? Le présent article tente de démontrer que la compréhension merleau-pontienne de la psychologie des femmes ne place pas indûment ou de façon sexiste les femmes dans une position infantile. Il démontre plutôt que cette relation même entre I’homme et la femme doit constituer le point de départ de I’analyse pour une philosophie et une psychologie sexuelles. (shrink)

The latest book by the Slovenian critic Slavoj Zizek takes the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze as the beginning of a dazzling inquiry into the realms of radical politics, philosophy, film (Hitchcock, Fight Club ), and psychoanalysis. Of Organs without Bodies Joan Copjec ( Imagine There's No Woman ) has written: "With all his ususal humor and invention, Zizek -- the acknowledged master of the 180 degree turn -- here takes a trip into "enemy" territory to deliver Deleuze of (...) a marvelously rebellious child, one that seriously challenges Deleuze's other progeny with a surprising but convincing bid for succession. Those who thought Deleuze's forward march into the future would follow a straight path are forced to rethink their stance. From now on all readings of Deleuze will have to take a detour through this important -- even necessary -- book." Eric Santner ( On the Psychopathology of Everyday Life ) describes Organs without Bodies as offering "an entirely new degree of conceptual clarity and political urgency. Through his deep engagement with the logic of Deleuze's project, Zizek opens up new possibilities of thought beyond the terms of the current political debates on globalization, democratization, war on terror. Once again, Zizek has produced an utterly timely and radically untimely meditation." Recently profiled in The New Yorker , and hailed by the Village Voice as "the giant of Ljubljana," Zizek is one of the most provocative and entertaining thinkers at work today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 195-198 [Access article in PDF] Implicit and Explicit Temporality Thomas Fuchs Keywords implicit/explicit temporality, embodiment, intersubjectivity, desynchronization, melancholia, schizophrenia Since Minkowski (1970), Strauss (1966), v. Gebsattel (1954), and Tellenbach (1980), temporality has been a main subject of phenomenological psychiatry. Drawing on philosophical concepts of Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger, these authors have analyzed psychopathologic deviations of time experience, mainly from an individual point of (...) view, for example, as a slowing down or inhibition of lived time in depression or obsessive–compulsive disorder. Their analyses are still most valuable today, but may be carried further by introducing concepts such as embodied and intersubjective temporality into psychopathology. Martin Wyllie (2005), by opening up a wide scope of temporal phenomena and related concepts, makes a laudable effort to contribute to such a progress.In my commentary, I would like to propose a distinction that is suggested by much of Wyllie's analysis and may shed further light on psychopathology, namely between implicit and explicit temporality. If we look at a child while obliviously playing with his toys, lost to the world, we may assume that there is no sense of the time passing. Lived time runs with the movement of life, implicit in the child's experience of being engaged in his play and directed toward his goals. It "unfolds through the processes of bodily activity" (Wyllie 2005). Future and past do not stand out against the pure presence of "becoming." This implicit mode of temporality is retrieved every time that we are absorbed in what we are doing, and may even reach the climax of "flow experiences" (Csikszentmihalyi 1988) where the sense of time is lost in unimpeded, fluent performance.However, this changes when a gap arises between need and satisfaction, desire and fulfillment, or plan and execution. Now the future appears as a "not yet" or "yet to come," experienced as the temporality of awaiting, striving, or longing for. Time is felt as passing by and refusing the desired fulfillment; it becomes conscious or explicit. A similar gap arises between the present and something irretrievably lost, bringing the past to consciousness as a "no more." Again time is experienced explicitly, but now as moving on relentlessly and separating us from the lost object. The gap to the past may not be bridged any more: this is the temporality of missing or mourning. In both cases, explicit time arises as a negation of implicit or lived time (here my use of the term is a bit divergent from Wyllie's); it is experienced as a "not yet" or "no more," often with a component of displeasure or suffering (Fuchs 2001a, 2003)."Implicit" versus "explicit time" thus come near to another distinction well known in phenomenology, namely between the "lived" and [End Page 195] the "corporal body" (Leib versus Koerper). The first term refers to the body functioning in the tacit mode, as the medium of everyday performance. The second term points to the body as turning into the object of attention, for example, when it puts up resistance to our purposes, or is used as an instrument deliberately (Fuchs 2001b). In fact, implicit temporality and tacit performance of the body are nearly synonymous: Lived time may be regarded as a function of the lived body, opened up by its potentiality and capability. The more we are engaged in our tasks, the more we forget time as well as the body; we are, as it were, "inside time." On the other hand, in explicit temporality the body often appears in the corporal or explicit mode as well. For example, when falling ill, we experience our body no more as a tacit medium but rather as an object or obstacle, while we notice the slowing down of time and may even feel excluded from the movement of life. Thus, embodiment and temporality have a parallel background–foreground structure.I now try to carry these considerations further by including the intersubjective dimension of time. In an earlier paper, I describe the attunement of the living being to its environment as a continuous synchronization on the biological as... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Autism and Intersubjectivity:Beyond Cognitivism and the Theory of MindRichard Gipps (bio)The papers that make up this special issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology are obviously united by both topic and approach. They all look at autism through a philosophical lens—both at infantile autism (Gallagher 2004a, 2004b; McGeer 2004; Shanker 2004) and at schizophrenic autism (Stanghellini and Ballerini 2004). Moreover, they are all concerned with the foundations of our understanding (...) of people and their minds, both the minds of others (Gallagher 2004a, 2004b; Shanker 2004; Stanghellini and Ballerini 2004) and that of oneself (McGeer 2004). The developmental disorder of infantile autism provides a conspicuous example of a disruption in the ability to develop such an understanding and enter into the social world, whilst schizophrenic autism provides a conspicuous example of what happens when one falls out of it (Stanghellini and Ballerini 2004).Yet what further affords the opportunity of this introduction is the possibility of discerning a strong common theme that runs through the philosophical treatment the papers provide. For they are united in their rejection of the primarily cognitive approach toward our capacity to relate to one another (or to ourselves) as to minded people taken by many in the mainstream of developmental psycho(patho)logy today.1 Such mainstream approaches ascribe to the developing child a 'theory of mind,' tacit knowledge of which supposedly enables them to negotiate the social world. In place of such an intellectualist, disengaged, cognition-focused psychology, we are offered perspectives that stress the primitive foundational character of our pre-reflective (noncognitive) engagement with one another, our emotion, our expression, and our embodiment.The grounds for this stressing of the affective and praxical dimensions of personal life over the cognitive and representational are twofold. First there is the developmental trajectory itself, and the claim is that the autistic child's interpersonal lacunae manifest themselves considerably before they develop the cognitive capacities for social knowledge (Gallagher 2004a; Shanker 2004). The principle ground, however, is philosophical, and the claim here is that what needs to be rejected in the developmental psycho(patho)logy is an alienated ontology and estranged epistemology that has implicitly become inscribed within it, constraining its explanatory project and limiting its vision of possibilities.2 That at least is how I [End Page 195] would put it and, by way of providing an overarching philosophical presentation of the papers of this issue, what follows shall be its elaboration.The ontology in question has it that the mind is an inner domain, that bodily behavior is an outer domain, that belief and thought epitomize the former, that intentionality is a function of the former and only derivatively manifest in the latter, that the form of our embodiment is contingent, that understanding is manifest primarily in thought and not intrinsically in praxis, that the mind is populated by free-standing inner representations, and that perception and the emotions are extrinsic to the understanding (Gallagher 2004a, 2004b; McGeer 2004; Shanker 2004). And such an ontology carries a host of epistemological implications. The self retreats from the interpersonal interactive domain, taking up residence even behind the subject's own mind, which itself becomes an objectified domain. In our own case, we are left in the predicament of needing to inspect (or intro-spect) our own inner states to find out how things are for us; our self-reports (avowals of what we think and feel) thereby become avowals of judgments of what we take ourselves to think and feel (McGeer 2004). And when we confront others the task becomes one of cognitively figuring out, from merely 'outer' clues, how things stand with them on the inside. The encounter with others is then epistemologically fraught, relying on inference and theory to take us from an outer domain of mere movement to a hidden inner world of intentionality (Gallagher 2004a, 2004b; Shanker 2004).Thus, an alienated ontology of the person and their mind bequeaths its own epistemological problematic, and the estranged epistemology gives to developmental psychology the task of filling in the details of the actual cognitive states and mechanisms which instantiate the theories and inferences which it has discerned a priori to be required. And psychopathology... (shrink)

