The dominant image of judicial authority is emotional detachment; however, judicial work involves emotion. This presents a challenge for researchers to investigate emotions where they are disavowed. Two projects, one in Australia and another in Sweden, use multiple sociological research methods to study judicial experience, expression, and management of emotion. In both projects, observational research examines judicial officers’ display of emotion in court, while interviews investigate judicial emotional experiences. Surveys in Australia identify emotions judicial officers generally find important in their (...) work; in Sweden, shadowing allows researchers to investigate individual judicial emotion experiences and expression. Evaluating the different methods used demonstrates the limitations and effectiveness of particular research designs, the value of multiple methods and the challenges for researching emotion. (shrink)

Recent cases in the United States and Australia have catapulted surrogacy into the forefront of debates and public policy regarding new procreative technologies, even though gestating and birthing a baby for another woman does not necessarily involve artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization. Feminists have condemned commercial surrogacy because it borders on baby selling and exploits women. Similar criticism has appeared in the mass media, but these forums, as well as the medical profession, have considered noncommercial surrogacy as more acceptable (...) because of the absence of monetary exchange. Using two cases of surrogacy, this article argues that the distinction between commercial and altruistic surrogacy is socially constructed rather than based on self-evident or intrinsic differences. Both types of surrogacy involve the application of pervasive gender norms specifying that women's motivations to have children should be based on emotion, selflessness, and caring, not on self-interest, financial incentives, or pragmatism. Applying these norms renders commercial surrogacy deviant, but altruistic arrangements more acceptable. However, the article's central argument is that both types of agreement can entail exploitation, the denial of the birth mother's rights, and the severe reduction of her autonomy. (shrink)

Though the overall numbers of women judges remain small, higher proportions of women have been appointed to many lower courts in common law, and particularly in civil law, countries. This paper investigates whether the experiences of judging and judicial work differ among women and men magistrates in Australia’s lower courts. The particular focus is satisfaction with their work as judges. In so doing, it helps build up a picture of the extent of the gendered nature of the judiciary as an (...) occupation. Measures of overall job satisfaction identify few gender differences; more refined measures highlight areas of divergence between men and women magistrates, suggesting gendered experiences of judicial work which result from particular characteristics of the occupation, as presently constituted, rather than the nature of judging itself. (shrink)

Empirical legal research into courts and adjudication starts with a formal model of trial courts and the nature of adjudication. This article discusses empirical legal research on trial courts and adjudication and divides them into three dimensions of analysis, macro, meso, and micro, to frame the discussion of empirical legal studies into courts and adjudication, the various methods researchers use, and significant findings. Empirical research may be theoretical, pragmatic or policy oriented. A large body of research approaches the study of (...) courts and adjudication from an organizational perspective, looking at court structures and how they affect daily operation. Examining trial court judges' approaches to their work, including adjudication, using survey research has also been undertaken in non-English speaking jurisdictions. Each type of research design has specific strengths and advantages, as well as limitations, but each contributes to advancing knowledge about the nature, role, and reality of trial courts and adjudication. (shrink)

Despite increasing numbers of women lawyers, gender segregation within the legal profession in the United States continues. The present article examines interorganizational differences in the employment of 34 men and 34 women lawyers in 12 in-house legal departments that varied by size and industry in corporations located in the northeast United States. There were differences among the firms with respect to the number, position, and salary of men and women lawyers. The findings suggest that women in-house counsel do not enter (...) the same type of practice or organizations, obtain the same positions, or earn the same salaries as men. The differential employment patterns, the article concludes, stem largely from organizational contingencies, such as a firm's market position, perceived needs, the kinds of rewards and training offered, and recruitment strategies. It also suggests that men's and women's differential location in the labor pool results not from their own career choices but from employer's hiring and work-allocation decisions that provide them with different experiences and expertise, which in turn constrain future employment options. (shrink)

Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories lacked the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many (...) memory-based accounts is inadequate. I argue that Klein and Nichols’ characterization of R.B.’s experience is implausible; as a result, the problems that they describe for memory-based accounts of personal identity do not arise. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Moral Distress for the Physician AssistantSharyn L. KurtzMy morning rounds as an inpatient medical oncology physician assistant began as usual. I arrived at the hospital early to receive 7 a.m. sign out from the covering resident. The overnight report began favorably. All patients remained stable. Even my patient, whom I will call Mrs. Walker,* had a quiet night. However, given her tenuous admission presentation, including altered mental status, hypercalcemia (...) (high levels of calcium in the blood), atrial fibrillation with rapid ventricular response (irregular, rapid heart function), widespread metastatic lung cancer, and recent neurosurgery to stabilize her spine, I decided to prioritize Mrs. Walker’s morning evaluation.Examining her medical chart proved reassuring. Her tachycardia (rapid heart rate) had been better controlled over the past two days. Her hypercalcemia had been treated, such that she was no longer somnolent. In fact, she was now arousable, conversant, and able to offer some input regarding her healthcare wishes. However, because she was experiencing intermittent delirium, her husband continued to act as her primary medical decision–maker.As her health care proxy, Mr. Walker had experienced conflict with the medical team during his wife’s prior hospital admission. However, even though Mr. Walker lived greater than 45 minutes from the hospital and was not able to visit regularly, he and I spoke daily by phone, which allowed me the opportunity to offer regular medical updates. Mr. Walker felt overwhelmed with his wife’s condition, but he was comfortable with the care the medical team had provided thus far. He was encouraged by the small improvements we had noted since her hospital admission five days prior.Mr. Walker stated on hospital admission that he wished for DNR/I orders to be placed, since this cohered with his wife’s previously stated wishes. However, he still wanted “everything else done” in terms of treating his wife’s medical conditions, including treatment of her atrial fibrillation, pain, and electrolyte anomalies. Most of all, he hoped Mrs. Walker would soon have increased mobility, which he felt would grant his wife the best quality of life possible. He was adamant that “being active” was what Mrs. Walker wished for, and that she had never wanted to be confined to bed.Mr. Walker’s requests seemed reasonable. Although Mrs. Walker’s lung cancer was widespread, and although many on the medical team felt she would not improve to the point where palliative chemotherapy could be considered, [End Page E13] she had stabilized. Her recent spine surgery had been successful, and she was healing adequately. The neurosurgeons had cleared Mrs. Walker for increased activity out of bed as soon as she could be fitted with a lumbar brace. The pain and palliative care specialists felt that Mrs. Walker’s residual back pain and delirium could be well managed with oral medications.Prior to my entering Mrs. Walker’s room to begin her physical evaluation, I was met by her seasoned nurse, whom I will call Amy. “Sharyn,” Amy warned, “Mrs. Walker’s heart rate is 150 and she is complaining of chest pain.” I entered Mrs. Walker’s room, and she was notably uncomfortable, grasping her chest. The monitor showed that Mrs. Walker’s heart rate was in fact in the 150’s. She was pale, short of breath, and wheezing. “Mrs. Walker,” I asked, “how severe is your chest pain on a scale from 1 to 10?” Mrs. Walker replied, “Nine.” I asked Amy to obtain an EKG, to provide oxygen, and to administer an IV medication that would slow Mrs. Walker’s heart rate. I stepped out of the room to place the computer orders, and I paged my attending physician to let him know about Mrs. Walker’s change in status. After hearing the update, my attending physician, whom I will call Dr. Clark, stated that he agreed with all of my treatment decisions thus far. He was on his way into the hospital. I planned out my next steps with him on the phone and returned to the patient’s room.The monitor gave evidence that Mrs. Walker’s heart rate was improving. Mrs. Walker reported that her pain was now “4 out of... (shrink)

This study explores possible links between educational background and ethics among marketing professionals. Data from two surveys of members of the American Marketing Association suggest that marketing professionals with master's degrees and higher are similar to their less educated counterparts in both their ethical standards and their intended ethical behaviors. Marketers with business degrees, however, have lower ethical standards than do graduates of non-business programs, though they report behavior as ethical as that of their non-business educated peers. Business schools may (...) be producing cynics likely to accept marginal behaviors of colleagues though not likely to engage in such behaviors themselves. (shrink)

Clough shows how inadequate empirical philosophy is in creating real change in the sciences. Instead, she supports a more pragmatic approach based on the work of Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson. This work encourages Clough's fellow feminists to refocus their critiques and discard their philosophical debates about epistemology.

