We estimate that 208,000 deep brain stimulation (DBS) devices have been implanted to address neurological and neuropsychiatric disorders worldwide. DBS Think Tank presenters pooled data and determined that DBS expanded in its scope and has been applied to multiple brain disorders in an effort to modulate neural circuitry. The DBS Think Tank was founded in 2012 providing a space where clinicians, engineers, researchers from industry and academia discuss current and emerging DBS technologies and logistical and ethical issues facing the field. (...) The emphasis is on cutting edge research and collaboration aimed to advance the DBS field. The Eighth Annual DBS Think Tank was held virtually on September 1 and 2, 2020 (Zoom Video Communications) due to restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The meeting focused on advances in: (1) optogenetics as a tool for comprehending neurobiology of diseases and on optogenetically-inspired DBS, (2) cutting edge of emerging DBS technologies, (3) ethical issues affecting DBS research and access to care, (4) neuromodulatory approaches for depression, (5) advancing novel hardware, software and imaging methodologies, (6) use of neurophysiological signals in adaptive neurostimulation, and (7) use of more advanced technologies to improve DBS clinical outcomes. There were 178 attendees who participated in a DBS Think Tank survey, which revealed the expansion of DBS into several indications such as obesity, post-traumatic stress disorder, addiction and Alzheimer’s disease. This proceedings summarizes the advances discussed at the Eighth Annual DBS Think Tank. (shrink)

This article reviews the transition between post-Fregean anti-naturalistic epistemology and contemporary naturalistic epistemologies. It traces the revival of naturalism to Quine’s critique of the "a priori", and Kuhn’s defense of historicism, and use the arguments of Quine and Kuhn to identify a position, "traditional naturalism", that combines naturalistic themes with the claim that epistemology is a normative enterprise. Pleas for more radical versions of naturalism are articulated, and briefly confronted.

In this book Philip Clayton defends the rationality of religious explanations by exploring the parallels between explanatory effects in the sciences and the explanations offered by religious believers, students of religion, and theologians. Clayton begins by surveying the types of religious explanation, offering a synopsis of the most significant competing positions. He then critically examines recent important developments in the philosophy of science regarding the nature of scientific explanations—including the work of Popper, Hempel, Kuhn, and Lakatos in the (...) natural sciences and Habermas, Weber, and Schütz in the social sciences. Clayton outlines the process of rational evaluation in these disciplines, defining the explanatory quest as the attempt to make sense of or bring coherence into subjective and intersubjective worlds. He briefly discusses explanations in philosophy and then turns to the explanatory role of individual religious experience, drawing on a coherence theory of meaning and on the conclusions from his discussion of science. Based on his defense of the doubting or “secular” believer, he concludes by advocating a model of theology in which questions about the truth of a religious tradition are intrinsic to its theology. “A valuable exposition of the thesis that the explanatory work of theology possesses formal similarities with that of the physical sciences, the social sciences, and philosophy. Clayton exhibits an impressive command of a broad area of scholarship, and his reflections are balanced and carefully argued.” –Michael J. Buckley, S.J., professor of religion at the Jesuit Theological Seminary and author of _At the Origins of Modern Atheism_ “I know of no philosopher writing today who has dealt in as informed and thoughtful a way with the broad subject of this book. Clayton guides the reader through important discussions with ease, illuminating the path all along the way.” –Josiah B. Gould, professor of philosophy at the State University of New York, Albany. (shrink)