_Background:_ Several studies have shown a connection between mothers with postnatal depression (PND) and emotional-behavioral problems in their children. Mothers’ psychopathology may impair interactional patterns with children and these outcomes can be influenced by father’s psychopathological symptoms. The primary aim of the study was to assess over time parent-infant interaction in families where mothers have experienced PND and have received psychological treatment during the child’s first year of life considering the severity of parents’ psychopathological symptoms and children’s temperament. (...) _Methods:_ Three groups of families were involved: families with mothers with PND wherein both parents followed a psychological treatment (TxMF); families with mothers affected by PND wherein only the mother followed the treatment (TxM) and control families wherein the mothers did not have a psychopathological diagnosis and did not receive any treatment (Con). The families were assessed at two time points through Symptom Check-List-90-Revised (SCL-90-R), Questionari Italiani Temperamento (QUIT) and the video-recorded procedure observing mealtime Scala di Valutazione Interazioni Alimentari (SVIA). _Results:_ Parents in the TxMF group had significantly lower SVIA scores (i.e., less maladaptive) at T2. TxMF group scored lower at T2 at SCL-90-R, whereas TxM showed no significant differences between T1 and T2. Involvement of fathers in the treatment was important to improve the psychopathological symptoms of both parents and the quality of interactions with their children. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 91-92 [Access article in PDF] Jaspers and Defining Phenomenology John McMillan IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH a number of positions that you might take on the importance of phenomenology for the study of the mind. The strongest position is to think that phenomenology is sufficient for understanding the mind. This is a position that would be very hard to defend and it is (...) unlikely that Gupta and Kay want to endorse such a view. It is clear that Jaspers did not believe this; although he thought that first-person experience was undervalued, his project was an attempt to make sense of different kinds of explanation, all of which contribute to our understanding of the mind.A second position is to deny that phenomenology gives us anything that is of use in understanding the mind and psychopathology. Philosophers have developed a number of such positions, from the eliminativism of Churchland (1981) to the heterophenomenology of Daniel Dennett (1989, 1991).A third position is to hold that phenomenology is one of the methods that are useful for understanding the mind and psychopathology. Along with neuroscience and other more behavioral approaches to behavior, phenomenology is an important component of an adequate understanding of the mind. This position appears to be that endorsed by Jaspers, Gupta, Kay, and the authors they discuss. It is also the position that Grant Gillett and I defend in Consciousness and Intentionality (2001). Gupta and Kay's paper presents an argument about where the boundaries between phenomenology and other approaches to the mind and psychopathology ought to be drawn. Gupta and Kay, following Jaspers, think that the boundaries of the phenomenological ought to be drawn around those approaches that employ empathy and the presuppositionless stance and do not include objective phenomena.Given that the paper is primarily about what phenomenology means and that it endorses the way that Jaspers used the term, it is fairly important that we have a definition from Jaspers. Gupta and Kay give a description of some of Jaspers's methods for getting at subjective phenomena, but do not give an account of what Jaspers thinks the aim of phenomenology is. In other words, one way to classify something as phenomenological is its methods and another is by what the point of the exercise is. In General Psychopathology, Jaspers (1997) says that phenomenology is an empirical method for investigating "individual psychic experience" (p. 55). We can think of this as a claim about the objective of phenomenology and then consider the merits of different phenomenological methodologies in terms of their success in achieving this objective. This opens up the possibility that a theory may be genuinely phenomenological because it has a plausible method for getting at psychic lived experience but does not use all of the methods advocated by Jaspers.Gupta and Kay are correct that Jaspers does stress the importance of the presuppositionless [End Page 91] stance, the importance of empathy and the importance of not simply relying on objective phenomena. However, it is not obvious why an approach to understanding the mind or psycho- pathology must satisfy these conditions to be phenomenological. Imagine the following kind of situation: when I am observed to hit my big toe against a brick and give a yelp, it is possible to infer something about my psychic lived experience. There is not much is room for doubt about my first-person experience and, although you might ask me questions about my pain, they are unlikely to add much to what you can simply read from my behavior. This example may appear a little crude because the first-person experience in this case is not especially complex and is not that interesting as a entrance to the inner workings of an individual's mental life. It is not hard to come up with other examples where we can read the first-person experience from behavior in a fairly accurate and informative way. A father gazing at his young child while she is sleeping in his arms may be having a number of thoughts that we would not know about... (shrink)