Molecular motor proteins, fueled by energy from ATP hydrolysis, move along actin filaments or microtubules, performing work in the cell. The kinesin microtubule motors transport vesicles or organelles, assemble bipolar spindles or depolymerize microtubules, functioning in basic cellular processes. The mechanism by which motor proteins convert energy from ATP hydrolysis into work is likely to differ in basic ways from man‐made machines. Several mechanical elements of the kinesin motors have now been tentatively identified, permitting researchers to begin to decipher the (...) mechanism of motor function. The force‐producing conformational changes of the motor and the means by which they are amplified are probably different for the plus‐ and minus‐end kinesin motors. BioEssays 25:1212–1219, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Within the New Zealand curriculum, hauora has been co-opted as an underlying and interdependent concept at the heart of the learning area of health and physical education. Hauora is identified as a Māori philosophy of well-being, advocating a Māori world view of hauora. Contemporary understandings of hauora as a Māori philosophy of health are constructed within dominant English-medium curriculum discourses. At first glance the juxtaposition of ‘hauora’ with ‘well-being’, and hauora being defined as ‘a Māori philosophy of health’ seems like (...) an opportunity to promote an indigenous perspective of health into English-medium curriculum, but the philosophical questions of what knowledge is valued, why we should teach it, and its worth of what is taught for human well-being, remain fraught. The notion of hauora is much richer than the word ‘health’ allows. I explore some issues associated with the equivalence between hauora and health, and some of the potential nuances of hauora in light of a counter-colonial Māori philosophy of holism. I invite the reader to consider the terms ‘whakapapa’ and ‘wairua’ in light of a proposed metaphysics. I show that the terms—and the objects they point to—share a relationship with each other and that recognition of that interdependence are necessary to their well-being. (shrink)

Within the New Zealand curriculum, hauora has been co-opted as an underlying and interdependent concept at the heart of the learning area of health and physical education. Hauora is identified as a Māori philosophy of well-being, advocating a Māori world view of hauora. Contemporary understandings of hauora as a Māori philosophy of health are constructed within dominant English-medium curriculum discourses. At first glance the juxtaposition of ‘hauora’ with ‘well-being’, and hauora being defined as ‘a Māori philosophy of health’ seems like (...) an opportunity to promote an indigenous perspective of health into English-medium curriculum, but the philosophical questions of what knowledge is valued, why we should teach it, and its worth of what is taught for human well-being, remain fraught. The notion of hauora is much richer than the word ‘health’ allows. I explore some issues associated with the equivalence between hauora and health, and some of the potential nuances of hauora in light of a counter-colonial Māori philosophy of holism. I invite the reader to consider the terms ‘whakapapa’ and ‘wairua’ in light of a proposed metaphysics. I show that the terms—and the objects they point to—share a relationship with each other and that recognition of that interdependence are necessary to their well-being. (shrink)

Feminist theorists have shown that knowledge is embodied in ways that make a difference in science. Intemann properly endorses feminist standpoint theory over Longino’s empiricism, insofar as the former better addresses embodiment. I argue that a pragmatist analysis further improves standpoint theory: Pragmatism avoids the radical subjectivity that otherwise leaves us unable to account for our ability to share scientific knowledge across bodies of different kinds; and it allows us to argue for the inclusion, not just of the knowledge produced (...) from marginalised bodies, but of the marginalised themselves. (shrink)

While feminist epistemologists have made important contributions to the deconstruction of the traditional representationalist model, some elements of the Cartesian legacy remain. For example, relativism continues to play a role in the underdetermination thesis used by Longino and Keller. Both argue that because scientific theories are underdetermined by evidence, theory choice must be relative to interpretive frameworks. Utilizing Davidson's philosophy of language, I offer a nonrepresentationalist alternative to suggest how relativism can be more fully avoided.

