We aimed to conduct a scoping review to assess the profile of retracted health sciences articles authored by individuals affiliated with academic institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). We systematically searched seven databases (PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, Embase, Medline/Ovid, Scielo, and LILACS). We included articles published in peer‐reviewed journals between 2003 and 2022 that had at least one author with an institutional affiliation in LAC. Data were collected on the year of publication, study design, authors' countries of (...) origin, number of authors, subject matter of the manuscript, scientific journals of publication, retraction characteristics, and reasons for retraction. We included 147 articles, the majority being observational studies (41.5%). The LAC countries with the highest number of retractions were Brazil (n = 69), Colombia (n = 16), and Mexico (n = 15). The areas of study with the highest number of retractions were infectology (n = 21) and basic sciences (n = 15). A retraction label was applied to 89.1% of the articles, 70.7% were retracted by journal editors, and 89.1% followed international retraction guidelines. The primary reasons for retraction included errors in procedures or data collection (n = 39), inconsistency in results or conclusions (n = 37), plagiarism (n = 21), and suspected scientific fraud (n = 19). In conclusion, most retractions of scientific publications in health sciences in LAC adhered to international guidelines and were linked to methodological issues in execution and scientific misconduct. Efforts should be directed toward ensuring the integrity of scientific research in the field of health. (shrink)

Resumen: Mediante un ejercicio hermenéutico se sostiene que la identidad personal supera la aporía del tiempo al construirse como relato de ficción. Primero, se plantea que el relato de ficción se inscribe en el círculo de la mimesis; segundo, que la imaginación es la facultad que crea el sentido de la identidad personal como relato de ficción; tercero, que es la imaginación la que establece la relación entre relato de ficción, innovación semántica e identidad personal; y cuarto, que la identidad (...) personal se crea a sí misma por medio de la generación sentido gracias al relato de ficción. Abstract: Through a hermeneutical approach, this paper states that personal identity overcomes the aporetic of time when built as a fictional narrative. First, it proposes that the fictional narrative is inscribed in the mimesis circle. Secondly, that imagination is the faculty that creates the meaning of personal identity as fictional narrative. Thirdly, that it is the imagination that establishes the relation among fictional narrative, semantic innovation, and personal identity. Fourthly, that personal identity as fictional narrative stresses the importance of the narrative, which creates itself as a generator of meanings. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo determine the factors associated with quality of life and depressive symptoms in Peruvian university students during the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsMulticentre study in 1,634 students recruited by convenience sampling. The quality of life was assessed with the European Quality of Life-5 Dimensions at three levels and depressive symptoms with the Patient Health Questionnaire-9. To assess factors associated with QoL and depressive symptoms, linear regressions and fitted regressions were used, with robust coefficients of variance information.ResultsA 345 reported problems in performing daily activities, (...) 544 reported pain and discomfort, 772 were moderately/very anxious or depressed. Furthermore, 207 had moderate-severe and severe depressive symptoms. Men reported better QoL than women and fewer depressive symptoms. Ayacucho’s residents had more depressive symptoms than Ancash’s residents and Piura’s residents had fewer depressive symptoms than Ancash’s residents. Students who left home during quarantine reported more depressive symptoms.ConclusionProblems performing daily activities, pain and discomfort, as well as mild to severe depressive symptoms were found in more than three-quarters of the sample. Authorities could consider depression care to improve quality of life in regions where high rates of infection occurred during the pandemic. (shrink)

El libro aborda las tensiones epistemológicas de la doble racionalidad a la que se ven enfrentados los estudiantes mapuches. Quienes, por un lado, construyen el conocimiento mediante el kimeltuwün, que de acuerdo a los kimches es un proceso de aprendizaje enseñanza que se configura entre una o más personas y que cuenta con cinco principios educativos clave: kümeyawael, yamüwael, küme che geael y kim che geael. Estos principios están orientados desde la naturaleza, el medio social y espiritual. Por otro lado, (...) los estudiantes, de origen mapuche, se ven enfrentados a una educación occidental de corte eurocéntrica, con un enfoque monocultural, que comprende a la educación como un proceso de enseñanza y aprendizaje, cuyo foco central es la reproducción de información. En este contexto se tensiona el aprendizaje, puesto que, la educación de la escuela no considera los saberes mapuches para la construcción de conocimiento, sin embargo la educación mapuche asume para si la educación occidental, logrando dos comprensiones: la escolar y la mapuche. (shrink)