Konrad Lorenz's popularity in the United States has to be understood in the context of social concern about the mother‐infant dyad after World War II. Child analysts David Levy, René Spitz, Margarethe Ribble, Therese Benedek, and John Bowlby argued that many psychopathologies were caused by a disruption in the mother‐infant bond. Lorenz extended his work on imprinting to humans and argued that maternal care was also instinctual. The conjunction of psychoanalysis and ethology helped shore up the view that the (...) mother‐child dyad rests on an instinctual basis and is the cradle of personality formation. Amidst the Cold War emphasis on rebuilding an emotionally sound society, these views received widespread attention. Thus Lorenz built on the social relevance of psychoanalysis, while analysts gained legitimacy by drawing on the scientific authority of biology. Lorenz's work was central in a rising discourse that blamed the mother for emotional degeneration and helped him recast his eugenic fears in a socially acceptable way. -/- . (shrink)

ABSTRACT Konrad Lorenz's popularity in the United States has to be understood in the context of social concern about the mother‐infant dyad after World War II. Child analysts David Levy, René Spitz, Margarethe Ribble, Therese Benedek, and John Bowlby argued that many psychopathologies were caused by a disruption in the mother‐infant bond. Lorenz extended his work on imprinting to humans and argued that maternal care was also instinctual. The conjunction of psychoanalysis and ethology helped shore up the view that (...) the mother‐child dyad rests on an instinctual basis and is the cradle of personality formation. Amidst the Cold War emphasis on rebuilding an emotionally sound society, these views received widespread attention. Thus Lorenz built on the social relevance of psychoanalysis, while analysts gained legitimacy by drawing on the scientific authority of biology. Lorenz's work was central in a rising discourse that blamed the mother for emotional degeneration and helped him recast his eugenic fears in a socially acceptable way. (shrink)