Racist beliefs express value judgments. According to an influential view, value judgments are subjective, and not amenable to rational adjudication. In contrast, we argue that the value judgments expressed in, for example, racist beliefs, are false and objectively so. Our account combines a naturalized, philosophical account of meaning inspired by Donald Davidson, with a prominent social-psychological theory of values pioneered by the social-psychologist Milton Rokeach. We use this interdisciplinary approach to show that, just as with beliefs expressing descriptive judgments, beliefs (...) expressing value judgments have empirical content, or can be inferentially linked to beliefs that do; the truth or falsity of that content can be objectively assigned; and that assignment is amenable to rational assessment. While versions of this objective view of value judgments have been defended by moral realists of various metaphysical stripes, our argument has the virtue of appealing, instead, to accounts that are as naturalistically informed as possible. And, unlike the influential subjective view of value judgments, and racist beliefs more particularly, our arguments are better able to account for instances where rational, persuasive strategies have been effective in reducing the ubiquity of racism in American culture. (shrink)

: Three major strategies exist for the protection of endangered habitat and species: (1) land acquisition programs, (2) government legislation and regulatory agencies, and (3) "stewardship" programs that are voluntary and community-based. While all of these strategies have merit, we suggest that stewardship holds particular advantages and should be considered more often as a strategy of first choice. In this article, we examine the Municipal Wetland Stewardship program of Newfoundland, a popular and successful Canadian policy for the local protection of (...) wetlands. Important issues are at stake: competing philosophical foundations for managerial ecology, the value of "local ecological knowledge," principles of community-based conservation, the question of whether stewardship empowers local communities or controls them from afar, and ethical conflicts around American colonialism, hunting, and ecotourism. The results suggest that despite some potentially problematic ironies, the Newfoundland program provides a model for a public policy aimed both at the pragmatics of biophysical sustainability and at the ideals of environmental ethics, social justice, and democratic politics. (shrink)

Fact/value holism has become commonplace in philosophy of science, especially in feminist literature. However, that facts are bearers of empirical content, while values are not, remains a firmly-held distinction. I support a more thorough-going holism: both facts and values can function as empirical claims, related in a seamless, semantic web. I address a counterexample from Kourany where facts and values seem importantly discontinuous, namely, the simultaneous support by the Nazis of scientifically sound cancer research and morally unsound political policies. I (...) conclude that even by the criteria available at the time, Nazi cancer research was empirically weak, and the weaknesses in their research are continuous with their moral failures in just the ways predicted by the holism I support. (shrink)

In assessing the appropriateness of a scientific community's research effort, Solomon considers a number of "decision vectors," divided into the empirical and non-empirical. Value judgments get sorted as non-empirical vectors. By way of contrast, I introduce Anderson's discussion of the evidential role of value judgments. Like Anderson, I argue that value judgments are empirical in the relevant sense. I argue further that Solomon's decision matrix needs to be reconceptualized: the distinction should not be between the empirical vs. non-empirical, but between (...) the relevant vs. irrelevant. Whether particular value judgments are relevant or not is an empirical question, to be decided on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

Three major strategies exist for the protection of endangered habitat and species: (1) land acquisition programs, (2) government legislation and regulatory agencies, and (3) "stewardship" programs that are voluntary and community-based. While all of these strategies have merit, we suggest that stewardship holds particular advantages and should be considered more often as a strategy of first choice. In this article, we examine the Municipal Wetland Stewardship program of Newfoundland, a popular and successful Canadian policy for the local protection of wetlands. (...) Important issues are at stake: competing philosophical foundations for managerial ecology, the value of "local ecological knowledge," principles of community-based conservation, the question of whether stewardship empowers local communities or controls them from afar, and ethical conflicts around American colonialism, hunting, and ecotourism. The results suggest that despite some potentially problematic ironies, the Newfoundland program provides a model for a public policy aimed both at the pragmatics of biophysical sustainability and at the ideals of environmental ethics, social justice, and democratic politics. (shrink)