El artículo tiene como objetivo examinar la noción de psicoafectividad en Manuel Zapata Olivella e interpretarla desde la perspectiva del concepto contraconducta de Michel Foucault. Se señalan los puntos de encuentro entre los dos pensadores, inicialmente, y se analiza después la particularidad filosófica del concepto zapatiano, resaltando su validez como recurso hermenéutico al abordar la cuestión de la resistencia cultural de los afroamericanos bajo el sistema esclavista colonial.

RESUMO O objetivo deste trabalho é indicar como a exploração estilística de Margaret Cavendish responde às particularidades do conceito de natureza dela, por exemplo, a tese de que a natureza é uma matéria viva, infinita, mutável e heterogênea. Primeiramente, mostrarei o modo pelo qual a autora está presente em seus escritos, como ela escreve de uma perspectiva de primeira pessoa sobre sua própria experiência e de quem ela é. Resumirei brevemente sua biografia e o contexto no qual ela praticou filosofia. (...) Dado que suas escolhas de estilo são bastante numerosas, apresentarei somente algumas poucas, entre as peculiaridades estilísticas dela. Em segundo lugar, desenvolverei uma visão geral do seu conceito de natureza, ao contrário do proposto pelas teorias mecanicistas de seu tempo. Esclarecerei que tal conceito é expresso adequadamente pela diversidade estilística à qual Cavendish se volta em suas investigações. ABSTRACT This paper aims at indicating how Margaret Cavendish's stylistic exploration answer to the particularities of her concept of nature, i.e. the thesis that nature is live, infinite, changing and heterogeneous matter. I will first show the way in which the author is present in her writings, as she writes from a first person perspective about her own experience and from who she is. I will briefly summarise her biography and the context in which she practiced philosophy. Given that her stylistic choices are quite numerous, I will only present a few of her stylistic particularities. Secondly, I will develop the general outline of her concept of nature, as opposed to the one proposed by the mechanistic theories of her time. I will make it clear that said concept is adequately expressed in the stylistic diversity to which Cavendish turns in her investigations. (shrink)

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)

This article explores the social representation of Information Technology and Network Society from Barthes' semiology, using his ideas about myth creation and the connotation of ideological discourses through naturalization. Supplemented with some concepts from Peirce and Santaella, we try to identify and understand these mystification mechanisms and how they affect the creation of an information order; in this case, a digital order. We conclude that we are before an evangelizing discursive alignment based on mythical elements arisen from our aversion to (...) uncertainty, the energy-saving principle, and an engineering discourse guided by the urgency of profit and power. We highlight the presence of a reckless narrative that permanently repeats the urgent need for information technology and digitalization without considering side effects or costs. (shrink)

This article explores the central themes in Mohsin Hamid’s Exit West (2017) by focusing on the complexities of finding oneself placeless and seeking refuge in an unwelcoming global world with porous borders. It examines different aspects of the experience of time, such as transience and waiting, by drawing on postcolonial and refugee studies and theoretical approaches to vulnerability, time, and being. Set in an unnamed city in an unnamed country on the verge of war, Hamid portrays the shattering of everyday (...) life in the city by following the lives of Saeed and Nadia, their growing love relationship, and the impact of their subsequent escape through “magic doors” to several places of refuge on their relationship and understanding of the world. Their story is interspersed with vignettes on several secondary characters who also become refugees by being transposed through magic doors to new locations. By using magic doors and by accelerating, compressing and conflating events and times—the effect of which universalizes the theme of transience and proximity of death—Exit West exposes us to the global history of suffering and invites us to bear witness to the suffering of others and to become aware of our own finitude and the obligations our common vulnerability places on us. (shrink)