In the nearly one hundred years that have elapsed since Freud’s publication of his pioneering work with “Little Hans,” psychoanalysis has transformed not only our clinical work with children, but has immeasurably enriched our understanding of normal child and adolescent development as well as developmental deviations and derailments. We have gradually come to understand childhood and adolescence as a complex tapestry of developmental themes, conflicts, and crises; sometimes discontinuous or discrete, at other times, harmonious and integrated, yet always occurring (...) within a transactional matrix of environmental influences and internal experience. In this transdisciplinary anthology, eight authors explore the changing terrain of child and adolescent psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic therapy. The contributions, which reflect theoretical and clinical heterogeneity, are both innovative and varied, and range from the highly abstract and theoretical to those that consider very specific dimensions of clinical process. Collectively, they make a compelling case for the continued relevance of psychoanalytic ideas in the treatment of children and adolescents. With insightful contributions by expert psychoanalysts, clinical social workers, and clinical psychologists, Psychoanalytic Approaches to the Treatment of Children and Adolescents: Tradition and Transformation is essential reading for child and adolescent therapists. Psychoanalytic Approaches to the Treatment of Children and Adolescents will increase your knowledge of: the function of play in normal development--and within the treatment relationship psychoanalytic theories and research investigations linking early object loss to depression the nature of adolescent depression the theoretical and clinical dimensions of a two-systems approach to understanding psychopathology and the clinical process the dynamic meaning and clinical management of drug and alcohol abuse, promiscuity, eating disorders, violence, and other self-destructive behaviors the complexities of treating children with neuropsychological deficits. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8.4 (2001) 291-293 [Access article in PDF] Schizophrenia and the Void Jean Naudin and Jean-Michel Azorin It was Eugene Minkowski who, from the 1920s on, introduced the French to the work of Eugen Bleuler, whose student he had been. In the introduction to his first book, Schizophrenia: Psychopathology of Schizoids and Schizophrenics (Minkowski 1927), Minkowski nevertheless notes with regard to Bleuler that he could (...) not allow himself "to be restricted to this student's task." For Minkowski, Bleuler certainly enjoys the great merit of having substituted the notion of schizophrenia for that of dementia praecox and of having described autism with precision. But—Minkowski says—autism is badly defined when, relying upon the concept of Spaltung, Bleuler fails to break free of associationist psychology. Minkowski justifies his critical attitude by appealing, as does Binswanger, to Husserl and above all to Bergson. For Bergson, dissociation is a normal feature of thought. If, for Minkowski, it is important to pay attention to autism, it is because it attests not to a certain fragmentation of consciousness, but rather to an attitude whereby the subject seeks to preserve the precarious equilibrium of a personality that is threatened by a void.The article translated into English for this special issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology prefigures Schizophrenia and, like an earlier article on the theme of "morbid rationalism," already announces certain key concepts. Here these concepts are, so to speak, caught in their embryonic state, and one is forced to recognize with Tatossian (1993) how radically Minkowski differs from his master, Bleuler, in the choice of specific cases. By according exemplary significance to cases of "poor autism," Minkowski focuses on the reflexivity of the subjective experience of the patient rather than on the proliferation of the delusional state, which lends itself more readily to clinical observation. We must remember that Minkowski is above all a healer. If, like Bleuler, he is interested in the problem that generates the illness, it is only in order to be able to heal the patient. It is therefore not so much the isolated problem that interests him as the way the person tries to deal with it. So it should not come as a surprise that one of the essential themes of this article is what Minkowski calls "compensation." Like the psychoanalytical concepts to which Bleuler refers, compensation is a dynamic concept. But Minkowski takes care to distinguish the compensation that characterizes the interrogative attitude from motives of a more psychological kind aimed at meeting a lack by symbolically satisfying a desire. In the purely phenomenological sense in which Minkowski takes it, compensation does not refer to a hidden motive. It represents a way of getting around the void or sense of emptiness that results from the schizophrenic person's inability to project himself into the future by pursuing the practical goals of normal, daily life. In this case, the dynamic does not feed off the vicissitudes of drive but off the élan vital—or rather, off the decline of élan vital that such persons suffer. [End Page 291]Minkowski particularly insists upon the fact that Paul's interrogative attitude is not simple curiosity, even if Paul's questioning began with sexual curiosity. Confronted with incessant questioning reminiscent of a child, a psychoanalyst would be likely to invoke infantile curiosity concerning procreation and sexual difference. Minkowski, however, seeks to show that the prevailing motive in Paul's case is not so much desire for knowledge as the vital necessity of finding a way of—can one put it this way?—playing for time. In other words, the interrogatory attitude is a way of avoiding confrontation with the realm of practical concerns that, at bottom, makes the patient suffer. If this realm makes him suffer, it is because the absence of any vital attachment leaves him floating in a kind of void. The fundamental problem of schizophrenia is therefore identified as the loss of meaning going along with a deficiency in the individual's attachment to practical reality. Practical reality, or to put it otherwise, an orientation toward practical activity... (shrink)

Mild signs of postpartum depression or anxiety are present in up to half of all new mothers. However, the impact of having the “baby blues” on infant development remains largely unknown. The current study explores a potential relation between mother’s self-reported depression or anxiety symptoms and infant’s motor development in a longitudinal sample of 50 mother-infant dyads. Further, we examine whether engaging in fetal kick counting during pregnancy may reduce maternal psychopathology symptoms and thereby positively influence infant motor development (...) and parent-child engagement during the first months of life. We hypothesized that subclinical maternal psychopathology would negatively impact infant motor development, and that completing a fetal kick count activity during the third trimester would reduce overall signs of maternal psychopathology. Results only partially support these hypotheses. Postpartum maternal anxiety seems to negatively affect the emergence of infants’ fine motor skills. However, engaging in fetal kick counting during pregnancy did not reduce maternal depression or anxiety symptoms. Nevertheless, preliminary evidence suggests that engaging in fetal kick counting may impact early child development by altering the mother’s attitudes toward the child. Future research is needed to examine the value of this low-cost intervention strategy more closely. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION: Delusional misidentification syndromes (DMS) are a group of psychopathological experiences occurring in psychosis, involving the misidentification of a person or place. DMS are often accompanied by hostility towards the object of delusional misidentification. This is of a particular concern in perinatal mental illness due to the potential disruption of the mother-infant bond, and risk of neglect, violence, or infanticide towards a misidentified child. This review aimed to collate all published cases of DMS in postpartum psychosis to further understand (...) how these syndromes present in perinatal mental illness. METHODS: In August 2021, an online database search was conducted using PubMed, MEDLINE, PsycINFO, CINAHL, and Embase to identify all publications reporting DMS in the perinatal period. RESULTS: Nine papers were included in the review involving 8 case reports of Capgras syndrome and one case series involving 4 cases of Fregoli syndrome. Three cases identified organic pathology, which may have contributed to the presentation. The most common subject of misidentification was the patient’s husband (n = 7), followed by their baby (n = 6), hospital staff (n = 4), other family members (n = 3), and self (n = 1). Five cases remark on the impact of perinatal illness on the maternal-infant bond, of which four result in the mother being unwilling to care for the infant as the result of their delusional beliefs. CONCLUSION: This is the first systematic review of the literature in this field. Although small in number, these cases reveal several important learning points including that DMS can occur with or without underlying organic disease. Active exploration of the nature of delusions in postpartum psychosis is required to mitigate the risk of harm to the infant and mother-infant bond. It may also uncover that these syndromes are more common in postpartum psychosis than previously realized. (shrink)