: The relationship between facts and values—in particular, naturalism and normativity—poses an ongoing challenge for feminist science studies. Some have argued that the fact/value holism of W.V. Quine's naturalized epistemology holds promise. I argue that Quinean epistemology, while appropriately naturalized, might weaken the normative force of feminist claims. I then show that Quinean epistemic themes are unnecessary for feminist science studies. The empirical nature of our work provides us with all the naturalized normativity we need.

This chapter’s main topic revolves around Davidson’s account of radical interpretation and the concept of triangulation as a necessary feature of communication and the formation of beliefs. There are two important implications of this model of belief formation for feminists studying the effects of social location on knowledge production generally, and the production of scientific knowledge in particular. The first is Davidson’s argument that whatever there is to the meaning of any of our beliefs must be available from the radical (...) interpreter’s external, third-person perspective. The second important implication of triangulation is that Davidson’s model is a holistic one that shows that there is no substantive difference in the triangulation process by which we form beliefs concerning basic descriptive features of the world and beliefs concerning evaluative features of the world. (shrink)

Psychiatry uncomfortably spans biological and psychosocial perspectives on mental illness, an idea central to Engel's biopsychosocial paradigm. This paradigm was extremely ambitious, proposing new foundations for clinical practice as well as a non-reductive metaphysics for mental illness. Perhaps given this scope, the approach has failed to engender a clearly identifiable research programme. And yet the view remains influential. We reassess the relevance of the biopsychosocial paradigm for psychiatry, distinguishing a number of ways in which it could be (re)conceived.

Human enhancement has emerged in recent years as a blossoming topic in applied ethics. With continuing advances in science and technology, people are beginning to realize that some of the basic parameters of the human condition might be changed in the future. One important way in which the human condition could be changed is through the enhancement of basic human capacities. If this becomes feasible within the lifespan of many people alive today, then it is important now to consider the (...) normative questions raised by such prospects. The answers to these questions might not only help us be better prepared when technology catches up with imagination, but they may be relevant to many decisions we make today, such as decisions about how much funding to give to various kinds of research. Enhancement is typically contraposed to therapy. In broad terms, therapy aims to fix something that has gone wrong, by curing specific diseases or injuries, while enhancement interventions aim to improve the state of an organism beyond its normal healthy state. However, the distinction between therapy and enhancement is problematic, for several reasons. First, we may note that the therapy-enhancement dichotomy does not map onto any corresponding dichotomy between standard-contemporary-medicine and medicineas-it-could-be-practised-in-the-future. Standard contemporary medicine includes many practices that do not aim to cure diseases or injuries. It includes, for example, preventive medicine, palliative care, obstetrics, sports medicine, plastic surgery, contraceptive devices, fertility treatments, cosmetic dental procedures, and much else. At the same time, many enhancement interventions occur outside of the medical framework. Office workers enhance their performance by drinking coffee. Make-up and grooming are used to enhance appearance. Exercise, meditation, fish oil, and St John’s Wort are used to enhance mood. Second, it is unclear how to classify interventions that reduce the probability of disease and death.. (shrink)

S es un biólogo, un médico, un profesor, un gobierno, un periodista, un usuario de Twitter, Facebook, o YouTube, o una persona común y corriente. Supongamos también que P es el coronavirus SARS-CoVid-2, su origen, su potencial de infestación, patógeno y pandémico. S conoce P, es decir, que su creencia sobre P es verdadera y justificada. El objetivo de este artículo es argumentar que el reduccionismo epistemológico limita el reclamo de S, cuya superación marca los derroteros de la virología, la (...) epidemiologia, así como de la ética y la política para enfrentar la pandemia del COVID-19. (shrink)

In a recent essay — “How Can Feminist Theories of Evidence Assist Clinical Reasoning and Decision-making?” — Maya Goldenberg discusses criticisms of evidence-based medicine (or EBM) (Goldenberg 2013). She is particularly interested in those criticisms that make use of an epistemic appeal to the underdetermination of theory by evidence...