I ask you to X. You now have a reason to X. My request gave you a reason. How? One unpopular theory is the epistemic account, according to which requests do not create any new reasons but instead simply reveal information. For instance, my request that you X reveals that I desire that you X, and my desire gives you a reason to X. Peter Schaber has recently attacked both the epistemic account and other theories of the reason-giving force of (...) requests. Schaber defends a new theory of the reason-giving force of requests according to which request give reasons because it is valuable for requesters and requestees that requests have this power. In this paper I argue that Schaber's attack on the epistemic account fails, and that his own theory ought to be rejected because it faces compelling objections. (shrink)

“X-Firsters” hold that there is some normative feature that is fundamental to all others (and, often, that there’s some normative feature that is the “mark of the normative”: all other normative properties have it, and are normative in virtue of having it). This view is taken as a starting point in the debate about which X is “on first.” Little has been said about whether or why we should be X-Firsters, or what we should think about normativity if we aren’t (...) X-Firsters. Hence the chapter’s two main goals. First, to provide a simple argument that one shouldn’t be an X-Firster about the normative domain, which starts with the observation that analogous views have dubious merits in analogous domains. Second, to offer an alternative view—taking normativity to be a determinable explained in terms of its determinates—that offers an interesting way to think about the structure and unity of normativity. (shrink)

Plato's dialogues frequently criticize traditional Greek myth, yet Plato also integrates myth with his writing. Daniel S. Werner confronts this paradox through an in-depth analysis of the Phaedrus, Plato's most mythical dialogue. Werner argues that the myths of the Phaedrus serve several complex functions: they bring nonphilosophers into the philosophical life; they offer a starting point for philosophical inquiry; they unify the dialogue as a literary and dramatic whole; they draw attention to the limits of language and the limits (...) of knowledge; and they allow Plato to co-opt cultural authority as a way of defining and legitimating the practice of philosophy. Platonic myth, as a species of traditional tale, is thus both distinct from philosophical dialectic and similar to it. Ultimately, the most powerful effect of Platonic myth is the way in which it leads readers to participate in Plato's dialogues and to engage in a process of self-examination. (shrink)

Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that (...) has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed. (shrink)

Resumen: Propongo una crítica a la noción de serialidad en la comprensión del concepto de tiempo en el contexto de los estudios cartesianos. En el debate entre los defensores del tiempo continuo y quienes defienden un tiempo discreto, sostengo que ninguna de estas posiciones tiene en cuenta que la serialidad se enmarca en una noción de tiempo que se concibe como divisible y numerable y que no pertenece intrínsecamente a la naturaleza de la experiencia temporal del cogito. Mi propuesta consiste (...) en comenzar a desarrollar la caracterización de dicho tiempo experiencial y cogitativo.: My aim is to criticize the notion of seriality embedded in the understanding of time within the framework of Cartesian studies. I hold that neither those who defend that time is continuous nor those who think that it is discrete take into account the fact that seriality is rooted in a conception of time conceived as divisible and numerable that does not belong intrinsically to the nature of the experience of time of the cogito. I propose to advance towards a characterization of such experiential and cogitative time. (shrink)

Motion—and, in particular, local motion or change in location—plays a central role in Kenelm Digby’s natural philosophy and in his arguments for the immateriality of the soul. Despite this, Digby’s account of what motion consists in has yet to receive much scholarly attention. In this paper, I advance a novel interpretation of Digby on motion. According to it, Digby holds that for a body to move is for it to divide from and unify with other bodies. This is a view (...) of motion—as change in relations of parthood—that Alison Peterman attributes to Digby’s contemporary and acquaintance, Margaret Cavendish. Having shown that Digby’s presentation of the view predates Cavendish’s by more than a decade, I make a case that Digby’s work influenced Cavendish’s on this topic. In developing and defending my reading, I consider to what extent the Digbean account of motion and the arguments for it accord with the ideals of the mechanical philosophy emerging in the early modern period. (shrink)

Abstract This paper offers an appraisal of Phillip Pettit's approach to the problem how a merely finite set of examples can serve to represent a determinate rule, given that indefinitely many rules can be extrapolated from any such set. I argue that Pettit's so-called ethnocentric theory of rule-following fails to deliver the solution to this problem he sets out to provide. More constructively, I consider what further provisions are needed in order to advance Pettit's general approach to the problem. I (...) conclude that what is needed is an account that, whilst it affirms the view that agents' responses are constitutively involved in the exemplification of rules, does not allow such responses the pride of place they have in Pettit's theory. (shrink)