_What place do Anna Freud’s ideas have in the history of psychoanalysis? What can her writings teach us today about how to work therapeutically with children? Are her psychoanalytic ideas still relevant to those entrusted with the welfare of infants and young people? _ _Reading Anna Freud_ provides an accessible introduction to the writings of one of the most significant figures in the history of psychoanalysis. Each chapter introduces a number of her key papers, with clear summaries of the main (...) ideas, historical background, a discussion of the influence and contemporary relevance of her thinking, and recommendations for further reading. Areas covered include Anna Freud’s writings on: • The theory and practice of child analysis and 'developmental therapy' • The application of psychoanalytic thinking to education, paediatrics and the law • The assessment and diagnosis of childhood disorders • Psychoanalytic research and developmental psychopathology Nick Midgley draws on his extensive experience as a child psychotherapist and a teacher to bring Anna Freud's ideas to life. He illustrates the remarkable originality of her thinking, and shows how analytic ideas can be used not only in child psychotherapy, but also to inform the care of children in families, hospitals, classrooms, residential care and the court-room. __Reading Anna Freud__ will be of interest to child therapists, child analysts and psychoanalysts, as well as others working in the field of child and adolescent mental health, such as clinical psychologists, child psychiatrists and educational psychologists. It also has much to offer to those entrusted with the care of children in a wide range of settings - including teachers, nurses and social workers - for whom Anna Freud was always keen to demonstrate the value of a psychoanalytic approach. _Nick Midgley_ trained as a child and adolescent psychotherapist at the Anna Freud Centre, where he now works as a clinician and as Programme Director for the MSc in Developmental Psychology and Clinical Practice. Nick has written articles on a wide range of topics and is joint editor of _Minding the Child: Mentalization-based Interventions with Children, Young People and their Families_ and _Child Psychotherapy and Research: New Directions, Emerging Findings_. (shrink)

Adverse childhood experiences are prevalent in many western populations. Large studies have put the likelihood of having at least one ACE above 50% of the general population. ACEs and the associated experience of chronic stress, moreover, have been consistently linked with a variety of negative physical and psychological health outcomes across the lifespan from behavioral problems and cognitive difficulties early on, to greater chance of suffering from a mental health disorder and engaging in self destructing behaviors. The literature puts forward (...) several protective factors, such as mother-child relations, parental health, and community engagement. In this perspective paper we put forward the potential of regular nature engagement as a possible additional protective factor. Nature’s therapeutic potential has been well documented, for many psychopathologies and mental health difficulties. Yet studies looking at the protective and therapeutic potential of nature with people with ACEs are remarkably limited in numbers. In this perspective piece we conduct a search of the literature to find previous applications of nature as a protective or therapeutic intervention for people with ACEs. We highlight the gap in the current literature, and put forward various mechanisms of action that justify a closer exploration of this area in further research. (shrink)

Sleep is a major concern, especially in people with Down Syndrome. Beyond Obstructive Sleep Apnea, a number of other sleep difficulties have been reported in children with DS, such as delayed sleep onset, night-time awakenings, and early morning awakenings. The detrimental effect of sleep difficulties seems to contribute to and exacerbate the cognitive and behavioral outcomes of DS. Although the screening for sleep disorders is recommended early in age in DS, only a few studies have evaluated the sleep profile in (...) preschool-age children with DS. The aim of the current study was to assess the association between sleep disturbances and behavioral problems in a group of preschool-age children with DS, by means of a feasible and easy-to-administer parent-report questionnaires. Seventy-one preschool-age children with DS, ranging in age from 3 to 5.11 years, were included in this retrospective study. Sleep disturbances were evaluated by means of the Sleep Disturbance Scale for Children, while emotional and behavioral problems by means of the Child Behavior Checklist. Sleep breathing disorders were the most frequent sleep difficulties reported by parents. Moreover, children with clinical scores in total sleep problems exhibited elevation of psychopathological symptoms, namely Total problems, Affective problems, Anxiety problems, Pervasive Developmental Problems, and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Problems. The identification of the broader connection between sleep difficulties and emotional and behavioral problems in preschool-age children with DS leads to important considerations for intervention. (shrink)