It is argued that if Kuhn's current attempt to characterize conceptual incommensurability is correct, then the phenomenon of conceptual incommensurability is epistemologically innocuous. The first part of the paper explains why available techniques of reference specification provide rival scientists with sufficient access to one another's languages to compare their views. The second half of the paper attempts to elaborate an account of conceptual incommensurability that will develop (what the author takes to be) Kuhn's fundamental insight.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 119 Der Verf. bedient sieh in Verfolgung seines Ziels der fibliehen historischen Methode, die er mit Meistersehaft handhabt. Doch ist er keineswegs ein typischer Vertreter des modernen Historismus. Als Philosoph ist er gefesselt von den Problemen, die sich in der dreifachen Thematik seiner Untersuehung verbergen. Er begibt sich in die Gesehichte, aber doch nur, um yon Zeit zu Zeit aus ihr herauszutreten und i)berlegungen nachzugehen, die er (...) selbst, anlfifilieh einer methodologisehen Bemerkung in der Einleitung, als eine "Typologie yon LSsungen" (3) bezeiehnet. Aber das ist ein understatement, keine exakte Besehreibung. Die unbefangene und nfiehterne Kfihnheit dieser seiner trans-historisehen Reflexionen durehweht als ein frischer Luftzug die Welt der Gelehrsamkeit und Vielbelesenheit, die sich in diesen Seiten aufbaut. Freilieh, wo der Verf. selbst steht, gibt er uns nur gelegentlieh zu verstehen, so z.B. wenn er mit Entsehiedenheit die averroistisehe Depotenzierung des Einzelnen gegenfiber der Mensehheir zurfickweist. Aber, wiederum im Zusammenhang mit Averroes, legt er Gedanken zu der berfihmten oder auch berfiehtigten Lebre yon der doppelten Wahrheit vor, die uns in Zweifel darfiber lassen, ob und wie weit sich der Verf. hier verbirgt oder d~couvriert. M. gesellt sich nicht zu denen, die Averroes entlasten woUen, indem sie die fatale Lehre als eine spatere Zutat erkl~ren. Vielmehr mSchte er das Anathema dadurch fortnehmen, daB er die grobe und beleidigende Darstellung der Lehre dutch eine subtile Deutung ersetzt, die sie als konsequent, als vernfinftig und schlie61ich als wahr erscheinen l~Bt (107 ft.). Der Mensch, so argumentiert er, drfickt sich in einer Mehrheit yon "Sprachen" (universes of discourse) aus, die sich nieht ineinander fibersetzen lassen--der Sprache der Kunst, der Dichtung, der Philosophie, der Religion usw. So kann ein und derselbe Menseh ohne Selbstwidersprueh oder Unredliehkeit als Philosoph sagen: die individuelleSeele ist sterblich, als Gl~ubigerhingegen: sie ist unsterblich. Denn sowohl "Seele" wie "Individuum" wie aueh "Unsterblichkeit" meinen etwas anderes je nach dem universe of discourse, dem philosophischen oder religiSsen, in welchem sie gebraueht werden. Freilich, man kann den Versueh maehen, in langagestart in einer der vielen langues zu reden, und die Theologie kann nicht umhin, eben dies zu wagen. Ffir die Theologie aber~ so bekennt der Verf., ist kein Raum in seinem "scheme of things" (109). Das ist ein erschreckendes Wort, und nieht blofi ffir den, der die Theologie erhalten mSchte. Denn es besteht begrfindete Sorge, dab der Ruin der zwisehen den versehiedenen langues zerriebenen Theologie auch die Philosophiepulverisiert. Die verschiedenen"Spraehen" miissen doch wohl in der einen mensehlichen Person sinnvoll zusammengeordnet sein. Welche Wissenschaft aber wenn nicht die Philosophie darf sich diese Zusammenordnung zum Gegenstand ihres Forschens und Sagens machen? Wir schliefien also unseren Bericht fiber ein bedeutendes Buch mit einer Frage, nicht aber der Kritik oder gar des Besser-wissen-wollenswegen, sondern um auszudrficken, dab der Autor uns nicht nur als gelehrter Kenner unterrichtet, sondern als Philosoph zum Denken zwingt. Mi~nchen, Germany HELMUT KUHN Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum. Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit H. S. Long. 1 vol. in2. (Oxford: 1964.Pp. xx ~ xiv W 597. $11.20.) Der Hg erinnert uns, dass seit der Cobetsehen (1850), leider apparatlosen, keine kritische Ausgabe des Diogenes im ganzen ersehlenen ist. Immerhin gibt es abet die Ubersetzung yon M. Gigante (DiogeneLaerzio, Vite dei filosofi, Bari 1962), die so annotiert ist, dass sie vielfach anstatt einer Edition gebraucht werden kann. Man bedauert, dass der Hg sie offenbar noch nicht benutzen konnte (sein Buch ist wohl 1964erschienen, doch ist die Vorrede 1961datiert). Der Hg schliesst sich der Meinung an, dass nut 3 der existierenden Diogenes-Hss den Wert unabh~ngiger Zeugen besitzen. Vorsichtiger beurteilt den Sachverhalt z.B.H. Erbse in: Geschichte der Text~berlieferung, I. Band (1961), S. 306f., doch wollen wir die These des Hg akzeptieren. Wie allgemein zugestanden, gehen diese drei auf eine gemeinsame Vorlage zur~iek. Unter diesen Ums~nden ist es die Pflicht des Hg, uns verl~sslich und eindeutig fiber den Text dieser drei (BFP aus dem 12.u. 13.Jh.) zu informieren, eine Entscheidung zu treffen, wo diese 120 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY nicht tibereinstimmen, darfiber hinaus Textverderbnisse anzuzeigen und womSglich zu emendieren, entweder dureh eigene Vermutungen (in Buch VI und IX, e. 19% des Ganzen, habe ich nur zwei gefunden, beide einleuehtend... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:116 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Forms not only as objects of contemplation but as patterns of conduct. Presumably the "physicist " is not interested, as physicist, in completing the dialectical journey. So from a moral point of view he rests in opinion, even though his thought may be conversant with Forms. Gully does not like the idea that the philosopher has a privileged method; Plato "gives no proper reason why (...) one particular method or account is privileged" (p. 146).Methods of "collection and division," as developments within the dialectical method, are discussed in the later dialogues, but they never take us to the end of the dialectical journey. Perhaps we should say that the modesty of Socrates in Books VI and VII of the Republic is prophetic. If one is looking for a completed theory of knowledge, one does not find it. Gulley is in agreement with this point, but he feels that if one wants to look for the area in which Plato could have settled on an adequate theory one will find it in the relationship of pure to applied mathematics. He says that Plato develops in his latest thought "a metaphysical theory restricted to the explanation of mathematical knowledge which provides a more satisfactory explanation of the distinction between a priori and empirical knowledge than does the theory of Forms" (p. 187). Yet with a suggestion of surprise he concludes, on Aristotle's testimony, that Plato 2id not "abandon the more general explanation.., which the theory of Forms provided." I 1o not think Gulley wishes to suggest that Plato should have seen the light as Gulley sees it, ~or Gulley conveys the impression of having confronted a puzzling fact. Some readers may be reassured in their efforts to lop off Level IV and commit it to the flames, but the author has presented his case with impartiality. ROBERT REIN'L Arizona State University Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness. Problems of the Soul in the Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic Tradition. By Philip Merlan. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. 154.) Innerhalb der Metaphysik liilit sich ein Kreis yon zentralen Fragen abgrenzen und durch den Titel "Noetik" bezeichnen. Wie ist der Mensch zur Erfassung des Seins oder des Absoluten (oder wie sonst der Gegenstand der Metaphysik bezeiehnet werden mag) ausgeriistet? Wie verhiilt sich dies ausgezeichaete VermSgen, mages po~ oder poS~,ro~7~K&oder intellectus oder Vernunft hei[3en, einmal zu seinem Gegenstand, sodann zu den tibrigen VermSgen der menschlichen Seele? Und sehliel]lieh: welehe Bedeutung hat die Be~tigung dieses VermSgens ffir die menschliche Praxis? Nach der Gliederung der Philosophie, wie sie im nach-kantischen Zeitalter iiblich geworden ist, liil~t sich dieser Fragezusammenhang schwer lokalisieren. In die moderne Topologie gepresst, erscheint er als eine Verquickung yon erkenntnistheoretischer, ontologischer, psychologischer und religiiiser Problematik. Aber durehgehend ist der "noetische Bezug", will sagen die Ausriehtung auf die yon den Griechen als ~o~ (inteIlectus, Geist, Vernunft ) bezeichnete Kraft. Der Zugang zu der Fragestellung ergibt sich yon Plato her. Die Seele "bei sich selbst," abr,} ~aO' a~r~, d.i. in AblSsung vom Leib und der dutch ihn vermittelten Sinneswahrnehmung, schaut das An-sich-seiende, die eI~, und diese "reine" Erkenntnis wird verstanden als Wiedererinnerung yon vorgeburtlieh Erschautem. Schon bei der Geburt des Menschen findet sich also die Seele im Besitz yon ihr selbst nicht zug~nglichen Erkenntnissen. Bei Aristoteles lebt dieser platonische Gedanke in verwandelter Gestalt fort. Das VermSgen unmittelbarer, nieht-sinnlicher Erkenntnis, der vo~, verhiilt sich nach De anima III zu den,,,m~a (intelligibilia) wie die bei sich seiende Seele zu den "Ideen". Dies Erkennen aber unterscheidet sich nach Aristoteles yon aller diskursiven Erkenntnis dadurch, daft der Intellekt die Intigibilia ist, und dieses Eins-werden, modern gesprochen die Aufhebung der Subjekt-ObjektRelation, gibt der Kennzeichnung des Intellekts als "sch6pferisch" (~o~K6~, intellectus agens) ihren Sinn. Aueh darin folgt Aristoteles seinem Lehrer Plato, daI3 er den Gedanken des "Vorbesitzes ", will sagen der Unentstandenheit der intellektualen Erkenntnis beibehiilt. Aber er gibt ibm eine neue Wendung dadurch, daft er die Ananmesis ersetzt durch den Begriff des ~o~ als einer yon keiner Potentialit~it behafteten reinen, immer und yon je t~itigen b~p.ycta, eines "von aul3en" (~bpad~) in den Mensehen eingeftihrten gSttlichen Prinzips. BOOK REVIEWS 117... (shrink)