This book is a study of the role of intellect in human action as described by Thomas Aquinas. One of its primary aims is to compare the interpretation of Aristotle by Aquinas with the lines of interpretation offered in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. The book seeks to clarify the problems involved in the appropriation of Aristotle's theory by a Christian theologian, including such topics as the practical syllogism and the problems of akrasia. Westberg argues that Aquinas was much closer to Aristotle (...) than is often recognized, and he puts forward important new interpretations of the relation of intellect and will in the stages of intention, deliberation, decision, and execution. In the concluding section of the book, he shows how this new interpretation yields fruitful insights on a range of theological topics, including sin, law, love, and the moral virtues. (shrink)

The problem known as Buridan’s Ass says that a hungry donkey equipoised between two identical bales of hay will starve to death. Indecision kills the ass. Some philosophers worry about human analogs. Computer scientists since the 1960s have known about the computer versions of such cases. From what Leslie Lamport calls ‘Buridan’s Principle’—a discrete decision based on a continuous range of input-values cannot be made in a bounded time—it follows that the possibilities for human analogs of Buridan’s Ass are far (...) more wide-ranging and securely provable than has been acknowledged in philosophy. We are never necessarily decisive. This is mathematically provable. I explore four consequences: first, increased interest of the literature’s solutions to Buridan’s Ass; second, a new asymmetry between responsibility for omissions and responsibility for actions; third, clarification of the standard account of akrasia; and, fourth, clarification of the role of credences in normative decision-theory. (shrink)

This paper aims to understand Hegel’s claim in the introduction to his Philosophy of Mind that mind is an actualization of the Idea and argues that this claim provides us with a novel and defensible way of understanding Hegel’s naturalism. I suggest that Hegel’s approach to naturalism should be understood as ‘formal’, and argue that Hegel’s Logic, particularly the section on the ‘Idea’, provides us with a method for this approach. In the first part of the paper, I present an (...) interpretation of Hegel’s method in which life plays a central role. In the second part of the paper, I develop Hegel’s method by providing a reading of Hegel’s Subjective Spirit, focusing on the sections ‘Anthropology’ and ‘Phenomenology’ in particular, arguing that they display the dialectic between life and cognition outlined by Hegel’s Idea. (shrink)

This paper aims to understand Hegel’s claim in the introduction to his Philosophy of Mind that mind is an actualization of the Idea and argues that this claim provides us with a novel and defensible way of understanding Hegel’s naturalism. I suggest that Hegel’s approach to naturalism should be understood as ‘formal’, and argue that Hegel’s Logic, particularly the section on the ‘Idea’, provides us with a method for this approach. In the first part of the paper, I present an (...) interpretation of Hegel’s method in which life plays a central role. In the second part of the paper, I develop Hegel’s method by providing a reading of Hegel’s Subjective Spirit, focusing on the sections ‘Anthropology’ and ‘Phenomenology’ in particular, arguing that they display the dialectic between life and cognition outlined by Hegel’s Idea. (shrink)

This essay considers the critical response to Hegel's view of Socrates we find in Kierkegaard's dissertation, The Concept of Irony. I argue that this dispute turns on the question whether or not the examination of particular thinkers enters into Socrates’ most basic aims and interests. I go on to show how Kierkegaard's account, which relies on an affirmative answer to this question, enables him to provide a cogent defence of Socrates' philosophical practice against Hegel's criticisms.