Most mental health research largely ignores or minimises gender and age differences in depression. In ‘Don't mind the gap: Why do we not care about the gender gap in mental health?’, Patalay and Demkowicz identify a dearth of research on the causal factors of depression in young women. They attribute this to an over-reliance on biological accounts of gender differences in depression. Patalay and Demkowicz conclude that a person-centred approach that meaningfully engages with the reports of young women with depression (...) is more likely to expose the social drivers of depression that impact this group. This commentary focuses on Patalay and Demkowicz's call to examine the patient's lived experience. We argue that there is an urgent need to reflect upon the methodologies involved in examining lived experience and how they can be best utilised. Ultimately, we advocate for an approach known as ‘phenomenological psychopathology’, through a phenomenological investigation of depression in young women, we can go some way towards closing the gender gap. (shrink)

BackgroundDifferent types of maltreatment lead to distortions in emotion and attention processing. The present study investigated whether the experience of peer victimization in childhood and adolescence has an additional influence on attention processing in adulthood.MethodsTwo non-clinical samples consisting of individuals with different levels of experiences of maltreatment were recruited. In an evaluative conditioning task, images of faces with neutral emotional expression were either associated with short videos of intense negative statements, or associated with neutral videos. Subsequently, these faces were used (...) as stimuli in an emotional Stroop task as well as a dot-probe task.ResultsIn both tasks, hierarchical regression analyses revealed that retrospective reports of relational peer victimization made an incremental contribution to the prediction of attentional biases beyond child maltreatment. In the emotional Stroop task, emotional abuse was the strongest predictor for an attentional bias showing delayed responses to negatively associated faces, while peer victimization was associated with faster responses to negatively associated faces. In the dot-probe task, relational peer victimization was the strongest predictor for an attentional bias. When the attentional bias was examined in more detail, though, peer victimization did not show incremental contributions although emotional abuse remained the strongest predictor for facilitated attention toward negatively associated neutral faces.ConclusionExperiences of peer victimization leave additional cognitive scars beyond effects of childhood maltreatment by caregivers. It is likely that attentional biases in the aftermath of victimization put individuals at risk for the development of psychopathology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.4 (2005) 307-310 [Access article in PDF] Aesthetics, Criticism, and Psychotherapy John Z. Sadler Keywords aesthetics, psychiatry, psychotherapy, Sibley In his wide-ranging survey of how Kantian aesthetic theory is implicated in psychothera-py, John Callender has raised at least a dozen potentially profound and rewarding possibilities in applying aesthetic theory to psychiatry and psychotherapy. Although the idea of marrying aesthetic theory to psychiatry and psychotherapy is (...) not new, Callender's direction of the merger is distinctively novel. The mid-twentieth century had a distinct literature in applying psychoanalytic and psychiatric theory to aesthetic experience, summarized by the sizable bibliography by Norman Kiell, Psychiatry and Psychology in the Visual Arts and Aesthetics: A Bibliography (1965). This line of interdisciplinary work influenced a later generation of art historians and literary theorists in applying (particularly) psychoanalytic theory to interpretation and appreciation of the arts, contributions that are still being developed today, along with the emergence of complementary viewpoints from cognitive neuroscience (Peretz and Zatorre 2003; Rose 2004; Zeki 1999). Callender's project, however, is quite the converse—he wishes to show how philosophical aesthetics can contribute to psychiatry and clinical psychology. Exploring the aesthetics of psychiatry is the innovation.Before focusing my own comments on a few of Callender's points, I wish to call attention to the substantive questions he has directly raised or implied by his discussions. These questions are worthy of further development in this and other journals, and I hope that Callender will succeed in engaging the minds of his readers and inspire them to work in this exciting area in the philosophy of psychiatry. In his elegant review of Kant's key theoretical points of aesthetics, his discussion provokes us to consider the kinds of evaluations that patients make of themselves (moral? aesthetic? others?), as well as the kinds of evaluations clinicians make in their judgments of psychopathology. Evolutionists may wonder about the adaptive significance of aesthetic capacities (e.g., derivatives of grooming? mating displays?). In presenting Kant's notion of "disinterestedness" or contemplative judgment, readers may wonder about overlap with notions of therapist neutrality and unconditional positive regard. Should therapist relationships with patients be dominated by a similar aesthetic sensibility? What does the aesthetic posture have to do with the therapist posture?Importantly, Callender notes the connections and ambiguities between moral values and aesthetic values. This is borne out in his later discussions of clinical case material (considered again below). He focuses primarily on the duplication of aesthetic and moral values in the same terms of praise (honesty, integrity, originality), but there is no question that aesthetic experiences are had by viewers of art exhibiting perverse or depraved [End Page 307] imagery (consider, for instance, Francis Bacon's "3 Screaming Popes" or, even more extremely, the grotesque staged photographs of Joel-Peter Witkin). The implication here is that (as an example) to understand the aesthetics of sadomasochistic art may help us to understand the psychology of sadomasochistic people.By the time he introduces his case material, Callender has raised the issue of intersubjectivity in aesthetic experience, an experience that may be devoid of discursive cognitive content but may be profound with emotional content, thus challenging tenets of cognitive psychology and psychotherapy. His discussion of cases reflecting elements of Kant's components of aesthetic judgment point toward new ways of understanding psychopathology as disturbances in aesthetic self-appraisal.I would like to return to the problem of moral and aesthetic judgments in psychotherapy and in psychopathology. Dr. Callender presents three cases—a woman who has been traumatized by multiple instances of sexual abuse, a young girl with postpartum depression with fears of losing her child because of bad mothering, and a third patient with anorexia nervosa who demonstrates the typically distorted body self-image. I suggest that the aesthetic nature of these patients' self-judgments is not so clear cut as Callender suggests. His sexual abuse case summary certainly suggests a woman consumed by shame. Because shame is a typical "moral emotion," the question is raised of moral badness being involved in her self-concept as well as, or perhaps... (shrink)