What could be the motives for producing a Popperian half‐life such as the present volume? This work, which takes Karl Popper right up to his debut on the world stage with the assumption of his position at the London School of Economics, displays no inclination to follow up with the complementary second half of Popper's life sometime in the future. Indeed, the author admits that the omitted subsequent “public Popper” was frequently an embarrassment. Here is truncation with a purpose: this (...) book is written to recommend the work of the early Popper to the “academic left” and to “historiciz[e] the postmodern predicament [as] an antidote to current false consciousness” . Since this is a work in social/political theory masquerading as biography, I shall respond in kind.There have recently been a spate of attempts to revisit the major figures of the philosophy of science in the twentieth century, primarily for the purpose of explaining to ourselves what it was that provoked such an efflorescence of ingenuity, only to result in the subsequent letdown we now confront or enjoy: Cartwright et al. on Neurath, Fuller on Kuhn, and Kadvany on Lakatos. Malachi Hacohen admits that this constitutes his motive as well: he is impressed with the early Popper's political leftism and anti‐foundationalism, regarding the later Cold Warrior as a sad retrogression. It seems to me, however, that he has missed the major lesson of all these retrospectives. Crudely, what emerges from these exercises, as a group, is the thesis that the looming significance in general intellectual discourse of philosophers of science in the mid‐twentieth century was due to the fact that they were doing social theory all along under the guise of describing Science. Furthermore, their question of the true nature of legitimate Science was seen as a crucial preliminary to understanding which politico‐economic system would come to dominate in the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War.From this perspective, I strongly doubt that Popper's social significance ever derived from his durable “solution” of any pressing philosophical problems: Did he really proffer a usable “demarcation criterion” for science, or rectify the problem of induction, or adequately describe probabilities as propensities, or banish “subjectivism” from physics, or even really demonstrate that Marxism was untestable? No, during the Cold War it turned out that the very best apologists for Western society were leftists and anti‐foundationalists; and one can observe this in the history of postwar social sciences like economics and psychology, as well as the philosophy of science. Kuhn et al. then took the next logical step in the sequence: something like “critical rationalism” was widely deemed a thoroughly implausible account of social organization in an anti‐foundationalist context . Social order had to be reconceptualized and reimposed, be it through “normal science,” “progressive research programs,” or whatever.Hence, banishing the half‐life of the Cold Warrior from the biographical account is to parade a pointless Popper in a plotless Punch‐and‐Judy show. Hacohen rightly cautions the reader about the unreliability of Popper's autobiography Unended Quest, but he should have taken more to heart Popper's assertions therein that although he knew almost no social theory, that didn't prevent him from seeking to dictate good “scientific method” to the social sciences ; and furthermore, that his vaunted method of “situational analysis” was little more than a repackaging of neoclassical economics as a general methodology for the social sciences . Thus when Hacohen proposes “situational logic” as a template for his historiography, is he sufficiently aware that he is merely participating in the general movement to extend neoclassical economics as a Theory of Everything for our contemporary globalized situation? If the purpose really was to demonstrate that Popper was situatedly rational, there would be no pressing need to write a biography; one could just as well fit his data to a generic maximization model. History should make us rather more self‐conscious about our scholarly and political options, not less. (shrink)