Can a liberal state exclude illiberal immigrants in order to preserve its liberal status? Hrishikesh Joshi has argued that liberalism cannot require a commitment to open borders because this would entail that liberalism is committed to its own demise in circumstances in which many illiberal immigrants aim to immigrate into a liberal society. I argue that liberalism is committed to its own demise in certain circumstances, but that this is not as bad as it may appear. Liberalism’s commitment to its (...) own demise is merely a reflection of the fact that it must take into account the rights of outsiders, not just the rights of existing citizens, and of the fact that circumstances of injustice can sometimes leave liberal societies with no correct choice. (shrink)

Mandatory minimum sentencing provisions have been a feature of the U.S. justice system since 1790. But they have expanded considerably under the war on drugs, and their use has expanded considerably under the Trump Administration; some states are also poised to expand drug-related mandatory minimums further in efforts to fight the current opioid epidemic. In this paper I outline and evaluate three prominent arguments for and against the use of mandatory minimums in the war on drugs—they appeal, respectively, to proportionality, (...) consistency, and efficiency. I ultimately defend the view that the use of mandatory minimums in the war on drugs is unjust. -/- . (shrink)

Abstract: According to a rationalist theory of introspection, rational agents have a capacity to believe they are in conscious states when they are in them, much as they have the capacity, for example, to avoid obvious contradictions in their beliefs. For the agent to know or believe by introspection, on this view, is for them to exercise that capacity. According to an acquaintance theory of introspection, by contrast, whenever an agent is in a conscious state, the agent is aware of (...) or is acquainted with being in the state, where the background notion of acquaintance is understood to be distinct from sense perception, on the one hand, and belief or knowledge, or the other. For the agent to know or believe by introspection, on this view, is for them to take advantage of the epistemic position they occupy in virtue of being acquainted in this way. These theories are not in conflict; it is possible to hold both an acquaintance theory and a rationalist theory. This paper, however, sets out and recommends a different possibility, namely, that of holding a rationalist theory while rejecting any acquaintance theory. (shrink)

According to Chandra Mohanty, there is no apolitical academy; academic and scholarly practices are in themselves political, insofar as they are inscribed in power and validation relations, which answer to and have effects upon the patriarchal, colonial, and capitalist structures to which they belong. In the case of philosophical writing, this means that the forms that regulate writing, that is, what determines how one must write in different contexts, are expressive of the power structures within philosophical academia. These power structures (...) are upheld through time because of, among many other factors, the rendering invisible of the diversity of places of enunciation belonging to those who write and think in philosophy, and of the universalization of the privileges associated with said places of enunciation. In this article, I propose a way of writing letters that appeals to grammatical persons and their relation to the authors of the texts. Through this writing practice it is possible to make explicit the places of enunciation from which we write philosophy. This enables, first, making visible the privileges and oppressions of those writing philosophy; and second, generating small spaces of resistance and transformation of the oppressive power relations within the philosophical academy. (shrink)

Functional decomposition is an important goal in the life sciences, and is central to mechanistic explanation and explanatory reduction. A growing literature in philosophy of science, however, has challenged decomposition-based notions of explanation. ‘Holists’ posit that complex systems exhibit context-sensitivity, dynamic interaction, and network dependence, and that these properties undermine decomposition. They then infer from the failure of decomposition to the failure of mechanistic explanation and reduction. I argue that complexity, so construed, is only incompatible with one notion of decomposition, (...) which I call ‘atomism’, and not with decomposition writ large. Atomism posits that function ascriptions must be made to parts with minimal reference to the surrounding system. Complexity does indeed falsify atomism, but I contend that there is a weaker, ‘contextualist’ notion of decomposition that is fully compatible with the properties that holists cite. Contextualism suggests that the function of parts can shift with external context, and that interactions with other parts might help determine their context-appropriate functions. This still admits of functional decomposition within a given context. I will give examples based on the notion of oscillatory multiplexing in systems neuroscience. If contextualism is feasible, then holist inferences are faulty—one cannot infer from the presence of complexity to the failure of decomposition, mechanism, and reductionism. (shrink)

A completely Lorentz-invariant Bohmian model has been proposed recently for the case of a system of non-interacting spinless particles, obeying Klein-Gordon equations. It is based on a multi-temporal formalism and on the idea of treating the squared norm of the wave function as a space-time probability density. The particle’s configurations evolve in space-time in terms of a parameter σ with dimensions of time. In this work this model is further analyzed and extended to the case of an interaction with an (...) external electromagnetic field. The physical meaning of σ is explored. Two special situations are studied in depth: (1) the classical limit, where the Einsteinian Mechanics of Special Relativity is recovered and the parameter σ is shown to tend to the particle’s proper time; and (2) the non-relativistic limit, where it is obtained a model very similar to the usual non-relativistic Bohmian Mechanics but with the time of the frame of reference replaced by σ as the dynamical temporal parameter. (shrink)