Family accommodation refers to the attempt of family members to prevent their child’s distress related to psychopathology. Family accommodation can limit meaningful participation in personal and social routines and activities. Accommodation has been studied extensively in the context of childhood anxiety and has been linked to greater impairment, and poor intervention outcomes. Like anxiety, sensory over-responsivity symptoms are associated with heightened distress and thus, may also be accommodated by family members. The current study describes the validation of a (...) new pediatric family accommodation scale for SOR. Parents of 301 children ages 3–13 years completed an online survey, of which 48 had medical or developmental conditions. The survey included the Child Sensory Profile 2 and the newly developed family accommodation scale for sensory over-responsivity. Three Sensory Profile 2 scores were analyzed: SOR, sensory under-responsivity and sensory seeking. The FASENS consists of 18 items; 12 describing the frequency of accommodation behaviors and 6 describing the impact of the accommodation on the wellbeing of the family and the child. Results indicated that the FASENS has high internal consistency as well as a significant 3-factor confirmatory model fit: accommodations, family impact, and child impact. FASENS scores significantly correlated with SOR symptoms. However, they also correlated with under-responsivity and seeking. Parents of children with health conditions reported significantly higher FASENS scores, which corresponded with their child’s significantly higher sensory scores. Family accommodations for SOR occur to some extent in the general population, but their prevalence and impact are significantly greater when the child has a health condition, in addition to SOR. Additional research is needed to explore whether these accommodations are adaptive and whether families and children would benefit from learning to reduce them, as with anxiety. (shrink)

The paper discusses issues raised by Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy, investigating its phenomenology and social ontology: the individual's genesis from the social and parental background in which it is immersed as an historical-cultural invariant; the idea of pri- mary objectification and the child's progressive stepping back from «environmental lived experiences»; «sympathy» as a way of «being together»; «community of life» and «pa- rental accompaniment» as the ground for the constitution of persons and relationships; the life-world and the idea (...) of estrangement in philosophy and in psychopathology ; the «sense of one's self», living oneself as a subject, which requires the experience of - one's ability to «feel oneself» through - actions and emotions. Lived subjectivity, sensitivity, power and primary socialization concur tothe emergence of «primary individuation» - a form of subjectivation through which the human creature enters the sphere of its own life definable as «reason». (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Interpersonal and Emotional Beginnings of Understanding: A Review of Peter Hobson’sThe Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of ThinkingShaun Gallagher (bio)Hobson's book (2002) is extremely accessible, interestingly interdisciplinary, and knowledgeable in all the right ways. He pulls together work in psychiatry, experimental psychology, and psychoanalysis in a framework that is relevant to issues in the philosophy of mind. We are told much of this in the preface, and (...) it is true. I think it is an excellent book for students and for theorists who have an interest in, but who are not working in the specific areas of, cognitive development. I recommend it highly for those audiences. For those who are already working in these areas, and for those who are already familiar with Hobson's work, there are no surprises. As someone who has learned a good deal from Hobson and who is in substantial agreement with many of his conclusions, I read the first six chapters of the book looking for something new and exciting, but did not find it. The reader will nonetheless find clear and careful discussions of contributions from evolutionary theory, developmental psychology, and psychopathology to our understanding of the mind.Hobson does tackle the difficult question of why we should include psychoanalysis as part of the investigation. He views psychoanalysis as a kind of experimental procedure. Like the experimentalist, the psychoanalyst "sets up an unusual situation that allows him to observe things that would otherwise remain hidden" (p. 19). What the psychoanalyst looks for in these arrangements are patterns of relationship that shape all of the patient's behavior and thought, relations with others and with herself. The analyst has to engage in something like a second-person phenomenology, examining not only the subjective [End Page 253] patterns of the patient, but also the effects (specifically the emotional effects) those patterns have on the analyst himself. The outcome of analysis, for purposes of the research project that Hobson is engaged in, is twofold. First, the psychoanalytic procedure reaches certain dimensions of thought and social relationships that seem unavailable to experimental approaches. "We find that the mind works in ways that are more complex than common sense or even experimental psychology would suggest. In particular, there are ways of thinking and relating to people that appear to be more primitive and less rational than we might suppose" (pp. 21-2). Second, psychoanalysis shows that what happens within an individual's mind is essentially related to what happens in her social relationships. The latter point, as Hobson notes, is a central theme of his book.This is all well and good, the experimental psychologist might say, but it seems overly subjective. After all, if the data include the emotional effects that a patient might have on the investigator, how precisely can we make that scientifically objective? I think that the right answer to that question is embodied in Hobson's approach, and perhaps in who Hobson is. Hobson is himself an experimental psychologist, as well as a practicing psychoanalyst and psychiatrist. He balances the claims that he bases on psychoanalysis with results from studies (including many of his own studies) in experimental psychology and psychiatry. To put it precisely, the task is not to turn the subjective or intersubjective data from psychoanalysis into objective data, but to explore subjectivity (which is certainly part of what we want to explain) by means of a method that gets at things from a different perspective, but that is also consistent with and balanced by the more objective results of experimental science. My own doubts about psychoanalysis are somewhat mitigated by the balance that Hobson maintains throughout this book.Chapters 2 through 6 summarize a large number of studies that ultimately make the case for the importance of intersubjectivity in the development of mental abilities. Chapter 2 explores the necessary prerequisites for the emergence of thought in infancy. Evidence found in experiments on and observations of the interaction between infants and caregivers, early imitation, and emotional relatedness supports the picture of a mix of innate and acquired aspects that move the child toward thought. Significant emphasis is devoted to the role of perception and... (shrink)