We discuss the early career of John H. Van Vleck, one of the earliest American quantum theorists who shared the 1977 Nobel prize with his student Philip W. Anderson and Sir Nevill Mott. In particular, we follow Van Vleck's trajectory from his 1926 Bulletin for the National Research Council on the old quantum theory to his 1932 book, The Theory of Electric and Magnetic Susceptibilities. We highlight the continuity of formalism and technique in the transition from dealing with spectra (...) in the old quantum theory to dealing with susceptibilities in the new quantum mechanics. Our main focus is on the checkered history of a numerical factor in the so-called Langevin-Debye formula for the electric susceptibility of gases. Classical theory predicts, under very general conditions, that this factor is equal to 1/3. The old quantum theory predicted values up to 14 times higher. Van Vleck showed that quantum mechanics does away with this "wonderful nonsense" and restores the classical value 1/3 under equally general conditions. The Langevin-Debye formula thus provides an instructive example of a Kuhn loss in one paradigm shift that was regained in the next. In accordance with the expectation of Thomas S. Kuhn that textbooks tend to sweep Kuhn losses under the rug, Van Vleck did not mention this particular Kuhn loss anywhere in his 1926 NRC Bulletin. Contrary to Kuhn's expectations, however, he put the regained Kuhn loss in susceptibility theory to good pedagogical use in his 1932 book. Kuhn claimed that textbooks must suppress, truncate, and/or distort the prehistory of their subject matter if they are to inculcate the exemplars of the new paradigm in their readers. This claim is not borne out in this case. We argue that it is ultimately because of the continuity of formalism and technique that we draw attention to that Van Vleck could achieve his pedagogical objectives in his 1932 book even though he devoted about a third of it to the treatment of susceptibilities in classical theory and the old quantum theory in a way that matches the historical record reasonably well. (shrink)