The hygiene hypothesis offers an explanation for the correlation, well-established in the industrialized nations of North and West, between increased hygiene and sanitation, and increased rates of asthma and allergies. Recent studies have added to the scope of the hypothesis, showing a link between decreased exposure to certain bacteria and parasitic worms, and increased rates of depression and intestinal auto- immune disorders, respectively. What remains less often discussed in the research on these links is that women have higher rates than (...) men of asthma and allergies, as well as many auto-immune disorders, and also depression. The current paper introduces a feminist understanding of gender socialization to the epidemiological and immunological picture. That standards of cleanliness are generally higher for girls than boys, especially under the age of five when children are more likely to be under close adult supervision, is a robust phenomenon in industrialized nations, and some research points to a cross- cultural pattern. I conclude that, insofar as the hygiene hypothesis successfully identifies standards of hygiene and sanitation as mediators of immune health, then attention to the relevant patterns of gender socialization is important. The review also makes clear that adding a feminist analysis of gender socialization to the hygiene hypothesis helps explain variation in morbidity rates not addressed by other sources and responds to a number of outstanding puzzles in current research. Alternative explanations for the sex differences in the relevant morbidity rates are also discussed (e.g., the effects of estrogens). Finally, new sources of evidence for the hygiene hypothesis are suggested in the form of cross-cultural and other natural experiments. (shrink)

I have argued that political values are beliefs informed, more or less well, by the evidence of experience and that, where relevant and well-supported by evidence, the inclusion of political values in scientific theorizing can increase the objectivity of research. The position I endorse has been called the “values-as-evidence” approach. In this essay I respond to three kinds of resistance to this approach, using examples of feminist political values. Solomon questions whether values are beliefs that can be tested, Alcoff argues (...) that even if our values are beliefs that can be tested, testing them might not be desirable because doing so assigns these important values a contingency that weakens their normative force, and Yap argues that the approach is too idealistic in its articulation of the role of evidence in our political deliberations. In response, I discuss the ways that values can be tested, I analyze the evidential strength of feminist values in science, and I argue that the evidence-based nature of these values is neither a weakness nor an idealization. Problems with political values affecting science properly concern the dogmatic ways that evaluative beliefs are sometimes held—a problem that arises with dogmatism toward descriptive beliefs as well. I conclude that scientists, as with the rest of us, ought to adopt a pragmatically-inclined appreciation of the fallible, inductive process by which we gather evidence in support of any of our beliefs, whether they are described as evaluative or descriptive. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract here is the first paragraph: -/- I mean the subtitle of my essay both as praise for the clarity with which Elizabeth Anderson writes about what is at stake in debates about values in science, and as a promise to outline an even more direct route to the heart of the matter. I begin with a quick review of the steps in Anderson’s argument that seem necessary and, indeed, laudable, followed by a brief discussion of (...) those steps in her argument that we might fruitfully skip. The hope is that we will arrive at roughly the same location but with a firmer foothold. (shrink)

The works of the later Wittgenstein resonate with aspects of the pragmatist tradition in American philosophy. Davidson’s work is similarly informed. We argue that because of their association with the pragmatist tradition, their work can be put to use by philosophers interested in social justice issues, including, for example, feminism, and critical race theory. Philosophers concerned with social justice continue to struggle between the extremes of an untenable foundationalism and a radical relativism. Given their holistic understanding of knowledge, meaning and (...) communication, the work of Wittgenstein and Davidson is particularly suited to dissolving the foundationalist/relativist dichotomy. We explore how this and other features of their work facilitates philosophy for social change. (shrink)