Lovejoy (1873-1962) was America's foremost historian of ideas, a major participant in the philosophical debates of the twentieth century, and a prominent advocate of academic freedom. The product of an emotionally unsettled childhood and an evangelical father, Lovejoy reacted against his father by postulating the certainty of self-sufficient reason. He believed that only the principles of reason could order the world and so make our universe intelligible. Originally published in 1980. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions (...) use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value. (shrink)

The _Physics_ is a foundational work of western philosophy, and the crucial one for understanding Aristotle's views on matter, form, essence, causation, movement, space, and time. This richly annotated, scrupulously accurate, and consistent translation makes it available to a contemporary English reader as no other does—in part because it fits together seamlessly with other closely associated works in the New Hackett Aristotle series, such as the _Metaphysics_, _De Anima_, and forthcoming _De Caelo_ and _On Coming to Be and Passing Away_. (...) Eventually the series will include all of Aristotle's works. Sequentially numbered endnotes provide the information most needed at each juncture, while a detailed Index of Terms indicates places where focused discussion of key notions occurs. An illuminating general Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what sort of work it is and what sorts of evidence it relies on. (shrink)

According to ethical objectivism, what a person should do depends on the facts, as opposed to their perspective on the facts. A long-standing challenge to this view is that it fails to accommodate the role that norms play in guiding a person’s action. Roughly, if the facts that determine what a person should do lie beyond their ken, they cannot inform a person’s deliberations. This paper explores two recent developments of this line of thought. Both focus on the epistemic counterpart (...) to ethical objectivism, according to which what a person should believe depends on the facts, as opposed to their perspective on the facts. The suggestion in each case is that epistemic objectivism faces a distinctive problem in accommodating guidance. Insofar as objectivism concerning the epistemic domain stands or falls with objectivism concerning the ethical domain, this is a problem for objectivism more generally. In this paper, I show that those arguments are not successful. The upshot is that the objectivist – whether ethical or epistemic – need not reject the idea that norms serve a guiding function. (shrink)

Despite myriad controversies about reasons, two theses are frequently taken for granted: (i) reasons are sources of normative support for actions, attitudes, etc; and (ii) reasons, at least in simple, paradigmatic cases, consist in atomic facts. Call this conjunction “the atomic view.” Against this, we advocate what we call “the cluster view,” on which even in the simplest cases, the normative support for an action or attitude is typically provided by a whole cluster of facts. Moreover, many of these facts (...) are on an explanatory par—they each play the same kind of role in explaining why there is normative support for the action or attitude in question. We show that presupposition of the atomic view generates unnecessary (psuedo-)puzzles⁠—about topics such as rationality, moral worth, and doxastic justification⁠—that can be largely (dis)solved with the cluster view in place. The cluster view’s ability to do this constitutes an argument in its favor, beyond intuitive considerations that we also adduce. (shrink)

En este texto exploraré la idea de que la práctica de la danza puede ser un método de investigación en filosofía. Propongo que no solo es posible hacer filosofía en movimiento, sino que además esta aproximación cinética al pensamiento permite poner en cuestión y transformar sesgos y paradigmas patriarcales y coloniales que han predominado en la historia de la filosofía. La danza nos permite experimentar nuestros cuerpos a través de, en y por el movimiento, en lugar de meramente hablar y (...) referirnos al cuerpo como un objeto (como cualquier otro objeto) y de conceptualizar sus propiedades generales. Mi tesis es que un cuerpo que piensa es un cuerpo en movimiento, de manera que, si queremos filosofar como una forma de rechazar los dualismos y privilegios arbitrarios, la danza es una forma interesante de hacerlo. Analizaré el concepto de lo viviente de Gilbert Simondon, a partir de una difracción basada en la experiencia de participar en un taller de danza de Marie Bardet, para mostrar que cuando la temporalidad y la topología de lo viviente se aclaran en la experiencia, es posible constatar las potencias de pensamiento de los cuerpos múltiples, ya no está en cuestión un cuerpo abstracto, sino un cuerpo vivido, feminizado, marcado por historias singulares. (shrink)