Abstract Thomas Kuhn is the most famous historian and philosopher of science of the last century. He is also among the most controversial. Since Kuhn's death, his corpus has been interpreted, systematized, and defended. Here I add to this endeavor in a novel way by arguing that Kuhn can be interpreted as a global response-dependence theorist. He can be understood as connecting all concepts and terms in an a priori manner to responses of suitably situated subjects to (...) objects in the world. Further, I claim, this interpretation is useful for three reasons. First, it allows us to systematize and defend Kuhn's views. We can therefore better appreciate him as a thinker in his own right. Second, it deepens our understanding of both the uniqueness of Kuhn's views and the continuity of those views with those of others. We can therefore better appreciate his place in history. And third, as I explain in the paper, my interpretation affords us the only example of an ethnocentric global response-dependence theory. We can therefore better appreciate the versatility of response-dependence itself. (shrink)

Both Richard Dawkins’s book The God Delusion and Philip Kennedy’s book A Modern Introduction to Theology: New Questions for Old Beliefs were published in 2006. This article aims to compare the two books and to argue that Kennedy does not oppose Dawkins’s views but, in fact, debates along similar lines. Kennedy is adamant that the Augustinian paradigm of Christianity no longer makes sense, because it is based on an outdated cosmology and anthropology. He firmly maintains that Christianity requires a (...) new paradigm, which is informed by our current knowledge and worldview. Thomas Kuhn’s ideas of paradigm and paradigm changes in the history of natural sciences are utilised in comparing the books, seeing that Dawkins accepts and works within the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary biology, and Kennedy argues that Christians and Christian theologians adhere to the Augustinian paradigm of Fall-Redemption-Judgement. It is argued that Dawkins should have referred to the paradigm change in the study of the Bible, which occurred towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, and the plea of theologians, like Kennedy, for a paradigm change in theology. The article concludes that only a paradigm change in Christianity, which is in line with the modern worldview, will enable Christians to keep the tradition alive. (shrink)

Philosophy of science is a rapidly evolving and increasingly inclusive academic field. It is one of the most dynamic branches of philosophy. However, for the most part, philosophy of science has been taught historically by recounting and tracing through discussions and debates from the early to late twentieth century. Great texts of positivism, instrumentalism, demarcation, falsification, paradigm shifts, realism, observation and so on are handed out to students and critically assessed. There is something rather puzzling about this way of teaching (...) philosophy of science, since contemporary philosophy of science has moved on significantly and is arguably distinct from the historical subject, just as current science has many features different from the science of Kuhn’s and Popper’s day. Such philosophical work, however, often only seems to make a late appearance in such courses. It often seems that we teach philosophy of science solely as an exercise in point and refutation, leaving stu .. (shrink)

Philip Pettit has argued that all semantically basic terms are learned in response to ostended examples and all non-basic terms are defined via them. Michael Smith and Daniel Stoljar maintain that this “global response-dependence” entails noumenalism, the thesis that reality possesses an unknowable, intrinsic nature. Surprisingly Pettit acknowledges this, contending instead that his noumenalism, like Kant’s, can be construed ontologically or epistemically. Moreover, Pettit insists, construing his noumenalism epistemically renders it unproblematic. The article shows that construing noumenalism epistemically prevents (...) Pettit from knowing whether members of different communities respond to different properties in the world or the same properties differently. Pettit then faces a trilemma. He can construe noumenalism ontologically and confront Smith and Stoljar’s charge. He can construe noumenalism epistemically and confront the author’s charge. Or he can reject global response-dependence. After explaining why Pettit should choose the middle horn, the article closes with lessons about global response-dependence generally. (shrink)