An anencephalic infant, who came to be known as Baby K, was born at Fairfax Hospial in Falls Church, Virginia, on October 13, 1992. From, the moment of birth and repeatedly thereafter, the baby's mother insisted that aggressive measures be pursued, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation and ventilator support, to keep the baby alive as long as possible. The physicians complied. However, following the baby's second admission for respiratory failure, the hospital sought declaratory relief from the court permitting it to forgo emergency (...) life support on the grounds that “a requirement to provide respiratory assistance would exceed the prevailing standard of medical care,” and that “because any treatment of their condition is futile, the prevailing standard of medical care for infants with anencephaly is to provide warmth, nutrition, and hydration.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the baby's mother, citing the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act , which contained no “standard of care” exception to the requirement to provide “treatment necessary to prevent the material deterioration of the individual's condition.” An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was rejected. The baby died some two and one-half years later of cardiac arrest during her sixth visit to the emergency department of Fairfax Hospital for respiratory failure. (shrink)

This chapter concentrates mainly on biomedical cognitive enhancements, but many of the remarks apply equally to enhancements that work on non‐cognitive capacities, and to non‐biomedical means of enhancement. Proponents of a positive right to enhancements could argue their case on grounds of fairness or equality, or on grounds of a public interest in the promotion of the capacities required for autonomous agency. The societal benefits of effective cognitive enhancement may turn out to be so large and unequivocal that it would (...) be economically efficient to subsidize enhancement for the poor, just as the state now subsidizes education. The example on iodine deficiency illustrates that cognitive enhancement policy need not center on preparing the ground for sophisticated, yet‐to‐be‐realized technologies. “Smart policy” should, rather, take as its starting point the recognition that effective cognition is not only subjectively valuable to individuals, but also delivers significant social, cultural, financial, and scientific benefits. (shrink)

Transformative technologies can radically alter human lives making us stronger, faster, more resistant to disease and so on. These include enhancement technologies as well as cloning and stem cell research. Such technologies are often approved of by many liberals who see them as offering us opportunities to lead better lives, but are often disapproved of by conservatives who worry about the many consequences of allowing these to be used. In this paper, we consider how a democratic government with mainly liberal (...) values that is governing a population divided between liberals and conservatives can introduce new transformative technologies and try to achieve consensus about the introduction of such technologies. To do so, we draw on recent work in moral psychology which enables us to better understand the intuitive and emotional responses that underpin conservative objections to such new technologies. We then show how a government may introduce incremental changes in our social practices that have the long-term effect of weakening conservative objections to transformative technologies and better enabling governments to achieve consensus about these. (shrink)

Peace literacy shows why public philosophy and activism for peace and justice are better together while providing a practical framework designed to make the collaboration stronger and more effective. In this chapter, the authors begin with an overview of peace literacy and then show how it operates as an effective lens through which to read the strengths of various approaches to public philosophy and activism for peace and justice, from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries and into the contemporary period. (...) Then, they turn to the development of peace literacy themes as we find them in the work of philosophers dedicated to publicly engaged activism for peace and justice, especially in American movements for the abolition of chattel slavery, anti‐war and nonviolence, and civil rights. (shrink)

The cellular processes of transport, division and, possibly, early development all involve microtubule‐based motors. Recent work shows that, unexpectedly, many of these cellular functions are carried out by different types of kinesin and kinesin‐related motor proteins. The kinesin proteins are a large and rapidly growing family of microtubule‐motor proteins that share a 340‐amino‐acid motor domain. Phylogenetic analysis of the conserved motor domains groups the kinesin proteins into a number of subfamilies, the members of which exhibit a common molecular organization and (...) related functions. The kinesin proteins that belong to different subfamilies differ in their rates and polarity of movement along microtubules, and probably in the particles/organelles that they transport. The kinesins arose early in eukaryotic evolution and gene duplication has allowed functional specialization to occur, resulting in a surprisingly large number of different classes of these proteins adapted for intracellular transport of vesicles and organelles, and for assembly and force generation in the meiotic and mitotic spindles. (shrink)