El pasaje de la _Física _ (218b21-219a) ha llevado a postular un concepto de tiempo deter minado por las condiciones perceptivas de la psyche. Se muestra cómo las condiciones de percepción son un punto de partida en la investigación: lo que es primero y más cercano a los sentidos y más conocido para los seres humanos. El punto de llegada es la conexión necesaria entre la existencia del tiempo y la del cambio. La percep ción del cambio de los durmientes (...) de Cerdeña permite determinar los elementos que componen la experiencia del tiempo y proceder a determinar aquellos que compo nen la existencia de este. (shrink)

Lozano-Vásquez, Andrea y Meléndez, Germán, comps. Convertir la vida en arte: una introducción histórica a la filosofía como forma de vida. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2016. 389 pp.

Having in mind the concept of poiesis, as Paul Valéry uses it, time and movement are presented as concepts produced within the project of understanding the natural world. From the idea of philosophy as a way of constructing through concepts the intelligibility of phenomena, I will show the coherence between the construction of the concept of time and that of the concept of movement.

El pasaje de la Física ha llevado a postular un concepto de tiempo determinado por las condiciones perceptivas de la psyche. Se muestra cómo las condiciones de percepción son un punto de partida en la investigación: lo que es primero y más cercano a los sentidos y más conocido para los seres humanos. El punto de llegada es la conexión necesaria entre la existencia del tiempo y la del cambio. La percepción del cambio de los durmientes de Cerdeña permite determinar (...) los elementos que componen la experiencia del tiempo y proceder a determinar aquellos que componen la existencia de este. Passage 218b21-219a of Aristotle's Physics has led to the formulation of a concept of time that is determined by the perceptual conditions of the psyche. The paper shows that the conditions for perception, that which is prior, closer to the senses, and better known by human beings, are just the starting point for the investigation. The point of arrival is the necessary connection between the existence of time and change. The perception of change in the case of the sleeping Sardinian heroes makes it possible to determine those elements involved in the experience of time and, subsequently, those that make up the existence of the same. (shrink)

The general idea that we have of artificial intelligence (AI) consists of the belief that machines will be able to develop conscious thoughts such as those possessed by human beings, and, as computing advances, such thinking will also advance until intelligence to surpass the human being, with which the advancement of AI represents ethical risks in the future. In reality, such a belief hides a cognitive assumption, which assumes that computational engineering explains human intelligence through the mind-computer metaphor. According to (...) this assumption, technology explains cognition, and philosophy, through ethics, reflects on the impact of said technology. However, in this article, I contradict such an assumption and defend that the philosophy in AI is not reduced to the ethics that is present after the use and impact of AI in the world. I intend to expose that a good ethics of AI is the one that reflects on the appropriate risks facing AI, and for this, philosophy, beforehand, must make a cognitive analysis about the possibilities that computing has to create intelligent machines, namely, whether or not the mindcomputer metaphor makes sense. My thesis consists in defending that the philosophical analysis about AI must be carried out both on a cognitive level and on an ethical level, but that the philosophical priority in the cognitive analysis over the ethical priority, since the ethical risks of AI depend of the possibilities of technology, and only the cognitive approach can account for this. (shrink)

About the ontology of the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden, as presented in his treatise 'The Controversy about the Existence of the World'.

Poor ethical decision–making costs industry billions of dollars a year and damages the images of corporations. Thus, by answering the question ‘Why do individuals behave as they do when confronted with ethical issues?’ ethical theory can provide businesses with a means to create a more ethical climate and a more successful operation. This study tested the Ethical Decision–Making Model with accountability (Beu & Buckley 2001), which uses theory that suggests that ethical behavior is influenced by the individual, the issue, social (...) relationships (accountability), and the organization in which the employee is embedded (Brass, Butterfield & Skaggs 1988; Frink & Klimoski 1998). The results showed that individuals’ thought processes (cognitive moral development), personalities (locus of control, hostility and aggression, Machiavellianism), and gender influence how they respond to ethical dilemmas, as well as the salience of the moral issue (moral intensity) and the environmental context (work/school). (shrink)