In the past few years, social epistemologists have developed several formal models of the social organisation of science. While their robustness and representational adequacy has been analysed at length, the function of these models has begun to be discussed in more general terms only recently. In this article, I will interpret many of the current formal models of the scientific community as representing the latest development of what I will call the ‘Kuhnian project’. These models share with Kuhn a (...) number of questions about the relation between individuals and communities. At the same time, they also inherit some of Kuhn’s problematic characterisations of the scientific community. In particular, current models of the social organisation of science represent the scientific community as essentially value-free. This may put into question both their representational adequacy and their normative ambitions. In the end, it will be shown that the discussion on the formal models of the scientific community may contribute in fruitful ways to the ongoing debates on value judgements in science. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher's book begins with a familiar historical overview. In the 1940s and 50s a confident, optimistic vision of science was widely shared by philosophers and historians of science. The goal of science was to discover the truth about nature, and over the centuries science had advanced steadily towards that goal; science discerned the real kinds of things of which the world was composed and the causal relations between them; the methods of science were rational and its deliverances objective; (...) and so on. Only where science failed in some of these respects was there any need to provide external, that is social, political, or individual, explanations of scientific belief. In the late 50s, and especially subsequent to Kuhn's classic, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, all this started to change. Historians increasingly insisted that the development of science must be treated just like any other cultural process, which meant embedding the narrative of the growth of scientific knowledge fully in the social and political context in which it occurred. This suggested that the view of science as deriving from a uniquely rational process could no longer be sustained. And, notoriously, Kuhn argued that science could not be seen as cumulative across the most dramatic changes in scientific theory. Though philosophers have never given up entirely on the old optimistic picture ("Legend" as Kitcher refers to it), its influence has steadily waned. For various reasons philosophers have become increasingly concerned over whether one could believe scientific claims to be literally true. And influenced by Duhem's thesis, revived by Quine, that scientific theory must always be underdetermined by empirical evidence, they became more sympathetic to the possibility that scientific belief must be explained, at least in substantial part, by much more than the rational objective processes envisioned by Legend. These philosophical doubts existed in uneasy tension with more extreme tendencies toward thoroughgoing relativism or skepticism, and with the movement in the sociology of science to see the whole concern with truth and falsity as an irrelevant diversion. (shrink)

Contents Preface General Introduction 1 | Science and Pseudoscience Introduction Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? Imre Lakatos, Science and Pseudoscience Paul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience Michael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not Science Larry Laudan, Commentary: Science at the Bar---Causes for Concern Commentary 2 | Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in Science Introduction Thomas S. Kuhn, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions Thomas S. Kuhn, Objectivity, (...) Value Judgment, and Theory Choice Ernan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science Larry Laudan, Kuhn’s Critique of Methodology Helen E. Longino, Values and Objectivity Kathleen Okruhlik, Gender and the Biological Sciences Commentary 3 | The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Underdetermination Introduction Pierre Duhem, Physical Theory and Experiment W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism Donald Gillies, The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis Larry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination *Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, The Duhem Problem Commentary 4 | Induction, Prediction, and Evidence Introduction Peter Lipton, Induction Karl Popper, The Problem of Induction Wesley C. Salmon, Rational Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Criteria of Confirmation and Acceptability Peter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight? *Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of Induction Commentary 5 | Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian Approaches Introduction Wesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivity in Science *Deborah G. Mayo, A Critique of Salmon’s Bayesian Way *Alan Chalmers, The Bayesian Approach Paul Horwich, Therapeutic Bayesianism Commentary 6 | Models of Explanation Introduction Rudolf Carnap, The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction Carl G. Hempel, Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation Carl G. Hempel, The Thesis of Structural Identity Carl G. Hempel, Inductive-Statistical Explanation Peter Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation *Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification *James Woodward, The Manipulability Conception of Causal Explanation Commentary 7 | Laws of Nature Introduction A. J. Ayer, What Is a Law of Nature? Fred I. Dretske, Laws of Nature D. H. Mellor, Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws Nancy Cartwright, Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts? Commentary 8 | Intertheoretic Reduction Introduction Ernest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations Paul K. Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist *Jerry A. Fodor, Special Sciences Philip Kitcher, 1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences Commentary 9 | Empiricism and Scientific Realism Introduction Grover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities Bas C. van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism Alan Musgrave, Realism versus Constructive Empiricism Larry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism *Juha T. Saatsi, On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies Ian Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific Realism David B. Resnik, Hacking’s Experimental Realism *Martin Carrier, What Is Right with the Miracle Argument Arthur Fine, The Natural Ontological Attitude Alan Musgrave, NOA’s Ark---Fine for Realism Commentary Glossary Bibliography Name Index Subject Index. (shrink)