Philosophers of mind have long been interested in the relation between two ideas: that causality plays an essential role in our understanding of the mental; and that we can gain an understanding of belief and desire by considering the ascription of attitudes to people on the basis of what they say and do. Many have thought that those ideas are incompatible. William Child argues that there is in fact no tension between them, and that we should accept both. He (...) shows how we can have a causal understanding of the mental without having to see attitudes and experiences as internal, causally interacting entities and he defends this view against influential objections. The book offers detailed discussions of many of Donald Davidson's contributions to the philosophy of mind, and also considers the work of Dennett, Anscombe, McDowell, and Rorty, among others. Issues discussed include: the nature of intentional phenomena; causal explanation; the character of visual experience; psychological explanation; and the causal relevance of mental properties. (shrink)

Life and works -- The Tractatus, language and logic -- The Tractatus, reality and the limits of language -- From the Tractatus to philosophical investigations -- Intentionality and rule-following -- Mind and psychology -- Knowledge and certainty -- Religion and anthropology -- Legacy and influence.

Profit is a concept that both causes and manifests deep conflict and division. It is not merely that people disagree over whether it is good or bad. The very meaning of the concept and its role in competing theories necessitates the deepest possible disagreement; people cannot agree on what profit is. Still, simply learning the starkly different sentiments expressed about profit gives us some feel for the depth of the conflict. Friends of capitalism have praised profit as central to the (...) achievement of prosperity and to civilized modern life. Calvin Coolidge, that silent sentinel of American business, said, “Profit and civilization go hand in hand.” F. A. Hayek tells us that in the evolution of the structure of human activities, profitability works as a signal that guides selection towards what makes man more fruitful; only what is more profitable will, as a rule, nourish more people, for it sacrifices less than it adds. (shrink)

At present, Third World countries owe over one trillion dollars to the developed Western nations; much of the debt is held by the leading international commercial banks. The debt of six Latin American countries alone — Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela — is over $330 billion, of which $240 billion is owed to commercial banks. Let us immediately narrow our focus to loans made by the major international commercial banks to Third World governments. We shall not be concerned (...) with government-to-government loans, or private-party-to-private-party loans, or with debt owed to the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. The bank-to-government loans — the so-called “sovereign loans” — are the most economically troublesome and morally interesting. The largest lenders, at least with respect to the Latin American countries, are the American banks Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Bank of America, Manufacturers Hanover, and Chemical Bank. About fifteen Third World countries have serious debt problems, including the largest: Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. (shrink)

Objective: Symptom improvement is often examined as an indicator of a good outcome of accessing mental health services. However, there is little evidence of whether symptom improvement is associated with other indicators of a good outcome, such as a mutual agreement to end treatment. The aim of this study was to examine whether young people accessing mental health services who meaningfully improved were more likely to mutually agree to end treatment.Methods: Multilevel multinomial regression analysis controlling for age, gender, ethnicity, and (...) referral source was conducted on N = 8,995 episodes of care [Female = 5,469, 61%; meanAge = 13.66 years] using anonymised administrative data from young people's mental health services.Results: Compared to young people with no change in mental health difficulties, those showing positive meaningful changes in mental health difficulties were less likely to have case closure due to non-mutual agreement. Similarly, they were less likely to transfer or end treatment for other reasons than by case closure due to mutual agreement.Conclusion: The findings suggest that young people accessing mental health services whose symptoms meaningfully improve are more likely to mutually agree to end treatment, adding to the evidence that symptom improvement may be appropriate to examine as an indicator of a good outcome of accessing mental health services. (shrink)

What is the relation between meaning and use? This chapter first defends a non-reductionist understanding of Wittgenstein’s suggestion that ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’; facts about meaning cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, facts about use, characterized non-semantically. Nonetheless, it is contended, facts about meaning do supervene on non-semantic facts about use. That supervenience thesis is suggested by comments of Wittgenstein’s and is consistent with his view of meaning and rule-following. Semantic (...) supervenience is then defended against two criticisms: first, John McDowell’s suggestion that the supervenience thesis falsifies the epistemology of meaning and fails to accommodate common-sense truths about meaning; second, a series of counter-examples proposed by Stephen Kearns and Ofra Magidor, who argue that worlds may differ semantically without differing non-semantically. It is argued that neither criticism is convincing: we should accept the thesis that semantic facts supervene on non-semantic facts. (shrink)