A flood of new multidisciplinary work on the causes of depersonalization disorder provides a new way to think about the feeling that experiences “belong” to the self. In this paper I argue that this feeling, baptized “mineness” or “subjective presence” : 565–573, 2013) emerges from a multilevel interaction between emotional, affective and cognitive processing. The “self” to which experience is attributed is a predictive model made by the mind to explain the modulation of affect as the organism progresses through the (...) world. When the world no longer produces predicted affect the organism needs to explain this unpredicted absence of feeling. It is important to this account that cognition and perception are otherwise intact. Consequently the mind’s representation of the world and its emotionally salient properties are unchanged, leading the mind to predict a characteristic affective response. When that prediction is not fulfilled the organisms feels as if she is no longer present in experience. This is reported at the as feeling of depersonalization. (shrink)

Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we argue that the ‘dual process’ model of cognition that frames the discussion within and without philosophy does not do justice to an important constraint on any theory of deliberation and judgement. Namely, decision-making is the exercise of a capacity for (...) agency. Agency, in turn, requires a capacity to conceive of oneself as temporally extended: to inhabit, in both memory and imagination, an autobiographical past and future. To plan, to commit to plans, and to act in accordance with previous plans requires a diachronic self, able to transcend the present moment. While this fact about agency is central to much of moral philosophy (e.g. in discussions of autonomy and moral responsibility) it is opaque to the dual process framework and those meta-ethical accounts which situate themselves within this model of cognition. We show how this is the case and argue for an empirically adequate account of moral judgement which gives sufficient role to memory and imagination as cognitive prerequisites of agency. We reconsider the empirical evidence, provide an alternative, agentive, interpretation of key findings, and evaluate the consequences for metaethics. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher is one of the leading figures in the philosophy of science today. Here he collects, for the first time, many of his published articles on the philosophy of biology, spanning from the mid-1980's to the present. The book's title refers to Gregor Mendel, an Augustinian monk who was one of the first scientists to develop a theory of heredity. Mendel's work has been deeply influential to our understanding of our selves and our world, just as the study (...) of genetics today will have a profound and long-term impact on future scientific research. Kitcher's articles cover a broad range of topics with similar philosophical and social significance: sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, species, race, altruism, genetic determinism, and the rebirth of creationism in Intelligent Design. Kitcher's work on the intersection of biology and the philosophy of science is both unprecedented and wide-ranging, and will appeal not only to philosophers of science, but to scholars and students across disciplines. (shrink)

W.V.O.Quine’s doctrine of referential inscrutability (RI) is the thesis that, first, linguistic reference must always be determined relative to an interpretation of the discourse and, second, that the empirical evidence always underdetermines our choice of interpretation--at least in principle. Although this thesis is a central result of Quine’s theory of language, it was long unclear just how much force RI actually carried. At best, Quine’s discussions provided localized examples of RI (e.g., ‘gavagai’), supplemented merely by arguments for the (in principle) (...) constructability of more general referentially divergent manuals. In defense of Quine, Gerald Massey provides a method for generating large-scale referentially divergent manuals for a complex language. I argue that, while Massey’s rival manuals do meet Quine’s translational criteria, they are demonstrably inferior to their commonsensical “homophonic” competitor. This result provides a clear indication of seminal deficiencies in Quine’s behaviorial approach to the theory of language. Next I argue that Quine’s acceptance of standard assumptions about the nature of perception strongly influences the shape of his semantical theory. Finally, I suggest how an alternative to the standard account of perception might provide grounds for a more adequate understanding of language. (shrink)

When asked to explain their solutions to a problem, both adults and children gesture as they talk. These gestures at times convey information that is not conveyed in speech and thus reveal thoughts that are distinct from those revealed in speech. In this study, we use the classic Tower of Hanoi puzzle to validate the claim that gesture and speech taken together can reflect the activation of two cognitive strategies within a single response. The Tower of Hanoi is a well‐studied (...) puzzle, known to be most efficiently solved by activating subroutines at theoretically defined choice points. When asked to explain how they solved the Tower of Hanoi puzzle, both adults and children produced significantly more gesture‐speech mismatches—explanations in which speech conveyed one path and gesture another—at these theoretically defined choice points than they produced at non‐choice points. Even when the participants did not solve the problem efficiently, gesture could be used to indicate where the participants were deciding between alternative paths. Gesture can, thus, serve as a useful adjunct to speech when attempting to discover cognitive processes in problem‐solving. (shrink)

The case of pain asymbolia is a case study that provides evidence of the mechanisms underlying the relationship between bodily experience, affective experience, and self-awareness. On one account pain asymbolia is the result of an affective deficit. Sensory signals of bodily damage are not associated with characteristic negative affect. Cochrane endorses this account as part of his version of a “conceptual act” theory of affective experience. In contrast, I propose an active inference account of affect in general and pain asymbolia (...) in particular. In the active inference framework the self is inferred as the endogenous cause of bodily and affective experience in the process of organismic regulation. This preserves Cochranes ambition to ground affect in bodily regulation but avoids the problem for affective deficit accounts of asymbolia that cannot do justice to the neural correlates. (shrink)

Jennifer Radden has drawn attention to two features of delusion, ambivalence and subjectivity, which are problematic for theories of delusion that treat delusions as empirical beliefs. She argues for an ‘attitude’ theory of delusion. I argue that once the cognitive architecture of delusion formation is properly described the debate between doxastic and attitude theorists loses its edge. That architecture suggests that delusions are produced by activity in the ‘default mode network’ unsupervised by networks required for decontextualized processing. The cognitive properties (...) of these networks explain the features of delusion which generate the debate between doxastic and attitude theorists. (shrink)

Philip Percival; X*—Absolute Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 189–214, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

A landmark study in the field of political science, The Changing Architecture of Politics charts the profound structural changes taking place in the late twentieth-century state. Looking at both theory and practice, Cerny argues that political structures--states in the broadest sense--are the key to understanding both the history and the future of modern politics. Included for discussion are such salient topics as the problem of locating institutional and structural theory within political and social science, how to describe and classify the (...) main elements of political structures, and a penetrating analysis of the structured action field that lies at the crossroads of political structuration. In addition, he explores several core areas in practice, including how states will operate in the next century and how states will interact with the manifold changes in social and economic processes--at both the domestic and international levels. Through his masterly portrayal of the architecture of contemporary politics, Cerny lays the foundations for an understanding of new political structures that are needed if the pursuit of human values is to continue into the next century. As such, this fascinating volume will appeal to all those interested in the paradigms of political and social science, whether from a purely theoretical or from a more empirical standpoint. "This is the best introduction available in English to contemporary academic discussions about the purpose and prospects of applying the comparative method to political science. Cerny's book is comprehensive in scope and accomplishes three, quite rare tasks: it brings together material on North America, Western Europe, and Japan; it combines theories of comparative politics and international relations; it pays equal attention to systems of party competition and of interest intermediation, although its primary focus is upon the state. Philip Cerny has produced a tour de force, an intelligent, erudite, and comprehensive text that cuts decisively through artificial barriers within the discipline." --Political Science Quarterly. (shrink)

The deposition of the political -- From paradox to partage : on citizenship and teletechnologies -- The disposition of being -- Being communist -- Seattle and the space of exposure.

In this paper I consider a theory developed within cognitive neuropsychiatry to explain two delusions of misidentification, the Capgras and the Cotard delusions. These delusions are classified together with others in which the subject misidentifies persons, places or objects, including parts of her own body. Strictly speaking, the Cotard may not, at the level of content, be a delusion of misidentification, but I have described it as such because the theory I discuss treats it as sharing a causal and a (...) conceptual structure with the Capgras delusion. That theory, associated particularly with the work of Andy Young, raises a Wittgensteinian echo in its claim that, at the subpersonal, information-processing, level, perceptual recognition of familiar faces and scenes is laden with affect. Where affect is absent or distorted as a result of neurological damage the subject “feels” strange in the presence of familiar scenes or people. Thus Young and Leafhead in their discussion of the Cotard delusion: “What the patients often give as evidence of their nonexistence or death is that they don’t have proper feeling.”. (shrink)

It is often argued that human emotions, and the cognitions that accompany them, involve refinements of, and extensions to, more basic functionality shared with other species. Such refinements may rely on common or on distinct processes and representations. Multi-level theories of cognition and affect make distinctions between qualitatively different types of representations often dealing with bodily, affective and cognitive attributes of self-related meanings. This paper will adopt a particular multi-level perspective on mental architecture and show how a mechanism of subsystem (...) differentiation could have allowed an evolutionarily “old” role for emotion in the control of action to have altered into one more closely coupled to meaning systems. We conclude by outlining some illustrative consequences of our analysis that might usefully be addressed in research in comparative psychology, cognitive archaeology, and in laboratory research on memory for emotional material. (shrink)